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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 41, Rule 23 CPC, Act 10 of 1995
  • Section 100 CPC, amending Act 10 of 1995
  • Section 100 CPC, Haryana amending Act 10 of 1995
  • Amending Act 10 of 1995
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 41, Rule 23 CPC, Act 10 of 1995
  • Section 100 CPC, amending Act 10 of 1995
  • Section 100 CPC, Haryana amending Act 10 of 1995
  • Amending Act 10 of 1995
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 6-9-1988 Savitri Devi sold 76 kanals 9 marlas of agricultural land. Ram Kanwar, claiming to be a co-sharer, sued for possession by way of pre-emption. The trial court dismissed the suit on 15-1-1993, holding that he was not a co-sharer. The first appellate court reversed that finding on 22-2-1995 and decreed the suit in his favour.

Before the defendants filed their second appeal, the Haryana Amendment Act 10 of 1995 abolished a co-sharer’s right of pre-emption. Relying on that statute and the Supreme Court decision in Ramjilal v. Ghisa Ram, the High Court (16-5-1996) allowed RSA No. 2198 of 1995 and dismissed the suit on the preliminary ground that the statutory right no longer existed.

Ram Kanwar appealed to the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1997). A Constitution Bench held on 31-7-2001 that Act 10 of 1995 was prospective and did not affect the pre-existing decree. A clerical error in the operative part was later corrected through IA No. 3 of 2001.

The present order deals with fresh applications:

  • IA No. 5 of 2004 (in IA 3/2001, C.A. 417/1997) by the defendant-respondents seeking remand of RSA 2198 of 1995 to the High Court.
  • IAs Nos. 8 & 10 of 2005 (in C.A. 4948/2001) by other respondents seeking a similar remand of RSA 2467 of 1993.
  • IAs Nos. 9 & 11 of 2005 for stay of execution pending remand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after the Supreme Court’s 2001 judgment, the second appeals decided by the High Court on a single preliminary ground should be remanded for consideration of all issues raised in accordance with Section 100 CPC.
  2. Whether Order 41 Rule 23 CPC empowers the Supreme Court to direct such a remand when the High Court had not framed substantial questions of law.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Respondents’ Arguments (Applicants)

  • The High Court dismissed the suit solely on the applicability of Act 10 of 1995 without framing substantial questions of law; other substantial grounds (set out in their RSA memorandum) remain undecided.
  • Under Order 41 Rule 23 CPC the matter should be sent back so that the High Court can consider those questions.

Plaintiff-Appellant’s Arguments

  • The defendants never challenged the first appellate court’s findings of fact; therefore no substantial question of law arises.
  • Section 100 CPC bars the High Court from re-appreciating evidence, making the request for remand “wholly uncalled for.”

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramjilal v. Ghisa Ram, (1996) 7 SCC 507; JT (1996) 2 SC 649 After the Haryana Amendment Act 10 of 1995 a co-sharer no longer enjoys a superior right of pre-emption. Referenced in the High Court’s 1996 judgment to dismiss the suit on the preliminary issue; noted by the Supreme Court as part of procedural history.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s objection that IA No. 5 of 2004 was “wholly uncalled for” and gave two principal reasons:

  1. The High Court’s 16-5-1996 order set aside the first appellate decree solely on the preliminary ground concerning Act 10 of 1995; its merits analysis was therefore incomplete.
  2. The defendants’ RSA memorandum contained multiple grounds—challenging factual findings and the status of the land—which the High Court never addressed. Because those grounds may raise substantial questions of law, the proper course is to remit the matter for determination under Section 100(4) CPC after hearing the parties.

The Court expressly declined to rule on whether substantial questions of law actually arise and made no observations on the merits of those questions.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The cases are REMANDED to the High Court.

RSA No. 2198 of 1995 and RSA No. 2467 of 1993 are to be heard afresh; the High Court must first decide whether substantial questions of law arise and then dispose of the appeals in accordance with Section 100 CPC. Pending execution proceedings may be addressed by the High Court upon application. No new substantive precedent is set; the order’s effect is confined to restoring the second appeals to the High Court’s docket.

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    Ram Kanwar v. Kewal Singh

    Order

    1. In the maze of IAs, we are concerned with the facts briefly stated in Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1997 and Civil Appeal No. 4948 of 2001 disposed of by this Court vide its judgment dated 31-7-2001, with a number of connected matters.

    IA No. 5 of 2004 in IA No. 3 of 2001 in Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1997

    2. On 6-9-1988, Savitri Devi (vendor) sold lands measuring 76 kanals 9 marlas of distinct killa numbers. Ram Kanwar (the plaintiff-appellant) filed a suit for possession of the above lands on the plea that he was co-sharer at all material times and as such he had a preferential right to acquire it. The said suit was contested by the vendees (the defendant-respondents). On 15-1-1993, the suit was dismissed by the trial court holding that the plaintiff-appellant was not a co-sharer in the suit land. On appeal from the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit, the first appellate court, by order dated 22-2-1995, reversed the findings of the trial court holding that the plaintiff-appellant (Ram Kanwar) was a co-sharer at all material times. Consequently, the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the judgment of the trial court was set aside.

    3. Being aggrieved, the defendant vendees (the respondents in civil appeal) preferred second appeal to the High Court under Section 100 CPC. At this stage, it is important to note that between the judgment of the first appellate court dated 22-2-1995 and the filing of the second appeal in the High Court by the defendant vendees (the respondents), the Haryana Assembly enacted the Haryana amending Act 10 of 1995 taking away the right of the co-sharer to pre-empt sale by the co-owner. In view of the said amending Act 10 of 1995, the High Court, in second appeal, passed the following order:

    “As per the decision of the Apex Court in Ramjilal v. Ghisa Ram (1996) 7 SCC 507, JT (1996) 2 SC 649 a co-sharer has no right to claim a superior right of pre-emption. Since the lower appellate court decreed the suit of the plaintiff only on the ground that the plaintiff is a co-sharer and so has a superior right of pre-emption which right in view of the amendment made by the Haryana Government has already been taken away, appeal consequently deserves acceptance. Accordingly, I accept the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff.”

