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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 20
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)
  • Section 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (the Customs Act)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2003 INSC 20
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)
  • Section 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (the Customs Act)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was apprehended at Trivandrum Airport on 12-8-1985 after arriving from Dubai with 90 gold biscuits of foreign origin concealed in his luggage and an electric water motor, valued at approximately Rs. 22 lakhs. He was prosecuted under Section 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam convicted him and awarded three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 20,000, with a default sentence. On appeal, the Sessions Court reduced the custodial term to two years while maintaining the fine.

During the pendency of these criminal proceedings, the petitioner was also preventively detained for two years under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA); that detention was later quashed by the Delhi High Court. In a revision before the Kerala High Court, the petitioner sought to have the COFEPOSA detention period set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The High Court rejected both the merits of the conviction and the request for set-off. The present petition before the Supreme Court sought leave to appeal against that refusal. The Court condoned the delay but, considering many similar cases, decided to dispose of the matter by a reasoned order without granting leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period of preventive detention undergone by the petitioner under COFEPOSA—subsequently quashed—can be set off against the sentence imposed on his conviction under Section 135(1) of the Customs Act by invoking Section 428 of the CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Invoked Section 428 CrPC to claim that any period of imprisonment undergone by an accused as an undertrial, irrespective of the case in which it was undergone, is liable to be set off against a later sentence.
  • Relied heavily on State of Maharashtra v. Najakat Ali Mubarak Ali (2001) 6 SCC 311 to assert that the provision is broad enough to include detention connected with “any other case.”
  • Contended that the factual situation was identical to Govt. of A.P. v. Anne Venkatesware (1977) 3 SCC 298, favouring a set-off.

The opinion does not record any detailed arguments made by the respondent/State.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. Najakat Ali Mubarak Ali (2001) 6 SCC 311 Period of imprisonment undergone by an accused as an undertrial, whether in the same case or another, may be set off under Section 428 CrPC. Relied upon by the petitioner; the Court distinguished it, holding that preventive detention is not undertrial detention and therefore outside Section 428.
Govt. of A.P. v. Anne Venkatesware (1977) 3 SCC 298 Section 428 allows set-off only for detention “during investigation, enquiry or trial of the same case.” Preventive detention cannot be set off. Expressly followed; formed the cornerstone of the Court’s refusal to grant set-off.
R. v. Halliday (1917) AC 260 (HL) Preventive detention is precautionary, not punitive; undertaken to avert anticipated harm. Cited to reaffirm the conceptual distinction between preventive and punitive detention.
Kubic Darusz v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 568 Reiterated that preventive detention is not by way of punishment but a precautionary measure. Quoted to support the view that COFEPOSA detention cannot be treated as undertrial custody for Section 428 purposes.
Champalal Punjaji Shah v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 507 Confirmed that preventive detention periods are excluded from Section 428 set-off. Cited as additional authority buttressing the Court’s conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by reciting the text of Section 428 CrPC and identifying its two statutory requisites: (1) detention must have been undergone “during the investigation, enquiry or trial” of a particular case, and (2) a sentence of imprisonment must subsequently be imposed in that same case. It traced the legislative intent behind the provision, emphasising that Parliament introduced it to alleviate the hardship of excessive undertrial incarceration, not to collapse the conceptual divide between undertrial and preventive detention.

Drawing on Govt. of A.P. v. Anne Venkatesware and a trilogy of subsequent cases, the Court underscored that preventive detention is fundamentally non-punitive. Quoting R. v. Halliday and Kubic Darusz, it reiterated that such detention is a precautionary step to forestall potential wrongdoing and is justified on suspicion rather than proof of an offence. Consequently, it lacks the penal character contemplated by Section 428.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s attempt to distinguish the earlier Supreme Court decisions on the ground that they involved post-conviction preventive detention. It held that the temporal sequence was immaterial; the defining feature is the nature of preventive detention itself, which remains non-punitive and unrelated to the “investigation, enquiry or trial” of the customs prosecution. Therefore, the statutory pre-conditions of Section 428 were not satisfied.

Having found no merit in the plea for set-off, the Court dismissed the petition.

Holding and Implications

Petition Dismissed.

As a result, the petitioner cannot deduct the period of COFEPOSA detention from the two-year custodial sentence imposed under the Customs Act and must serve the remaining term in full. The decision restates, but does not expand, the settled principle that preventive detention periods fall outside the ambit of Section 428 CrPC; no new precedent is set beyond reaffirming existing jurisprudence.

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    Maliyakkal Abdul Azeez v. Asstt. Collector, Kerala And Another

    Order

    1. Delay condoned.

    2. Though this is not a case which deserves grant of leave to prefer appeal, we think it appropriate to dispose of the petition with a reasoned order as many cases involving similar issues are being filed.

    3. According to the petitioner, he is entitled to set-off as provided under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) for the period of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short “COFEPOSA”), since the detention was quashed by the Delhi High Court. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali (2001) 6 SCC 311 to contend that the period is available to be set off against the period of sentence imposed on conviction under Section 135(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (in short “the Customs Act”).

    4. The factual position is almost undisputed and needs to be noted in brief. The prosecution version which led to trial of the accused-petitioner is as follows:

    The petitioner arrived at Trivandrum Airport on 12-8-1985 from Dubai by Air India Flight No. AI 920. Though declaration was given by him about the possession of 16 items, nothing was stated about possession of the gold. When his baggage was subjected to open examination, it was revealed that he was carrying 20 gold biscuits of foreign origin. On the basis of the information furnished by the petitioner, an electric water motor brought by him was opened and 70 gold biscuits were found concealed. The total value of the illegally transported gold biscuits was fixed at around Rs 22 lakhs. The Assistant Collector, Air Customs, Trivandrum Airport filed a complaint and the petitioner faced trial by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam. As noted above, he was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 135(1) of the Customs Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs 20,000 with default stipulation of two months' simple imprisonment. Appeal before the Sessions Court, Ernakulam was partly allowed and the custodial sentence was reduced to two years. The fine amount was maintained, but default stipulation partly modified.

