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2002 INSC 269
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 269
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a co-operative sugar factory, entered into an agreement on 17-11-1992 with the respondent for the design, manufacture, procurement and supply of machinery to modernise its plant using the “encillium” continuous fermentation process. The contract contained an arbitration clause.

Disputes arose and, pursuant to the clause, each party appointed an arbitrator. On 20-6-1999 the arbitrators awarded the appellant Rs 151.97 lakhs in full and final settlement.

The award was filed before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sangamner. Both parties objected. By judgment dated 6-5-2000 the Civil Judge found errors apparent on the face of the award—including failure to consider relevant documents and violation of natural justice—and remitted the matter to the arbitrators for a fresh award.

The appellant filed a revision petition challenging the remission; the respondent filed an appeal contending the award should have been set aside, not remitted. A Single Judge of the High Court heard both matters together, dismissed the appellant’s revision, allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside Rs 107.54 lakhs and interest of Rs 28.74 lakhs from the award, and made the balance a rule of court.

The appellant sought special leave from the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the arbitrators had jurisdiction to decide the appellant’s claim of Rs 107.54 lakhs and corresponding interest, or whether that claim was beyond the scope of the reference.
  2. Whether the Civil Judge correctly exercised discretion under Section 16(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in remitting the award for reconsideration instead of setting it aside.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside part of the award and in overturning the Civil Judge’s order of remission.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679 The scope of an arbitration clause depends on the language used; phrases like “arising out of” or “in relation to” are of the widest amplitude. Used to conclude that the claim for Rs 107.54 lakhs fell within the arbitration agreement and was therefore within the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.
Ramachandra Reddy & Co. v. State of A.P., (2001) 4 SCC 241 Remission of an award under Section 16 is a matter of judicial discretion; appellate interference is warranted only if the discretion is misused. Relied on to uphold the Civil Judge’s decision to remit the award and to criticise the High Court for interfering with that discretionary order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Scope of Reference: Examining the arbitration clause—which covers disputes “arising out of or in relation to” the agreement—and the notices initiating arbitration, the Court held that the claim for Rs 107.54 lakhs and interest was expressly included in the issues framed (Issues 10–12). Applying Renusagar, the Court rejected the High Court’s view that the claim lay outside the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.

2. Error on the Face of the Award: The Civil Judge had identified omissions (failure to consider relevant documents) and violation of natural justice (lack of hearing on a decisive issue). These constituted errors apparent on the face of the award, justifying intervention under Section 16(1)(c).

3. Appropriateness of Remission vs. Setting Aside: Citing Ramachandra Reddy, the Supreme Court emphasised that remission is a discretionary remedy. The Civil Judge’s decision to remit rather than annul the award was a proper exercise of that discretion given the identified errors.

4. Appellate Interference: The High Court displaced the Civil Judge’s discretionary order without showing misuse of discretion. This was characterised as an error in law, warranting reversal.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the Civil Judge’s order remitting the entire award to the original arbitrators. The arbitrators must render a fresh award within six months of receiving the Supreme Court’s order.

Implications: The decision reinstates the arbitral process, requiring reconsideration of all disputes by the original tribunal. It affirms broad interpretative principles for arbitration clauses and reinforces the limited scope of appellate interference with discretionary remission orders. No new legal precedent is created beyond application of settled principles.

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    Sangamner Bhag Sahakari Karkhana Ltd. v. Krupp Industries Ltd. .

    R.C Lahoti, J.— Leave granted in both petitions.

    2. The appellant is a cooperative sugar factory manufacturing sugar from sugarcane. On 17-11-1992 an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent for design, manufacture, procurement and supply of machinery and equipments for modernisation with continuous fermentation process based on “encillium process”, developed and patented by Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi and National Chemical Laboratory, Pune. Disputes arose between the parties. The agreement dated 17-11-1992 contained an arbitration clause pursuant whereto the disputes were referred for arbitration by two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties. By their award dated 20-6-1999, the learned arbitrators directed an amount of Rs 151.97 lakhs to be paid by the respondent to the appellant in full and final settlement of all claims by and between the parties.

    3. The award was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangamner. Both the parties preferred objections against the award. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, by its judgment dated 6-5-2000 the learned Civil Judge directed the award to be remitted back to the learned arbitrators for rendering a fresh award consistently with the directions given by the learned Civil Judge. The appellant preferred a revision laying challenge to the direction of the court remitting the award while the respondent preferred an appeal submitting that on the view taken by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division the award itself should have been set aside and there was no occasion for remitting the award to the arbitrators. The learned Single Judge of the High Court heard the revision and the appeal together. By the impugned order the learned Judge has dismissed the civil revision and allowed the appeal. As a result the order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division remitting the award to the arbitrators has been set aside and the award to the extent of Rs 107.54 lakhs and the interest thereon in the sum of Rs 28.74 lakhs has been set aside. The rest of the award has been made a rule of the court. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court these petitions have been filed by the appellants seeking leave to file appeals by special leave.

    4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length who have apart from making legal submissions carried the Court through the pleadings, the relevant correspondence between the parties, several documents and the proceedings before the arbitrators. However, it is not necessary for us to deal with the same in very many details as we have formed an opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the order of the learned Civil Judge deserves to be restored.