    4. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit on the preliminary point, the plaintiff-appellant (Ram Kanwar) came to this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1997. By judgment dated 31-7-2001, a five-Judge Bench of this Court held that amending Act 10 of 1995, which came into force on 7-7-1995, was prospective in operation and, therefore, it did not affect the decree passed by the first appellate court before 6-7-1995. Consequently, the said Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1997 stood allowed. At this stage, we may point out that there was an error in the operative part of the judgment of this Court dated 31-7-2001. Although, the plaintiff-appellant succeeded in the appeal, on account of error in the operative part, the word “dismissed” came to be incorporated. Therefore, IA No. 3 of 2001 was allowed and the necessary correction was ordered to be made in the operative part of the judgment dated 31-7-2001.

    5. In the said IA No. 3 of 2001, the defendant-Respondents 1 to 3 have moved IA No. 5 of 2004. Briefly, the plea taken by the defendant-respondents is that the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant (Ram Kanwar) stood dismissed by the judgment of the High Court dated 16-5-1996 only on the preliminary point concerning applicability of amending Act 10 of 1995; that the High Court in the second appeal did not frame substantial question of law although, according to the defendant-respondents, there were substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and, therefore, by way of IA No. 5 of 2004, the defendant-respondents seek remand of the case to the High Court, in accordance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 23 CPC.

    6. On 17-8-2005, the plaintiff-appellant (Ram Kanwar) has filed a detailed reply to the said IA No. 5 of 2004, in which it is pleaded that in the second appeal before the High Court, the defendant-respondents did not challenge the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court and, therefore, the High Court had no occasion to go into the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, it is submitted that the first appellate court is a final court of fact and according to the settled law, the High Court is bound by the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court and, therefore, the said IA No. 5 of 2004 is wholly uncalled for, particularly when Section 100 CPC did not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court.

    7. We do not find merit in the contention of the plaintiff-appellant that IA No. 5 of 2004 was wholly uncalled for, for the following reasons. Firstly, as can be seen from the judgment of the High Court dated 16-5-1996 in RSA No. 2198 of 1995 quoted above, the appeal was accepted and the judgment and decree of the first appellate court was set aside only on the preliminary point based on the applicability of amending Act 10 of 1995. Secondly, we have perused the memo of appeal filed by the defendant-respondents in RSA No. 2198 of 1995. We reproduce the grounds of RSA No. 2198 of 1995 as under:

    “1. That the learned lower appellate court has erred in accepting the appeal and reversing the well-considered judgment and decree of the learned trial court.
    2. That the law of pre-emption, as it stands today, in the State of Haryana, does not vest the pre-emptory rights in the co-sharers. Hence, the suit must be dismissed.
    3. That the plaintiff had ceased to be co-sharer in the suit land. He, thus, could not plead any right of pre-emption. The learned trial court has rightly dismissed the suit.
    4. That the learned lower appellate court has reversed the findings, given by the learned trial court, merely on the ground, that during the first appeal, the application of partition was set aside by the Financial Commissioner and the case had been remanded.
    5. That the very fact that the defendants had purchased specific khasra numbers showed that the land had already been partitioned, and the parties were in possession of their respective shares. Therefore, the question of pre-emption could not arise.
    It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be accepted, judgment and decree of the lower appellate court be set aside and that of learned trial court be restored and the suit be dismissed with costs, throughout.”

    8. We do not wish to make any observation on the merits of the matter. Suffice it to state that in view of the above facts, we are of the view that the matter needs to be remanded to the High Court with a direction to decide the said RSA No. 2198 of 1995 in accordance with law. We may clarify that our present order shall not be construed to mean that substantial questions of law arise in this case. That question will have to be decided by the High Court in terms of Section 100(4) CPC after hearing the parties concerned.

    IAs Nos. 8 and 10 of 2005 in IAs Nos. 2 and 6 of 2002 in Civil Appeal No. 4948 of 2001

    9. Respondent 3 Raj Singh in Civil Appeal No. 4948 of 2001, disposed of by this Court with Civil Appeal No. 417 of 1997 along with a number of connected matters, vide judgment dated 31-7-2001, has filed IA No. 8 of 2005 inter alia seeking remand of the case on the ground that the High Court had, by the impugned order dated 11-9-2000, allowed RSA No. 2467 of 1993 only on the preliminary point concerning the co-sharer's right of pre-emption having been abolished by the Haryana amending Act 10 of 1995.

    10. A similar IA No. 10 of 2005 has also been filed by the LRs of Respondent 2 Ram Phal, in the said Civil Appeal No. 4948 of 2001.

    11. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we remand this case also to the High Court with a direction to dispose of RSA No. 2467 of 1993 in accordance with law.

    IAs Nos. 9 and 11 of 2005 in IAs Nos. 2 and 6 of 2002 in Civil Appeal No. 4948 of 2001

    12. These IAs have been preferred by the defendant-respondents in Civil Appeal No. 4948 of 2001 for stay of execution proceedings adopted by the plaintiff-appellant pursuant to the decision of the first appellate court decreeing the suit. Since we have remanded the matter to the High Court, liberty is given to the defendant-respondents to move the High Court for interim relief in RSA No. 2467 of 1993.

    13. For the above reasons, IA No. 5 of 2004 along with IAs Nos. 8 to 11 of 2005 herein stand disposed of.

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    Comments

    Ram Kanwar v. Kewal Singh
    (Aug 30, 2005)