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2003 INSC 380
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  • Section 15 of the Act
  • Section 16 of the Act
  • Section 15(1) of the Act
  • Section 15(2) of the Act
  • Section 15(2)(a) of the Act
  • Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 380
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 15 of the Act
  • Section 16 of the Act
  • Section 15(1) of the Act
  • Section 15(2) of the Act
  • Section 15(2)(a) of the Act
  • Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the estate of Smt. Rajathiammal, who died intestate and issueless on 1-7-1972. The appellant, V. Dandapani Chettiar (plaintiff in O.S. No. 300 of 1974, Sub-Court, Cuddalore), claimed that the properties left by Rajathiammal devolved upon the heirs of her father, Sri Venugopal Chettiar, under Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. He sought a declaration of joint ownership, partition, separate possession of his 1/10th share in the movable and immovable assets, and recovery of past mesne profits.

First respondent Balasubramanian Chettiar (defendant 1) contended that, in the absence of issue, Section 15(1) applied and the properties devolved upon the husband’s heirs; alternatively, reliance was placed on an alleged Will (Ex. B-26) executed by Rajathiammal on 15-6-1972 in favour of the contesting respondents.

The suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge; the trial court accepted Section 15(1) and also upheld the validity of Ex. B-26. A first appeal (A.S. No. 1055 of 1977) was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court, who agreed that Section 15(1) governed but rejected the Will for want of proof. A Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A. No. 32 of 1983) was likewise dismissed by a Division Bench on 12-4-1988. The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges all three concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the properties obtained by Rajathiammal under compromise decrees in O.S. No. 8 of 1926 and O.S. No. 15 of 1942 were “inherited” from her mother so as to attract Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, or whether Section 15(1) governed succession.
  2. Whether the Will dated 15-6-1972 (Ex. B-26) propounded by the first respondent was proved and operative.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The compromise decrees merely recognised Rajathiammal’s pre-existing right to property derived through her mother’s line; hence the assets were “inherited” from her mother within the meaning of Section 15(2)(a).
  • Upon her intestate death without issue, the property must revert to the heirs of her father, i.e., the appellant and respondents 2-9 & 23.
  • Ex. B-26 was neither genuine nor proved, and even if genuine would be ineffective once held unproved by the High Court.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Under Section 15(1), in the absence of children, the property devolves first upon the husband and then upon the husband’s heirs; thus the contesting respondents inherit.
  • In the alternative, Ex. B-26 validly bequeathed absolute or limited interests in the suit properties to the first respondent and other beneficiaries, and possession had been taken and improvements made accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ayi Ammal v. Subramania Asari, AIR 1966 Mad 369 Explained the rationale of Section 15(2): property inherited from parents should ordinarily revert to the parental line. Quoted to support the proposition that Section 15(2)(a) preserves property within the father’s family when a female dies intestate without issue.
Venugopala Pillai v. Thayyanayaki Ammal, AIR 1979 Mad 124 Held that rights acquired by compromise are a reiteration of pre-existing rights. Relied upon to characterise the compromise decrees as confirmation of Rajathiammal’s inherited rights, not as an independent source removing the case from Section 15(2)(a).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first noted that Rajathiammal died intestate, issueless, and without descendants of any pre-deceased son or daughter, triggering Section 15(2). It rejected the respondents’ submission that the compromise decrees constituted an independent source of title disconnected from inheritance:

  • Because Rajathiammal’s entitlement arose qua daughter of her mother, the decrees only declared a pre-existing hereditary right; they did not transform the property into self-acquired or husband-derived assets.
  • Consequently, clause (a) of Section 15(2) squarely applied, mandating devolution upon the heirs of the father.

The Court emphasised that Section 15(2) carves out an exception precisely to prevent property inherited from the parental line from passing to the husband’s line when the female owner dies without issue.

On the alleged Will (Ex. B-26), the High Court had already held that it was not proved. The Supreme Court saw no reason to revisit that finding; therefore, testamentary succession was unavailable to the respondents.

Finding that all lower courts had mis-applied Section 15, the Court held that the appellant and respondents 2-9 & 23, being the sons and daughters of Venugopal Chettiar, are the sole heirs entitled to the estate.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is ALLOWED; the judgments of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court (both single-Judge and Division Bench) are set aside.

Immediate Effect: The estate of Rajathiammal devolves upon the appellant and respondents 2-9 & 23 as heirs of her father. First respondent and other beneficiaries under the unproved Will take nothing. No order as to costs.

