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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 48 after its amendment in 1963
  • Section 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
  • Section 48, Act (prior to amendment)
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Amendment Act 8 of 1963
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 48 after its amendment in 1963
  • Section 9 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
  • Section 48, Act (prior to amendment)
  • Article 226 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Amendment Act 8 of 1963
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns ownership and possession of Plot No. 301, Village Khakhra Khurd Tappa Sahila, District Basti (Uttar Pradesh). In 1914 the plot was auction-sold in execution of a money decree obtained by Ram Khelawan (predecessor of the present respondents) against Bhagwati (predecessor of the present appellants). A sale certificate and “dakhalnama” were issued in favour of Ram Khelawan, and the respondents claim continuous possession since then.

During village consolidation proceedings the respondents filed objections under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (“the Act”) asserting title on the strength of the 1914 auction. The appellants counter-claimed that they had never been dispossessed and had perfected title by adverse possession.

The Consolidation Officer (20-1-1972) rejected the respondents’ claim, and the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer (8-3-1972) upheld that rejection on appeal. On revision, however, the Deputy Director of Consolidation set aside both orders, holding that the 1914 auction conferred title on the respondents and that adverse-possession requirements were not satisfied by the appellants.

The appellants challenged the revisional order by writ petition, which the Allahabad High Court dismissed on 30-4-1980; a subsequent review petition was also dismissed on 24-9-1980. The present Supreme Court appeal is directed against that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (as amended in 1963), the Deputy Director of Consolidation possesses authority to overturn concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer.
  2. Consequently, whether the appellants’ plea of adverse possession could survive the Deputy Director’s revisional scrutiny in light of the documentary evidence of the 1914 auction sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • Section 48 limits the Deputy Director’s revisional jurisdiction to errors of jurisdiction, legality, or material irregularity; it does not permit re-appraisal of concurrent factual findings.
  • The appellants asserted continuous possession since 1914 and claimed to have perfected title by adverse possession.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The 1914 auction sale, sale certificate, and related revenue records conclusively established their ownership and possession of the entire Plot 301 (new), corresponding to old Plots 88/1 and 88/2.
  • The Consolidation Officer and Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer ignored material documentary evidence, justifying interference by the Deputy Director in revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation (1978) 3 SCC 172 Section 48 (pre-1963) is pari materia with Section 115 CPC, limiting revisional interference to jurisdictional errors and material irregularities. Cited to explain the earlier, narrower scope of Section 48 before its 1963 amendment.
Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1994 Supp (2) SCC 198) After the 1963 amendment, Section 48 allows examination of correctness, legality, or propriety of subordinate orders, but the revisional authority cannot act as a de-novo fact-finding court; it may interfere where material evidence has been ignored or conclusions are perverse. Relied upon to uphold the Deputy Director’s power to revisit findings that overlooked the sale certificate and other crucial evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ jurisdictional objection. It found that both the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer had ignored the decisive sale certificate issued in favour of Ram Khelawan. Because a claim of adverse possession requires specific pleading and proof of hostile, continuous, and open possession—elements neither alleged nor established by the appellants—the subordinate authorities had proceeded “on a wrong premise and against the settled principles of law.”

Applying the principles articulated in Ram Dular, the Court held that the Deputy Director properly exercised revisional power: he corrected a decision rendered in disregard of material documentary evidence and in misapprehension of the legal requisites for adverse possession. Hence, the High Court rightly refused to interfere in writ jurisdiction or on review.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The Deputy Director of Consolidation’s order declaring the respondents owners in possession of Plot 301 stands affirmed.

Broader Implication: The decision reinforces that, post-1963 amendment, Section 48 empowers the revisional authority to rectify subordinate orders that ignore crucial evidence or misapply legal standards, even when this entails overturning concurrent factual findings. No new doctrinal precedent was established beyond this clarification.

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    Seshmani v. Dy. Director Of Consolidation

    D.P Wadhwa, J.— This appeal is directed against judgment dated 24-9-1980 of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the review petition of the appellant. Earlier writ petition of the appellants filed under Article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated 30-4-1980. The appellants had sought quashing of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (for short “the Act”). The Deputy Director of Consolidation had allowed the revision filed by the contesting respondents under the Act holding the respondents to be the owners in possession of plot bearing No. 301, Village Khakhra Khurd Tappa Sahila, PO Khan Naugarh, District Basti. By that judgment, the Deputy Director of Consolidation set aside the orders of the Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer.

