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2006 INSC 750
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned in the text. However, it mentions 'Section 5' without specifying the year or subsection.
  • Section, p. 286 in Jagdish Swarup's Constitution of India, 2nd Edn.
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned in this excerpt
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2006 INSC 750
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned in the text. However, it mentions 'Section 5' without specifying the year or subsection.
  • Section, p. 286 in Jagdish Swarup's Constitution of India, 2nd Edn.
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned in this excerpt
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Maharashtra State Electricity Board (now “Maharashtra State Power General Co. Ltd.” – mahagenco) issued a notice inviting tenders (NIT) on 3 March 2005 for coal liaisoning, quality and quantity supervision at its thermal power stations. Four entities, including the appellant B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. and Respondents 1, 4 and 5, submitted bids. The appellant’s bid was significantly lower (26.59 % of the estimated amount) and was accepted.

Respondent 1 filed a writ petition before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court alleging that the appellant did not satisfy three “essential” technical conditions—Clauses 1.5(ii), 1.5(v) and 1.5(vii)—of the NIT. A Division Bench allowed the petition and quashed the award in favour of the appellant. The appellant sought relief before the Supreme Court, which granted leave and delivered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether mahagenco could relax or modify the “essential” eligibility conditions in the NIT after opening the technical bids, particularly the shift from calendar-year to financial-year evaluation under Clause 1.5(ii).
  2. Whether the appellant in fact complied with Clause 1.5(ii) (minimum coal-handling experience), Clause 1.5(v) (minimum 100 employees with provident-fund compliance) and Clause 1.5(vii) (not being a “declared defaulter”).
  3. The scope of judicial review over contractual awards by State instrumentalities when some conditions are relaxed in the interest of the public exchequer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd.)

  • Handled more than 49 million MT of coal in the preceding five years—well above the 30 million MT requirement.
  • The practice of evaluating experience on a financial-year basis had been consistently accepted by mahagenco for all bidders.
  • Provided proof from the Provident Fund Commissioner that more than 100 employees were on its rolls during March 2004–February 2005, satisfying Clause 1.5(v).
  • Was never formally “declared” a defaulter by any electricity board; pending disputes with M.P. State Electricity Board did not amount to blacklisting.
  • Acceptance of its bid saved mahagenco approximately Rs 52 crore; High Court should not have interfered under Article 226.

Writ-Petitioner/Respondent 1 (Nair Coal Services Ltd.) and Respondents 4 & 5

  • All nine NIT conditions were pre-requisites; any relaxation was impermissible.
  • The appellant failed to: (a) show five million MT per calendar year in 2004–05, (b) furnish PF proof for 100 workers for FY 2003–04, and (c) overcome its status as a defaulter vis-à-vis M.P. State Electricity Board and Madhya Pradesh High Court findings.
  • Mahagenco lacked power to modify essential conditions after bid opening.
  • The appellant’s late PF challans (7-3-2005) showed manipulation.

Mahagenco

  • Constituted a Scrutiny Committee which found the appellant had “substantially complied” with essential conditions.
  • All bidders, including respondents, had supplied experience data by financial year; deviation applied equally.
  • Identified cartelisation among Respondents 1, 4 and 5; their rates were Rs 51–52 crore higher.
  • In public interest, awarding the contract to the lowest qualified bidder was justified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. (1993) 3 SCC 499 Defines “cartel” and declares cartelisation an unfair trade practice. Used to characterise Respondents 1, 4 & 5 as a cartel quoting inflated rates.
Chimajirao Kanhojirao Shirke v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2000) 6 SCC 622 Plea not raised in pleadings should not be entertained. High Court erred in entertaining new contention on employee strength.
Prativa Pal v. Janhabi Charan Chatterjee AIR 1963 Cal 470 Meaning of “declaration”. Explained that “declared defaulter” requires formal proclamation.
Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. (1975) 1 SCC 70 Blacklisting has civil consequences; prior hearing required. Reinforced that appellant could not be termed defaulter without due process.
Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar (1989) 1 SCC 229 Natural-justice requirement before blacklisting. Supported view that no declaration of default existed against appellant.
Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 Judicial restraint in contractual matters. Illustrated limits on High Court interference.
G.J. Fernandez v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 488 Permissible deviation only if it does not cause arbitrariness or prejudice. Court found no prejudice to respondents; deviation valid.
Poddar Steel Corpn. v. Ganesh Engg. Works (1991) 3 SCC 273 Distinction between essential and ancillary tender conditions. Adopted to hold that some conditions could be relaxed uniformly.
Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 138 Courts should interfere only when overwhelming public interest demands. Reasoned that public interest favoured acceptance of lowest bid.
Other citations: Guruvayoor Devaswom (2003) 7 SCC 546; State of U.P. v. Johri Mal (2004) 4 SCC 714; Noble Resources Ltd. (2006) 10 SCC 236; Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. (2003) 4 SCC 579; Delhi Development Authority v. UEE Electricals (2004) 11 SCC 213; State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181 General principles on judicial review and bona fide decision-making. Cited illustratively to reinforce limited court intervention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court undertook a three-fold analysis:

