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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 548
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act (Section 5, Subsection 2)
  • The Statute of Frauds, 1677 (Section 4)
  • Section 53-A of the Transfer of the Property Act
  • Section 53-A of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 548
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act (Section 5, Subsection 2)
  • The Statute of Frauds, 1677 (Section 4)
  • Section 53-A of the Transfer of the Property Act
  • Section 53-A of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a house in Mohalla Boiwada, Aurangabad originally owned by Mohd. Hussain. In 1951 he created a usufructuary mortgage over the property in favour of Petitioner 1 for Rs 700. Two years later, on 8-7-1953, he agreed in writing to sell the same property to Petitioner 1’s husband, Mohd. Yarkhan, for Rs 825 and handed over possession. Before the sale deed could be registered, Mohd. Hussain died. On 20-6-1954 two of his children executed an unregistered sale deed in favour of Petitioner 1 recording receipt of the full consideration (after adjusting the mortgage amount).

On 12-1-1965 five persons claiming to be Hussain’s heirs sold the house to Respondent 1 for Rs 3,000, retaining Rs 600 to redeem the mortgage. Respondent 1 then sued for redemption and possession. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge reversed that decision. In second appeal the High Court remanded the matter, directing that Mohd. Yarkhan be joined as a party so he could raise a defence under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

By that time Yarkhan had died and his heirs (Petitioners 2-7) were substituted. The trial court again dismissed the redemption suit, accepting their Section 53-A defence. The Assistant Judge reversed, holding that the petitioners had not proved readiness and willingness to perform the 1953 contract. The High Court affirmed that view and decreed redemption. The petitioners obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which called for a factual finding from the High Court on readiness and willingness. The High Court reported negatively, leading to the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether part-performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act can extinguish the mortgagor’s statutory right of redemption under Section 60.
  2. Whether the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Mohd. Yarkhan, was “ready and willing” to perform the contract dated 8-7-1953 so as to satisfy the conditions of Section 53-A.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners’ Arguments

  • The 1953 agreement of sale was a concluded contract; possession was delivered and substantial consideration, including the mortgage amount, was paid, satisfying all four requirements of Section 53-A.
  • Improvements made to the property and continued possession manifested performance and willingness to complete the sale, thus barring Respondent 1 from seeking redemption or possession.

Respondent 1’s Arguments

  • The equity of redemption survives notwithstanding Section 53-A; therefore the property remains redeemable on payment of the mortgage money.
  • The petitioners failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the sale contract, particularly because they did not tender the balance consideration by 15-7-1953 or during Mohd. Hussain’s lifetime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit (1989) 1 SCC 458 Judicial protection of the mortgagor’s right of redemption; concept of “clogs on redemption”. Cited to illustrate the traditional sanctity of the right of redemption before examining whether Section 53-A can cut it down.
Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam (1977) 3 SCC 247 Equity of redemption is extinguished only on execution and registration of a conveyance. Referred to show that the earlier decision had not considered the effect of Section 53-A on the right of redemption.
Nathulal v. Phoolchand (1969) 3 SCC 120 Enumerated four essential conditions for invoking Section 53-A (part-performance). The Supreme Court applied these conditions to determine if the petitioners satisfied Section 53-A.
Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 237 Illustrates that protection under Section 53-A fails if the transferee is not ready and willing to perform. Used as a benchmark to assess readiness and willingness in the present case.
Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusjii Jamshedji Ginwalla AIR 1950 SC 1 Readiness and willingness may be inferred where the transferee has performed everything except registration. Quoted to support the finding that Yarkhan had done all he could short of registration, satisfying Section 53-A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Statutory Interaction: The Court first examined the language of Section 53-A, emphasising its mandatory nature. If its conditions are met, the transferor is “debarred” from enforcing any right against the transferee other than those expressly reserved. Therefore, once part-performance is proved, the mortgagor cannot reclaim possession, effectively limiting the right of redemption under Section 60.