    5. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division shows the learned Judge having formed an opinion that the award suffered from an error apparent on its face. There was an omission on the part of the learned arbitrators to consider a few relevant documents available on record which in the opinion of the learned Civil Judge if taken into consideration, the finding of the arbitrators would not have been what it is. The learned Civil Judge also formed an opinion that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the parties were not afforded a hearing on the issue on which the learned arbitrators had based their decision. The learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that on totality of the facts and circumstances of the case instead of setting aside the award the same deserved to be remitted to the arbitrators with the request to render the award afresh. The High Court has however formed an opinion that to the extent to which the award has been set aside by the High Court it was beyond the scope of reference to the arbitration and hence there was no question of the parties being afforded an opportunity of rearguing the same question before the arbitrators as the arbitrators could not assume jurisdiction over an issue which was not referred to them.

    6. On 19-10-1994 the appellant served a notice on the respondent setting out several disputes arising between the parties. One of the disputes raised therein reads as under:

    “Till today, we have spent Rs 107.54 lakhs on the said plant, which it is abundantly clear, will not give required results as agreed, not even optimum to the norms laid down by the Excise Rules. Therefore, Rs 107.54 lakhs will be straight away loss to my client and there will be also loss of interest at the rate of 18% per year from 1-5-1993 onwards. In the circumstances my clients have instructed me to call upon you, which I hereby do to reimburse the loss suffered by my clients to the tune of Rs 237.83 lakhs within a week from today.”

    7. On 26-12-1994, once again a notice was served by the appellant on the respondent appointing its own arbitrator and calling upon the respondent to appoint its own and in the contents of the notice it was specifically stated that they were the questions, disputes and differences mentioned in the notice dated 19-10-1994 which shall be referred to the arbitration. During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, on 24-7-1995, a memorandum of understanding was arrived at between the parties which suggests that it was the dispute referred to in the notice dated 19-10-1994 for which trial runs were being conducted. The notice dated 12-9-1995 served by the appellant on the respondent reiterates that it was the failure on the part of the respondent to manufacture and supply the plant and comply with the terms of agreement that had caused total failure entitling the appellant to refund of total amount of advance paid by the appellant to the respondent. In its reply dated 30-9-1995 the respondent had told the appellant that the matter was already before the arbitrators and the respondent reserved the right to file an appropriate written statement before the arbitrator disputing the claim made by the appellant and it was not necessary to give a detailed reply in response to the appellant's notice. We have also perused the statements of claim and their responses filed by the parties before the arbitrators. We find that the claim for Rs 107.54 lakhs and the interest thereon raised by the appellant against the respondent was very much before the arbitrators and the parties also proceeded on the assumption that this dispute was before the arbitrators and liable to be adjudicated upon by them. Issues (10), (11) and (12) framed by the arbitrators are:

    “(10) Does the claimant prove that it spent Rs 107.54 lakhs on the plant and the plant has gone waste for not getting the guaranteed performance?
    (11) Is the claimant entitled to Rs 107.54 lakhs as actual damages?
    (12) Is the claimant entitled to Rs 45.46 lakhs as interest on the said amount of Rs 107.54 lakhs?”

    The issues are widely worded and include within their sweep the disputes arising for decision and as was adjudicated upon by the award.

    8. The arbitration agreement between the parties opens as under:

    “18.0 Arbitration
    If at any time there should be any question, dispute or difference between the parties in respect of any matter arising out of or in relation to this agreement, either party may give to the other party notice in writing of the existence of such question, dispute or differences and the same shall be referred to arbitration….”

    9. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1984) 4 SCC 679 this Court has held:

    “(1) Whether a given dispute inclusive of the arbitrator's jurisdiction comes within the scope or purview of an arbitration clause or not primarily depends upon the terms of the clause itself; it is a question of what the parties intend to provide and what language they employ.
    (2) Expressions such as ‘arising out of’ or ‘in respect of’ or ‘in connection with’ or ‘in relation to’ or ‘in consequence of’ or ‘concerning’ or ‘relating to’ the contract are of the widest amplitude….”

    In our opinion, it is the substance of the claim made before the arbitrators which has to be seen. The court would not construe the nature of claim by adopting too technical an approach or by indulging into hair-splitting. Else the whole purpose behind holding arbitration proceedings as an alternative to the civil court's forum would stand defeated. We have carefully perused the arbitration clause and the disputes referred and adjudicated upon by the arbitrators. We find it difficult to sustain the finding of the High Court that the arbitrators had determined an issue which was beyond the scope of reference to the arbitration. The disputes did arise out of the contract between the parties and the arbitrators were seized of the disputes within the scope of reference to them. The parties have also joined in the contest before the arbitrators having understood the scope of controversy, as already stated hereinabove.

    10. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 contemplates an award being remitted to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as the court thinks fit where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it. As held recently by this Court in Ramachandra Reddy & Co. v. State of A.P (2001) 4 SCC 241 the jurisdiction to remit an award by the court to the arbitrators is a discretionary jurisdiction conferred on the court and so long as the said discretion has been judicially exercised, an appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion unless the discretion is misused. In our opinion no fault can be found with the discretion exercised by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division. The High Court has erroneously formed an opinion that part of the award was beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.

    11. For the foregoing reasons the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division is restored. The award shall stand remitted to the arbitrators in the terms as directed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division. However, the time of six months appointed for giving the award shall run from the date of communication of this order to the arbitrators.

    12. The appeals stand disposed of in the terms abovesaid. No order as to the costs.

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    Sangamner Bhag Sahakari Karkhana Ltd. v. Krupp Industries Ltd. .
    (May 7, 2002)