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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 139
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 32 clause (5) of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 35 of the Evidence Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 139
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 32 clause (5) of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 35 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was appointed as a Patwari on 5-2-1958 after declaring his date of birth as 1-10-1934. Subsequent complaints led to a departmental enquiry which concluded that his true date of birth was 25-11-1931. On that basis the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the respondent from service on 27-7-1988; the Commissioner later reduced the punishment to a one-stage reduction in grade until retirement.

The respondent filed a civil suit seeking (i) a declaration that 1-10-1934 is his correct date of birth as recorded in the service book, (ii) all consequential service benefits up to his notional date of superannuation on 30-9-1992, and (iii) setting aside of the disciplinary punishment. The trial court dismissed the suit.

On first appeal, the District Judge reversed the decree, holding that the claimed date (1-10-1934) stood proved. The State’s second appeal under Section 100 CPC was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that no substantial question of law arose. The State (appellant) sought relief before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in holding that no substantial question of law arose in the State’s second appeal under Section 100 CPC.
  2. Whether, under Rule 2.5 Note 1 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, an employee’s recorded date of birth can be altered by the competent authority after a proper enquiry and hearing.
  3. What evidentiary weight attaches respectively to (a) school-leaving certificates and admission registers, and (b) a horoscope, in determining an employee’s correct date of birth under Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act, 1872.
  4. Whether submission of an incorrect date of birth at the time of appointment constitutes misconduct justifying disciplinary action.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (State)

  • Enquiry documents, including the original school register and related records, conclusively show the respondent’s date of birth as 25-11-1931.
  • The first appellate court discarded these authentic records only because a horoscope indicated 1-10-1934; this approach ignored the stronger probative value of school records.
  • Under Rule 2.5 Note 1 the competent authority (Deputy Commissioner) was empowered to correct the entry after enquiry; hence no right had accrued to the respondent on the basis of the erroneous date.
  • The High Court failed to notice that these errors constituted a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

Respondent's Arguments (Employee)

  • The first appellate court, on appreciation of evidence, found the horoscope reliable and therefore upheld the date 1-10-1934.
  • Once the competent civil court decided in his favour, the finding was largely factual and not open to interference in second appeal.
  • When two dates appear in different documents, preference should be given to the horoscope allegedly produced at the time of appointment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramnarain Kallia v. Monee Bibee, ILR (1883) 9 Cal 613 Horoscope is a weak piece of evidence for proving age unless authenticity is strictly established. Quoted to underscore that horoscopes enjoy low evidentiary value under Section 32(5) Evidence Act.
Biro v. Atma Ram, AIR 1937 PC 101; 1937 All LJ 462 Same principle: burden lies on the party relying on horoscope to prove its authenticity. Relied upon to prefer school records over horoscope in age determination.
Satish Chandra Mukhopadhya v. Mohendra Lal Pathak Further authority that horoscopes are inadmissible or weak in proving age. Cited for the same evidentiary proposition.
Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1982) 2 SCC 202 Entries in school register/admission forms are strong proof of age; oral or horoscope evidence is generally unreliable. Applied to hold that school records, made ante litem motam, outweigh the respondent’s horoscope.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the original school-leaving certificate produced during the hearing and found it recorded the respondent’s birth as 25-11-1931. The Court noted that the respondent never explained the discrepancy between this authentic record and the horoscope he relied upon, nor did he attempt to have the school record corrected if it were erroneous.

Invoking Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act, the Court held that:

  • A horoscope is a “very weak” piece of evidence because its maker is seldom available to prove contemporaneity and accuracy; heavy onus rests on the proponent.
  • School registers and admission records, entered ante litem motam on information supplied by a parent or guardian, possess higher probative value.

The Court criticised the first appellate court for:

  • Discarding reliable documentary evidence (school records) in favour of an unproven horoscope.
  • Failing to consider that forged alterations were visible in photocopies of the school certificate.

Because the appellate court’s decision rested on irrelevant material and ignored relevant evidence, a substantial question of law did arise, contrary to the High Court’s conclusion. The trial court’s dismissal of the suit was therefore legally sound.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; the respondent’s suit stands dismissed.

