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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and respondent were married on 18 November 1981. According to the appellant, the respondent left the matrimonial home on 28 January 1987; the respondent contends she was driven out and has consistently expressed willingness to resume cohabitation. On inquiry by the Supreme Court, counsel for the appellant confirmed that the appellant is unwilling to take the respondent back.

On 27 April 1991 the appellant filed a divorce petition alleging cruelty and desertion. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding neither ground proved. An appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was filed in the Delhi High Court. A Single Judge affirmed that cruelty was not proved but granted divorce on the ground of desertion.

Both parties appealed via Letters Patent Appeals (LPA No. 593 of 2000 by the respondent against the desertion finding, and LPA No. 82 of 2001 by the appellant challenging the cruelty finding). A Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s decree, holding that neither cruelty nor desertion had been established, and dismissed the divorce petition. The present Supreme Court appeals challenge that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant proved that the respondent deserted him, thereby entitling him to a decree of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  2. Whether the appellant proved cruelty as an alternative ground for divorce.
  3. Whether, notwithstanding failure to prove statutory grounds, the Supreme Court should dissolve the marriage on the doctrine of irretrievable breakdown.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent deserted the appellant without sufficient cause, justifying divorce.
  • Documents purportedly showing the respondent held herself out as the wife of one Hari Shankar Sharma support the desertion claim.
  • Even if statutory grounds fail, the marriage has irretrievably broken down and should be dissolved, relying on L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar.

Respondent's Arguments

  • She was forced to leave the matrimonial home and remains willing to resume cohabitation.
  • The documents produced by the appellant were not pleaded, proved, or marked in evidence and are unreliable.
  • Because the appellant is at fault and prevented reconciliation, he cannot invoke irretrievable breakdown.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar, (1983) 4 SCC 231 The Supreme Court may dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown in exceptional circumstances. The Court declined to apply the precedent, stating that irretrievable breakdown is an extraordinary ground, the respondent is willing to live with the appellant, and the appellant—being at fault—cannot rely on it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court that cruelty had not been proved; the appellant did not press this ground further. On desertion, the Court agreed with the lower courts that the respondent was compelled to leave and the appellant’s alleged attempts to reconcile were unbelievable. Documentary evidence introduced to show the respondent’s purported second marriage was neither pleaded nor proved; hence, no reliance could be placed on it.

Regarding the plea of irretrievable breakdown, the Court emphasized that divorce on this non-statutory ground is reserved for extreme cases. Here, the respondent’s readiness to return and the appellant’s own misconduct undermined the claim. Consequently, the Court found no basis to grant divorce on any ground.

Holding and Implications

Appeals DISMISSED; no order as to costs.

The marriage remains undissolved, and the appellant’s petition for divorce stands dismissed. The judgment reaffirms that parties alleging desertion must establish voluntary abandonment by the spouse and that the Supreme Court will invoke irretrievable breakdown only in truly exceptional situations. No new legal precedent was set beyond application of existing standards.

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    Shyam Sunder Kohli v. Sushma Kohli Alias Satya Devi .

    S.N Variava, J.— Special leave granted.

    2. Heard parties.

    3. These appeals are against the judgment dated 14-8-2002 of the Delhi High Court. By this judgment, two letters patent appeals have been disposed of.

    4. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:

    The appellant and the respondent were married on 18-11-1981. The appellant claims that the respondent left the matrimonial home on 28-1-1987. The respondent denies this. The respondent claims that she was driven out of the matrimonial home. She claims that she was always and even now is ready to stay with the appellant. On a question from court, counsel for the appellant states that the appellant is not willing to take back the respondent.

    5. On 27-4-1991, the appellant filed a divorce petition on grounds of cruelty and desertion. The trial court, after considering the evidence of the parties and the material on record, held that the respondent had not proved cruelty or desertion and thus dismissed the petition.

    6. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the Delhi High Court. The High Court also held that the appellant has not been able to prove cruelty. The Single Judge of the High Court, however, held that the respondent had deserted the appellant without sufficient cause and granted divorce on that ground.

    7. The respondent filed LPA No. 593 of 2000 against the order granting divorce on the ground of desertion. The appellant filed LPA No. 82 of 2001 against that portion of the order, wherein it has been held that cruelty was not proved. Both these LPAs have been disposed of by the impugned judgment. The Division Bench has also held that the appellant has not been able to prove cruelty. It has held, on an appreciation of evidence and material, that there was no desertion by the respondent. Thus, the order of the first appellate court has been set aside and the petition has been dismissed.

    8. We have heard the parties and gone through the material on record. Very fairly, in view of concurrent finding of facts, by all the courts below, the ground of cruelty is not pressed. We find ourselves in agreement with the finding of the trial court as well as observation in the impugned judgment that the appellant has not been able to prove that the respondent had deserted him. The evidence on record indicates that the respondent had been forced to leave the matrimonial home. We are in agreement with the findings that the case of the appellant, that he had made attempts to get her back, cannot be believed.

    9. An attempt was made to rely upon various documents in order to show that the respondent was holding herself out as the wife of one Hari Shankar Sharma. However, we find that the documents had not been referred to nor relied upon in the petition. They had not been disclosed by the appellants. During the course of evidence on his behalf, no attempt was made to prove these documents. For the first time when the respondent entered the witness box, she was confronted with these documents. She has denied that she has taken out any life insurance policy. She has explained how her name is there in a bank account jointly with Hari Shankar Sharma. Even after the respondent explained the documents, no attempt has been made to prove these documents. As these documents have not been proved or marked in evidence, we are of the opinion that no reliance can be placed on these documents.

    10. Thus, we find that no case for desertion is made out.

    11. Faced with this situation, it was submitted that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. It was submitted that on this ground the divorce may be granted by this Court. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the authority of this Court in L.V Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar (1983) 4 SCC 231.

    12. On the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the court must not lightly dissolve a marriage. It is only in extreme circumstances that the court may use this ground for dissolving a marriage. In this case, the respondent, at all stages and even before us, has been ready to go back to the appellant. It is the appellant who has refused to take the respondent back. The appellant has made baseless allegations against the respondent. He even went to the extent of filing a complaint of bigamy, under Section 494 IPC against the respondent. That complaint came to be dismissed. As stated above, the evidence shows that the respondent was forced to leave the matrimonial home. It is the appellant who has been at fault. It can hardly lie in the mouth of a party who has been at fault and who has not allowed the marriage to work to claim that the marriage should be dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. We, thus, see no substance in this contention.

    13. For the above reasons, the appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Shyam Sunder Kohli v. Sushma Kohli Alias Satya Devi .
    (Oct 1, 2004)