  1. Uniform Deviation: All bidders furnished experience figures by financial year; hence shifting the yardstick from calendar to financial year affected all parties equally and fell within mahagenco’s implicit power to relax non-essential terms.
  2. Substantial Compliance: Evidence from A.P. GENCO and internal scrutiny showed the appellant handled 49+ million MT of coal and maintained more than 100 employees with provident-fund deposits for March 2004–February 2005, satisfying Clauses 1.5(ii) & 1.5(v).
  3. Declared Defaulter: The Court clarified that a “declared” defaulter requires a formal proclamation after due hearing. Neither M.P. State Electricity Board nor the Madhya Pradesh High Court had formally declared the appellant a defaulter; any disputes were pending and unresolved.
  4. Cartelisation & Public Interest: Internal notes revealed Respondents 1, 4 and 5 quoted identical, substantially higher rates, indicating a cartel. Accepting the appellant’s low bid saved ~Rs 52 crore, advancing public interest.
  5. Judicial Restraint: Relying on Tata Cellular and allied precedents, the Court emphasised that tender evaluation lies primarily with the employer; absent mala fides or blatant illegality, courts should not substitute their judgment.
  6. Guiding Principles Summarised: The Court distilled seven principles governing relaxation of tender conditions, underscoring adherence to essentials, permissible uniform deviation, prohibition on cartels, and preference for public interest.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment is set aside. Mahagenco must reconsider the appellant’s bid afresh; if the appellant now fulfils essential conditions, mahagenco may award it a one-year contract to commence one month after agreement execution. Private respondents shall receive payment for work already performed, and each must pay Rs 50,000 costs to the appellant.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that State entities have limited but real discretion to relax non-essential tender terms provided the relaxation is uniform and promotes public interest. It underscores the necessity of formal declaration before branding a bidder a defaulter and cautions courts against undue interference in commercial decisions of public utilities.

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    B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

    2. A notice inviting tender was issued by the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, now known as “the Maharashtra State Power General Co. Ltd.” (for short “mahagenco”), inter alia, for coal liaisoning, quality and quantity supervision for its thermal power stations on 3-3-2005. Indisputably, coal is used as a primary fuel for generation of electrical energy in the power stations belonging to mahagenco wherefor coal is procured from various coal mines belonging to government companies including Western Coalfields Ltd., South Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Mahanadi Coal Ltd. and Singareni Collieries Ltd.

    3. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said notice inviting tender, the appellant herein as also Respondents 1, 4 and 5 submitted their tenders. Tender of the appellant herein was accepted by mahagenco. Estimated amount of contract as per MSPGCL was Rs 4842.25 per MT. The rates quoted by the respective parties are as under:

    “Sl. No. Particulars Estimated order amount/per year % of amount with respect to MSPGCL estimation 1. B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. Rs 1287.64 26.59% 2. Nair Coal Services Ltd. Rs 6459.77 133.42% 3. Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (CS) Ltd. Rs 6510.70 134.47% 4. Nareshkumar & Co. Ltd. Rs 6544.96 135.17%”

    4. On the premise that the appellant herein failed to fulfil the essential qualifications as contained in Conditions 1.5(ii), 1.5(v) and 1.5(vii) of the notice inviting tender, a writ petition was filed by the first respondent before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court.

    5. The said writ petition has been allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment quashing the order awarding contract in favour of the appellant.

    6. Indisputably, the tender documents were in two parts: (a) technical bid; and (b) financial bid. Ordinarily, nine conditions mentioned therein were required to be fulfilled by the bidders before their respective financial bids could be opened.

    7. As indicated hereinbefore, according to the first respondent, the appellant did not fulfil the essential conditions laid down in the technical bid and, thus, was ineligible for being considered for awarding the said contract.

    8. The relevant provisions of the notice inviting tender are as under:

    “1.5(ii) The bidder should have executed the work of total minimum quantity of 5 (five) million metric tons per year for preceding 5 years. Besides this, bidder should have executed the work of total quantity of 10 (ten) million MTs in any of the preceding 5 (five) years. Above execution of work should be on behalf of the State Electricity Board and/or NTPC and/or other State or Central undertakings and/or the private power generating companies as their liaison agent/coal agent, with regard to receipt and supply of the coal including supervision on dispatch, loading, movement of the coal up to destination by Railway only.
    (v) The bidder should have professionally competent staff, and offices at the main centres of the coal companies such as at Nagpur, Bilaspur, Sambalpur and Secunderabad/Hyderabad and at Delhi and Kolkata or wherever linkage committee has allotted the linkages of the coal of MSEB. Bidder should be in a position to employ sufficient manpower required for liaison work. They should have on their own roll minimum manpower strength of 100. They should produce a valid proof of payment of provident fund contribution of 100 personnel during the last financial year. The bidder should submit the copies of the relevant documents to authenticate his claim towards experience.
    (vii) The bidder should not be declared defaulter from any Electricity Board/Government/Semi-Government/Public Power Utility Companies during last 3 (three) years.”

    9. Indisputably, handling of quantum of coal by the appellant herein for five years preceding invitation to treat was as under:

    Sl. No. Name of work Deptt./Utility Yearwise details of quantity in MTs 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 1. Loading supervision and shortage minimisation including liaisoning with Railway and Coal Co. for dispatch of 6 Inc. Mt. of quality coal from M/s MCL to Vijaywada Thermal Power Station of a.p genco a.p seb/a.p genco 60,05,892.31 66,30,248.89 11,37,713.47 59,47,203 TALCHER 7,06,661 Ib vALLEY 2. Liaisoning with M/s SCCL and Railways for loading supervision, shortage minimisation and dispatch of good quality coal as per specification to power station of a.p genco a.p genco to KTPS (O&M), Paloncha To KTPS (Vth Stage), Paloncha 30,75,996.08 23,22,337.48 3. Liaisoning work in respect of quantity and quality i/c loading supervision and movement of coal to Satpura Thermal Power Station, Sarni. M.P.SEB 13,98,269.55 32,55,587.39 35,23,708.55 32,52,401.01 4. Liaisoning work in respect of quality and quantity aspects including loading, supervision and movement of coal by rail to (SGTPS), Birsingpur Pali. M.P.SEB 7,36,553.00 38,96,023.00 35,21,527.00 41,87,553.00 Grand Total 81,40,714.86 1,91,80,192.84 81,82,949.02 74,39,934.01 66,53,864

    10. It is not in dispute that whereas a contractor was required to handle 30 million metric tonnes of coal during last five years, the appellant had handled more than 49 million metric tonnes of coal. In relation to the contract, the appellant claimed that it had entered into a contract with Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Limited (a.p genco) and it was awarded a contract for one year with effect from 11-9-2003. It completed the said contract successfully. The contract came to an end on 10-9-2004.

