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AMICUS AI
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2003 INSC 363
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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Acts
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 363
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a resident of Sultanagaram, was tried before the Sessions Judge, Krishna Division at Machilipatnam (Sessions Case No. 110 of 1998) for offences under Sections 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The prosecution case was that on 14-7-1996 the appellant raped a minor girl (aged 15-16 years) in an unused shed near a canal bund, then threw her into a nearby well, weighed the body down with a stone, and hid torn pieces of her clothes to conceal the crime. When the victim did not return home, relatives searched for her. On information from PW 5 (a neighbour who had seen the appellant speaking with the victim earlier), village elders questioned the appellant, who allegedly confessed. PW 1 (foster-father of the deceased) lodged the First Information Report, and police recovered skeletal remains and the victim’s clothing pursuant to the appellant’s disclosure.

The Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant of the rape (Section 376 IPC) and destruction of evidence (Section 201 IPC) charges, but convicted him of murder under Section 302 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs 100 (with one month’s simple imprisonment in default). The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The present appeal challenges those concurrent findings, relying exclusively on circumstantial evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved the identity of the deceased beyond reasonable doubt in the absence of testimony from the Assistant Director who issued the super-imposition report (Exhibit P-29).
  2. Whether the “last-seen” circumstance, based on PW 5’s testimony, was reliable despite discrepancies highlighted by the defence.
  3. Whether the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-2) and the consequent recovery of material objects (MOs 1-8) satisfied Section 27 of the Evidence Act and could be relied upon.
  4. Whether, cumulatively, the circumstantial evidence formed an unbroken chain pointing unerringly to the appellant’s guilt under Section 302 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Identity of the deceased was not established because the Assistant Director (FSL) who issued Exhibit P-29 was not examined, undermining the super-imposition evidence.
  • The “last-seen” testimony of PW 5 was unreliable due to inconsistencies between her statement in the FIR (two months, 11 a.m.) and her deposition in court (three months, 3 p.m.), further weakened by contradictions marked as Exhibits D-6 to D-8.
  • The disclosure statement and corresponding recoveries were doubtful: the statement and recovery memo lacked the appellant’s signature; the recovered items were allegedly not sealed; and certain items (hairpins and bangles) were not produced in court.
  • Citing Jaskaran Singh v. State of Punjab, counsel argued that such procedural deficiencies render the recovery inadmissible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jaskaran Singh v. State of Punjab, 1997 SCC (Cri) 651; AIR 1995 SC 2345 Disclosure statement and recovery memos that lack signatures of the accused or panch witnesses may not inspire confidence. The Court distinguished the present case: here PW 6 (Village Administrative Officer) and PW 12 (Investigating Officer) testified to both the disclosure and recovery; the recovered items were uniquely traceable to the deceased, rendering the absence of signatures non-fatal.
Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80; AIR 1994 SC 2420 Section 27 Evidence Act: where discovery follows a voluntary disclosure, the information is admissible because the discovery furnishes a guarantee of truthfulness. Relied upon to uphold the admissibility of the appellant’s disclosure, as the recovery of skeletal remains and clothing from concealed locations corroborated the statement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Both lower courts identified five key circumstances; the Supreme Court examined three of them in detail:

  1. Identity of the deceased: Though the Assistant Director who issued Exhibit P-29 was not examined, PW 7 (doctor who performed the post-mortem), PW 9 (forensic scientist) and PW 12 (Investigating Officer) provided consistent evidence that the skeletal remains belonged to a 15-16-year-old female. The Court held that this combination sufficed to establish identity beyond reasonable doubt.
  2. Last-seen circumstance: Discrepancies in PW 5’s timeline (two vs. three months; 11 a.m. vs. 3 p.m.) were deemed minor and attributable to lapse of four years before testimony. Exhibits D-6 to D-8 did not undermine her core assertion that she saw the appellant with the deceased. The Court affirmed the concurrent factual finding that the deceased was last seen in the appellant’s company.
  3. Disclosure statement and recovery: The appellant’s Telugu statement (Exhibit P-2) led to recovery of hair, skeletal remains, clothing and a cement stone from a well containing 6½ feet of water, and torn langas buried near the shed. PW 6 and PW 12 corroborated the process. The Court applied Section 27 of the Evidence Act, stressing that discoveries from concealed places under the appellant’s exclusive knowledge bolstered reliability. It dismissed objections about the absence of signatures, sealing, and non-production of minor items, distinguishing Jaskaran Singh on its facts.

