AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 323
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 196(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • The Code [Section not specified], Year not mentioned
  • Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 120-B, Section 121, Section 121-A, Section 122, Section 123, Section 212 IPC and under Sections 25(1)(A) and (B), 27 of the Arms Act
  • Article 136
  • Section 200, and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202, Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 196(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 323
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 196(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • The Code [Section not specified], Year not mentioned
  • Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 120-B, Section 121, Section 121-A, Section 122, Section 123, Section 212 IPC and under Sections 25(1)(A) and (B), 27 of the Arms Act
  • Article 136
  • Section 200, and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202, Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 196(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (Accused 9) was charge-sheeted on 12-4-2000 for offences under Sections 120-B, 121, 121-A, 122, 123 and 212 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25(1)(A)&(B) and 27 of the Arms Act. Because these offences are triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the Metropolitan Magistrate committed the case to the City Sessions Court on 4-5-2000. Government sanction under Section 196(1) CrPC—required for offences under Chapter VI IPC—was obtained on 7-5-2000 and produced before the Sessions Court before the charge was framed.

The petitioner’s discharge application, contending that no prima facie case existed, was rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge. A revision filed under Sections 397/401 CrPC before the Gujarat High Court raised an additional ground—that the committal was illegal because the sanction order had not been produced before the Magistrate. The High Court dismissed the revision on 3-11-2001. The present special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether failure to place the requisite sanction under Section 196(1) CrPC before the committing Magistrate vitiates the committal proceedings and the subsequent trial in the Court of Session.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The Magistrate, while deciding to commit, necessarily “takes cognizance” of the offences; therefore, the statutory bar in Section 196(1) CrPC applied at that stage.
  • Committal is a judicial act requiring satisfaction that an offence exclusively triable by the Sessions Court is disclosed; hence, absence of prior sanction renders the entire proceeding void.
  • Relied on Supreme Court decisions (Rajender Kumar Jain; State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman) emphasising the judicial nature of committal, and on precedents defining “taking cognizance”.

State’s Arguments

  • The Magistrate, at the committal stage, conducts only an inquiry and need not take cognizance; therefore Section 196(1) is not attracted then.
  • Non-production of sanction before the Magistrate does not vitiate proceedings because the sanction was produced before the Sessions Court, which must itself take cognizance before trial.
  • Any procedural lapse should not derail the prosecution, especially when the objection was raised belatedly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207 Definition of “taking cognizance” – the point at which a court first takes judicial notice of an offence. Cited to analyse whether the Magistrate “takes cognizance” when committing a case.
Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal 437 Magistrate must apply mind to proceed under Chapter XVI to be said to have taken cognizance. Relied upon by both sides to support competing views on when cognizance occurs.
Gopal Marwari v. King-Emperor, AIR 1943 Pat 245 Earlier articulation of the concept of cognizance adopted in R.R. Chari. Referred to provide historical context for the meaning of cognizance.
Rajender Kumar Jain v. State, (1980) 3 SCC 435 Committal is a judicial function requiring evaluation of the case. Invoked by petitioner to argue sanction must precede committal.
State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman, (1983) 2 SCC 372 Reiterated that committal is not a mechanical act. Supported petitioner’s stance on the Magistrate’s duty at committal.
Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P., (2000) 2 SCC 504 Sessions Court must also take cognizance after committal; Section 193 bars original cognizance unless committed. Cited to show that cognizance is again taken by the Sessions Court, diluting the importance of sanction at the committal stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court acknowledged the persuasive force of the petitioner’s contention that a Magistrate may take cognizance before committal. Nevertheless, it focused on two decisive considerations:

  • Stage of Effective Cognizance: Regardless of whether the Magistrate had earlier taken cognizance, the Sessions Court must necessarily take cognizance before commencing trial. The sanction order had been produced before the Sessions Court, satisfying the statutory requirement at that critical stage.
  • Procedural Fairness and Delay: The objection to sanction was not raised before either the Magistrate or the Sessions Court. Accepting it at the Supreme Court stage would merely necessitate a fresh, formal committal, causing delay without substantive benefit. The Court found no miscarriage of justice requiring intervention under Article 136.

Holding and Implications

Special Leave Petition Dismissed.

The prosecution will proceed in the Sessions Court on the basis of the sanction already produced there. The judgment sets no new precedent; its practical effect is limited to denying the petitioner’s attempt to annul the committal on technical grounds and to emphasise judicial reluctance to entertain belated procedural objections that do not cause prejudice.

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    Dharmesh Alias Nanu Nitinbhai Shah v. State Of Gujarat .

    P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.— This special leave petition arises out of the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat rejecting the revision application filed by the petitioner herein against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad. A charge-sheet for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 121, 121-A, 122, 123, 212 IPC and under Sections 25(1)(A) and (B), 27 of the Arms Act came to be filed by the police on 12-4-2000 in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate. The petitioner figures as Accused 9 therein. The case being triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the learned Magistrate submitted the case to the Court of City Session by an order dated 4-5-2000. Sanction for prosecution as required by Section 196(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was obtained on 7-5-2000, such sanction being necessary in view of the fact that the petitioner stands accused of some of the offences falling under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code viz. collection of arms for the purpose of waging war against the Government etc. Sanction accorded by the State Government was produced before the Court of Session before the charge was framed against the petitioner-accused. The petitioner applied to the Court of Session for discharge on the ground that there was no prima facie evidence to frame the charge against him. That application was rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad. Thereupon, a revision petition was filed in the High Court under Sections 397/401 CrPC. In that revision, an additional ground was raised for the first time that the entire proceedings including committal of the case to the Court of Session are vitiated by illegality for want of sanction under Section 196 CrPC and, therefore, the criminal proceedings cannot go on against him. The High Court by the impugned order dated 3-11-2001 dismissed the revision application, rejecting both the grounds urged. Hence, this special leave petition. After notice to the State, we have heard the learned counsel.

