Khazan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Union Of India ., Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Factual and Procedural Background

Land belonging to Khazan Singh was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Collector on 16 July 1984, Singh sought a reference to the civil court under Section 18. While the reference was pending before the District Judge, neither the claimant nor his counsel appeared on 29 September 1997, leading the Additional District Judge to dismiss the reference for default.

After Khazan Singh’s death, his legal heirs (the present appellants) moved for restoration of the reference under Order 9 Rule 9 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court refused restoration, finding no sufficient cause for the earlier absence. An appeal to the High Court was also dismissed on similar grounds, prompting the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 MP 1	A reference under Section 18 cannot be dismissed for default.	Cited to reinforce that dismissal for default is impermissible.
Bhadar Munda v. Dhuchua Oraon, AIR 1970 Pat 209	Same principle—civil court must decide the reference on merits.	Relied upon as consistent authority.
Shyam Shankar Sahai v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 Pat 176	Reiterated that non-appearance does not empower the court to reject the reference.	Cited in support of the core proposition.
Fr. Joseph v. Government of Kerala, (1991) 2 KLT 69	Confirmed that dismissal for default is not contemplated by the Act.	Quoted as a Division Bench authority taking the same view.
Jogi Sahu v. Collector, AIR 1991 Ori 283	(i) Reference cannot be dismissed for default; (ii) Restoration can be sought under Section 151 CPC even if filed under Order 9 Rule 9.	Used both to bolster the main principle and to validate the avenue for restoration.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Abdul Karim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 MP 1

A reference under Section 18 cannot be dismissed for default.

Cited to reinforce that dismissal for default is impermissible.

Bhadar Munda v. Dhuchua Oraon, AIR 1970 Pat 209

Same principle—civil court must decide the reference on merits.

Relied upon as consistent authority.

Shyam Shankar Sahai v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 Pat 176

Reiterated that non-appearance does not empower the court to reject the reference.

Cited in support of the core proposition.

Fr. Joseph v. Government of Kerala, (1991) 2 KLT 69

Confirmed that dismissal for default is not contemplated by the Act.

Quoted as a Division Bench authority taking the same view.

Jogi Sahu v. Collector, AIR 1991 Ori 283

(i) Reference cannot be dismissed for default; (ii) Restoration can be sought under Section 151 CPC even if filed under Order 9 Rule 9.

Used both to bolster the main principle and to validate the avenue for restoration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework of the Land Acquisition Act, emphasising Sections 18, 20 and 26. Once a valid reference is made, Section 20 mandates the court to “proceed to determine the objection” and Section 26 requires an award, deemed a decree, to be passed. The Court reasoned that the Act contemplates an adjudication on merits, not a summary dismissal.

Non-participation of a party merely exposes that party to an adverse award; it does not confer jurisdiction on the court to terminate the proceedings for default. The Court found support in a consistent line of High Court decisions holding that dismissal for default is ultra vires the Act. It also acknowledged that, as held in Jogi Sahu, restoration of an improperly dismissed reference is permissible under the court’s inherent powers in Section 151 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; dismissal order dated 29 September 1997 set aside. The District Court is directed to adjudicate the reference and pass an award in accordance with Section 26.

Implications: The judgment reaffirms that courts dealing with references under Section 18 must decide them on the merits and lack authority to dismiss such references for default. It safeguards claimants against loss of statutory remedies due to non-appearance and clarifies that restoration applications can be entertained under the court’s inherent powers. No new precedent is set, but the Supreme Court’s endorsement lends authoritative weight to the existing jurisprudence.

Khazan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Union Of India .

K.T Thomas, J.— Leave granted.

2. Can the reference made by a Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) be dismissed for default? A civil court dismissed the reference for default of the claimant as he failed to be present when the matter was taken up. He made an unsuccessful bid to have the reference restored to the file. The High Court also did not help him as per the impugned order.

3. The appellants are the legal heirs of one Khazan Singh. Certain area of land belonging to the said Khazan Singh was acquired under the provisions of the Act and an award was passed by the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) on 16-7-1984, fixing the compensation payable to the landowners. As Khazan Singh was not satisfied with the amount fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer he moved an application under Section 18 of the Act for making a reference to the civil court. The Land Acquisition Officer, acting on the said application made the reference. It was pending before the Court of the District Judge. On 29-9-1997 the Additional District Judge dismissed the reference on the premise that “neither the applicant nor his counsel appeared in the court on the said date”.

4. In the meanwhile Khazan Singh died and the present appellants filed an application quoting Order 9 Rule 9 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (“the Code” for short) for restoration of the reference. The Additional District Judge rejected the said petition on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for the absence of the appellant or his counsel on 29-9-1997.

5. The appellants thereafter filed an appeal before the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal, mainly on the ground that absence of the appellant and his counsel has not been satisfactorily explained, and also on the ground that there was unexplained delay in moving the application for restoration. It is the said judgment of the High Court which is now being challenged in this appeal.

6. Section 18 of the Act empowers a person interested in the land to move by a written application to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred for determination of the court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. If the application for reference is in order the Collector is bound to make a reference of it to the court. Section 20 of the Act enjoins on the court to “proceed to determine the objection”. The court shall after holding such inquiry as may be necessary pass an award. Section 26 of the Act reads thus:

“26. Form of Awards.—(1) Every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.

(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2 clause (2) and Section 2 clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

7. The provisions above subsumed would thus make it clear that the civil court has to pass an award in answer to the reference made by the Collector under Section 18 of the Act. If any party to whom notice has been served by the civil court did not participate in the inquiry it would only be at his risk because an award would be passed perhaps to the detriment of the party concerned. But non-participation of any party would not confer jurisdiction on the civil court to dismiss the reference for default.

8. It appears that various High Courts have taken the aforesaid view in a number of decisions: Abdul Karim v. State Of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1964 MP 1, 1963 MPLJ 867, Bhadar Munda v. Dhuchua Oraon AIR 1970 Pat 209, 1970 BLJR 8, Shyam Shankar Sahai v. State of Bihar AIR 1974 Pat 176, 1974 BLJR 162, Fr. Joseph v. Government Of Kerala (1991) 2 KLT 69 and Jogi Sahu v. Collector AIR 1991 Ori 283.

9. In Fr. Joseph v. Government Of Kerala (1991) 2 KLT 69 Paripoornan, J. (as he then was) speaking for a Division Bench has made reference to two earlier decisions of Single Judges, one by the same High Court and the other by the Karnataka High Court which held the same view.

10. In Jogi Sahu v. Collector AIR 1991 Ori 283 Pasayat, J. (as he then was) further held that an application for restoration of the reference can be entertained under Section 151 of the Code albeit the same was filed quoting Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code.

11. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the Additional District Court on 29-9-1997 by which the reference was dismissed for default. The said District Court will now proceed to answer the reference in accordance with the law and pass award as envisaged in Section 26 of the Act. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Civil Appeal No. 667 of 2002, decided on January 24, 2002

Khazan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Union Of India .

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Khazan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. v. Union Of India .

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