Broader Implication: The decision reinforces that property inherited by a female from her parents remains within the parental lineage under Section 15(2)(a), even where the female’s title is confirmed through a compromise decree, thereby limiting the scope of Section 15(1) and safeguarding the parental family’s reversionary interest.

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    V. Dandapani Chettiar v. Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead) By Lrs. And Others

    Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.— The unsuccessful plaintiff who lost his case in all the three courts is the appellant in this appeal. The appellant (Dandapani Chettiar) filed OS No. 300 of 1974 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore for a declaration that the suit properties belonged to him and Defendants 2-9 and 23 (Respondents 2-9 and 23) and for partition and separate possession of his 1/10th share in the movables and immovables and for recovery of past mesne profits. His case in brief is that the suit properties came to Rajathiammal and that the properties were obtained by her from her mother Sivabagyammal. Rajathiammal succeeded to the properties as stridhana heir and on the death of Rajathiammal on 1-7-1972 issueless and intestate, in accordance with Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) the suit properties devolved upon the heirs of the father of Rajathiammal i.e Venugopal Chettiar. The appellant (plaintiff) and Respondents 2-8 (Defendants 2-8) are the children of the said Venugopala Chettiar through his wife and the 9th defendant (9th respondent) is the son of the said Venugopal Chettiar through another wife and Respondent 23 (Defendant 23) is one of his wives and they are the heirs.

    2. The case of the first respondent Balasubramanian Chettiar (dead) and the other respondents is that on the death of Rajathiammal, the suit properties devolved upon the heirs of the husband of Rajathiammal, namely, Muthukumarasami under Section 15(1) of the Act in the absence of any issues to her. In the alternative, the respondents contended that Rajathiammal executed a Will, Exhibit B-26, dated 15-6-1972 and that in accordance with the said Will, there would be a testamentary succession for the first respondent Balasubramanian Chettiar and the others.

    3. The Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore framed as many as twenty-two issues. The sub-court took the view that the suit properties came to Rajathiammal only because of the compromise decree in OSs No. 8 of 1926 filed by one Natanasabapathy, son of Sivabagyammal and No. 15 of 1942 and her pre-existing right has no relevance. The sub-court also held that only Section 15(1) of the Act is attracted which would be in favour of the first respondent Balasubramanian Chettiar and his supporting respondent-defendants. As regards the alleged Will, Exhibit B-26, the trial court held that it is a true and valid document executed by Rajathiammal. On these findings, the trial court negatived the appellant-plaintiff's claim and dismissed the suit.

    4. The appellant preferred an appeal, AS No. 1055 of 1977 in the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court took the view that the suit properties devolved upon Rajathiammal not by inheritance from her mother but as stridhana heir of her grandmother under the compromise decrees in OS No. 8 of 1926 and OS No. 15 of 1942 granting the properties to her and, therefore, Section 15(1) of the Act alone applies, dismissed the appeal of the appellant by a judgment dated 17-12-1982. The learned Single Judge also held that the Will, Exhibit B-26, pleaded by the first defendant, first respondent herein and found to have been executed by Rajathiammal by the trial court, is not a Will that has been proved and, therefore, the finding of the trial court regarding the Will was set aside in the appeal.

    5. The appellant preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 32 of 1983 to a Division Bench of the said High Court. The Division Bench held that the property of Rajathiammal will devolve as per Section 15(1) and not Section 15(2) and that the property does not devolve on the plaintiff, the appellant herein and Respondents 2-9.Defendants 2-9. Therefore, the argument of the appellant-plaintiff that on the death of Sengamalam and Thaiyanayagi, Sivabagyammal got absolute right in the properties was unacceptable. Holding so, the Division Bench dismissed the letters patent appeal of the appellant on 12-4-1988 by rejecting the contentions of the appellant that it is only Section 15(2) of the Act that applies in the instant case. Aggrieved by the decision, as aforesaid, the plaintiff preferred the present appeal in this Court.

    6. We heard Mr K. Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr A.T.M Sampath, learned counsel for the contesting respondents. Mr K. Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff took us through the pleadings and the judgments passed by the trial court and of the High Court and also the compromise decrees in OS No. 8 of 1926 and OS No. 15 of 1942. Mr K. Ram Kumar submitted that since the properties have been got by Rajathiammal by compromise decrees (Exhibits B-1-B-4), they cannot be said to be the properties inherited by her mother and, therefore, the contentions of the respective parties will have to be considered and a conclusion arrived at regarding the question whether Section 15(1) of the Act is applicable or Section 15(2) of the Act is applicable in the matter of succession of the properties of late Rajathiammal. In other words, as per the provisions of the Act, the appellant-plaintiff and his brothers and sisters, namely, Defendants 2-9 and his mother, Defendant 23 are the heirs of Rajathiammal and they are entitled to the properties.