2. Assessment of Readiness and Willingness: The Assistant Judge and High Court had inferred lack of willingness because the sale was not registered by 15-7-1953 and because the original written statement lacked an averment of willingness. The Supreme Court held these inferences unsustainable: (a) There was no evidence that time was of the essence; the 15-7-1953 date imposed an obligation on the vendor, not a limitation on the vendee. (b) The High Court erred in relying on a pleading filed before Yarkhan was made a party and ignored subsequent evidence.

3. Factual Findings Supporting Section 53-A: The Court noted undisputed facts satisfying each Nathulal condition: a written contract dated 8-7-1953; transfer of possession to the transferee; substantial acts in furtherance, including payment of full consideration and extensive improvements; and demonstrated willingness, evidenced by drafting the deed, taking heirs for registration, and paying additional sums.

4. Precedential Support: By contrasting the facts with Mahadik, the Court found that unlike Sahai in Mahadik, Yarkhan’s possession derived from the contract of sale and he had fulfilled all obligations save registration, aligning with the principle in Maneklal.

5. Consequence for Redemption: Given that Section 53-A protection operates “notwithstanding” non-registration, the Court concluded that Respondent 1’s right to redeem and obtain possession was barred.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; High Court judgment set aside.

Respondent 1 is debarred from redeeming the mortgage or recovering possession of the property; the petitioners retain possession under Section 53-A. The decision affirms that fulfilment of the statutory conditions of part-performance can, in effect, extinguish the mortgagor’s right of redemption, though the owner may still sue to compel execution of the conveyance. No wider precedent is set beyond clarifying the inter-play of Sections 53-A and 60 on the facts presented.

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    Hamzabi And Others v. Syed Karimuddin And Others

    Ruma Pal, J.— The question to be determined in this case is whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act has any impact on the right of redemption granted by Section 60 of that Act.

    2. The right of the mortgagor to redeem had its origin as an equitable principle for giving relief against forfeiture even after the mortgagor defaulted in making payment under the mortgage deed. It is a right which has been jealously guarded over the years by courts. The maxim of “once a mortgage always a mortgage” and the avoidance of provisions obstructing redemption as “clogs on redemption” are expressions of this judicial protection. (See: Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit (1989) 1 SCC 458, AIR 1989 SC 436 in this context.) As far as this country is concerned, the right is statutorily recognised in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section gives the mortgagor right to redeem the property at any time after the principal money has become due by tendering the mortgage money and claiming possession of the mortgaged property from the mortgagee. The only limit to this right is contained in the proviso to the section which reads:

    “Provided that the right conferred by this section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a court.”

    3. While the expression “decree of court” is explicit enough, the phrase “act of parties” has given rise to controversy. One such act may be when the mortgagor sells the equity of redemption to the mortgagee. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A Kamtam (1977) 3 SCC 247, AIR 1977 SC 774 has said that:

    “In India it is only on execution of the conveyance and registration of transfer of the mortgagor's interest by registered instrument that the mortgagor's right of redemption will be extinguished.”

    4. Section 53-A provides for another equitable principle viz., the doctrine of part-performance. The Chancery Court had developed the principle of part-performance to deal with situations when a person took an unfair advantage of the transaction entered into and then denied the transaction itself. The party seeking to resist dispossession must have altered his position and done some act under the contract so that it would amount to fraud in the opposite party to take advantage of the contract not being in writing. The principle was statutorily recognised in the United Kingdom by Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677. In India, Section 53-A similarly protects the possession of persons who may have acted on a contract of sale but in whose favour no legally valid sale deed may have been executed or registered. The section reads:

    “53-A. Part-performance.—Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,
    and the transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part-performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,
    and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,
    then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:
    Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part-performance thereof.”

    5. The conditions necessary under this section for making out the defence of part-performance to an action in ejectment by the owner have been extricated in Nathulal v. Phoolchand (1969) 3 SCC 120 as:

    “(1) that the transferor has contracted to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;
    (2) that the transferee, has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession continues in possession in part-performance of the contract;
    (3) that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and
    (4) that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.”

    6. The language of the section is mandatory, and if the conditions are fulfilled then

    “notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which, the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract”.

    (See Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 237.)

