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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, a public limited company engaged in import-export, lodged FIR No. 616 of 1997 at Police Station Kalkaji, New Delhi, against M/s Malabar Cashewnuts and Allied Products and its partners for alleged cheating, misappropriation and conspiracy causing a loss of Rs 2,10,60,000. During investigation it emerged that Respondent 2, J. Rajmohan Pillai—Managing Director of sister concern M/s Pace International Company—had received two letters of credit transferred by another accused. Because a Kerala High Court stay order prevented his interrogation, the police did not show him as an accused in the charge-sheet but placed his name in column 2 (“accused not sent for trial”).

On 3-8-1999 the Metropolitan Magistrate issued summons to the accused named in the FIR under Sections 420/406/120-B IPC, and on 20-12-1999 also summoned Respondent 2. Pillai challenged this order before the Delhi High Court, which on 3-7-2000 held that he could only be summoned under Section 319 CrPC after evidence was recorded. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, at the stage of taking cognizance on a police report under Section 190 CrPC, a Magistrate can issue process to a person not shown as an accused in the charge-sheet without invoking Section 319 CrPC.
  2. Whether the Delhi High Court erred in holding that such summoning is permissible only after additional evidence is recorded under Section 319 CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court overlooked Section 190 CrPC, which empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence and issue process irrespective of whether the person is named as an accused in the charge-sheet.
  • Section 319 CrPC was irrelevant at this preliminary stage; its application arises only during enquiry or trial after evidence is led.

Respondent 2's Arguments

  • Because Pillai was placed only in column 2 of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate lacked authority to summon him without additional evidence.
  • The High Court correctly relied on Section 319 CrPC, under which a court may summon a person as an accused only after evaluating evidence during enquiry or trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 1167 Once cognizance of an offence is taken, the Magistrate must identify all offenders and may summon persons not sent up by the police. Relied upon to hold that the Magistrate, having taken cognizance under Section 190, could summon Respondent 2 even though he was not named in the charge-sheet.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that Section 190 CrPC enables a Magistrate to take cognizance “of an offence” on a police report and that cognizance is of the offence, not individual offenders. After cognizance, Section 204 CrPC gives the Magistrate discretion to issue process against any person revealed by the materials accompanying the charge-sheet. The Court emphasized that:

  • The Magistrate may ignore the investigating officer’s conclusion and independently evaluate the FIR, witness statements, and documents.
  • Section 319 CrPC applies only “in the course of any enquiry or trial,” neither of which had begun when the Magistrate issued summons; hence Section 319 was inapplicable.
  • No statutory bar prevents a Magistrate from issuing summons to additional persons on later dates if material in the charge-sheet justifies such action.

Applying the principle in Raghubans Dubey, the Court concluded that the Magistrate rightly exercised power under Section 190, and the High Court misdirected itself by invoking Section 319.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; Delhi High Court order dated 3-7-2000 set aside.

Consequently, related SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1564-65 of 2001 and TC (Crl.) No. 1 of 2001 were disposed of as infructuous, and the trial court was directed to proceed in accordance with law. The decision reaffirms that a Magistrate, upon taking cognizance under Section 190 CrPC, may summon persons not named as accused in the charge-sheet without resort to Section 319, but it does not create new precedent beyond reinforcing existing jurisprudence.

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    Swil Ltd. v. State Of Delhi And Another

    M.B Shah, J.— Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 620 of 2001.

    2. The High Court of Delhi in Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 1818 of 2000 vide judgment and order dated 3-7-2000 arrived at the conclusion that “the court was totally unjustified in summoning the petitioner when the petitioner was not shown in the column of accused persons in the charge-sheet”. Relying on Section 319 CrPC, the High Court held that such persons could be summoned by the court under Section 319 only after the evidence has been recorded. That order is challenged in this appeal.

    3. Learned Senior Counsel, Dr Singhvi, appearing for the appellant submitted that the impugned order passed by the High Court ignored the provisions of Section 190 CrPC and there was no question of referring to Section 319 CrPC at the stage. As against this, learned Senior Counsel, Mr R.K Jain, appearing for Respondent 2 supported the impugned order and submitted that in the charge-sheet Respondent 2 was not shown as accused and his name appeared only in column 2 and, therefore, without there being any additional evidence on record, the Magistrate was not justified in issuing summons. He, therefore, contended that the High Court rightly referred to Section 319 and held that without there being any additional evidence, Respondent 2 could not be summoned as accused.