    2. During consolidation proceedings in the village the respondents, successors of Ram Khelawan, filed objection under Section 9 of the Act before the Consolidation Officer claiming that they were owners of Plot No. 301 having acquired the same in auction in 1914 in a suit pending in the Court of Munsif. It was submitted that Ram Khelawan, father of the respondents, got a decree against Bhagwati, father of the appellants, in a suit filed by him for recovery of a loan given by Ram Khelawan to Bhagwati, father of the appellants. The respondents contended that they had been in possession of the plot since then. In support of their claim they produced a copy of the judgment of the Munsif's Court, the sales certificate and copy of khatauni for the period of 1359.F and 1324.F. The appellants claimed that they were never dispossessed all through 1914 and that they had been in possession of the plot and had since perfected their title by adverse possession. In support of their claim, the appellants submitted before the Consolidation Officer copy of the “khewat” and entry in the register of 1914. By his order dated 20-1-1972 the Consolidation Officer rejected the claim of the respondents. The matter was taken in appeal to the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer by the respondents who dismissed the same by order dated 8-3-1972 holding that the respondents had never filed any claim on the basis of auction-sale with regard to the land. More than 12 years having elapsed since the sale, the appellants had perfected their title by adverse possession. The respondents did not rest there and filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. There was a dispute regarding the number of the plot. It was found that the sale certificate in favour of the respondents mentioned Plot No. 82/2 (old) though the new number of the plot was 301. It was made up of the old Plots Nos. 88/1 and 88/2. Boundaries of the plot bearing No. 301, however, tallied with the boundaries given in the “dakhalnama” (auction certificate) of old Plot No. 82/2. That showed that the predecessor of the respondents had acquired the title of the whole of Plot No. 301 (new). The Deputy Director of Consolidation rejected the claim of the appellants that after the auction of the plot in favour of Ram Khelawan, no steps were taken to obtain possession of the same. There was a suit in which decree was passed in favour of Ram Khelawan. Auction of the plot was held for recovery of the decretal amount. It was purchased by Ram Khelawan and sales certificate granted in his favour. The Deputy Director of Consolidation further observed that it was not possible to accept the contention of the appellants that having gone through all the processes, Ram Khelawan would not get possession of the plot. He, therefore, returned the finding that as per record Plot No. 301 (new) comprised of Plots Nos. 88/1 and 88/2 (old) and that the “dakhalnama” showed that Ram Khelawan predecessor of the respondents was in possession. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer as well as that of the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer. Aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed and the review also met the same fate.

    3. It was submitted by the appellant that under Section 48 of the Act, the Deputy Director in exercise of his powers of revision could not upset the concurrent findings of fact by the Consolidation Officer and on appeal by the Settlement Officer. Section 48 of the Act was amended by Amendment Act 8 of 1963. Before its amendment Section 48 read as under:

    “48. The Director of Consolidation may call for the record of any case if the officer (other than the Arbitrator) by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity and may pass such orders in the case, as it thinks fit.”

    4. This Court in Sher Singh v. Jt. Director of Consolidation (1978) 3 SCC 172 with reference to Section 48 prior to its amendment said that the section was in pari materia with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“Code” for short). This Court thereafter referred to various judgments of the Privy Council and of this Court regarding the powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code and held:

    “12. The position that emerges from these decisions is that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters: (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction and failed to do so and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provisions of law, or with material irregularity by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. And if the High Court is satisfied that there is no error in regard to any of these three matters, it has no power to interfere merely because it differs from the conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. A distinction must be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding questions of law which have relation to, or are concerned with, questions of jurisdiction of the said courts, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. An erroneous decision on a question of fact or of law reached by the subordinate court which has no relation to question of jurisdiction of that court, cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115.”

    5. The scope of Section 48 after its amendment in 1963 again came up for consideration by this Court in Ram Dular v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1994 Supp (2) SCC 198. Now this section reads as under:

    “48. Revision and reference.—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit.”

    6. Again the question arose as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation was legally justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer. The Court said that while exercising the revisional powers under Section 48 what was required to be seen was whether the Deputy Director had considered the questions in its proper perspective or had ignored any material findings on record in coming to a particular finding. The Court said:

    “It is clear that the Director had power to satisfy himself as to the legality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings or correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact-finding authority by appreciating for itself of those facts de novo. It has to consider whether the legally admissible evidence had not been considered by the authorities in recording a finding of fact or law or the conclusion reached by it is based on no evidence, any patent illegality or impropriety had been committed or there was any procedural irregularity, which goes to the root of the matter, had been committed in recording the order or finding.”

    7. It is difficult to accept the contention of the appellants. The Consolidation Officer as well as the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer had ignored the sales certificate in favour of Ram Khelawan, predecessor of the respondents. To base a claim on adverse possession, it is not enough to allege that one is in possession of the land. The ingredients of adverse possession were missing as these were not alleged nor taken into consideration. The Consolidation Officer as well as the Assistant Settlement Consolidation Officer proceeded on a wrong premise and against the settled principles of law. The Deputy Director, Consolidation, therefore, was well justified in exercising his power of revision and coming to a different conclusion. The writ petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court and so also the review petition of the appellants.

    8. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

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    Seshmani v. Dy. Director Of Consolidation
    (Feb 14, 2000)