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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 30
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 30
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 27 October 1992, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Krishnan Kutty (PW 1) was walking along a public road near Pulinchode Cruz Junction when the appellant struck him on the head and face with a stone. PW 1 sustained injuries and was taken to Medical Mission Hospital, Kolencherry, where medical certificates (Ext. P-7 and Ext. P-3) were issued. An FIR (Crime No. 220/1992) was registered, and after investigation a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant.

The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kolencherry convicted the appellant under Section 326 IPC and sentenced him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam and later by the Kerala High Court in revision. The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the injuries proved in evidence constitute “grievous hurt” within the meaning of Section 320 IPC.
  2. Whether the stone used in the assault qualifies as a “dangerous weapon” so as to attract Section 326 IPC, or whether the case falls under Section 325 IPC.
  3. Consequent to the above, whether the sentence of two years’ rigorous imprisonment requires modification.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The testimonies of PW 1 and PW 2 are unreliable and should not have been accepted.
  • The medical evidence does not establish “grievous” injury; fracture of a tooth and a lacerated wound are insufficient for Section 326 IPC.
  • A stone cannot be categorised as a “dangerous weapon” in the circumstances of the case.
  • More than a decade has passed and the appellant has served a major part of the sentence, warranting reduction or alteration of the sentence.

Respondent's Arguments

  • PW 1, being the victim, has no reason to falsely implicate the appellant, and his testimony is corroborated by PW 2.
  • The medical evidence shows a fractured tooth, which squarely falls under Clause Seven of Section 320 IPC (“fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth”), constituting grievous hurt.
  • The size of the stone employed renders it a dangerous weapon; therefore Section 326 IPC is applicable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of U.P. v. Indrajeet alias Sukhatha (2000) 7 SCC 249 There is no fixed category of weapons earmarked for particular offences; whether an article is capable of causing grievous hurt must be decided on the facts of each case. The Court relied on this principle to assess whether the stone used in the present case could be deemed a “dangerous weapon.”

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first affirmed the credibility of PW 1, noting that as the victim he had no demonstrated motive to falsely implicate the appellant, and his testimony was corroborated by PW 2.

Turning to the nature of the injuries, the Court observed that the fracture of “the left upper second incisor tooth” falls under Clause Seven of Section 320 IPC, thereby constituting “grievous hurt.”

The decisive question became whether the stone constituted a “dangerous weapon.” Drawing on the principle from State of U.P. v. Indrajeet, the Court held that the classification depends on size, sharpness, and other factual particulars. On the materials before it, the Court concluded that the stone, while capable of inflicting harm, did not qualify as a dangerous weapon in this instance.

Because all three statutory elements of Section 326 IPC (grievous hurt and use of a dangerous weapon) were not satisfied, the conviction under Section 326 was altered to Section 325 IPC, which punishes voluntarily causing grievous hurt without the aggravating factor of a dangerous weapon.

Regarding sentence, the Court noted that the appellant had already served a substantial portion of the two-year term and that significant time had elapsed since the 1992 incident. On these “peculiar facts,” it reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.

Holding and Implications

Conviction altered to Section 325 IPC; sentence reduced to the period already undergone; appellant to be released forthwith unless required in another case.

The decision immediately benefits the appellant by securing his release. The Court did not articulate broader doctrinal implications, and no new legal test was announced; the judgment applies existing principles to the specific facts at hand.

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    Mathai v. State Of Kerala .

    Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court upholding view of the trial court that the appellant (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) was guilty of offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) and has been rightly convicted under such provision with corresponding sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment. Learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kolencherry convicted the accused and sentenced him which was confirmed by learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam. The revision application filed by the accused under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) was dismissed by the impugned order.

    3. The prosecution case is that on 27-10-1992 at about 5.30 p.m while Krishnan Kutty (PW 1) was walking along the public road near Pulinchode Cruz Junction, the accused hit him on his head and face with a stone causing injuries. PW 1 was taken to Medical Mission Hospital, Kolencherry for treatment. On the basis of Ext. P-1 statement given by PW 1, Kumaran (PW 7), the Head Constable of Puthencruz Police Station registered Crime No. 220 of 1992 under Ext. P-3 FIR. Radhakrishnan (PW 8), the then Asstt. Sub-Inspector of Police, Puthencruz took up the investigation in the case. On completion of the investigation, V. Radhakrishnan Nair (PW 10), the then Sub-Inspector of Police, Puthencruz laid the charge before the Court.

    4. The accused denied the charge. Thereupon the prosecution examined ten witnesses to further its case. It was not seriously disputed during trial that PW 1 sustained injuries on the date of occurrence as alleged by the prosecution. Immediately after the occurrence, PW 1 was taken to Medical Mission Hospital, Kolencherry where he was examined by Dr. Reji Paul (PW 9) who issued Ext. P-7 wound certificate. Ext. P-3 is the discharge certificate issued by Dr. R.V Devdas (PW 5). Thus, the medical evidence in the case shows that PW 1 had sustained the injuries as stated by him.