Direct Effect: The respondent gains no service benefits based on the disputed date; the disciplinary action (reduction in grade) remains undisturbed. Broader Implication: The judgment reinforces that school records ordinarily prevail over horoscopes when determining age, and clarifies that appellate interference under Section 100 CPC is warranted where lower courts rely on inadmissible or weak evidence.

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    State Of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh .

    Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The appellant State calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the second appeal filed by it under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the Code”) holding that no question of law was involved.

    3. The background facts are as under:

    The respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiff”) was appointed as a Patwari on 5-2-1958. At the time of appointment he disclosed his date of birth to be 1-10-1934. Complaints were received and preliminary enquiry was conducted and it was held that his actual date of birth is 25-11-1931. A suit was filed by the respondent for declaration to the effect that his date of birth as recorded in the service-book i.e 1-10-1934 is the correct date of birth and the plaintiff is entitled to all benefits and privileges which would have accrued to him had he continued on that basis till the date of superannuation i.e 30-9-1992 and for setting aside the punishment awarded for allegedly manipulating records and disclosing wrong date of birth.

    4. The following issues were framed by the trial court:

    “1. Whether the High Court was justified in observing that no substantial question of law arises in the second appeal, whereas the substantial question of law was/is whether interpretation of the expression ‘Government’ in Rule 2.5 Note 1 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules is not competent/appointing authority, who is the Deputy Commissioner in this case?
    2. Whether as per Rule 2.5 Note 1 of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, the date of birth entered in the service-book of an employee cannot be changed by the competent authority after conducting a regular enquiry and giving proper opportunity of hearing to the said employee?
    3. Whether submission of wrong date of birth at the time of joining service amounted to misconduct on the part of the said employee?
    4. Whether the date of birth entered in the matriculation certificate shall not prevail over the date of birth mentioned in the horoscope?
    5. Whether entering a correct date of birth in the service-book after valid enquiry qua the correct date of birth of the respondent can be challenged, which was entered after affording proper opportunity of hearing and which is final and never challenged as bad?
    6. Whether the respondent, who is literate and was qualified to be appointed as Patwari was supposed to know the admissibility of document in respect of date of birth, did not tamper with documents by submitting a wrong date of birth i.e 1-10-1934 instead of 25-11-1931?
    7. Whether a long span of 33 years ought to be allowed to come in the way to correct a false entry regarding date of birth made on wrong and tampered documentation of an employee, which undoubtedly being the date of birth shall seriously affect the services of the colleagues of the said employees in the same cadre?”

    5. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) dismissed the suit holding that there was no ground to interfere with the orders of the Deputy Commissioner who, on the basis of the enquiry conducted, had observed that the date of birth was 1931 and not 1934 and if he had given actual date of birth he would have been overage and would not have been eligible for the post of Patwari. The enquiry report of the Additional Deputy Commissioner was submitted on 21-5-1985. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sangrur who held the enquiry held that the charge regarding change of date of birth from 25-11-1931 to 1-10-1934 was proved. The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the respondent from service with effect from 27-7-1988 after granting opportunity of hearing. An appeal was filed before the Commissioner who by order dated 18-6-1990 dismissed the same. He, however, reduced the punishment by observing that ends of justice would be met if he is reduced by one stage in his running grade with effect from the date on which he was charge-sheeted till retirement and he will not earn any increment during the period of this reduction till the date on which the respondent superannuated from service.

    6. Against the order passed by the trial court an appeal was preferred before the District Judge who held that the materials on record do not show that there was any change in the true date of birth and the claimed date of birth i.e 1-10-1934 is the actual date of birth as recorded. Second appeal filed by the appellant as noted above was dismissed on the ground that no substantial question of law was involved.

    7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of the first appellate court is not proper. On the basis of materials on record and after enquiry it was held that the date of birth was 25-11-1931 and not 1-10-1934 as claimed. School register and the connected records were produced which clearly show that the date of birth was 25-11-1931. The evidentiary value of these documents was discarded by the first appellate court primarily on the ground that a horoscope was produced according to which the date of birth was 1-10-1934.

