AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 523
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(4), Section 2(15) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960
  • the Bombay Shops and Commercial Establishments Act
  • The Employees' State Insurance Act (under which the appeal was filed)
  • Section of the Act under which the appeal was filed (not specified, but implied to be relevant)
  • Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948
  • The ESI Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 523
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(4), Section 2(15) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960
  • the Bombay Shops and Commercial Establishments Act
  • The Employees' State Insurance Act (under which the appeal was filed)
  • Section of the Act under which the appeal was filed (not specified, but implied to be relevant)
  • Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948
  • The ESI Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is a consultancy organization that, under one roof, employs engineers, architects, financial and management consultants to advise clients—including companies, corporations and local authorities—on optimal utilisation of their industrial assets. After the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (respondent) issued a letter stating that the establishment was covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) with effect from 31-7-1976, the appellant began remitting contributions for its employees.

Invoking Section 75 of the ESI Act, the appellant sought a declaration from the ESI Court, Pune, that the Act did not apply, contending that its premises was neither a factory nor a “shop.” The ESI Court agreed, relying on Dattatraya Advertising Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corporation (1956 LLN 346). The Corporation appealed, and the Bombay High Court—relying on ESI Corporation v. R.K. Swamy (1994 1 SCC 445)—reversed the ESI Court, holding that consultancy premises constituted a “shop” for ESI purposes. The present appeal challenges that High Court ruling before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a consultancy establishment that sells expert industrial, technical, marketing and management advice for a price is a “shop” within the meaning of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948.
  2. Whether an alleged conflict between V. Sasidharan v. Peter and Karunakar (1984 4 SCC 230) and ESI Corporation v. R.K. Swamy (1994 1 SCC 445) warranted reference to a larger Bench.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Relied on V. Sasidharan v. Peter and Karunakar, where a lawyer’s office was held not to be a “shop” under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, asserting that professional advice is not trade or business.
  • Contended that “shop” presupposes trade or commerce in goods and therefore cannot encompass purely professional consultancy services.
  • Argued that R.K. Swamy conflicts with Sasidharan; hence, the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for reconciliation.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Submitted that the term “shop” in the ESI Act has received an expanded judicial meaning to include premises where services are marketed for consideration.
  • Asserted that consultancy activities are commercial in nature, involving trade or commerce, and therefore squarely fall within the broadened concept of “shop.”
  • Maintained that there is no conflict between Sasidharan and R.K. Swamy because Sasidharan dealt with a differently worded state statute, whereas the present case concerns the ESI Act, which lacks a statutory definition of “shop.”

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dattatraya Advertising Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corporation (1956 LLN 346) Premises providing intellectual advice are not “shops.” Relied upon by the ESI Court; Supreme Court implicitly overruled its relevance by adopting an expanded concept of “shop.”
ESI Corporation v. R.K. Swamy (1994 1 SCC 445) An advertising agency that sells expert services for price operates a “shop.” Formed the cornerstone of the High Court’s decision and was affirmed by the Supreme Court as directly applicable to consultancy services.
V. Sasidharan v. Peter and Karunakar (1984 4 SCC 230) Lawyer’s office is not a “shop” under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. Distinguished: dealt with a state statute containing its own definition; not determinative of the meaning of “shop” under the ESI Act.
Hindu Jea Band v. Regional Director, ESI Corporation (1987 2 SCC 101) Premises offering musical performance services can constitute a “shop.” Cited to illustrate judicial expansion of “shop” to service-oriented establishments.
Cochin Shipping Co. v. ESI Corporation (1992 4 SCC 245) Stevedoring and related commercial services bring a premises within “shop.” Used to reinforce that trade in services suffices for classification as a “shop.”
International Ore and Fertilizers (India) (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corporation (1987 4 SCC 203) Negotiation and ancillary activities related to sale of goods can render premises a “shop.” Invoked to support the proposition that physical sale of goods is unnecessary for “shop” status.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court approached the case by examining prior interpretations of the undefined term “shop” within the ESI Act. It noted that Sasidharan concerned the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, whose definitions could not be transplanted into the ESI context. By contrast, a consistent line of ESI jurisprudence—Hindu Jea Band, International Ore and Fertilizers, Cochin Shipping and, most decisively, R.K. Swamy—has broadened “shop” to encompass premises that market expert services for remuneration.

Applying that approach, the Court characterised the appellant’s activities as inherently commercial: the preparation of project reports and offering of technical, marketing and management advice are rendered to customers for a price. Such economic transactions amount to trading in services, thereby fitting squarely within the expanded concept of a “shop.” Consequently, the Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on Sasidharan and found no doctrinal conflict warranting reference to a larger Bench.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct Effect: The consultancy establishment remains covered by the ESI Act and must continue to comply with contribution obligations. Each party will bear its own costs.

Broader Implications: The decision reaffirms, without creating new doctrine, that service-oriented establishments selling expertise for consideration are “shops” under the ESI Act, further entrenching the Court’s expansive interpretation of that term.

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    Kirloskar Consultants Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corpn. .

    S. Rajendra Babu, J.— The appellant before us provides under a roof, the services of several different professionals like Engineers, Architects, Financial Consultants and Management Consultants, guidance and advice to other companies, corporations, boards and even local authorities on how best to manage their business for optimum utilisation of plant, machinery and other infrastructure. The appellant is registered as “a commercial establishment” under the provisions of the Bombay Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. An application was filed by the applicant under Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) before the ESI Court, Pune for a declaration that the provisions of the said Act would not be applicable to the appellant, pursuant to a letter sent by the respondent stating that it was covered under the provisions of the Act w.e.f 31-7-1976. From that letter it was assumed that it was a shop for purposes of the applicability of the Act. The appellant started remitting contribution in respect of its employees as per the provisions of the Act. It was contended before the ESI Court that the appellant has not carried on any process of manufacture and hence is not a factory much less work carried on by it on the premises could make it a shop.