Finding these three circumstances fully proved, consistent, and forming an unbroken chain, the Court concluded that the prosecution met the standard for conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; conviction under Section 302 IPC and life sentence confirmed.

The decision affirms the admissibility of disclosure-led recoveries when adequately corroborated and underscores that minor discrepancies in witness testimony do not vitiate a circumstantial-evidence case, particularly after concurrent findings of fact. No new legal principle was created, but the ruling reinforces existing standards for evaluating circumstantial evidence and Section 27 disclosures.

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    Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State Of A.P .

    H.K Sema, J.— The appellant was put to trial for an offence punishable under Sections 376, 302 and 201 IPC before the Sessions Judge, Krishna Division at Machilipatnam in Sessions Case No. 110 of 1998. After the trial, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant not guilty under Sections 376 and 201 IPC and he was accordingly acquitted of the charges under the aforesaid sections. The learned Sessions Judge, however, found the appellant guilty under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs 100 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The conviction and the sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge were confirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment under challenge.

    2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that the appellant, a resident of Sultanagaram and a neighbour of the deceased Devanaboyina Lakshmi, stated to be a minor girl aged 15-16 years, accosted the deceased about two months prior to the incident on 14-7-1996. It is stated that the deceased went to graze goats at water canal bund. The appellant noticed the deceased going towards the water canal bund, followed her, and began to talk to her with an evil eye. This fact is stated to have been witnessed by PW 5 Sala Ankamma. It is also stated that having found no one present around the area, the appellant caught the deceased, dragged her to a nearby unused shed, gagged her mouth and committed rape on her against her will. It is also alleged that all the resistance put up by the victim girl went in vain as the accused overpowered the girl. It is further disclosed, in the process of struggle the upper and inner langa of the deceased were torn. When the appellant left the deceased alone and was about to part from the place of occurrence, the deceased allegedly was said to have told the appellant that she would bring the matter to the notice of villagers and the police. Being frightened by this disclosure, it is alleged, the appellant chased her, caught her and threw her into the well situated in the north-eastern corner of the dibba. The appellant also kept a stone in the well so as to prevent the body from floating and also put some caveltry creepers (guprapu dekka) with an intention to hide the offence. It is also alleged that the appellant had buried the torn clothes of the deceased. Since the deceased did not return by the evening, her kith and kin started searching for her without any result. Finally, PW 1 (author of FIR and foster-father of the deceased), to whom the deceased was given in adoption by PW 2, came to know through PW 5 Sala Ankamma that two months prior to the date of missing i.e 14-7-1996 she noticed the appellant talking with the deceased. Upon this information being given, PW 1 approached the village elders, one of whom, Rajarao was examined as PW 4. On being asked by the village elders the appellant allegedly confessed the guilt of committing rape on the deceased and throwing her into the well. It is only after this information, PW 1 lodged the FIR (Exhibit P-1). In course of investigation the prosecution examined as many as twelve PWs and marked Exhibits P-1 to P-29 and MOs 1-8. None of the DWs were examined on behalf of the appellant. He, however, pointed out three contradictions in the evidence of PW 5 marked as Exhibits D-6 to D-8. After the conclusion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty as noticed above.

    3. Undisputedly, there is no eyewitness to the occurrence and conviction of the appellant is solely based on the circumstantial evidence.