    7. Per contra, Mr A.T.M Sampath, learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that Rajathiammal executed a Will, Exhibit B-26, dated 15-6-1972 under which she bequeathed absolute interest in some of the properties to Balasubramanian Chettiar, the first respondent/first defendant and some of the properties to his son Saravanan and limited interest in other items of properties to others, like one Subramaniam Chettiar, husband of Rajalakshmi (D-6), V. Krishnasamy Chettiar (D-9) and Nagalakshmiammal (D-25) directing the remainder in some of the properties to be vested in the first respondent/first defendant and in some other properties in his son Saravanan. There was also some direction to the first respondent for performing brahmotsavam at a temple at Thiruppapuliyur etc. out of the income from Properties Items 8 and 9 mentioned in the second schedule. It was further contended by Mr Sampath that after the death of Rajathiammal he took possession of the properties as per the terms of the Will and effected improvements and leased out some of the properties also. Therefore, the first respondent and other respondents, who are the beneficiaries under the Will are entitled to the properties and even if the Will is not there and Rajathiammal died intestate, the contesting defendants alone are entitled to the properties as heirs of Rajathiammal under the Act.

    8. The question, therefore, is who will succeed to the properties left by Rajathiammal (got by her under compromise decrees B-2 and B-8 dated 27-8-1927 and 19-9-1949) in OS No. 8 of 1926 and OS No. 15 of 1942 respectively, on her death on 1-7-1972 as between the appellant-plaintiff and Respondents 2-9.Defendants 2-9 on the one hand and the first respondent/first defendant and other contesting respondents on the other hand. Before we proceed further, it is useful to reproduce the relevant provision, namely, Section 15 of the Act, which reads thus:

    “15. General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus.—(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16,—
    (a) firstly, upon the sons and the daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband;
    (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
    (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
    (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
    (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),—
    (a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and
    (b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.”

    9. The above section propounds a definite and uniform scheme of succession to the property of a female Hindu who dies intestate after the commencement of the Act. This section groups the heirs of a female intestate into five categories described as Entries (a) to (e) and specified in sub-section (1). Two exceptions, both of the same nature are engrafted by sub-section (2) on the otherwise uniform order of succession prescribed by sub-section (1). The two exceptions are that if the female dies without leaving any issue, then (1) in respect of the property inherited by her from her father or mother, that property will devolve not according to the order laid down in the five Entries (a) to (e), but upon the heirs of the father; and (2) in respect of the property inherited by her from her husband or father-in-law, it will devolve not according to the order laid down in the five Entries (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) but upon the heirs of the husband. The two exceptions mentioned above are confined to the property “inherited” from the father, mother, husband and father-in-law of the female Hindu and do not affect the property acquired by her by gift or by device under a Will of any of them. The present Section 15 has to be read in conjunction with Section 16 which evolves a new and uniform order of succession to her property and regulates the manner of its distribution. In other words, the order of succession in case of property inherited by her from her father or mother, its operation is confined to the case of dying without leaving a son, a daughter or children of any predeceased son or daughter.

    10. Sub-section (2) of Section 15 carves out an exception in case of a female dying intestate without leaving son, daughter or children of a predeceased son or daughter. In such a case, the rule prescribed is to find out the source from which she has inherited the property. If it is inherited from her father or mother, it would devolve as prescribed under Section 15(2)(a). If it is inherited by her from her husband or father-in-law, it would devolve upon the heirs of her husband under Section 15(2)(b). The clause enacts that in a case where the property is inherited by a female from her father or mother, it would devolve not upon the other heirs, but upon the heirs of her father. This would mean that if there is no son or daughter including the children of any predeceased son or daughter, then the property would devolve upon the heirs of her father. Result would be — if the property is inherited by a female from her father or her mother, neither her husband nor his heirs would get such property, but it would revert back to the heirs of her father.

    11. In the present case, it is not disputed that Rajathiammal died intestate without leaving any son or daughter or children of a predeceased son or daughter. Hence, the property would devolve on the heirs of her father. It is contended that she got the property because of the compromise decree and, therefore, the property is not inherited by her from her father or mother. This submission, in our view, is without any substance. She was the daughter of Sivabagyammal and, therefore, she was entitled to inherit the property of her maternal grandmother as her mother had expired. As some dispute was raised by the other heirs, a suit was filed. In that suit, rights of Rajathiammal were recognized and a compromise decree was passed in her favour. Result is — she got the property as daughter of her mother. That means, she got the property not from her husband or father-in-law, but from her mother's side. In that state of affairs, the heirs of her father, that is, heirs of S.V Venugopala Chettiar would be entitled to inherit her property in view of Section 15(2)(a) of the Act.

