Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association And Others, Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed by the first respondent, Indian Tea Association, as an Assistant Secretary in 1986, promoted to Joint Secretary in 1991, transferred to Dibrugarh in 1995, and terminated from service with effect from 27-11-1995. Claiming the status of a “workman”, he invoked the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After a failure report by the Labour Commissioner, the State Government declined to refer the dispute on the ground that the petitioner was not a workman. The Calcutta High Court directed a reference; its order was affirmed by a Division Bench. In Secretary, Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat (2000) 3 SCC 93, the Supreme Court allowed the employer’s appeal and set aside the High Court’s direction. The petitioner’s Review Petition No. 550 of 2000 was dismissed on 26-7-2000. He now invokes Article 32 of the Constitution seeking to have the earlier Supreme Court judgment of 14-2-2000 set aside.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable for quashing or setting aside a prior judgment of the Supreme Court rendered on the judicial side.

Whether the earlier judgment in Indian Tea Association infringed the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 21 by allegedly ignoring binding precedents of larger Benches.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

The judgment dated 14-2-2000 violated Article 21 because it was rendered contrary to larger-Bench precedents and without proper consideration of his submissions.

Reliance on A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 to contend that a decree or order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged at any stage, even before the Supreme Court itself.

Citation of Nawabkhan (1974) 2 SCC 121 to suggest that orders passed without hearing a party and affecting fundamental rights are void.

Invocation of Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167 for the proposition that this Court can correct an error apparent on the face of the record.

Reference to Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725 to support maintainability of an Article 32 petition alleging violation of fundamental rights.

Respondents’ / Opposing Submissions (as recorded by the Court)

Drew the Court’s attention to paragraphs 102 and 109 of A.R. Antulay, and to the nine-Judge Bench ruling in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1, which holds that judicial orders of the Supreme Court are not amenable to its own writ jurisdiction.

Contended that the proper remedy was review, which has already been exhausted and dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Secy., Indian Tea Assn. v. Ajit Kumar Barat (2000) 3 SCC 93	Earlier judgment of the Supreme Court whose validity is now challenged.	Treated as final; Court declined to reopen or set it aside via Article 32.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602	Discusses circumstances for recalling/altering Supreme Court directions; states certiorari does not lie against Supreme Court orders.	Court held petitioner’s reliance misplaced; emphasised that Antulay affirms that writ jurisdiction cannot quash Supreme Court’s own judicial orders.
Nawabkhan (1974) 2 SCC 121; (1974) 3 SCR 427	Order passed without hearing a party and affecting fundamental rights is void.	Distinguished; petitioner had been heard in the earlier proceedings.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1; (1966) 3 SCR 744	Judicial orders of the Supreme Court are not subject to its own writ jurisdiction.	Relied upon as binding authority to reject maintainability of Article 32 petition against Supreme Court’s judgment.
Prem Chand Garg AIR 1963 SC 996; 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885	Earlier case discussed in Mirajkar; illustrates limits of writ jurisdiction.	Mentioned to reinforce principle that Supreme Court orders are final and not open to writ review.
Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725	Article 32 petition maintainable to enforce fundamental rights against State action.	Held irrelevant because that case did not involve quashing a Supreme Court judgment.
Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167	Supreme Court’s power to correct an error apparent on the face of the record in review.	Distinguished; review route already pursued and dismissed.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Secy., Indian Tea Assn. v. Ajit Kumar Barat (2000) 3 SCC 93

Earlier judgment of the Supreme Court whose validity is now challenged.

Treated as final; Court declined to reopen or set it aside via Article 32.

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602

Discusses circumstances for recalling/altering Supreme Court directions; states certiorari does not lie against Supreme Court orders.

Court held petitioner’s reliance misplaced; emphasised that Antulay affirms that writ jurisdiction cannot quash Supreme Court’s own judicial orders.

Nawabkhan (1974) 2 SCC 121; (1974) 3 SCR 427

Order passed without hearing a party and affecting fundamental rights is void.

Distinguished; petitioner had been heard in the earlier proceedings.

Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1; (1966) 3 SCR 744

Judicial orders of the Supreme Court are not subject to its own writ jurisdiction.

