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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Transfer of Property Act
  • Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • Section 10 of the aforesaid Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Transfer of Property Act
  • Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • Section 10 of the aforesaid Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent landlady filed an eviction suit against the appellant tenant under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, alleging wilful default in rent payment and commission of waste. While rent had been paid regularly up to March 1977, the tenant thereafter fell into arrears. At the tenant’s request, the parties executed an agreement of sale dated 4-5-1977 for a sale consideration of ₹25,000, of which ₹20,000 was paid on the date of the agreement and ₹5,000 was to be paid upon registration of the sale deed. The landlady later repudiated the agreement, returned the ₹20,000, and pursued eviction proceedings. The Rent Controller, the appellate authority, and the High Court all decreed eviction. The present appeal is by the tenant against those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether execution of an agreement of sale between landlord and tenant—coupled with receipt of a substantial portion of the price—terminates the landlord-tenant relationship and substitutes it with a purchaser-seller relationship, thereby removing the tenant from the purview of the Rent Control Act.
  2. Consequently, whether non-payment of rent after such agreement can be treated as “wilful default” under Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Tenant)

  • Upon execution of the agreement of sale and payment of ₹20,000, the parties ceased to be landlord and tenant; their relationship became that of purchaser and seller.
  • Because the tenancy ended, proceedings under the Rent Control Act are not maintainable.
  • In any event, failure to pay rent during this period cannot constitute “wilful default.”

Respondent (Landlady)

  • The words “already been surrendered” in the agreement merely refer to the tenant’s existing possession and do not alter the landlord-tenant relationship.
  • Repudiation of the agreement and return of the advance restored the parties to their original positions, permitting eviction on grounds of wilful default.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani v. Girish Chandra Dutta, (1973) 2 SCC 197 An agreement of sale between landlord and tenant ends the earlier landlord-tenant relationship; even cancellation of the agreement does not automatically revive the tenancy. The Court relied on this case to hold that the 4-5-1977 agreement of sale terminated the tenancy, and therefore the tenant could not be evicted for wilful default under the Rent Control Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the language of the 4-5-1977 agreement, noting that the landlady acknowledged having “already been surrendered” possession and had received ₹20,000 of the ₹25,000 sale price. This, coupled with the parties’ intent, demonstrated a conscious shift from landlord-tenant to purchaser-seller.

The Court emphasized the principle that contractual agreements can alter existing legal relationships, subject to law. When the landlady agreed to sell and accepted consideration, the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased. Therefore, obligations thereafter arose under the sale agreement, not the tenancy.

Applying Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani v. Girish Chandra Dutta, the Court held that once the sale agreement was executed, the tenancy did not revive even if the landlady later repudiated the agreement by returning the advance (which the tenant did not encash). Consequently, the statutory ground of wilful default in rent could not be invoked because the appellant was no longer a tenant.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; eviction decree set aside.

The High Court, appellate authority, and Rent Controller were in error in treating the appellant as a tenant after the execution of the sale agreement. Their orders are set aside. The decision leaves the parties free to pursue any remedies arising from the sale agreement, but establishes no new precedent beyond reaffirming the principle that a sale agreement terminates the landlord-tenant relationship.

    R. Kanthimathi And Another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs) .

    Order

    1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The question raised in this appeal is an interesting question and of some importance. The question is:

    “Whether on the execution of agreement of sale by the landlord with the tenant and landlord having received substantial portion of the sale consideration, the relationship of landlord-tenant inter se between them ceases and fresh rights and obligations flow under this agreement?”

    2. The present appeal is by the tenant who received decree of eviction against him by the order of the trial court confirmed by the appellate authority and finally affirmed by the High Court. The respondent landlord filed a suit for eviction on the ground of wilful default and also of committing an act of waste under Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(2)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Her case is that though the tenant paid rent regularly up to March 1977, but thereafter did not pay rent regularly. But on request of the appellant tenant to the landlady she agreed to sell the disputed premises. As a consequence, the agreement of sale was executed on 4-5-1977. According to the landlady, a breach was committed by the appellants, hence she repudiated that agreement by returning the amount she received under it and then she filed a suit for eviction against the tenant. It is not in dispute that in terms of the said agreement, the total sale consideration was a sum of Rs. 25,000. Out of this, the tenant paid Rs. 20,000 to the landlady on the date of the agreement itself. The balance of Rs. 5000 remained to be paid on the date of registration of the sale deed.

    3. Relying on this agreement of sale, the appellants' case is that on its execution, the relationship between the respondent and the appellant changed. They no more remained as landlord and tenant. Hence the present petition for eviction under the aforesaid Act is not sustainable. In the alternative it is submitted, in any case non-payment of rent for this period cannot be construed to be a wilful default within the meaning of Section 10 of the aforesaid Act. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority, both rejected this contention of the tenant and held that the tenant committed wilful default which was confirmed by the High Court.

