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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Article 12 of the Constitution, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Societies Registration Act, 1860
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Article 12 of the Constitution, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Societies Registration Act, 1860
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Government of Rajasthan established District Rural Development Agencies (DRDAs) in each of the State’s 33 districts to implement poverty-alleviation programmes such as IRDP, Jawahar Rozgar Yojna, and others. Appointments to DRDAs were made locally, funded 100% by the State, and expressly described as temporary and scheme-linked.

In 1992 an Expert Committee (Rajender Jain Committee) recommended abolishing 338 posts, including numerous Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) and Class IV staff, due to diminished need and fiscal constraints. Acting on the State’s directive, DRDAs terminated 273 employees.

Affected employees filed writ petitions in the Rajasthan High Court. Single Judges quashed the terminations, holding that DRDAs had acted mechanically on the State’s instructions. On appeal, a Division Bench reversed those orders. The employees appealed to the Supreme Court, and one connected writ petition (W.P. (C) No. 540 of 1998) was tagged for disposal alongside the civil appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether abolition of DRDA posts and consequent termination of employees was legally sustainable when the decision originated from the State Government but was implemented by autonomous DRDAs.
  2. Whether the petitioners, employed under temporary, scheme-specific posts, possessed a right to regularisation or absorption in alternative posts within the State Government.
  3. Whether a court can compel the creation or continuation of posts once a time-bound, fund-dependent project has concluded.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners’ Arguments

  • They were “regularly” appointed and thus could not be terminated summarily.
  • Salaries were paid from State funds; therefore, in substance they were State Government employees entitled to absorption against existing vacancies.
  • DRDAs constitute an “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act; non-compliance with Section 25-F (retrenchment requirements) invalidated the terminations.
  • The statutory principle of “last-come-first-go” was ignored.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • Employment was expressly temporary, for six-month blocks linked to specific schemes and extendable only when funds were available.
  • DRDAs had no independent resources; when the State withdrew scheme funding, posts necessarily lapsed.
  • The Expert Committee’s recommendations justified abolition on rational administrative and financial grounds; courts cannot mandate the creation of non-essential posts.
  • Absorption elsewhere was impossible because no equivalent vacancies existed; nevertheless, the State undertook to give displaced employees preference should new posts arise.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, (1992) 4 SCC 99 Temporary employment under poverty-alleviation schemes does not confer a right to regularisation; courts should not frustrate scheme objectives by imposing permanent appointments. Relied on as the controlling authority to reject claims for regularisation and uphold the legitimacy of scheme-linked, time-bound employment.
Sandeep Kumar v. State of U.P., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 525 Employees engaged for project-specific work cannot demand regularisation once the project ends. Cited to emphasise that courts cannot order absorption when the underlying project and need have ceased.
State of H.P. v. Ashwani Kumar, (1996) 1 SCC 773 Closure of a project for want of funds precludes a mandate to regularise displaced workers. Used to reinforce the principle that judicial orders cannot compel retention of employees without available work or budget.
State of U.P. v. U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh, (1996) 7 SCC 34 Court cannot create or perpetuate posts that the employer no longer requires. Quoted in support of declining any direction to continue or create posts for the petitioners.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found that all appointments were explicitly temporary, limited to six-month periods, and contingent on scheme-specific funding. DRDAs lacked independent finances; once State funding ceased, continuation of the posts became impossible.

The State, acting on the recommendations of the Rajender Jain Committee, rationally decided to abolish surplus posts. The Court viewed this as a bona fide administrative and financial decision. Because the DRDAs merely implemented a policy they were powerless to resist, their reliance on the State’s directive did not vitiate the termination orders.

Invoking Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union and allied precedents, the Court held that recognising a right to regularisation or continued employment would undermine the very purpose of temporary poverty-relief schemes and strain limited public resources.

The Court also noted the State’s affidavit undertaking to give displaced workers preferential consideration, subject to eligibility, for any future posts created under new schemes. This assurance was deemed adequate in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Appeals and connected writ petition dismissed.