    2. The respondent pleaded that the appellant is engaged in the consultancy services in technical and marketing fields for a price and it is a shop. The ESI Court after noticing that the appellant's establishment is a commercial establishment doing consultancy service in respect of marketing, management, technical and industrial establishment, observed that a shop does not include a premises where intellectual advice is tendered and, therefore, the appellant is not covered by the Act. To reach this conclusion, it relied upon the decision of the High Court in Dattatraya Advertising Co. Ltd. v. ESI Corpn. 1956 LLN 346

    3. Against the order of the ESI Court the respondent filed an appeal under the Act in the High Court. The High Court, on the basis of ratio of the decision in ESI Corpn. v. R.K Swamy (1994) 1 SCC 445 held that the word “shop” has acquired an expanded meaning to cover a premises where the advertising agency sells its expert services to a client to enable the client to launch an effective advertising campaign for his product, and in the same manner premises where consultancy service is provided is also a “shop” and appeal of the respondents was allowed. Hence this appeal.

    4. Shri Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, relying upon a decision of this court in V. Sasidharan v. Peter And Karunakar (1984) 4 SCC 230 contended that the appellant's business premises cannot be a shop on the analogy that a lawyer's office where advice is given by lawyers is not a “shop” as held by this Court for purposes of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960. He emphasised that a place of work cannot be regarded as a “shop” unless the activity conducted is in a “shop”. He submitted that the expression “shop” means a premises which is used in connection with the trade or business, but not when professional service is rendered. He emphasised that the appellant does not carry on any trade or business and contended that the appellant's establishment cannot be a “shop”. He also submitted that the decision of this Court in R.K Swamy case 1956 LLN 346 is in conflict with the decision in Sasidharan case (1984) 4 SCC 230 and therefore, the matter has to be considered by a larger Bench.

    5. Shri Vijay Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that in the light of the several decisions of this Court where the expression “shop” having been given expanded meaning for purposes of the ESI Act, whereunder the expression “shop” is not defined the matter is no longer res integra. Nor is “shop” defined as had been done in the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. He, therefore, submitted that it is unnecessary to refer the matter to a larger Bench as there is no conflict between the views expressed in the decision in Sasidharan case (1984) 4 SCC 230 and the decision in R.K Swamy case (1994) 1 SCC 445.

    6. He also submitted that whenever an establishment carries on activities in the nature of a trade or commerce, it must be held that such premises is a “shop” in the light of the judgments rendered by this Court giving an expanded meaning to the word “shop”. He also submitted that on the facts of this case, it is clear that the appellant is engaged in several activities including advice to its clients in respect of industrial, technical, marketing and management activities. It is submitted that the nature of the activities carried on by the appellant cannot fall outside the scope of the expression “shop” as understood by this Court in several decisions.

    7. This Court in Sasidharan case (1984) 4 SCC 230 was concerned with the interpretation of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1960, wherein Section 2(4) defines “commercial establishment” and Section 2(15) defines “shop”. In that case, therefore, this Court had to find out whether the activities carried on in a lawyer's office fall within the definitions in Sections 2(4) and 2(15) of the said Act. Thus, this Court was not concerned with the meaning attributed to a shop arising in the ESI Act. It was held that lawyers do not carry on trade or business nor render service to customers but carry on a profession and therefore cannot fall within the scope of that Act.

    8. Reference may be made to a decision of this court in Hindu Jea Band v. Regional Director, ESI Corpn. (1987) 2 SCC 101 and in that case the premises in which services for rendering music is given is held to be a “shop”, so was the decision in Cochin Shipping Co. v. ESI Corpn. (1992) 4 SCC 245 wherein it was held that regardless of the fact that the steamship Company is not carrying on stevedoring operations, it is a shop. Further, in the case of International Ore and Fertilizers (India) (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn. (1987) 4 SCC 203 the premises was held to be a shop even where activities relating to sale of goods do not take place but negotiations for the terms of sale, carrying on of the survey of the goods imported, is done.

    9. What we are concerned in the present case is what this Court was concerned in R.K Swamy case (1994) 1 SCC 445. An advertising agency organises campaigns by conducting the same in different media and would give advice in this behalf and also in regard to possible expenses. It is also engaged in preparing and presenting alternate campaigns and for such a purpose it prepares artwork and appropriate slogans to go with it. By engaging the service of experts in different fields the advertising agency would prepare the campaign for customers and sell the campaign by receiving the price thereof. As the advertising agency sells its expert services to a client to enable him to launch an advertising campaign to advertise his product, the same being offered for at a price, the premises of an advertising agency could reasonably be said to be a shop. Adopting the same logic, we may say that the business carried on by the appellant is of consultancy services to its customers in respect of industrial, technical, marketing and management activities and preparation of project reports by engaging the services of architects, engineers and other experts. In substance, the nature of activities carried on by the appellant is commercial or economical and would amount to parting with the same at a price. Hence reliance on Sasidharan case (1984) 4 SCC 230 is misplaced. Thus, we do not find any good reason to differ from the view expressed by the High Court.

    10. Hence, this appeal stands dismissed. However, in the circumstances, the parties shall bear their respective costs.

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    Kirloskar Consultants Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corpn. .
    (Nov 14, 2000)