    7. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A Kamtam (1977) 3 SCC 247, AIR 1977 SC 774 was not called upon to decide whether the equity of redemption could also be extinguished by part-performance of a contract of sale under Section 53-A. When a mortgagor/vendee agrees to sell the mortgaged property to the mortgagee/putative vendee in possession, the mortgagee's status is subsumed or merged in his rights as a putative vendee under Section 53-A against the transferor, provided of course the preconditions for the application of Section 53-A are fulfilled. Given the mandatory language of Section 53-A, it must be held that in such a situation the equity of redemption in the mortgagor/vendee is lost to the extent that the mortgagor cannot reclaim possession of the mortgaged property. To hold to the contrary, would not only defeat the mandate of Section 53-A but would result in an anomalous situation. An owner who may not have mortgaged his property cannot be in a worse position vis-à-vis the vendee than an owner who may have mortgaged the subject-matter of sale to the vendee. The only right left with the owner in both cases is to sue for the completion of the contract.

    8. Let us now consider the facts of this case:

    The subject-matter of dispute is a house at Mohalla Boiwada, Aurangabad. The house belonged to one Mohd. Hussain. In 1951, Mohd. Hussain created a usufructuary mortgage of the house for 7 years in favour of Petitioner 1 for a consideration of Rs 700. If the amount were not repaid within the period of 7 years, the mortgagee would be entitled to retain the mortgaged house in her possession till the payment of amount or by filing suit for foreclosure get the same foreclosed.

    9. In 1953 Mohd. Hussain agreed to sell the house to Petitioner 1's husband Mohd. Yarkhan for Rs 825. The agreement is evidenced by a document dated 8-7-1953 which records that Mohd. Hussain had received Rs 15 as earnest money from Mohd. Yarkhan and

    “transferred the possession of the mortgage of the house by way of a sale (sic). The remaining amount will be received in cash before the competent authority at the time of registration. Hence, I have given these few sentences as an Isar Pawati. The registration will be effected on dated 15-7-1953”.

    10. Mohd. Hussain died before any sale deed was registered. On 20-6-1954 a sale deed was executed by Amir Hussain and Rabiyabi, the son and daughter of Mohd. Hussain in favour of Petitioner 1. This document records that the sale of the house was effected for a consideration of Rs 900 and that after adjusting the mortgage amount of Rs 700 the remaining amount of Rs 200 had been received in cash. The document, however, was not registered.

    11. According to the petitioners, after this, Mohd. Yarkhan improved the mortgaged property and made various additions and alterations and converted the two-room house into a 15-roomed one.

    12. On 12-1-1965 a sale deed was executed by which Amir Hussain, Rahimabi, Rabiyabi, Anisabi, and Hamidabi, all claiming to be the children of Mohd. Hussain, sold the house to Respondent 1 for a sum of Rs 3000, out of which an amount of Rs 600 was retained by Respondent 1 for the purpose of redeeming the mortgage in favour of Petitioner 1.

    13. Five months later, Respondent 1 filed a suit against Petitioner 1 for redemption of the mortgage and for possession of the house. The trial court dismissed the suit inter alia on the ground that Petitioner 1 was not the true mortgagee but her husband Mohd. Yarkhan was. Respondent 1 preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The District Judge, while upholding the finding that Mohd. Yarkhan was the actual mortgagee, reversed the decision of the trial court and passed a decree permitting Respondent 1 to redeem the mortgage. The High Court in second appeal was of the view that because of the concurrent finding that Petitioner 1 was really the benamidar of Mohd. Yarkhan, the suit should have been dismissed as Mohd. Yarkhan had never been made a party. It was noted that had Mohd. Yarkhan been a party, he could have claimed protection from eviction under Section 53-A of the Transfer of the Property Act. The parties conceded the position before the High Court. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the decree of the District Judge set aside. The suit was remanded to the trial court with a direction that Respondent 1 should be permitted to add Mohd. Yarkhan as a party to the suit and if this was done then Mohd. Yarkhan should be given an opportunity to file his written statement and to raise all the contentions which were open and available to him and the suit should then be disposed of on merits.