Relied upon as binding authority to reject maintainability of Article 32 petition against Supreme Court’s judgment.

Prem Chand Garg AIR 1963 SC 996; 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885

Earlier case discussed in Mirajkar; illustrates limits of writ jurisdiction.

Mentioned to reinforce principle that Supreme Court orders are final and not open to writ review.

Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725

Article 32 petition maintainable to enforce fundamental rights against State action.

Held irrelevant because that case did not involve quashing a Supreme Court judgment.

Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167

Supreme Court’s power to correct an error apparent on the face of the record in review.

Distinguished; review route already pursued and dismissed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench queried the petitioner on the maintainability of an Article 32 writ aimed at nullifying a prior Supreme Court judgment. It held:

Finality of Supreme Court Judgments: Citing the nine-Judge Bench in Mirajkar, the Court reiterated that its judicial orders cannot be subjected to its own writ jurisdiction; certiorari does not lie against such orders.

Distinction from Authorities Cited:

Antulay was distinguishable because the observations relied upon by the petitioner actually confirm the non-availability of writ relief against Supreme Court orders.
Nawabkhan was inapposite because the petitioner had been heard in the earlier appeal.
Other cases, including Kochunni and Northern India Caterers, dealt with State action or review proceedings, not a direct attack on a Supreme Court judgment through Article 32.

Exhaustion of Review Remedy: The petitioner had already filed Review Petition No. 550 of 2000, raising similar grounds; it was dismissed on 26-7-2000. Article 32 could not be used as a substitute for a second review.

No Violation of Article 21: The earlier judgment was delivered after full hearing and did not infringe the petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Holding and Implications

Writ Petition Dismissed.

The Court refused to entertain an Article 32 petition aimed at setting aside its own prior judgment, affirming the principle of finality of Supreme Court decisions and underscoring that judicial orders of the Court are not amenable to its writ jurisdiction. The dismissal leaves the judgment in Indian Tea Association (2000) 3 SCC 93 intact and sets no new precedent beyond reiterating existing doctrine.

Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association And Others

Shivaraj V. Patil, J.— In this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought for setting aside the judgment and order dated 14-2-2000 passed by this Court in Secy., Indian Tea Assn. v. Ajit Kumar Barat (2000) 3 SCC 93.

2. The facts to the extent relevant to dispose of this petition briefly stated are the following:

The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Secretary by Respondent 1 on 16-9-1986; was promoted to the post of Joint Secretary on 1-4-1991; was transferred on 22-5-1995 to Dibrugarh, which order of transfer was also the subject-matter of another litigation with which we are not concerned in this petition. His services were terminated with effect from 27-11-1995. An industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner. The Labour Commissioner submitted the failure report in conciliation proceedings on 2-7-1997 recommending a reference, as according to him the question whether the petitioner was a workman required adjudication. Since the Government did not act, the petitioner filed writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court directed the State Government to take a decision under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the time fixed. The Government communicated its decision regretting its inability to make a reference saying that the petitioner was not a workman. Again, the petitioner moved the High Court against the said order of the State Government. Learned Single Judge of the High Court made an order directing the State Government to make a reference as to whether the petitioner was a workman. The appeal filed by the respondents herein was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Respondent 1 herein brought the matter to this Court. This Court, by an elaborate order dated 14-2-2000 (2000) 3 SCC 93, noticing the facts, contentions of the parties and the decisions, allowed Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 2000 (2000) 3 SCC 93 and set aside the judgment of the High Court directing the State Government to make an appropriate reference.

3. The petitioner filed Review Petition No. 550 of 2000 in the said Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 2000 (2000) 3 SCC 93, which was dismissed by this Court on 26-7-2000. Now the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking the relief as stated above.