    2. We are concerned here with the second ground, that is to say, the effect of non-production of sanction order before the learned Magistrate who committed the case to the Court of Session as that is the only point urged before us. The High Court was of the view that while committing the case to the Court of Session, the Magistrate cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. “It cannot be laid down”, observed the learned Judge “that unless Magistrate takes cognizance, he cannot commit the case to the Court of Session”. The learned Judge, after referring to the decisions of the Calcutta and Kerala High Courts, observed thus:

    “In both the decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioner, it has been laid down that the committal proceedings is an enquiry before the Magistrate. It is not necessary, therefore, that during the enquiry, Magistrate is obliged to take cognizance of the offence. The glaring example is in Section 200 CrPC when Magistrate conducts enquiry before issuing process under Section 204….”

    The learned Judge of the High Court therefore held that the ban under Section 196(1) is not attracted to the committal proceedings. The correctness of the view taken by the High Court has been questioned before us.

    3. Section 196(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins that

    no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government.

    The sanction of the Government is thus a precondition for the cognizance of the offences specified in various clauses of Section 196. Section 193 enacts a bar against the Court of Session taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the provisions of the Code. However, if the Code or any law in force expressly provides for the Court of Session directly taking cognizance, the fetter under Section 193 does not apply. The other provision which deserves notice is Section 209. It provides for commitment of case if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. In R.R Chari v. State of U.P AIR 1951 SC 207, 1951 SCR 312, 1951 Cri LJ 775 this Court observed, relying on the dicta in Gopal Marwari v. Emperor AIR 1943 Pat 245 that the word “cognizance” was used in the Code to indicate a point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence and that it is a different thing from the initiation of proceeding. The following exposition of law by Das Gupta, J. in Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B v. Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR 1950 Cal 437 was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court: (AIR p. 438, para 7)

    “What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, — proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g, ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.”

    4. Both the learned counsel relied on the above passage to support their arguments. That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the observations made in the decision of this Court in Rajender Kumar Jain v. State (1980) 3 SCC 435 and State of U.P v. Lakshmi Brahman (1983) 2 SCC 372 submits that the committal, even under the new Code, is not a mechanical act, but a judicial function to be performed by the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to be satisfied that an offence is prima facie disclosed and such offence is triable exclusively by a Court of Session. The fact that the proceeding before the Magistrate is in the nature of an inquiry does not make any difference, according to the learned counsel. The learned counsel then submits that the inquiry culminates in making the order of commitment and thus facilitates trial before the Court of Session and therefore the dicta laid down by Das Gupta, J. applies with full force. The fact that the Court of Session is disabled from taking cognizance as a court of original jurisdiction (vide Section 193) is a definite point that the Magistrate takes cognizance before passing an order of commitment, argues the learned counsel.

    5. The learned counsel for the respondent State seeks support from the judgment of the High Court and further contends that the proceedings are not vitiated merely for the reason that the sanction order was not produced at the stage of committal of the case.

    6. Though there is considerable force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Magistrate does take cognizance of the offence before committing the case to the Court of Session, still the question remains whether the sanction order is required to be produced before the Magistrate who takes cognizance in the first instance or before the Sessions Court which has exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence. Though the Sessions Court cannot take cognizance of the offence as a court of original jurisdiction, it has to necessarily take cognizance before commencing the trial after committal. That the Sessions Court takes cognizance of the offence irrespective of the fact whether the committal Magistrate at an anterior point of time had taken cognizance of the same offence for the purpose of committal cannot be doubted. If any authority is needed, we may refer to the following observations in Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P (2000) 2 SCC 504:

    “The section imposes an interdict on all Courts of Session against taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction. It can take cognizance only if ‘the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate’, as provided in the Code.”

    7. We are not inclined to discuss the issue further and express our opinion on the question formulated in the preceding paragraph. We are of the view that it is not a fit case to interfere by granting leave in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136. Firstly, as already noticed, the petitioner did not choose to raise the objection regarding sanction either before the Magistrate or even before the Sessions Court. The only point urged before the learned Sessions Judge in the application for discharge was that there is no evidence even prima facie to connect the accused with the offence. The contention regarding non-production of the order of sanction before the Magistrate was urged for the first time in the revision filed in the High Court. Even then, we could have considered this contention, if substantial relief could be granted to the petitioner or if injustice could be averted. Assuming that the petitioner is right in his contention, at best, the matter has to be sent back to the Magistrate to go through a fresh process of committal after receiving the sanction order filed by the prosecution. In any case, the matter would have to come up to the Sessions Court again. The compliance with the formality would only result in further delay in holding the trial, without any corresponding advantage to the petitioner. Such a situation should not be permitted to happen while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136, more so when the petitioner inexplicably failed to raise the objection at the earliest. Evidently, he chose to raise the objections in piecemeal without apparent justification. For these reasons, the petition is dismissed.

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    Dharmesh Alias Nanu Nitinbhai Shah v. State Of Gujarat .
    (Aug 1, 2002)