    14. By the time the matter was remanded back, Mohd. Yarkhan was dead. As such his legal heirs namely Petitioners 2 to 7 before us were added as defendants in the suit. They filed a written statement in which they inter alia claimed the right to retain possession of the house by virtue of Section 53-A of the Act. After framing of fresh issues, the trial court again dismissed Respondent 1's suit on 31-10-1977. The trial court held that the agreement of sale dated 8-7-1953 was proved; that Rahimabi, Anisabi, and Hamidabi were also the children of Mohd. Hussain along with Amir Hussain and Rabiyabi; that Amir Hussain and Rabiyabi had executed the sale deed on 20-6-1954 in favour of Petitioner 1 as benamidar of Mohd. Yarkhan; that Respondent 1 had purchased the house with notice of the agreement for sale dated 8-7-1953 and the part-performance thereof, that the petitioners had been able to establish all the ingredients of Section 53-A and that because of this Respondent 1 was not entitled to redeem the house or seek possession of it.

    15. On appeal, the Assistant Judge by his judgment dated 20-12-1980 upheld the findings of the trial court on all issues but held that the plea under Section 53-A of the Act was not available to the petitioners as there was no evidence that Mohd. Yarkhan was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. This was based on the finding that the agreement to sell mentioned that the sale deed was to be executed and the sale completed on 15-7-1953 and that there was no evidence that Mohd. Yarkhan had offered to pay the balance consideration and get the deed executed on 15-7-1953 or during Mohd. Hussain's lifetime. The Assistant Judge negatived the submission of the petitioners that the execution of the sale deed on 20-6-1954 showed that Mohd. Yarkhan was willing to perform the contract dated 15-7-1953. In reversing the decree of the trial court and allowing Respondent 1 to redeem the mortgage by payment of Rs 600 to the petitioner, the District Judge noted that:

    “The evidence has been brought on record to the effect that certain improvements have also been made by the mortgagees in the mortgaged property and that therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to get the possession of the suit property as it exists now. This question will be finally decided while passing a final decree ordering the delivery of possession.”

    16. Petitioner 1 had died during the proceedings before the trial court. The remaining petitioners challenged the decision of the Assistant Judge before the High Court. The High Court held that as a matter of law the equity of redemption was not extinguished even if the conditions under Section 53-A of the Act had been fulfilled by the petitioners. As such, the High Court was of the view that Respondent 1 was entitled to redeem the mortgage and dismissed the appeal.

    17. The petitioners have impugned the decision of the High Court before this Court. After granting special leave on 27-9-1988, it was found necessary to have a factual finding of the High Court whether the appellants were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement dated 8-7-1953. Presumably this was because the principle of law enunciated by the High Court was unacceptable. The appeal was directed to be heard after the finding of the High Court on the point was received on the evidence on record and within the ambit of second appeal keeping in view the findings recorded by the trial court.

    18. The High Court by its decision dated 3-2-1989 came to the conclusion that the petitioners were not ready and willing to perform the agreement dated 8-7-1953. The High Court deduced this from the fact that in the written statement filed by Petitioner 1 in 1965 there was no mention regarding willingness to perform the part of the contract either on Petitioner 1's or Mohd. Yarkhan's part. The second ground for finding against the petitioners was that the balance consideration was not paid even when Amir Hussain and Rabiyabi executed the unregistered sale deed in favour of Petitioner 1 on 20-6-1954.

    19. The basic facts as narrated in this judgment have been accepted by all the courts. The question remains whether the Assistant Judge and the High Court were right in drawing the inference from the established facts that Mohd. Yarkhan was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract dated 8-7-1953. If the inference was perverse and the petitioners are therefore entitled to the protection of Section 53-A, then for the reasons stated earlier, Respondent 1's right of redemption does not survive and the appeal must be allowed.

