Order
1. This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi allowing the respondent's Second Appeal Order No. 275 of 1980 on 2-12-1981.
2. The appellant-landlord of the suit premises is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act. It filed application against the respondent-tenant for his eviction from the suit premises under clause (d) of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “the Act”) on the ground that the premises are required bona fide for furtherance of its activities. The respondent filed written statement denying both that the appellant is an institution within the meaning of that provision and that it required the premises bona fide for furtherance of its activities. It appears that when the case was posted for trial, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent conceded the facts disputed by the respondent in his written statement before the Court. That statement of the advocate was recorded by the Additional Rent Controller thus: “The respondent's learned counsel has admitted the ground of eviction and also the fact that the applicant is a public charitable institution and for that purpose it required the premises.” On that basis the eviction application filed by the appellant was allowed on 24-3-1973. Within a week thereafter the respondent filed a review petition which was dismissed. He then filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the said order of eviction but that was dismissed as withdrawn on 22-7-1974. Thereafter, the respondent filed an appeal against the said order of eviction before the Rent Control Tribunal but it was also dismissed on 5-9-1977. Be that as it may, when the appellant filed a petition for execution of order of eviction, the respondent raised objections both under Section 40 of the Act as well as under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By separate orders both the objection petitions were dismissed on 5-4-1980. That order was challenged by the respondent unsuccessfully before the Rent Control Tribunal. Dissatisfied with the order of the Tribunal dated 16-5-1980, dismissing the appeal, the respondent filed the aforementioned second appeal which was allowed on 2-12-1981. It is against that order of the High Court that the present appeal is filed by special leave.
3. Mr Jaspal Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has vehemently contended that statement made by the learned counsel of the respondent across the Bar is indeed an admission of the party and, therefore, the Additional Rent Controller recorded his satisfaction on the basis of the admission; the order of the Additional Rent Controller cannot thereby be treated as being without jurisdiction. We are afraid we cannot accede to the contention of the learned counsel. Whether the appellant is an institution within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it required bona fide the premises for furtherance of its activities, are questions touching the jurisdiction of the Additional Rent Controller. He can record his satisfaction only when he holds on these questions in favour of the appellant. For so holding there must be material on record to support his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction not based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated and any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction. There can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material. But can the statement made by the learned counsel of a party across the Bar be treated as admission of the party? Having regard to the requirements of Section 18 of the Evidence Act, on the facts of this case, in our view, the aforementioned statement of the counsel of the respondent cannot be accepted as an admission so as to bind the respondent. Excluding that statement from consideration, there was thus no material before the Additional Rent Controller to record his satisfaction within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 22 of the Act. It follows that the order of eviction was without jurisdiction.
4. The learned counsel next contended that the statement of the learned counsel for the respondent should be treated as a compromise as the Court granted five years' time to the respondent for vacating the suit premises. In our view, this contention has to be rejected. The compromise like a contract postulates consensus between two parties. A statement of a counsel conceding the grounds of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent to vacate the premises, cannot be termed a compromise.
5. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order under challenge. The appeal is dismissed with costs.