    11. It is also not in dispute that whereas in terms of the notice inviting tender the proof in regard to handling of contract was to be shown in the calendar year, all the participants showed the same for financial year; and the authorities of mahagenco accepted the change. The requisite term in the contract is as under:

    “Please confirm that you have similar experience of liaisoning for loading, dispatches and monitoring the movement of coal by Railways, at least continuously for a period of 3 (three) years for thermal power stations. The bidder should have executed the work of total minimum quantity of 5 (five) million metric tonnes per year for preceding five calendar years (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) and should have executed the work of total quantity of 10 (ten) million MTs in any of the preceding 5 (five) years on behalf of the State Electricity Board and/or NTPC and/or other State or Central undertakings and/or the private power generating companies as their liaison agent with regard to receipt and supply of the coal including supervision on dispatch, loading, movement of the coal up to the destination by Railways only. Experience of monitoring and movement of coal of manufacturers of cement or steel will also be considered. However, the experience of movement of coal by road and ropeway shall not be considered for such purposes. Bidder should have experience of monitoring of coal supplies from any or more of the following coal companies for preceding three years SECL, MCL, SCCL, WCL.”

    12. Indisputably the said term had been modified after opening of the technical bid, from calendar year to financial year. It is also not in doubt or dispute that if requirements were treated to be furnishing details in each calendar year and not financial year, no tenderer was qualified for award of the contract. The appellant contended that there had been a consistent practice in the past that the contracts were awarded for one year or two years, as the case may be, and in view of the fact that the contracts were not awarded on financial year or calendar year basis, deviation was permissible.

    13. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that if the quantity supplied in the said period is taken into consideration, the appellant must be held to be qualified.

    14. In regard to the finding of the High Court that the appellant did not satisfy the criterion that it had engaged 100 workers, the question which arose was as to whether having regard to the fact that tender document was issued on 3-3-2005, the requirement to engage minimum 100 persons in the previous year would mean financial year 2003-2004 or 2004-2005.

    15. In this connection, reference has been made to a letter dated 10-3-2005 issued by the appellant herein to the Assistant Commissioner, Employees' Provident Fund, stating:

    “We will appreciate if you could arrange to inform us about your accounting and financial year i.e how do you take the accounting and financial year.
    This information is needed for computing our accounts.
    Please do the needful at the earliest.”

    16. In response thereto by a letter dated 16-3-2005 the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner informed the appellant that:

    “After verifying our records we hereby confirm that M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd., has paid provident fund contributions for more than 100 persons for the period from March 2004 to February 2005 and deposited provident fund amounts.
    The above letter is issued at the request of M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd.”

    17. In regard to the purported violation of Condition 1.5(vii), it was submitted that the appellant had never been declared to be a defaulter. Only because certain disputes were pending by and between the appellant and the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board and some recovery proceedings had been initiated by the latter, the same would not mean that it was a declared defaulter. According to the appellant, no hearing was given to it by the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board, prior to passing of an order declaring it to be a defaulter, which was sine qua non therefor. It was further contended that the Board of Directors of mahagenco took into consideration each of the documents filed by each of the tenderers scrupulously and opined that keeping in view the rates quoted by the appellant, acceptance thereof would be in the interest of the Board, as thereby it would save about Rs 52 crores and in that view of the matter it was improper on the part of the High Court to interfere therewith in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    18. Mr Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondents, on the other hand, would contend that each of the nine conditions laid down in the notice inviting tender were pre-requisites for the tenderers being considered therefor. They, being imperative in character, could under no circumstances be relaxed. If the Board keeping in view the magnitude of the contract intended to have an experienced contractor who had not only handled specified quantity of coal but also had sufficient personnel on its roll and/or must not necessarily be a defaulter vis-à-vis any other public sector undertaking, no exception thereto could be taken and the appellant, thus, necessarily was required to comply with each of the said conditions. In regard to modification of Condition 1.5(ii) from calendar year to financial year, it was urged that such deviation was permissible in law.

    19. Mr Tankha would submit that in regard to the violation of Condition 1.5(v) not only more than 100 persons should have been on the roll of the appellant during the period April to March in the financial year 2003-2004, but it was also required to file proof of payment of provident fund for the preceding year. The learned counsel contended that from the records produced by the appellant, it would appear that whereas at the first instance, it filed proof of payment of the employees' provident fund for a few persons, it later on furnished supplementary challans on 7-3-2005 so as to raise the number of employees to more than 100. The Board, according to learned counsel, overlooked this fact and purported to have relaxed the condition, which power it did not have. In regard to the finding of the High Court that the appellant was a declared defaulter, it was contended that the expression “declared” would merely mean to make it known that a huge amount was payable to the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board, and furthermore, the same was required to be considered having regard to the fact that when in relation to such a contract dated 17-4-2005 the case of the appellant was not considered, it filed a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that it was a defaulter. The letters patent appeal filed thereagainst having also been dismissed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the appellant must be held to have been declared a defaulter by the High Court itself.