    4. The learned Sessions Judge, and in our view correctly, has formulated the following circumstantial evidence appearing against the appellant on appreciation of evidence:

    “(i) The identity of the deceased was established.
    (ii) The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused.
    (iii) The accused made an extra-judicial confession before PW 4 and another village elder to the effect that he committed rape on the victim, killed her and threw her into the well.
    (iv) Recovery of the articles and skeletal remains of the deceased pursuant to the disclosures of the information furnished by the accused himself.
    (v) The accused failed to adduce any evidence to the contra to prove the so-called oblique motive of PWs 4 and 6 to implicate him in a false case nor did he state anything mitigating in his Section 313 CrPC statement, a false wholesale denial.”

    5. The learned Sessions Judge having regard to and after considering the evidence on record and exhibits found Circumstances (i), (ii) and (iv) well established against the appellant.

    6. By now it is a well-settled principle of law that in cases where the evidence is purely circumstantial in nature, the facts and circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any reasonable doubt and such circumstances must be consistent and must unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and the chain of circumstances must be established by the prosecution.

    7. Mr Mahendra Anand, learned Senior Counsel vehemently submits that the prosecution has not established the aforesaid circumstances appearing against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. It is his contention that the identity of the deceased was not established beyond all reasonable doubt inasmuch as the Assistant Director (FSL), who issued Exhibit P-29, was not examined. Undisputedly, Exhibit P-29, superimposition report was sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Vijayawada. The Assistant Director, who issued Exhibit P-29 certified that the skull in Item 1 (one) could have belonged to the person in the photograph in Item 2 (two). The Court would not be oblivious of the fact that the identity of the deceased was got tested by superimposition of the skeletal remains of the deceased conducted with reference to the photograph of the deceased. PW 12 deposed that he had sent the photograph of the deceased for superimposition test by the Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad. PW 7 Dr S. Rama Brahmam conducted the post-mortem examination of the skeletal remains (Exhibit P-7). In the said report he gave the age of the deceased between 15-16 years based on his medical knowledge. PW 9 Dr P. Vijaya Kumar, a professor and scientist, working in the Forensic Laboratory examined the skeletal remains in the court and stated that they showed feminine characteristics and the age of the person concerned would be around 15 to 16 years. This apart, Exhibit P-9 is the opinion of the forensic expert which also makes it abundantly clear that the skull belonged to a human being of female sex aged 15 or 16 years. In the facts and circumstances stated above, we have no doubt in our mind, that the identity of the deceased is well established beyond all reasonable doubt and non-examination of the Assistant Director who issued Exhibit P-29 would not itself throw away the otherwise reliable and trustworthy evidence of PWs 7, 9 and 12. We have no reason to take a view different from the view taken by the two courts concurrently.

    8. The next contention of Mr Anand, learned Senior Counsel, is that the deceased was last seen with the appellant by PW 5 has not been established by convincing evidence having regard to the discrepancies appearing in the testimony of PW 5. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in the FIR lodged by PW 1 (Exhibit P-1) it is stated that two months prior to her death she was missing and this information was given to him by PW 5 Sala Ankamma that at about 11.00 a.m she saw the deceased talking with the appellant at Puranamvari Cheruvu whereas PW 5 Sala Ankamma when examined before the court has stated as under:

    “The deceased died about 3 years ago. The deceased was found missing 3 months prior to her death. At that time at about 3.00 p.m, I had been to the canal bank for collecting firewood. There I found the accused and the deceased talking with each other. I told the fact of seeing the accused and the deceased talking with each other two months ago to the parents of the deceased.”