    8. In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that on evaluation of evidence the first appellate court held that the date of birth was 1-10-1934 and when a horoscope is available, merely because a different date is indicated in the school record same is of no consequence.

    9. During the course of hearing of the matter we directed the respondent to produce the original school-leaving certificate which was sought to have been brought from the Government High School, Gujjarwal. It was filed by the respondent. A perusal thereof shows that the date of birth has been clearly indicated to be 25-11-1931. Stand of the respondent as noted above was that the date of birth was entered in the service record by relying on the horoscope. It is to be noted that the respondent claimed that both school-leaving certificate and the horoscope were produced and the date of birth was recorded by relying on the horoscope. It has not been explained as to how varying dates remained. If according to the respondent, the horoscope reflected the actual state of affairs it has not been explained as to why no steps were taken to get the school records corrected. The first appellate court was not justified in its conclusion that there was no material adduced by the present appellant to substantiate its stand regarding the date of birth. One thing further significant is that a school-leaving certificate was produced at the time of appointment. On enquiry it was found that the same was a forged one. Apart from the fact that there was no effort to reconcile the discrepancy in the so-called horoscope and the school record is a factor which has rightly been taken note of by the trial court. Without any plausible reason the first appellate court took a different view.

    10. In terms of Section 32 clause (5) of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”), the evidentiary value of a horoscope has to be considered. No evidence was led by the respondent to prove authenticity of the same. In any event the same was not to be given primacy over the school-leaving certificate. It was not shown as to how the entry therein was wrong. The onus was on the respondent to prove that the same was not correct, which was not discharged. Two photostat copies of the school-leaving certificate were produced before the enquiry officer. He compared them and found that even to the naked eye change of figure “31” to “34” was visible. Interestingly in the said copies the date of birth was indicated even after the change to be 25-11-1934 and not 1-10-1934 as claimed.

    11. Horoscope is a very weak piece of material to prove age of a person. In most cases, the maker of it may not be available to prove that it was made immediately after the birth. A heavy onus lies on the person who wants to press it into service to prove its authenticity. In fact, a horoscope to be treated as evidence in terms of Section 32 clause (5) must be proved to have been made by a person having special means of knowledge as regards authenticity of a date, time, etc. mentioned therein. In that context horoscopes have been held to be inadmissible in proof of age. (See Ramnarain Kallia v. Monee Bibee ILR (1883) 9 Cal 613, Biro v. Atma Ram AIR 1937 PC 101, 1937 All LJ 462 and Satish Chandra Mukhopadhya v. Mohendra Lal Pathak.)

    12. On the contrary, the statement contained in the admission register of the school as to the age of an individual on information supplied to the school authorities by the father, guardian or a close relative is more authentic evidence under Section 32 clause (5) unless it is established by unimpeachable contrary material to show that it is inherently improbable. The time of one's birth relates to the commencement of one's relationship by blood and a statement therefore of one's age made by a person having special means of knowledge, relates to the existence of such relationship as that referred to in Section 32 clause (5).

    13. As observed by this Court in Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1982) 2 SCC 202 ordinarily oral evidence can hardly be useful to determine the correct age of a person, and the question, therefore, would largely depend on the documents and the nature of their authenticity. Oral evidence may have utility if no documentary evidence is forthcoming. Even the horoscope cannot be reliable because it can be prepared at any time to suit the needs of a particular situation. Entries in the school register and admission form regarding date of birth constitute good proof of age. There is no legal requirement that the public or other official book should be kept only by a public officer and all that is required under Section 35 of the Evidence Act is that it should be regularly kept in discharge of official duty. In the instant case the entries in the school register were made ante litem motam.

    14. Therefore, the school records have more probative value than a horoscope. Where no other material is available, the horoscope may be considered but subject to its authenticity being established. These aspects were not considered by the first appellate court and the High Court.

    15. The High Court was, therefore, not justified in dismissing the second appeal by observing that there was no substantial question of law involved.

    16. Since the first appellate court acted on irrelevant materials and left out of consideration relevant materials question of law was involved. The suit that was filed was rightly dismissed by the trial court.

    17. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. No costs.

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    Comments

    State Of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh .
    (Mar 14, 2005)