4. We heard the petitioner (party-in-person) at length. In response to our query as to how the writ petition is maintainable so as to question the validity and correctness of the order of this Court passed on 14-2-2000 (2000) 3 SCC 93 and to set aside the same in a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, he submitted that his fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution are affected because of the decision of this Court passed in the aforesaid appeal, ignoring the binding precedents of larger Benches of this Court; this Court has not considered the submissions and decisions cited by him before passing the order in the said appeal. He invited our attention to the judgment of this Court in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602, AIR 1988 SC 1531. He read to us paras 38, 61 and 62 of the said judgment. Para 38 deals with a decree passed without jurisdiction and states that such a decree is a nullity, the validity of which could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. What is stated in para 38 has no relevance on the question as to the maintainability of writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution so as to challenge the order passed by this Court on merits. In para 61 it is noticed that directions were given without hearing the appellant and in the circumstances that order was bad. Further in para 62 reference is made to Nawabkhan case (1974) 2 SCC 121, (1974) 3 SCR 427 wherein it was held that an order passed without hearing a party, which affects its fundamental rights, is void. The petitioner's case is not such where an order was passed without hearing him. The other side requested us to read paras 102 and 109 (AIR) of the same judgment. Para 102, to the extent relevant, reads:

“100. What remains to be decided is the procedure by which the direction of February 16, 1984, could be recalled or altered. There can be no doubt that certiorari shall not lie to quash a judicial order of this Court. That is so on account of the fact that the Benches of this Court are not subordinate to larger Benches thereof and certiorari is, therefore, not admissible for quashing of the orders made on the judicial side of the Court.

Shah, J. who wrote a separate judgment upheld the vires of the rule and directed dismissal of the petition. The fact that a judicial order was being made the subject-matter of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was not noticed and whether such a proceeding was tenable was not considered. A nine-Judge Bench of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1, (1966) 3 SCR 744 referred to the judgment in Prem Chand Garg case AIR 1963 SC 996, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885. Gajendragadkar, C.J, who delivered the leading and majority judgment stated at pp. 765-66 of the Report:

It is difficult to see how this decision can be pressed into service by Mr Setalvad in support of the argument that a judicial order passed by this Court was held to be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court itself.’

In view of this decision in Mirajkar case AIR 1967 SC 1, (1966) 3 SCR 744 it must be taken as concluded that judicial proceedings in this Court are not subject to the writ jurisdiction thereof.”

(emphasis supplied)

From this judgment it is clear that the validity of an order passed by this Court itself cannot be subject to writ jurisdiction of this Court. Reading of para 109 of the same judgment shows that the directions given in the said case were on peculiar facts and circumstances. In the said para, it is stated thus:

“107. There is still another aspect which should be taken note of. Finality of the orders is the rule. By our directing recall of an order the well-settled propositions of law would not be set at naught. Such a situation may not recur in the ordinary course of judicial functioning and if there be one certainly the Bench before which it comes would appropriately deal with it. No straitjacket formula can be laid down for judicial functioning particularly for the Apex Court. The apprehension that the present decision may be used as a precedent to challenge judicial orders of this Court is perhaps misplaced because those who are familiar with the judicial functioning are aware of the limits and they would not seek support from this case as a precedent. We are sure that if precedent value is sought to be derived out of this decision, the Court which is asked to use this as an instrument would be alive to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in which this order is being made.”

(emphasis supplied)

That was a case where an order had been made against the appellant in his absence transferring the criminal case to the High Court when there was specific provision for trial of the case by a Special Court. In view of what is stated in the above para itself, the said decision cannot be used as a precedent to challenge the judicial order of this Court which is otherwise binding on the parties.

5. The petitioner cited another decision of this Court in Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725. That was not a case where a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for quashing the very order passed by this Court. That was a petition filed for enforcing fundamental rights of the petitioner making grievance against the action of the State.

6. He also cited a decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167, AIR 1980 SC 674 made in Review Petitions Nos. 111-12 of 1976, to contend that where there is an apparent error on the face of the record, this Court can correct the error. This judgment also does not help the petitioner as it is not a case for review. We may notice here itself that Review Application No. 550 of 2000 filed by the petitioner including the ground that larger Bench decisions of this Court were not considered, was already dismissed by this Court on 26-7-2000. This being the position, it cannot be said that the said judgment passed by this Court in CA No. 1041 of 2000 (2000) 3 SCC 93 on merits offended fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution. In our view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this is not a fit case to be entertained to exercise jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we decline to do so.

7. In the light of what is stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.

Writ Petition (C) No. D13754 of 2000, decided on May 2, 2001

Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association And Others

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

Respondents’ / Opposing Submissions (as recorded by the Court)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ajit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association And Others

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