    4. Brief facts are: it is the say of the appellant complainant that it is a public limited company dealing in import and export business and is having its registered office at Calcutta and branch office at New Delhi. The petitioner lodged FIR No. 616 of 1997 on 28-8-1997 at Police Station Kalkaji, New Delhi, against M/s Malabar Cashewnuts and Allied Products, having its office at Quilon (Kerala) and its partners. During investigation, it was revealed that Respondent 2 J. Rajmohan Pillai was the Managing Director of another sister company known as M/s Pace International Company and two letters of credit given by the appellant complainant were transferred by one of the accused A. Suresh Kumar to Pace International Company. On this discovery, notice under Section 160 CrPC was issued to J. Rajmohan Pillai by the police. Because of the stay order issued by the High Court of Kerala, it was not possible for the police to interrogate Respondent 2 and to ascertain whether he was involved in the conspiracy. He was, therefore, not joined as accused in the charge-sheet submitted by the police, but his name was shown in column 2, which is meant for the accused who are not sent for the trial. It was also stated that the accused had cheated, misappropriated and caused wrongful loss to the complainant Company to the tune of Rs 2,10,60,000.

    5. On the basis of the said charge-sheet, the Metropolitan Magistrate on 3-8-1999 issued summons against all accused shown in the FIR for the offence under Sections 420/406/120-B IPC. On the next date of posting (20-12-1999), he also issued the summons to Respondent 2. That part of the order was challenged by him by filing the aforesaid petition before the High Court of Delhi.

    6. In our view, from the facts stated above, it is clear that at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, provisions of Section 190 CrPC would be applicable. Section 190 inter alia provides that “the Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon a police report of such facts which constitute an offence”. As per this provision, the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and not the offender. After taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate under Section 204 CrPC is empowered to issue process to the accused. At the stage of issuing process, it is for the Magistrate to decide whether process should be issued against particular person/persons named in the charge-sheet and also not named therein. For that purpose, he is required to consider the FIR and the statements recorded by the police officer and other documents tendered along with charge-sheet. Further, upon receipt of police report under Section 173(2) CrPC, the Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused by ignoring the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently applying his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation by taking into account the statement of the witnesses examined by the police. At this stage, there is no question of application of Section 319 CrPC. Similar contention was negatived by this Court in Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar AIR 1967 SC 1167, 1967 Cri LJ 1081, (1967) 2 SCR 423 by holding thus: (AIR p. 1169, para 9)

    “In our opinion, once cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, he takes cognizance of an offence and not the offenders; once he takes cognizance of an offence it is his duty to find out who the offenders really are and once he comes to the conclusion that apart from the persons sent up by the police some other persons are involved, it is his duty to proceed against those persons. The summoning of the additional accused is part of the proceeding initiated by his taking cognizance of an offence.”

    7. Further, in the present case, there is no question of referring to the provisions of Section 319 CrPC. That provision would come into operation in the course of any enquiry into or trial of an offence. In the present case, neither the Magistrate was holding enquiry as contemplated under Section 2(g) CrPC nor had the trial started. He was exercising his jurisdiction under Section 190 of taking cognizance of an offence and issuing process. There is no bar under Section 190 CrPC that once the process is issued against some accused, on the next date, the Magistrate cannot issue process to some other person against whom there is some material on record, but his name is not included as accused in the charge-sheet.

    8. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.

    9. In view of the aforesaid order, SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1564-65 of 2001 filed by A. Sasikanth seeking quashing of the impugned order passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 1818 of 2000 and TC (Crl.) No. 1 of 2001, originally filed by J. Rajmohan Pillai before the High Court of Kerala would not survive at this stage and stand disposed of accordingly.

    10. The trial court to proceed with the matter in accordance with law.

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    Swil Ltd. v. State Of Delhi And Another
    (Aug 14, 2001)