    9. Learned counsel contended that there is discrepancy in Exhibit P-1 and in the statement of PW 5 between 3 months and 2 months and also 11.00 a.m and 3 p.m That apart, the discrepancy as pointed out is not of a substantial character which would throw out the prosecution story as unbelievable. The fact remains that the incident was said to have occurred on 14-7-1996 and PW 5 was examined on 23-5-2000 after a long gap of four years be taken note of. It is not expected from a rustic village woman to have remembered the incident that had taken place after a lapse of four years with mathematical precision. It is but quite natural that human memories are apt to blur with the passage of time. This witness subsequently had admitted that she does not remember the day on which the appellant and the deceased were talking to each other but she, however, reaffirmed that they were talking to each other sitting at the place. The fact remains that PW 5 last saw the deceased and the appellant together and this fact has not been demolished and remains unimpeached. The appellant, as already noticed, brought to the notice of the Court three contradictions in the evidence of PW 5 marked as Exhibits D-6 to D-8. Exhibit D-6 is with regard to contradiction in the evidence of PW 5 that PW 5 saw the deceased last being in the company of the accused three months ago whereas in Exhibit P-1, PW 1 has stated that the deceased was found missing only two months prior to the discovery of death. Exhibits D-7 and D-8 relate to the contradictions in the statement of PW 5 which suggest that her mother, herself and her sister happened to be at the place of incident whereas in her cross-examination she stated that she alone had seen the deceased and the accused together at that point of time. We have gone through the contents of Exhibits D-6 to D-8 which have been placed on record and we are in full agreement with the concurrent finding of the two courts that the contents of Exhibits D-6 to D-8 do not relate to PW 5 having seen the deceased and the appellant together. Therefore, Exhibits D-6 to D-8 do not in any way detract from the truth or the assertion of PW 5 that she alone had seen. The trial court has not placed reliance on the extra-judicial confession while convicting the appellant. This question, therefore, does not detain us any longer.

    10. The next important circumstance which weighed with the trial court to base the conviction, is the recovery of MOs 1-8 at the disclosure statement furnished by the accused. The recovery of MOs is preceded by the disclosure statement made by the appellant (Exhibit P-2) which is in his mother tongue (Telugu). The disclosure statement given by the appellant is carved out from the mediator's report. The translated version of the admissible portion quoted by the learned trial Judge reads as follows:

    “If you come with me, the day how Lakshmi was raped at the bank of Puranam Lake and how Lakshmi was forcibly thrown in the well and killed at that place, in what clothes she was and which lange (paiticot) she wear and lange's pieces were digged and close down in the earth and that place I can show as he said….”
    (It is stated in the court that translation is not happily drafted.)

    11. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. In the instant case the recovery (Exhibit P-2) was made on the basis of the disclosure statement furnished by the appellant. The disclosure statement (Exhibit P-2) is proved by the mediator examined as PW 6 who is the Village Administrative Officer and also the Inspector of Police examined as PW 12. PW 6 has stated that on the basis of the disclosure statement (Exhibit P-2) the accused led the party to a place called “Puranamvari Dibba” where they found a dilapidated tin-roofed shed and a well. From inside the well, hair, hairpins, bangles were recovered and the police seized those articles under the cover of Ext. P-3. MO 3 is the hair, MO 4 is the cement pole piece, MO 5 is the bones. Then the accused led the party to a spot behind the tin-roofed shed. The accused then dug out and unearthed the piece of langa. MO 6 is the piece of blue langa and MO 7 is the pieces of green langa. MO 8 is the pieces of mithai-coloured langa.

    12. PW 12 arrested the appellant and questioned him. He stated that on being interrogated in the presence of PW 6 the appellant offered to show the place of occurrence and also where the dead body was thrown. He also offered to show the clothes of the deceased. Pursuant to the disclosure, he took the party to the well and disclosed that the body had been thrown into the well where there was a water level of 6 1/2 feet and with the help of swimmers the body was recovered from the well marked as MO 3 and MO 5 i.e hair and skeletal remains respectively. They also recovered white plastic bangles and MO 1 jacket. They also recovered cement pole piece (survey stone) MO 4. The said stone was stated to have been kept to prevent the body from floating. He further stated that the accused then led them to a place towards the western side of the nearby shed and dug out a spot from where pieces of langa were retrieved, marked as MO 2, MO 6 and MO 8.

    13. PW 3, who is none other than the foster-mother of the deceased has stated that when the deceased left the house for the last time she was wearing clothes MO 1 and MO 2. It is a matter of common knowledge that women have an inherent sense of identifying the wearing apparel of their daughters who are attached to the mother, particularly the attire worn commonly by them in the house. We have no doubt in our mind, therefore, that the wearing apparel of the deceased dug out from the place at the disclosure of the appellant and identified by PW 3 were the wearing apparel of the deceased at the time she left the house and was subsequently missing.