    5. In the revision filed before the Kerala High Court, the conviction and sentence imposed were challenged. Additionally, it was prayed that the period of detention under COFEPOSA was for two years and should be set off in terms of Section 428 of the Code. The High Court rejected the revision on merits. The plea relating to set-off was also turned down. It was held that the period spent under COFEPOSA was not to be considered as detention for the purpose of the criminal case. It was further noted that the petitioner was on bail while the detention order was passed and, therefore, cannot be treated to be an undertrial prisoner. He was in judicial custody when detained under COFEPOSA. After detention under COFEPOSA, bail granted was not cancelled and, therefore, the petitioner was not an undertrial prisoner.

    6. In support of the application for grant of leave, strong reliance was placed on the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Najakat Alia Mubarak Ali (2001) 6 SCC 311. It was submitted that the period of imprisonment undergone by an accused as an undertrial during investigation, enquiry or trial of a particular case irrespective of whether it was in connection with the same case or any other can be set off against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on conviction in that particular case. It was further submitted that the facts situation is identical to those involved in Govt. of A.P v. Anne Venkatesware (1977) 3 SCC 298.

    7. In order to appreciate the stand of the petitioner, Section 428 of the Code needs to be noted. The provision reads as follows:

    “428. Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment.—Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.”

    8. The two requisites postulated in Section 428 of the Code are:

    (1) During the stage of investigation, enquiry or trial of a particular case the prisoner should have been in jail at least for a certain period.
    (2) He should have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in that case.

    If the above two conditions are satisfied then the operative part of the provision comes into play i.e if the sentence of imprisonment awarded is longer than the period of detention undergone by him during the stages of investigation, enquiry or trial, the convicted person need undergo only the balance period of imprisonment after deducting the earlier period from the total period of imprisonment awarded.

    9. Section 428 of the Code was brought on the statute-book for the first time in 1973. It was incorporated in the light of the proposal put forward by the Joint Select Committee. It was noticed by the Committee that in many cases the accused persons are kept in prison for a very long period as undertrial prisoners and in some cases the period spent in jail by undertrial prisoners far exceeded the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded. It was also noticed by the Committee with concern that a large number of prisoners in the overcrowded jails of the country were undertrial prisoners. The provision was introduced to remedy the unsatisfactory state of affairs, by providing for setting off the period of detention as undertrial prisoners against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the accused. Views of the Committee were expressed in the following words:

    “The Committee has noted the distressing fact that in many cases accused persons are kept in prison for very long period as undertrial prisoners and in some cases the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded is a fraction of the period spent in jail as undertrial prisoner. Indeed, there may even be cases where such a person is acquitted. No doubt, sometimes courts do take into account the period of detention undergone as undertrial prisoner when passing sentence and occasionally the sentence of imprisonment is restricted to the period already undergone. But this is not always the case so that in many cases the accused person is made to suffer jail life for a period out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence or even to the punishment provided in the statute. The Committee has also noted that a large number of persons in the overcrowded jails of today are undertrial prisoners. The new clause seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs. The new clause provides for the setting off of the period of detention as an undertrial prisoner against the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him. The Committee trusts that the provision contained in the new clause would go a long way to mitigate the evil.”

    10. In Govt. of A.P v. Anne Venkatesware (1977) 3 SCC 298 it was observed that Section 428 provides for set-off of the period of detention of an accused as an undertrial prisoner against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction. It only provides for a “set-off”, but does not equate an “undertrial detention or remand detention with imprisonment on conviction”. The provision as to set-off expresses a legislative policy; this does not mean that it does away with the difference in the two kinds of detention and puts things on the same footing for all purposes.

    11. A preventive detention as was held in R. v. Halliday 1917 AC 260, 86 LJKB 1119 (HL) (AC at p. 268) “is not punitive but a precautionary measure”. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept him before he does it and to prevent him from doing it. No offence is proved, nor is any charge formulated; and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability and there is no criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. In this sense it is an anticipatory action. Preventive justice requires an action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. In case of punitive detention the person concerned is detained by way of punishment after being found guilty of wrongdoing where he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself, while preventive detention is not by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to prevent a person from indulging in any conduct injurious to the society. This position was noticed by this Court in Kubic Darusz v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 568, AIR 1990 SC 605.

    12. In Govt. of A.P v. Anne Venkatesware (1977) 3 SCC 298 this Court observed as follows:

    “It is true that the section speaks of the ‘period of detention’ undergone by an accused person, but it expressly says that the detention mentioned refers to the detention during the investigation, enquiry or trial of the case in which the accused person has been convicted. The section makes it clear that the period of detention which it allows to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused on conviction must be during the investigation, enquiry or trial in connection with the ‘same case’ in which he has been convicted. We therefore agree with the High Court that the period during which the writ petitioners were in preventive detention cannot be set off under Section 428 against the term of imprisonment imposed on them.”

    13. The view was reiterated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Champalal Punjaji Shah v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 507.

    14. Though learned counsel for the petitioner tried to distinguish the last-named two cases on the footing that they related to post-conviction detention, we do not think that the same is really of any consequence in view of the settled legal position that detention under the preventive detention laws is not punitive but is essentially a precautionary measure intended to prevent and intercept a person before he commits an infra-active act which he had done earlier.

    15. The petition is without any merit and is dismissed.

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    Maliyakkal Abdul Azeez v. Asstt. Collector, Kerala And Another
    (Jan 17, 2003)