    4. As aforesaid, the question for consideration is, whether the status of tenant as such changes on the execution of an agreement of sale with the landlord. It is relevant at this junction first to examine the terms of the agreement of sale. The relevant portions of the agreement of sale record the following:

    “I, the aforesaid, Mrs Beatrice Xavier hereby agree out of my own free will, to sell, convey and transfer the property to you Mrs R. Kanthimathi, wife of Mr S. Ramaswami, 435 Trichy Road, Coimbatore for a mutually agreed sale consideration of Rs. 25,000.
    I shall be proceeding to Coimbatore and shall execute the sale deed and present the same for admission and registration before the registration authority, accepting and acknowledge payment of the balance of consideration of Rs. 5000 (Rupees five thousand only) at the time of registration and shall complete the transaction of sale and conveyance as the property demised has already been surrendered to your possession.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    5. Submission for the tenant is after entering into the agreement, the landlady accepted Rs. 20,000 confirming delivery of possession in this context which already constitutes the clear intent of the landlady of entering into a new relationship with the tenant under it. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the words “already been surrendered” therein, only refer to the existing possession of the tenant and nothing more. So far as this submission for the respondent is concerned we have no hesitation to reject the same. The reference of the words “already been surrendered” has been incorporated with consciousness. This is to be construed in the background of the landlady having received a major amount of sale consideration and as normally, if a substantial sum is received by the seller, the purchaser is put in possession of the property hence to fall in the same lines the said words were used to confirm this possession in this context. There could be no other reason to record therein as such. Even if it be said to refer to the possession as a tenant the reassertion in the agreement of sale is only for the purpose of denoting possession given in pursuance of this agreement of sale.

    6. Any jural relationship between two persons could be created through agreement and similarly could be changed through agreement subject to the limitations under the law. Earlier when the appellants were inducted into tenancy it only means both agreed that their relationship was to be that of landlord and tenant. Later when the landlord decided to sell this property to the tenant and the tenant agreed by entering into agreement, they by their positive act changed their relationship as purchaser and seller. When the seller-landlord accepts the sum he actually acts under this agreement. This acceptance preceded by agreement of sale changes their relationship. This is how they intended. Once accepting such a change, their relationship of landlord-tenant ceases.

    7. This Court in Arjunlal Bhatt Mall Gothani v. Girish Chandra Dutta (1973) 2 SCC 197 held as under: (SCC Headnote)

    “The appellants were tenants in the premises of the respondent landlord and three suits, including an eviction suit, were pending against them. By an agreement between the appellants and the respondent, the respondent agreed to sell the whole property to the appellants for a certain sum to be paid to him by equal instalments. Clause (5) of the agreement provided that in case of default of any instalment, the agreement for sale would stand cancelled and if the purchasers failed to pay the defaulted instalments within one month's notice the payments made would stand forfeited and purchasers would make over possession of the property to the vendor.”
    “Under clause (5) of the agreement the question of giving notice arises only if the vendor wanted to forfeit the instalments paid by the purchaser. Not even one instalment having been paid the question of forfeiture does not arise and no notice was necessary for cancelling agreement. It stood automatically cancelled. It was sought to be argued before us that once the agreement stood cancelled the appellants stood restored to their original position as tenants and the suit could not be filed without giving notice under the Transfer of Property Act. We are of opinion that when the agreement, dated June 7, 1959, was entered into the old relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end. The rights and liabilities of the parties have to be worked out on the basis of that agreement.”

    8. This decision clearly spells out that once there is agreement of sale between a landlord and a tenant, the old relationship as such comes to an end. It goes on to record that even after the cancellation of such agreement of sale the status of tenant is not restored as such. In other words, on the date of execution of the aforesaid agreement of sale their status as that of landlord and tenant changed into a new status as that of a purchaser and a seller.

    9. Thus within this legal premises, the submission by learned counsel for the respondent for revival of their old relationship of landlord and tenant when she repudiates this agreement by sending back to the tenant Rs. 20,000 through a cheque (which according to the appellant was not encashed) cannot be accepted. So we have no hesitation to reject the same. Every conduct of the landlady right from the date of entering into agreement of sale, accepting money towards the sale consideration, delivering possession in lieu of such agreement all clearly indicates and has to be construed in law that she repudiated her old relationship of landlord and tenant. Thus after this parties enter into a new cloak of seller and purchaser and their relationship is to be governed under the said terms of the agreement. Every right and obligation thereafter would flow from it. Even if parties under the agreement of sale do not perform their obligations, remedy may be availed in law as permissible under in law. Hence we have no hesitation to hold that the courts below including the High Court committed error in holding that the tenant committed wilful default. When the appellant is no more the tenant how can non-payment be construed as wilful default?

    10. Accordingly, we find merit in this appeal and the same is allowed. The judgment of the High Court and that of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority is hereby set aside. However, this is without prejudice to the rights of the parties to pursue their remedy as is available to them under the law. Costs on the parties.

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    Comments

    R. Kanthimathi And Another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs) .
    (Feb 8, 2000)