    20. Mr A.S Bhasme, learned counsel appearing on behalf of mahagenco drew our attention to the fact that pursuant to the order of the High Court dated 3-5-2005 fresh tenders had been invited and by an order dated 27-3-2006 this Court directed:

    “Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the main petition is coming up for final hearing on 17-4-2006. Learned counsel appearing for Respondents 2 and 3 submits that for purposes of generating power, coal supplies have to be continued to the respondents failing which the entire generation of electricity shall come to a standstill. Keeping in view this fact, the respondents are permitted to go ahead with their tender process including award of contract. They are free to make whatever arrangement they want to make in this behalf to ensure continued supply of coal to them. It is, however, made clear that whatever arrangement is made by the respondents the same will be subject to the final decision of this special leave petition.”

    21. Respondents 1, 4 and 5 had been allotted contracts in furtherance thereof. According to the learned counsel, the Board shall abide by the decision of this Court.

    22. Offers are to be made in response to the notice inviting tender. Only when an offer is made and accepted, a contract comes into being.

    23. The terms contained in the notice inviting tender may have to be construed differently having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. We would, a little later, notice the underlying intention of the employer in prescribing the so-called essential conditions.

    24. So far as non-fulfilment of Condition 1.5(ii) of the tender document is concerned, the High Court opined that the appellant did not fulfil the condition of handling a quantity of 5 million metric tonnes in the financial year 2004-2005, stating:

    “They also demonstrate that the Authority floating tender must insist upon compliance with essential conditions of eligibility and is not entitled to deviate from insistence on strict compliance with such essential conditions of eligibility. However, in case of ancillary or subsidiary condition, it is open to the authority to deviate therefrom….”

    25. With a view to understand the implication of the conditions, we may notice certain broad facts. In its letter dated 18-8-2005, the appellant stated:

    “It may be relevant to mention here that the total quantity of coal handled by us during the preceding five years as shown at p. 85 in the tender submitted by us is 4,73,76,084 tonnes, thereby average figure of quantity handled per year is 9.47 million tonnes which is far above the desired figure of 5 million tonnes as per tender requirement.
    Further, the quantity of coal handled by us in the year 2002-2003 has been shown as 10,30,829.84 tonnes in the tender which is in fact 32,52,401.01 tonnes as confirmed vide S.E Services II, M.P SEB. Sarni's Letter No. 905/1800/2097 dated 29-3-2005. A copy of the letter has already been submitted as Annexure ‘O’ of our confidential Letter No. BSNJ/NGP/MSEB/04-05 dated 16-4-2005 addressed to the Dy. Chief Engineer (GEN. TIS & C MSPGC, Nagpur).
    Thus, the quantity handled by us during the preceding five years is in fact 4,95,97,663 tonnes i.e 49.60 million tonnes as per figures confirmed and certified by the respective power station authorities. Even after excluding the figure 3.164 million tonnes, which is part of the quantity handled by us at a.p genco under the aforesaid LOIs, at para 1, during the contract period of one year ending in September 2004, the average yearly quantity handled by us for the preceding five years is 9.29 million tonnes per year as against the required figure of five million tonnes per year.
    We hope that our explanation as stated above shall clarify the position on the points raised in your above referred letter.
    Further, we humbly wish to submit that, as being L-1 party, if the work, as a whole, is awarded to us, we are ready to service MSPGCL. We have no objection if the work is awarded to us for a period of one year only. We also do not have any objection if the work is distributed among all the bidders including us.”

    26. An inquiry admittedly was conducted on behalf of mahagenco as to whether the statements made by the appellant herein in relation thereto were correct. Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Limited in its letter dated 15-6-2005, stated:

    “With reference to the letter cited above it is to confirm that M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. has supervised the following coal quantity for the years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005:
    Sl. No. Period Name of colliery Quantity in MT 1. 11-9-2003 to March 2004 M/s MCL, Talcher 31,72,750.00 2. 1-10-2003 to 31-3-2004 M/s MCL, Ib valley Area 3,16,930.00 34,89,680.00 3. 1-4-2004 to 10-9-2004 M/s MCL, Talcher 27,74,455.00 4. 1-4-2004 to 30-9-2004 M/s MCL, Ib valley Area 3,89,732.00 31,64,187.00”

    It is, therefore, evident that total quantity of 62,64,135 metric tonnes of coal had been handled by the appellant for them.

    27. The intention of introduction of the said clause becomes self-evident from the aforementioned note. It may be true, as was observed by the High Court, that the respondents in the tender documents did not categorically state that the block of 365 days in respect of handling of coal by the tenderers shall be taken into consideration. It is also true that the Corporation must be held to be aware as to what the true intent and purport of the said term was.

    28. A special committee was constituted to scrutinise the tender document submitted by all the four bidders. A comparative statement was prepared wherein the discrepancies vis-à-vis the conditions of tender were recorded. Clarifications were sought from the bidders. The Scrutiny Committee made its observations on such clarifications. It recorded that the appellant substantially complied with all the essential conditions. It also noticed that the appellant had enclosed three copies of the PF challans for the year 2003-2004 showing that provident fund for more than 100 employees has been deposited. In regard to the contention that the appellant was a declared defaulter, it took into consideration the opinion of the Law Officer, which was as under:

    “In this regard, I would like to state that M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. filed application for deleting observations in para 8 of the order by filing MCC No. 644 of 2004. In the said application M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. contended before the High Court that they never admitted as defaulter and, therefore, the word ‘admittedly’ used in para 8 of the judgment is not appropriate. It was contended that the word ‘admittedly’ in the order was coming in their way in securing other contracts and also that it may affect other pending litigations. The Hon'ble Division Bench deleted the word ‘admittedly’ and replaced it by word ‘apparently’. The Hon'ble Bench further observed that in view of such observation there can be no basis for apprehension that the said order will come in the way of any other litigation. Thus, the High Court has clarified that the observation will not come in the way of M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd.
    From the circumstances on record, it seems that the possibility that there might be business rivalry between M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd. and M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd., cannot be ruled out. Admittedly there are litigations between MPEP and M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. may be for breach of contract. However, that does not mean that M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. is declared defaulter by the said Board. The High Court has already clarified that the observations about defaulter, will not come in way, in any other litigations.”

