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Disposition
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  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-landlord filed a suit for eviction against Respondent 4 (tenant) in respect of Shop No. D-50/128, Mohalla Kajipura Kala, Nai Sarak, Varanasi. Among several grounds, the landlord alleged that the tenant had unlawfully sub-let the premises. The trial court, relying inter alia on a Commissioner’s report showing that third parties were conducting a ready-made garments business in and around the shop and that the tenant had produced no business licences or documents, decreed eviction. A revision filed by the tenant was dismissed. The tenant then invoked Article 226 of the Constitution; the High Court allowed the writ petition on 30-4-1997, characterising the situation as, at most, a “casual licence.” The present appeal challenges that High Court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, exceeded its supervisory limits by re-appreciating evidence and substituting its own findings for those of the trial and revisional courts.
  2. Whether the factual findings of sub-letting reached by the trial and revisional courts were liable to be disturbed in the absence of jurisdictional error, illegality, or procedural impropriety.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477; (1964) 5 SCR 64 Defines the limited, supervisory nature of certiorari under Article 226; errors of jurisdiction may be corrected, but findings of fact cannot be re-opened unless based on no evidence or influenced by inadmissible evidence. Relied upon to hold that the High Court was not entitled to re-appreciate evidence or craft a new factual theory (“casual licence”), absent any jurisdictional error in the lower courts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated the constitutional limits on a High Court’s power to issue certiorari, citing Syed Yakoob. It observed that:

  • The trial and revisional courts had, after evaluating evidence—including a Commissioner’s report—concluded that the tenant had sub-let the premises.
  • The High Court did not identify any jurisdictional error, illegality, or breach of natural justice in those findings; instead, it reassessed the evidence and characterised the activity as a mere casual licence.
  • Such re-appreciation of facts is impermissible in writ jurisdiction because adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is for the original tribunal to decide.
  • Moreover, a defence of “casual licence” was neither pleaded nor proved by the tenant, and the High Court could not construct a new case for the respondent.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had transgressed its supervisory boundaries under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; decrees of the trial court and revisional court restored.

The decision reinstates the eviction decree against Respondent 4 and clarifies that High Courts cannot, in certiorari jurisdiction, reassess factual findings absent jurisdictional error. No broader precedent is established beyond reinforcing the existing limits articulated in Syed Yakoob.

    Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. District Judge, Varanasi

    Order

    1. This appeal is directed against an order dated 30-4-1997 by which the High Court has allowed the writ petition filed by Respondent 4 herein.

    2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: the appellant who is the landlord of the premises filed a suit for eviction of Respondent 4 from Shop No. D-50/128 situated in Mohalla Kajipura Kala, Nai Sarak, Varanasi City. The suit was filed on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the fourth respondent had sub-let the premises to other parties. The trial court decreed the suit on this ground. The revision filed by the fourth respondent was dismissed. The respondent then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    3. At this stage, the limits of jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution need to be kept in mind. It has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477, (1964) 5 SCR 64 as follows: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7)

    “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to the principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised….”

    4. The trial court, as well as the revisional court, had on appreciation of evidence come to the conclusion that the fourth respondent had sub-let the premises. In coming to the conclusion, they had relied on a report of a Commissioner appointed by the trial court to visit the premises. The Commissioner had found that somebody else was carrying on business of selling ready-made garments inside and around the premises. Admittedly, the fourth respondent was not carrying on this business. The fourth respondent had also not produced any licence to carry on any business nor produced any documents like bills, vouchers, sale receipts, etc. to show that he had been carrying on any business in the suit premises. It is on appreciation of this evidence that the suit had been decreed and the revision dismissed. The High Court, however, reversed the findings of the trial court and the revisional court on the reasoning that even if the entire evidence is accepted, this would still not amount to a case of sub-letting. The High Court held that at the most it would be a case of casual licence allowing persons to temporarily store their goods inside or to do some business outside the shop by using the patra and also on a chowki. On this reasoning, the High Court allowed the writ petition.

    5. In our view, the High Court has transgressed the limits of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by purporting to reappreciate the evidence and coming to its own conclusion. The High Court has nowhere stated or concluded that the lower courts had committed an error of jurisdiction or that they had acted illegally and improperly. Further the High Court failed to notice that a case of casual licence was not pleaded or proved by Respondent 4. Therefore, it was not open to the High Court to make out a new case on behalf of the party in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    6. In our view, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. The decrees passed by the trial court and the revisional court are restored.

    7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. District Judge, Varanasi
    (Sep 5, 2002)