    12. A passage in the case of Ayi Ammal v. Subramania Asari AIR 1966 Mad 369, (1966) 1 MLJ 411, can be beneficially reproduced hereunder: (AIR pp. 369-70, para 2)

    Whereas succession to a female Hindu generally is provided for under sub-section (1) of Section 15 an exception has been engrafted under sub-section (2) recognizing a different mode of devolution in respect of property which the woman acquired by inheritance, in a way to a very limited extent recognizing the old Hindu law in the matter, which restricted a woman's estate in inherited property and provided for its devolution as from the last full owner. Prima facie, the exception engrafted seeks to retain in the father's family property inherited by the deceased lady from her parents and similarly seeks to retain in the husband's family property inherited from her husband or father-in-law. The word “inherit” means to receive as heir, that is, succession by descent.

    13. In the case reported in Venugopala Pillai v. Thayyanayaki Ammal AIR 1979 Mad 124, (1979) 1 MLJ 87 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed that in cases where the female Hindus acquired rights by virtue of compromise is a reiteration and a declaration of a pre-existing right of the female Hindus.

    14. The respective case of the parties, as contended by their respective counsel, has already been summarized in the above paragraphs. It is not in dispute that Rajathiammal died intestate and got certain items by way of compromise in Suit No. 8 of 1926 and in Suit No. 15 of 1942 filed by Natanasabapathy. Items 1 to 3, 5 and 8 to 18 in the plaint second schedule were allotted to Rajathiammal under the compromise decree passed in OS No. 8 of 1926. Likewise, Items 4, 6 and 7 were given to Rajathiammal under the compromise decree passed in OS No. 15 of 1942. Thus all the items got by Rajathiammal were under the compromise decree in both the suits.

    15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant and the counsel for the respondents with specific reference to the pleadings, evidence, exhibits, records and the judgments impugned in this appeal. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff merits acceptance. The trial court, the learned Single Judge and the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court are in error in dismissing or rejecting the case of the appellant-plaintiff.

    16. In our opinion, the contention of the appellant-plaintiff that it is only Section 15(2) of the Act that applies in the instant case to the properties of Rajathiammal upon her death on 1-7-1972 has support and is well founded. The High Court having upheld the finding of the learned Single Judge that Exhibit B-26, a Will executed by Rajathiammal, according to the first respondent, is not a Will that is proved to have been executed by her, should have further held that the properties devolved upon the heirs of the father of Rajathiammal in accordance with Section 15(2)(a) of the Act.

    17. It will be seen from the facts of the present case that Rajathiammal had inherited the property from her mother, the section applicable will be Section 15(2) of the Act, according to which the properties will go to the heirs of her father and, therefore, the appellant-plaintiff and Respondents 2-9.Defendants 2-9 who are the sons and daughters of Rajathiammal's father, Venugopal Chettiar, through his third wife Nagalakshmi would be entitled to the suit properties. Therefore, the case put forward by the first defendant and other contesting defendants that Rajathiammal inherited the properties not from her mother but also from her grandmother and great-grandmother, and, therefore, Section 15(1) of the Act would only apply, cannot at all be countenanced.

    18. In the instant case, Rajathiammal acquired her rights by virtue of a compromise which is a reiteration and a declaration of her pre-existing right. Therefore, on the death of Rajathiammal who died intestate and issueless, the suit properties devolved upon the heirs of her father, Venugopal Chettiar. The present appellant-plaintiff, V. Dandapani Chettiar, who is the son of the father of Rajathiammal through his third wife and Respondents 2-9 and 23 who are children of the father of Rajathiammal and one of his wives become the heirs and are entitled to succeed under Section 15(2)(a) of the Act since the properties which came to Rajathiammal under the compromise decree amount to a declaration of her pre-existing right under the compromise decree passed by the courts.

    19. In our opinion, the appellant-plaintiff and Respondents 2 to 9 and 23.Defendants 2-9 and 23 are the only rightful heirs of Rajathiammal and would be entitled to succeed to the properties of Rajathiammal.

    20. For the foregoing reasons, we have no hesitation to set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore as confirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in AS No. 1055 of 1977 and by the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No. 32 of 1983 dated 12-4-1988.

    21. Therefore, this appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff succeeds. Considering the relationship of the parties to this action, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    V. Dandapani Chettiar v. Balasubramanian Chettiar (Dead) By Lrs. And Others
    (Aug 8, 2003)