    29. From the note-sheet in regard to price bids, it furthermore appears, that the following observations were made therein:

    “9.1. As per instructions, vide letter dated 8-6-2005, all the bidders were informed of the decision to open price bids on date 13-6-2005 (please refer Annexure ‘V’ enclosed).
    The price bids of all the four bidders were opened on 13-6-2005 and the audited statements of the rates quoted by the 4 bidders is enclosed herewith as Annexure ‘W’.
    9.2. From the comparative statement, it is observed that rates quoted by M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. for all the seven Items P, Q, R, S, T, U, V (as detailed under para 3 of this note) are quite less than the rates quoted by other three bidders, namely, M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd., M/s Karam Chand Thapar & Bros. (CS) Ltd. and M/s Nareshkumar & Co.
    9.3. For Item ‘P’ contract (i.e for linkage materialisation, shortage minimisation and quality monitoring M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd., have quoted Rs 5.70 while other three bidders have quoted Rs 12.50; present rate in the existing contract for the similar type of work is Rs 6.50
    For Items Q, P, R, S, T, U, V M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd., have quoted their rates in the range of 12 paise to 50 paise whereas other three bidders have quoted the rates in the range of Rs 10 to Rs 75.”

    30. It is also of some significance to note that the Chief Engineer in his note dated 19-8-2005, by which date the writ petition had already been filed by the first respondent in the High Court, upon consideration of the recommendations made by a committee appointed for the said purpose and upon inviting all the four bidders for negotiation of rates and matching of rates with the lowest bidder by the other three parties, stated:

    “Since above three bidders are not ready to match the rates with lowest bidder, we do not have any other option but to award whole contracts to M/s B.S.N Joshi & Sons and accordingly we may intimate the bidder M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd. as per the court directives.
    It is therefore requested to accord the approval for above so as to enable coal office to communicate our decision to the petitioner as well as the Hon'ble High Court.
    The estimated order value of this tender is about Rs 13 crores. As per BR No. 277 dated 11-10-2004 (copy enclosed as Annexure C) the MD, mahagenco in consultation with Director (Operation) and Director (Finance) is empowered to place the order up to Rs 15 crores in works contract.”

    31. The said note received the approval of the Director (Operation). The Director (Finance) in his note dated 19-8-2005 opined:

    “All the four tenderers were called for negotiations on 17-8-2005. M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd., Nagpur, M/s Nareshkumar & Co. Ltd., Nagpur and M/s Karamchand Thapar & Bros. Ltd., Mumbai have submitted in writing that they are not in a position to match their rates with LI. All the parties have also raised the issue of LI not satisfying the qualifying requirement. In this connection, it is noted that as per the tender conditions the requirement regarding turnover was to be evaluated for 5 calendar years. However, while submitting the offers, all the firms including LI have submitted their physical turnover for financial years instead of calendar years. In order to evaluate all the firms on the same footing the deviation from calendar year to financial year was made. The intention of introducing such qualifying requirement is essentially to ascertain the physical capability of the bidder to carry out the work of the scale stipulated in the tender. It is, therefore, not very relevant whether for the purpose of evaluation the calendar year or financial year or any other period of 365 days is considered. Therefore, considering the documents submitted by M/s B.S.N Joshi & Co. in this regard and confirmation given by M/s a.p genco it was recommended that M/s B.S.N Joshi & Co. can be considered to satisfy the qualifying requirement and that their financial bid be opened along with the other tenderers.
    On the issue of LI being apparent/admitted defaulters, etc. LO has already given his opinion. As per the comparative statement of rates placed on p. 24 it is seen that M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd., Nagpur, M/s Karamchand Thapar & Bros. Ltd. and M/s Nareshkumar & Co. Ltd. have formed a cartel. The difference between the rates quoted by LI and other three firms is of the order of Rs 51 crores to 52 crores. Keeping in view the huge difference and the interest of the organisation, it would be appropriate to consider the offer of LI and award the contract to LI.”

    32. The Managing Director of mahagenco approving the note of the Director, Finance, stated:

    “On perusal of rates of M/s Nair Coal Services Ltd., Nagpur, M/s Nareshkumar & Co. Ltd., Nagpur and M/s Karamchand Thapar & Bros. Ltd., Mumbai, it is apparent that they have formed a cartel. The rates quoted by these firms are nearly Rs 51 crores to 52 crores more than quoted by LI. As a goodwill gesture the above parties were called for negotiations. However, they have refused to match the LI rates.
    In view of the above, it is in public interest and in the interest of mahagenco, a Govt. owned public utility that the work is allocated to the lowest qualified bidder, namely, M/s B.S.N Joshi & Co.”

    33. Deviation, if any, therefore, was made by the competent authority of mahagenco keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

    34. It is significant to note that a finding was arrived at that the private respondents herein formed a cartel. What is a cartel has been stated in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn. by P. Ramanatha Aiyar at p. 693 in the following terms:

    “ ‘Cartel’ includes an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or, trade in goods or provision of services.”

    35. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. (1993) 3 SCC 499, AIR 1994 SC 988 (AIR at p. 1008) this Court held :

    “The cartel therefore is an association of producers who by agreement among themselves attempt to control production, sale and prices of the product to obtain a monopoly in any particular industry or commodity. Analysing the object of formation of a cartel in other words, it amounts to an unfair trade practice which is not in the public interest.”

    36. A similar interpretation was made by the appropriate authority of mahagenco in relation to compliance with Condition 1.5(v) of the tender document.