    20. The decision in Mahadik case (1982) 1 SCC 237 is instructive as that was a case where the question of readiness and willingness of the mortgagee/vendee was in issue. In that case, the owner, Mahadik, had mortgaged his house to Sahai. The mortgage was not a usufructuary mortgage. Although Sahai was given possession of the house, nevertheless he was accountable to Mahadik for the rent earned from the house. The mortgagor, Mahadik was also required to pay interest on the rent amount to secure which the mortgage had been created. A draft deed of sale was prepared on 5-10-1945 under which Mahadik purportedly sold the house to Sahai in consideration for finalising the accounts of the mortgage, repaying the other creditors of the mortgagor and payment of the balance consideration money in cash at the time of registration. The sale deed was not registered. In the suit filed by Mahadik for redemption and possession, Sahai claimed protection under Section 53-A of the Act. The High Court found in favour of Sahai. This Court reversed the finding having determined from the facts that no action had been taken by Sahai in furtherance of the sale deed. Sahai had not settled the mortgage accounts nor had he paid the creditors of the mortgagor. Sahai's possession was also not relatable to the contract of sale. In an application filed by Sahai in proceedings subsequent to the execution of the sale deed, Sahai had claimed that an amount of Rs 27,792.23 was due under the mortgage from Mahadik. This Court also found that the agreement on which Sahai had relied was not a concluded contract because the parties were not ad idem. According to Mahadik, the agreement did not correctly reflect the negotiations between the parties which was that there would be a conditional sale. That was why Mahadik had refused to execute the deed of sale. Sahai's defence was negatived but it is apparent that Mahadik case (1982) 1 SCC 237 proceeded on the basis that had Sahai been successful in establishing his claim under Section 53-A, Mahadik would not have been entitled to possession.

    21. In the present case, there is no dispute that the agreement of sale dated 8-7-1953 was a concluded contract. Yarkhan, the actual mortgagee and putative vendee had acted in terms of the agreement for sale dated 8-7-1953. The reason given by the Assistant Judge for holding that Yarkhan was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract of sale was that in terms of the agreement dated 8-7-1953, the sale was to be completed by 15-7-1953 and that there was no evidence that Yarkhan had called upon Mohd. Hussain to execute the sale deed on that date. This inference of lack of readiness and willingness assumes that the time mentioned in the contract was of the essence of the contract. There is no evidence in support of this. On the other hand, the agreement does not state that if the registration were not effected on 15-7-1953, there would be no sale. The mentioning of the date appears to be a term in favour of the vendee casting a duty on the vendor to complete the vendee's title within the time specified. The term cannot be construed against the vendee to limit his right to have the sale completed on a subsequent date.

    22. The reasoning of the High Court is equally unacceptable. Yarkhan was not a party to the suit as originally filed. The High Court in remanding the matter to the trial court had specifically held that Yarkhan should be added as a party and that he should be permitted to raise the defence of Section 53-A. This was done. To reject the plea of the willingness of Yarkhan on the basis of the earlier written statement filed by Petitioner 1 was, to say the least, erroneous. The second reason given by the High Court is factually incorrect. The balance consideration had in fact been paid to Amir Hussain and Rabiyabi when the unregistered sale deed was executed as averred by Yarkhan and admittedly recorded in the sale deed dated 20-6-1954.

    23. The contract for sale required Mohd. Hussain to pay Rs 15 as earnest money. This had been done. Yarkhan had paid not only the consideration envisaged under the agreement of sale but an additional amount as demanded by two of the heirs of Mohd. Hussain. Yarkhan had drafted the deed of sale and taken it for registration to the registration office. Two of the heirs had even executed the deed of sale. It is also in evidence that subsequent to the deed, Mohd. Yarkhan had exercised rights of ownership and altered his position under the contract by adding several rooms to the existing structure at some expense. Yarkhan had, therefore, asserted his possession qua owner. This was also in terms of the agreement of sale. Short of actual registration of the deed of sale, there was nothing else that Yarkhan could do. As stated in Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusjii Jamshedji Ginwalla AIR 1950 SC 1:

    “The defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were willing to perform their part of the contract. As a matter of fact, they have performed the whole of it. All that remains to be done is the execution of a lease deed by the lessor in favour of the lessee and of getting it registered.”

    24. The four conditions under Section 53-A of the Act having been fulfilled by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, it must be held that Respondent 1 is debarred from claiming possession of the mortgaged property. The judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside and the appeal allowed without any order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Hamzabi And Others v. Syed Karimuddin And Others
    (Nov 28, 2000)