Arijit Pasayat, J.— Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a serious blow to her supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity — it degrades and humiliates the victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman i.e her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity. Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (Ms) . (1996) 1 SCC 490, AIR 1996 SC 922 the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. It is a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the victim's most cherished of the fundamental rights, namely, the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”). The courts are, therefore, expected to deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. A socially sensitized judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex exceptions and provisos.
2. The State of Punjab questions the acquittal of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”) who was charged for commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”).
3. We do not propose to mention the name of the victim. Section 228-A IPC makes disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences punishable. Printing or publishing name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or is found to have been committed can be punished. True it is, the restriction does not relate to printing or publication of judgment by the High Court or the Supreme Court. But keeping in view the social object of preventing social victimization or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for which Section 228-A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that in the judgments, be it of this Court, High Court or lower courts, the name of the victim should not be indicated. We have chosen to describe her as “victim” in the judgment. (See State Of Karnataka v. Puttaraja . (2004) 1 SCC 475, (2003) 8 Supreme 364.)
4. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:
On 1-10-1985 the mother of the victim PW 4 lodged information with the police that 17-18 days back the accused had committed rape on her daughter PW 7. According to the information lodged, the victim had told her mother after coming from the house of the accused that she was forcibly dragged away by the accused while she was cleaning utensils and was raped. At the time of occurrence the wife of the accused was absent and taking advantage of her absence, the accused committed the lustful act. As the father of the victim PW 5 was lying seriously ill they did not think it proper to inform him and when he recovered from illness, and the police had come to the village for investigating into some other case, the information was lodged. The victim girl was sent for medical examination and she was examined by PW 2. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was placed and the accused faced trial. He denied the accusations and pleaded false implication. It was stated that the mother of the victim had taken some money as advance for serving as maidservant and as she did not work and refused to refund the money, a suit was filed for recovery of the amount and, therefore, with a view to avoid payment false accusation has been made. The trial court placed reliance on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and convicted the accused of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000 with default stipulation. Being aggrieved by the judgment, the accused filed Crl. A. No. 432-SB of 1986 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By the impugned judgment dated 2-12-1994 the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and consequently the sentence.
5. According to the High Court, primarily four factors render the prosecution version vulnerable. Firstly, there was unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. Secondly, the victim's evidence did not inspire confidence as there were exaggerations, and a friend to whom she claimed to have told about the incidence was not examined. Thirdly, the medical evidence indicated that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse and, therefore, her version that she was raped by the accused is not believable. Fourthly, there was no evidence to show that the victim was employed as a maidservant in the house of the accused.
6. In support of the appeal the learned counsel for the State submitted that approach of the High Court is totally erroneous. In case of sexual assaults the court has to take note of the realities of life and should not enter into hypertechnicalities. The delay was properly explained and nothing was brought on record to raise any doubt about the reason indicated by PWs 4 and 5. Merely because respectable persons in the locality and the police were not informed, the prosecution should not have been doubted. Had they informed the police earlier there was no question of explaining the delay. The reasons for which there was delay have been properly explained. The hypothetical medical evidence has been given primacy to cast doubt over the victim's version. When the defence itself suggested that the victim was engaged as maidservant, the High Court's conclusion that there was no material to show about her employment as a maidservant is based on total misreading of the evidence.
7. Merely because of the doctor's hypothetical and opinionative evidence that the victim was accustomed to sexual intercourse, prosecution version of rape was not to be discarded.
8. In response, learned counsel for the accused supported the judgment submitting that reasonings indicated by the High Court are on terra firma, more particularly, when the victim's testimony is completely unreliable because it is at great variance with the medical evidence. Residually, it is submitted that the judgment is one of acquittal and after a long lapse of time the jurisdiction under Article 136 should not be exercised.
9. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the same would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the same cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution version, as was done by the High Court in the present case.
10. The evidence of PWs 4 and 5 read with that of the victim clearly explained as to why the first information report was lodged after 17-18 days. The evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses clearly shows that PW 5 was seriously ill and the family members did not want to create tension in his mind when he was not physically well and waited for his recovery. In spite of the lengthy cross-examination this aspect has not been shaken by the defence. The view of the High Court that PW 4 should have told some respectable person or the father earlier to say the least is a view which has no foundation and overlooks the very reason to shun or openly publicise it to avoid the ignominy involved in it. In a tradition-bound and conservative society, more particularly in a rural area, the shame of sexual assault on a girl of about 14 years cannot be lost sight of. This down-to-earth reality has been lost sight of by the High Court. The trial court had rightly emphasized this aspect, but unfortunately, the High Court took a contrary view irrationally.
11. Further, the victim's evidence has been discarded by holding that it is at variance with the medical evidence. The High Court has not indicated as to in what way it is at variance with the medical evidence. Mere statement that according to the doctor, the victim's vagina admitted two fingers and she could on earlier occasions have had sexual intercourse five, ten or fifteen times rules out rape by the accused once as alleged, in no way casts doubt on the victim's evidence.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent-accused pointed out that rape as claimed by the victim was discounted by the evidence of PW 2, who did not find visible injury when she medically examined the victim. In our opinion the same is of no consequence. The doctor examined the victim after about three weeks. That being so, the effect of the act on the physical form was practically obliterated. That is not denied by the doctor. Merely because the friend of the victim was not examined that also cannot be a suspicious circumstance to throw suspicion on the victim's evidence.
13. Another factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court is the evidence of the doctor, PW 2 that there were signs of previous sexual intercourse on the victim. That cannot, by any stretch of imagination, as noted above, be a ground to acquit an alleged rapist. Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. Finally, if we may say as a last straw, is the fallacy in the High Court's reasoning about lack of evidence relating to the employment of the victim as a maidservant. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that suggestions were given to witnesses, more particularly PWs 4, 5 and 7 that the accused or his wife had threatened to put an end to the victim's service as a maidservant because of her immoral character, or refusal to refund the amount taken as advance for her employment as a maidservant.
14. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former, it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration, as understood in the context of an accomplice would do.
15. As was noted by this Court in State Of Rajasthan v. N.K The Accused . (2000) 5 SCC 30, (2000) 3 Supreme 70:
“18. Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix has weighed with the High Court for inferring consent on the part of the prosecutrix. We are not at all convinced. We have already noticed that the delay in medical examination of the prosecutrix was occasioned by the factum of the lodging of the FIR having been delayed for the reasons which we have already discussed. The prosecutrix was in her teens. The perpetrator of the crime was an able-bodied youth bustling with energy and determined to fulfil his lust armed with a knife in his hand and having succeeded in forcefully removing the victim to a secluded place where there was none around to help the prosecutrix in her defence. The injuries which the prosecutrix suffered or might have suffered in defending herself and offering resistance to the accused were abrasions or bruises which would heal up in the ordinary course of nature within 2 to 3 days of the incident. The absence of visible marks of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix on the date of her medical examination would not necessarily mean that she had not suffered any injuries or that she had offered no resistance at the time of commission of the crime. Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix is not necessarily an evidence of falsity of the allegation or an evidence of consent on the part of the prosecutrix. It will all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”
16. The High Court was not justified in reversing the conviction of the respondent and recording the order of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none reasonably exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for a finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females or minor children. The courts have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women, particularly of tender age and children.
17. Looked from any angle, the High Court's judgment does not stand scrutiny and deserves to be set aside, which we direct. The conviction as recorded by the trial court and the sentence imposed by it are restored. The accused shall surrender forthwith to serve remainder of sentence, if any. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
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