    37. Before we embark upon the respective contentions made before us on the said issue, we may notice that although the point was urged during hearing before the High Court, the first respondent in its writ application did not raise any plea in that behalf. The High Court was not correct in allowing the first respondent to raise the said contention. (See Chimajirao Kanhojirao Shirke v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2000) 6 SCC 622, SCC at p. 625.)

    38. The short question before the High Court was as to whether the financial year should be taken to be April to March or March to February. According to the authorities of the Provident Fund, the financial year is taken to be from March to February in the sense that dues in respect of March are deposited in April and those of February are deposited in March. Yet again, the same logic would apply in regard to the intention of mahagenco which according to them was to ascertain that the contractor should have minimum 100 number of employees on its roll so that its works ultimately do not suffer.

    39. This brings us to the question as to what would be the meaning of a “declared defaulter”.

    40. The expression “declaration” has a definite connotation. It is a statement of material facts. It may constitute a formal announcement or a deliberate statement. A declaration must be announced solemnly or officially. It must be made with a view “to make known” or “to announce”. (See Prativa Pal v. Janhavi Charan Chatterjee AIR 1963 Cal 470.) When a person is placed in the category of a declared defaulter, it must precede (sic be preceded by) a decision. The expression “declared” is wider than the words “found” or “made”. Declared defaulter should be an actual defaulter and not an alleged defaulter.

    41. When it is proclaimed or published affecting the rights of the parties, in the sense in which it has been used, so far as the affected person is concerned, its effect would be akin to blacklisting. When a contractor is blacklisted by a department he is debarred from obtaining a contract, but in terms of the notice inviting tender when a tenderer is declared to be a defaulter, he may not get any contract at all. It may have to wind up its business. The same would, thus, have a disastrous effect on him. Whether a person defaults in making payment or not would depend upon the context in which the allegations are made as also the relevant statute operating in the field. When a demand is made, if the person concerned raises a bona fide dispute in regard to the claim, so long as the dispute is not resolved, he may not be declared to be defaulter.

    42. In Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B (1975) 1 SCC 70 this Court stated the law thus:

    “20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.”

    43. Yet again in Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar (1989) 1 SCC 229 it was opined:

    “4. Indisputably, no notice had been given to appellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order.”

    44. In this case, the appellant had made a counterclaim. It had raised a bona fide dispute. It may be true that when the tender document was not furnished to the appellant by the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board, on the premise that he is a defaulter, it filed a writ petition. A learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court while passing an order dated 5-8-2004 recorded a finding that it was a defaulter in respect of the said demand.

    45. We may, however, notice that the principal ground for not entertaining the writ petition filed by the appellant was judicial restraint on the part of the Court. It refused to intervene in the decision-making process relying on or on the basis of a decision of this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651, AIR 1996 SC 11.

    46. The matter was carried in appeal. The Division Bench of the High Court in its order stated:

    “The ratio of the judgments (supra) makes it clear that the judicial review in such matter should be in rare cases and on limited grounds as quoted above. The appellant admittedly being a defaulter it cannot be said that the Board has committed any illegality in outstanding the appellant from the tender process. No mala fides have been alleged.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    47. It is, however, not in dispute that a miscellaneous application was filed and the Division Bench by an order dated 3-5-2005 deleted the word “admittedly” and substituted the same by the term “apparently”. It was clearly observed: “in view of such observation, there can be no basis for apprehension that the said order will come in the way of any other litigation”.

    48. Mr Tankha was, therefore, not correct in submitting that the High Court declared the appellant to be a defaulter. Nor could it do so. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court while noticing that the term “defaulter” would mean a formal statement, proclamation or announcement, wrongly opined:

    “We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the bidder, who is a defaulter, merely because the State Electricity Board for some reasons, failed to declare such bidder a defaulter, however, in absence of such declaration, the bidder, in our view does not cease to be a defaulter….”

    49. The observations were made out of context. The Madhya Pradesh High Court did not declare the appellant to be a defaulter. So was the (sic the case with) Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board. They could not have declared the appellant to be a defaulter. It had no jurisdiction to do so. In the said writ petition filed by the appellant before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board took a categorical stand in its counter-affidavit that it had not declared the appellant to be a defaulter, stating:

    “So far as the performance of the petitioner is concerned, it was found satisfactory; he has supplied the coal to the destination and there was no default on his part. When he had delayed in making payment to the Railway Authorities on which 15% surcharge was imposed and virtually recovered from the Board but now Respondent 3 has undertaken to pay said amount. So far as the award of the Labour Court is concerned the Board has no knowledge about it because the Board was not party in the Labour Court.”

    It was further stated:

    “That till today Respondent 3 has not been blacklisted by the Board. There are various decisions of this Hon'ble High Court and the Supreme Court that unless a contractor is declared blacklisted, the tender document cannot be refused to him. Though there is Rs 97 lakhs recoverable from Respondent 3 but he has given undertaking that he will pay the amount to the Board.”

    50. The High Court, thus, failed to notice the materials placed on record by the parties. The matter was internally examined by the officers of mahagenco. The opinion of the Law Officer was sought for. The Law Officer of mahagenco clearly opined:

    “Considering their business rivalry it is advisable not to pay much attention to such pressure tactics in the interest of the Board. Merely because some litigations are pending between M.P SEB and B.S.N Joshi & Sons, it may not be proper to hold them declared defaulter….”

    51. The said opinion of the Law Officer was accepted by the Scrutiny Committee. The Scrutiny Committee as also the competent authority of mahagenco thought it fit to relax the conditions keeping in view the fact that the same would create a healthy competition.

    52. The rates quoted by the parties have been considered at great details. The difference of the amount in view of the rates quoted by the appellant vis-à-vis the other three firms was of the order of about Rs 52 crores. Thus, a decision was taken in the interest of the organisation. Such a decision taken in public interest should ordinarily be not interfered with.