    14. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the disclosure statement and recovery of the articles is doubtful and no reliance can be placed on such disclosure statement and recovery of MOs. He further contended that the materials recovered were not sealed by the police. Hairpins and bangles said to have been recovered were not produced before the court and these circumstances will make the recovery all the more doubtful. The counsel relied on the decision of this Court rendered in Jaskaran Singh v. State of Punjab 1997 SCC (Cri) 651, AIR 1995 SC 2345 wherein in para 8, SC at p. 2347, it was pointed out that the disclosure statement inspires no confidence because none of the two panch witnesses Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh have been examined at the trial and secondly, because the disclosure statement does not bear the signature or the thumb impression of the appellant and also the recovery memo does not bear the signature or thumb impression of the accused. Every case has to be decided on its own facts. The facts of that case do not fit in the facts of the case at hand. In the present case, as already noticed, PW 6 and PW 12 were examined to prove the disclosure as well as the recovery pursuant to the disclosure statement of the appellant. In the instant case, while it is true that neither the disclosure statement nor the recovery memo bear the signatures of the accused but the fact remains that pursuant to the disclosure statement MOs have been recovered from the well and dug out from a place which is pointed out by the appellant, leaves no manner of doubt that the recovery of MOs has been made on the basis of the voluntary disclosure statement. In Jaskaran Singh case 1997 SCC (Cri) 651, AIR 1995 SC 2345 the recovery memo Ext. P-9.A relates to revolver and cartridges. There the appellant had denied the ownership of the crime revolver and the prosecution had led no evidence to show that the crime weapon belonged to the appellant. The observation of this Court was in that context. In the instant case, as already noticed, the recovery is pursuant to the disclosure statement offered by the appellant. The fact that the recovery is in consequence of the information given is fortified and confirmed by the discovery of wearing apparel and skeletal remains of the deceased which leads to believe that the information and the statement cannot be false.

    15. The provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and consequently, the said information can safely be allowed to be given in evidence because if such an information is further fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles or the instrument of crime and which leads to the belief that the information about the confession made as to the articles of crime then cannot be false. (See Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80, AIR 1994 SC 2420, AIR at p. 2448; SCC at p. 119.) As already noticed MO 3, MO 4 and MO 5 were retrieved from the well with the help of swimmers, as there was a water level of 6 1/2 feet. MO 2, MO 6 and MO 8 are the pieces of langa dug out and unearthed at the disclosure of the appellant. These materials were not found lying on the surface of the ground but they were found inside the well, which had 6 1/2-feet-deep water, with the help of swimmers and were found after being dug out and unearthed only after the place was pointed out by the appellant. It is not found from a place where the public can have free access. Therefore, there is no reasonable apprehension of the material exhibits being planted to rope in the appellant in the crime.

    16. Mr Anand next contended that the investigating officer PW 12 did not have the lac seal fixed on the particulars so recovered and no evidentiary value can be attached to the recovery. We are unable to countenance the contention of the learned counsel because nowhere in the statement PW 12 has stated that he had not fixed a seal on the material so seized. This question was also not put to PW 12 in his cross-examination. At the same time PW 6 has stated that the police took away all the articles seized along with them one hour after completing Ext. P-3. In Ext. P-3 there is a mention about the pieces of langa being packed there itself and affixing the chits with the signatures of the mediators on that packet.

    17. Lastly, it is contended by Mr Anand that hairpins and bangles so recovered at the disclosure statement of the appellant were not produced before the court. Non-production of hairpins and bangles before the court would not by itself disclose tampering of evidence with regard to the recovery of MOs inasmuch as MOs 1-8 as noticed above have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Non-production of hairpins and bangles before the court during the course of trial in the facts and circumstances as aforestated become inconsequential. No prejudice also seems to have been caused to the appellant by non-production of hairpins and bangles.

    18. For the aforestated reasons, we do not find any infirmity in the order under challenge. The appeal, therefore, fails and stands dismissed.

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    Golakonda Venkateswara Rao v. State Of A.P .
    (Aug 1, 2003)