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citation codes
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Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973
  • Section 56, Section 68, Section 69 of the Act
  • Sections 8, 9 and 49 of the Act read with Chapter X of the RBI Manual
  • Section 56 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973
  • Section 56, Section 68, Section 69 of the Act
  • Sections 8, 9 and 49 of the Act read with Chapter X of the RBI Manual
  • Section 56 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants include a company that functions as an “authorised dealer” under Section 2(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA). Enforcement authorities allege that the company contravened various provisions of FERA, particularly Sections 8, 9 and 49 read with Chapter X of the Reserve Bank of India Manual. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the company and the individuals in charge of its affairs under Section 56 (which prescribes, inter alia, mandatory imprisonment) read with Section 68 of FERA. The appellants challenged the maintainability of these criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court, leading to the present order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a company can be prosecuted and convicted for offences under Section 56 of FERA when the statute prescribes a mandatory term of imprisonment.
  2. If the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, whether the individuals in charge under Section 68(1) and (2) can nevertheless be prosecuted and punished.
  3. Whether the Supreme Court’s earlier three-Judge Bench decision in Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 405, which held that companies could not be prosecuted where only mandatory imprisonment is prescribed, was correctly decided.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • Invoked Velliappa Textiles to contend that, because Section 56 mandates imprisonment, criminal proceedings cannot lie against a company (which cannot physically be imprisoned); consequently, neither the company nor the officers referred to in Section 68 can be proceeded against.
  • Suggested that the statutory scheme necessarily precludes prosecution of juristic persons where mandatory imprisonment is the only punishment.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Highlighted that conviction and sentencing are distinct stages of a criminal trial; a company can be convicted even if imprisonment cannot be imposed.
  • Drew attention to Section 69 of FERA, which contemplates consequential liabilities after conviction, to show that Parliament envisaged convicting companies.
  • Supported a purposive interpretation that would avoid letting serious corporate offenders escape liability merely because imprisonment is impracticable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 405 Held that a company cannot be prosecuted where the offence carries mandatory imprisonment. The Court expressed prima facie disagreement and referred its correctness to a Constitution Bench.
Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 Affirmed the principle of purposive construction to make statutes workable. Cited to justify “reading down” Section 56 so that a company may be convicted even if imprisonment cannot be imposed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that Section 56 of FERA creates a spectrum of offences: some punishable with imprisonment or fine, others with mandatory imprisonment and fine. Treating companies as immune from prosecution for the graver category would create “reverse discrimination” and thwart legislative intent to hold all offenders accountable. Invoking the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (a statute must be interpreted so that it is workable), the Court suggested a purposive construction whereby:

  • The court may record a conviction against a company even though imprisonment cannot be executed upon a juristic person.
  • Inability to imprison the company does not bar prosecution or punishment of individuals liable under Section 68.

Because these conclusions conflict with the ratio of Velliappa Textiles, the Bench deemed it necessary to seek an authoritative pronouncement from a larger Bench.

Holding and Implications

REFERRED TO A CONSTITUTION BENCH

The Supreme Court directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate larger Bench to reconsider the correctness of Velliappa Textiles. Pending that decision, no final ruling on the merits was issued. The immediate implication is that prosecutions of companies under statutes prescribing mandatory imprisonment remain uncertain until resolved by the Constitution Bench; however, the order signals a judicial inclination toward allowing such prosecutions by adopting purposive statutory interpretation.

    Anz Grindlays Bank Ltd. And Others v. Directorate Of Enforcement And Others

    Order

    1. Mr K.K Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, raised several contentions in support of the appeal; one of them being that having regard to the fact that as the offence is said to have been committed by a company; and as in terms of Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (for short “the Act”), the punishment of mandatory imprisonment has to be imposed; no criminal proceedings can be initiated against the company and in that view of the matter, the company as well as the person referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 68 thereof cannot be proceeded with.

    2. In support of the said contention reliance has been placed on a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Asstt. Commr. v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 405 We do not prima facie agree with the ratio laid down in Velliappa Textiles (2003) 11 SCC 405.

    3. In this case the Company is the “authorised dealer” within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act. The authorised dealer indisputably is required to comply with the statutory requirements contained in Sections 8, 9 and 49 of the Act read with Chapter X of the RBI Manual. The contraventions of the provisions of the Act having allegedly taken place at the hands of the authorised dealer, that is, Appellant 1, and, thus, although it is a company it is liable to be proceeded against. Section 56 of the Act provides for different punishments for commission of different offences. It is true that in an offence of this nature a mandatory punishment has been provided for but offences falling under other part of the said section do not call for mandatory imprisonment. Section 56 of the Act covers both cases where an offender can be punished with imprisonment or fine and a mandatory provision of imprisonment and fine. In the event it is held that a case involving graver offence allegedly committed by a company and consequently, the persons who are in charge of the affairs of the company as also the other persons, cannot be proceeded against, only because the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, in our opinion, the same would not only lead to reverse discrimination but also go against the legislative intent. The intention of Parliament is to identify the offender and bring him to book.

    4. In order to make the statute workable, the court should thus take recourse to such principles of interpretation of statute as may be necessary, keeping in view the doctrine of ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

    5. In that view of the matter, upon taking recourse to the principle of purposive construction as has been held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 an attempt should be made to make Section 56 of the Act workable. It is possible to read down the provisions of Section 56 to the effect that when a company is tried for commission of an offence under the Act, a judgment of conviction may be passed against it, but having regard to the fact that it is a juristic person, no punishment of mandatory imprisonment can be imposed.

    6. Furthermore, even if the company cannot be punished, the same may not mean that the other persons referred to under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 68 cannot also be punished.

    7. We may at this juncture notice that Mr Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents submitted that a judgment of conviction and an order of sentence pertain to two different stages of the trial. Learned counsel in support of the said contention drew our attention to Section 69 of the Act which provides for certain consequences on passing of an order of conviction and submitted that because the sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed upon the company, the same may not mean that the company cannot be convicted.

    8. We are of the opinion that the correctness of the decision of this Court in Velliappa Textiles (2003) 11 SCC 405 requires reconsideration by a Constitution Bench, and, thus the matters are referred to a Constitution Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the subject. Records be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.

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    Anz Grindlays Bank Ltd. And Others v. Directorate Of Enforcement And Others
    (Jul 16, 2004)