    53. We, however, at the cost of repetition would place on record that the other three bidders had clearly stated that they would not be able to match the rates of the appellant. It is also relevant to note here that the categorical stand taken by mahagenco before the High Court in its counter-affidavit was that the contract had been awarded in favour of the appellant in its own interest. In regard to the order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it stuck to its stand that a clear finding was arrived at therein that the observations which were incidentally made in the judgment should not come in the way of the appellant in securing other contracts.

    54. In its counter-affidavit it was contended by mahagenco before the High Court:

    “It is denied that there was any question of reasonable expectation to oust Respondent 3 from the tender process on the ground that Respondent 3 did not satisfy the basic qualifying criteria, as alleged. The petitioner has referred to several communications annexed to the petition at Annexures N to X. The contents of all these communications are taken into consideration by the respondents while taking the ultimate decision in the matter.”

    55. A contention has also been raised that the rates quoted by the appellant were unrealistic. mahagenco denied or disputed the said stand, stating:

    “It is denied that the rates quoted by Respondent 3 are unrealistic according to estimates of Respondent 1, as alleged. The petitioner has not placed on record any material to substantiate the contention. As a matter of fact, it is submitted that presently, the petitioner is carrying out the work in question at the rate of Rs 6.50 as against the rate of Rs 12.5 which he has quoted in the tender document. As a matter of fact, the rates quoted by Respondent 3 are even lower than the rates at which the petitioner is presently working. Presently, the work is being carried out by the petitioner and Respondents 4 and 5 at the very same rate i.e Rs 6.50 Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner and Respondents 4 and 5 have formed a cartel. The rates quoted by them are really unrealistic and not competitive. Hence, keeping in view a huge difference and the interests of Respondent 1, the decision taken by Respondent 1 Company is legal, correct and proper.”

    56. It may be true that a contract need not be given to the lowest tenderer but it is equally true that the employer is the best judge therefor; the same ordinarily being within its domain, court's interference in such matter should be minimal. The High Court's jurisdiction in such matters being limited in a case of this nature, the Court should normally exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the employer is apparent on the face of the record.

    57. This Court in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K Rajan (2003) 7 SCC 546 [Ed. observed:

    “30. Dawn Oliver in Constitutional Reforms in the UK under the heading ‘The Courts and Theories of Democracy, Citizenship and Good Governance’ at p. 105 states:
    ‘However, this concept of democracy as rights-based with limited governmental power, and in particular of the role of the courts in a democracy, carries high risks for the judges—and for the public. Courts may interfere inadvisedly in public administration. The case of Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council (1983) 1 AC 768, (1982) 1 All ER 129, (1982) 2 WLR 62 (HL) is a classic example. The House of Lords quashed the GLC cheap fares policy as being based on a misreading of the statutory provisions, but were accused of themselves misunderstanding transport policy in so doing. The courts are not experts in policy and public administration—hence Jowell's point that the courts should not step beyond their institutional capacity (Jowell, 2000). Acceptance of this approach is reflected in the judgments of Laws, L.J in International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt. 2002 EWCA Civ 158, (2002) 3 WLR 344 and of Lord Nimmo Smith in Adams v. Lord Advocate Times 8-8-2002 in which a distinction was drawn between areas where the subject-matter lies within the expertise of the courts (for instance, criminal justice, including sentencing and detention of individuals) and those which were more appropriate for decision by democratically elected and accountable bodies. If the courts step outside the area of their institutional competence, the Government may react by getting Parliament to legislate to oust the jurisdiction of the courts altogether. Such a step would undermine the rule of law. The Government and public opinion may come to question the legitimacy of the judges exercising judicial review against Ministers and thus undermine the authority of the courts and the rule of law.”

    (See also State of U.P v. Johri Mal (2004) 4 SCC 714.)

    58. In Jagdish Swarup's Constitution of India, 2nd Edn., p. 286, it is stated:

    “It is equally true that even in contractual matters, a public authority does not have an unfettered decision to ignore the norms recognised by the courts, but at the same time if a decision has been taken by a public authority in a bona fide manner, although not strictly following the norms laid down by the courts, such decision is upheld on the principle that the courts, while judging the constitutional validity of executing decisions, must grant a certain measure of freedom of ‘play in the joints’ to the executive.”

    59. Recently, in Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd. (2005) 6 SCC 138, upon noticing a large number of decisions, this Court stated:

    “15. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere.”

    (See also Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa (2006) 10 SCC 236, (2006) 9 Scale 181.)

    60. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr Tankha on G.J Fernandez v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 488 wherein this Court observed:

    “15. Thirdly, the conditions and stipulations in a tender notice like this have two types of consequences. The first is that the party issuing the tender has the right to punctiliously and rigidly enforce them. Thus, if a party does not strictly comply with the requirements of para III, V or VI of the NIT, it is open to the KPC to decline to consider the party for the contract and if a party comes to court saying that the KPC should be stopped from doing so, the court will decline relief. The second consequence, indicated by this Court in earlier decisions, is not that the KPC cannot deviate from these guidelines at all in any situation but that any deviation, if made, should not result in arbitrariness or discrimination. It comes in for application where the non-conformity with, or relaxation from, the prescribed standards results in some substantial prejudice or injustice to any of the parties involved or to public interest in general. For example, in this very case, the KPC made some changes in the time-frame originally prescribed. These changes affected all intending applicants alike and were not objectionable. In the same way, changes or relaxations in other directions would be unobjectionable unless the benefit of those changes or relaxations were extended to some but denied to others. The fact that a document was belatedly entertained from one of the applicants will cause substantial prejudice to another party who wanted, likewise, an extension of time for filing a similar certificate or document but was declined the benefit. It may perhaps be said to cause prejudice also to a party which can show that it had refrained from applying for the tender documents only because it thought it would not be able to produce the document by the time stipulated but would have applied had it known that the rule was likely to be relaxed.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    No such case of prejudice was made out by the respondent before the High Court or before us.