    5. The courts below placed reliance on the evidence of the injured who was examined as PW 1 and found that his evidence was corroborated by the evidence of Narayan (PW 2), who claimed to be an eyewitness. Accordingly, conviction was made and sentence imposed which has been upheld by the High Court.

    6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 should not have been relied upon by the courts below and the injuries as noticed by the doctor (PW 5) do not constitute a grievous injury. In addition, weapon allegedly used cannot be termed as a dangerous weapon to attract Section 326 IPC. In any event, it was submitted that the appellant has suffered imprisonment for a major portion of the sentence awarded and as more than a decade has already elapsed, the sentence needs to be suitably modified.

    7. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that PW 1 was the victim and there was no reason as to why he would falsely implicate the accused. According to him, the courts below have rightly placed reliance on his evidence which was corroborated by the evidence of PW 2. The doctor's evidence clearly shows that a grievous hurt was caused and considering the fact that a big stone was used, Section 326 IPC has been rightly applied.

    8. We find that PW 1 is the victim of the assault allegedly made by the accused. His evidence is clear and cogent. As he was a victim, in the absence of any material to show as to why he would falsely implicate the accused, his evidence has been rightly relied upon. PW 2's evidence has also corroborated his evidence.

    9. The residual question is whether the factual position indicates that any grievous hurt was caused and whether the weapon used was a dangerous weapon. The doctor who examined the injured noticed following injuries:

    1. Lacerated wound over the left posterior parietal region of the head.
    2. Fracture of the left upper second incisor tooth involving the pulp and the root.
    Alleged cause of the injury is “assault”. Opinion could be as alleged.
    He identified his signature in Ext. P-3 discharge certificate.

    10. Section 325 deals with punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt.

    11. Section 326 deals with offence of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.

    12. Section 326 provides that whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and also with a liability to pay a fine.

    13. Sections 325 and 326, like the two sections immediately preceding, provide the ordinary punishment and punishment under certain aggravating circumstances of the offences mentioned thereunder. The two latter sections apply to the case of causing “grievous hurt” and the immediately preceding two sections to the case of “hurt”.

    14. “Grievous hurt” has been defined in Section 320 IPC, which reads as follows:

    “320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only are designated as ‘grievous’:
    First.—Emasculation.
    Secondly.—Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
    Thirdly.—Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
    Fourthly.—Privation of any member or joint.
    Fifthly.—Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
    Sixthly.—Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
    Seventhly.—Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
    Eighthly.—Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.”

    15. Some hurts which are not like those hurts which are mentioned in the first seven clauses, are obviously distinguished from a slight hurt, may nevertheless be more serious. Thus a wound may cause intense pain, prolonged disease or lasting injury to the victim, although it does not fall within any of the first seven clauses. Before a conviction for the sentence of grievous hurt can be passed, one of the injuries defined in Section 320 must be strictly proved, and the eighth clause is no exception to the general rule of law that a penal statute must be construed strictly.

    16. The expression “any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death” has to be gauged taking note of the heading of the section. What would constitute a “dangerous weapon” would depend upon the facts of each case and no generalisation can be made.

    17. The heading of the section provides some insight into the factors to be considered. The essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are: (1) voluntarily causing a hurt; (2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means. As was noted by this Court in State of U.P v. Indrajeet (2000) 7 SCC 249 there is no such thing as a regular or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a particular article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined factually. As noted above, the evidence of the doctor (PW 5) clearly shows that the hurt or the injury that was caused was covered under the expression “grievous hurt” as defined under Section 320 IPC. The inevitable conclusion is that a grievous hurt was caused. It is not that in every case a stone would constitute a dangerous weapon. It would depend upon the facts of the case. At this juncture, it would be relevant to note that in some provisions e.g Sections 324 and 326 the expression “dangerous weapon” is used. In some other more serious offences the expression used is “deadly weapon” (e.g Sections 397 and 398). The facts involved in a particular case, depending upon various factors like size, sharpness, would throw light on the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or not. That would determine whether in the case Section 325 or Section 326 would be applicable.

    18. In the instant case considering the size of the stone which was used, as revealed by material on record, it cannot be said that a dangerous weapon was used. Therefore, the conviction is altered to Section 325 IPC. No hard-and-fast rule can be applied for assessing a proper sentence and a long passage of time cannot always be a determinative factor so far as sentence is concerned. It is not in dispute that a major portion of the sentence awarded has been suffered by the appellant. On the peculiar facts of the case we restrict it to the period already undergone.

    19. The appellant who is stated to be in custody shall be released forthwith, unless he is required to be in custody in connection with any other case. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.

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    Comments

    Mathai v. State Of Kerala .
    (Jan 12, 2005)