    61. Law on the similar term has been laid down in Poddar Steel Corpn. v. Ganesh Engg. Works (1991) 3 SCC 273 in the following terms:

    “6. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank clause 6 of the tender notice was not obeyed literally, but the question is as to whether the said non-compliance deprived the Diesel Locomotive Works of the authority to accept the bid. As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two categories — those which lay down the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the condition. In the first case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance with the condition in appropriate cases.”

    62. In Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar (2003) 4 SCC 579 this Court explained as to what would amount to bad faith and non-application of mind in regard to exercise of power on the part of the employer. It further opined that the burden would be on the person who seeks to invalidate or nullify the act or order to prove charge of bad faith and abuse or mistake by the authority of its power. It opined that an attempt should be made to balance the conflicting interest.

    63. In Delhi Development Authority v. UEE Electricals Engg. (P) Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 213 the Court was considering a case where conduct of the Director of the company was found to be relevant. However, the Court opined that if the authority felt that in view of the background facts, it would be undesirable to accept the tender, the power of judicial review should not be exercised in absence of any mala fides or irrationality.

    64. In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181 the Court reiterated the principles of judicial review.

    65. We are not oblivious of the expansive role of the superior courts in judicial review.

    66. We are also not shutting our eyes towards the new principles of judicial review which are being developed; but the law as it stands now having regard to the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions may be summarised as under:

    (i) if there are essential conditions, the same must be adhered to;
    (ii) if there is no power of general relaxation, ordinarily the same shall not be exercised and the principle of strict compliance would be applied where it is possible for all the parties to comply with all such conditions fully;
    (iii) if, however, a deviation is made in relation to all the parties in regard to any of such conditions, ordinarily again a power of relaxation may be held to be existing;
    (iv) the parties who have taken the benefit of such relaxation should not ordinarily be allowed to take a different stand in relation to compliance with another part of tender contract, particularly when he was also not in a position to comply with all the conditions of tender fully, unless the court otherwise finds relaxation of a condition which being essential in nature could not be relaxed and thus the same was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction;
    (v) when a decision is taken by the appropriate authority upon due consideration of the tender document submitted by all the tenderers on their own merits and if it is ultimately found that successful bidders had in fact substantially complied with the purport and object for which essential conditions were laid down, the same may not ordinarily be interfered with;
    (vi) the contractors cannot form a cartel. If despite the same, their bids are considered and they are given an offer to match with the rates quoted by the lowest tenderer, public interest would be given priority;
    (vii) where a decision has been taken purely on public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint.

    67. Law operating in the field is no longer res integra. The application of law, however, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not in dispute before us that there are only a few concerns in India who can handle such a large quantity of coal. Transportation of coal from various collieries to the thermal power stations is essential. For the said purpose, apart from transportation job, the contractor is required to see that coal of appropriate grade is supplied. The appellant herein is in business for the last 52 years. It had been taking part in contracts involving similar jobs in various parts of India. It had all along been quoting a low rate. According to it, despite the same it has been generating profits.

    68. The employer concededly is not bound to accept a bid only because it is the lowest. It must take into consideration not only the viability but also the fact that the contractor would be able to discharge its contractual obligations. It must not forget the ground realities. mahagenco considered all aspects of the matter while accepting the appellant's offer. In its counter-affidavit, it categorically stated that the appellant would be able to perform the contractual undertaking even at such a low rate.

    69. While saying so, however, we would like to observe that having regard to the fact that huge public money is involved, a public sector undertaking in view of the principles of good corporate governance may accept such tenders which are economically beneficial to it. It may be true that essential terms of the contract were required to be fulfilled. If a party failed and/or neglected to comply with the requisite conditions which were essential for consideration of its case by the employer, it cannot supply the details at a later stage or quote a lower rate upon ascertaining the rate quoted by others. Whether an employer has power of relaxation must be found out not only from the terms of the notice inviting tender but also the general practice prevailing in India. For the said purpose, the court may consider the practice prevailing in the past. Keeping in view a particular object, if in effect and substance it is found that the offer made by one of the bidders substantially satisfies the requirements of the conditions of notice inviting tender, the employer may be said to have a general power of relaxation in that behalf. Once such a power is exercised, one of the questions which would arise for consideration by the superior courts would be as to whether exercise of such power was fair, reasonable and bona fide. If the answer thereto is not in the negative, save and except for sufficient and cogent reasons, the writ courts would be well advised to refrain themselves in exercise of their discretionary jurisdiction.

    70. The question which arises for consideration is as to what relief can be granted in the instant case. The private respondents who had formed a cartel have successfully obtained the contract after the judgment of the High Court. Award of such contract although was subject to the decision of this appeal, this Court cannot ignore the fact that if the appellant is permitted to take over forthwith, supply of coal to the thermal power station may be affected. We, therefore, intend to give another opportunity to mahagenco. It shall consider the offer of the appellant upon consideration of the matter afresh, as to whether it even now fulfils the essential tender conditions. If it satisfies the terms of the tender conditions, the contract may be awarded in its favour for a period of one year; but such contract shall take effect after one month from the date of the said agreement so as to enable the private respondents herein to wind up their business. This order is being passed in the interest of mahagenco as also the private respondents herein.

    71. The private respondents, however, shall be paid their dues in terms of the offer made by them and accepted by mahagenco.

    72. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations and directions. All the private respondents shall pay and bear the cost of the appellant which is quantified at Rs 50,000 each.

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    B.S.N Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. And Others
    (Oct 31, 2006)