The terminations were upheld as lawful; no direction for regularisation or absorption was issued. The only relief preserved is the State’s voluntary commitment to accord displaced employees preference for any posts that may arise under future schemes, with age relaxation and seniority considerations. The decision reaffirms existing precedent that courts cannot compel the creation or continuation of posts once a scheme concludes and does not establish any novel legal principle.

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    Rajendra And Others v. State Of Rajasthan And Others

    R.C Lahoti, J.— In the early eighties, the Government of Rajasthan introduced various programmes and allied schemes for poverty elimination, employment generation etc. It brought into existence bodies known as District Rural Development Agencies (hereinafter referred to as “DRDAs”) registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The main object of these Agencies was to plan and administer the area development programme aiming at integrated rural development. In the year 1992, these DRDAs were concerned with the following schemes:

    Limit of admn. expenses (i) IRDP (Antyodaya) 10-15% (ii) Desert Development Programme 5% (iii) Jawahar Rozgar Yojna 2% (iv) Indira Avas Yojna 2% (v) Apna Gaon Apna Kam 2% (vi) Biogas Plants — (vii) Development of Women and Children of Rural Areas —

    2. The main object of the Agencies was to implement such schemes and to identify beneficiaries including small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers and other persons eligible for assistance under these schemes. The agencies also coordinated execution of these plans for the benefit of the identified participants through the existing Agencies engaged in this direction in the field, whether private, public or cooperative. Each District Rural Development Agency was an independent entity with a District Collector as ex officio Chairman and a Project Director as the Chief Executive Officer.

    3. There are 33 districts in the State of Rajasthan and, as such, there were 33 DRDAs in the State with an ex officio Chairman and a Project Director. Subject to the allocation of the fund by the State of Rajasthan to each DRDA for implementation of a particular scheme, persons were employed on various posts pursuant to the State Rural Development Agency Employees' Service Regulation, 1983. Each DRDA was an independent Agency located in each district. The appointments were made locally and seniority of the employees was also maintained on district basis. There was no inter se seniority. The jobs were not interchangeable or transferable from one DRDA to another. The services of the employees strictly depended on funds made available to the individual DRDA for implementing its scheme for only fixed administrative expenses were met out of the same.

    4. In the year 1992, looking to the availability of the funds, the Government of Rajasthan took a decision to abolish 273 posts in the entire State of Rajasthan belonging to different DRDAs. The DRDAs were accordingly informed. This led to termination of several LDCs and Class IV employees (Peons). The petitioners in Civil Appeals Nos. 5476-83 of 1998 and Civil Appeals Nos. 5484-5494 of 1998 are such Class III and Class IV employees.

    5. Several petitions were filed before the High Court of Rajasthan challenging such termination of the employees. The principal grounds of challenge were that the petitioners having been appointed regularly against different posts, their services could not have been so terminated unceremoniously; that the petitioners, though outwardly appointed in several Societies, were in fact the employees of the State Government inasmuch as their salaries were being paid from the funds made available by the State Government and even if the need for such employment had come to an end with the Societies, there were several vacancies available with the State Government against which the petitioners could have been accommodated and regularised; that the DRDA was an “industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and yet the provisions of Section 25-F were not complied with and so the termination was bad; and that the rule of “last come first go” was not followed.

    6. The learned Single Judges before whom the petitions came up for hearing allowed the same and several orders of termination were directed to be quashed. The State of Rajasthan, as well as the Societies preferred writ appeals which were heard by a Division Bench and have been allowed reversing the Single Bench decisions. The aggrieved petitioners have come up to this Court. The learned Single Judges and the Division Bench have both held that the DRDA Societies were instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and hence amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. This finding has not been assailed before this Court, being unnecessary in the submission of the learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan, and hence we express no opinion thereon. So also neither the Single Judge nor the Division Bench has held the DRDA Society to be an “industry” for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This finding is also not assailed before us.

    7. A perusal of the judgments of the learned Single Judges and the Division Bench goes to show that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition solely on the ground that though the petitioners were employees of the DRDA Societies which were independent bodies, the decision to abolish the posts and consequently to terminate the employment of the petitioners was taken by the State Government which was followed by the Societies without any application of the mind of their own. Inasmuch as the Societies terminated the employment of the petitioners at the behest of the State Government and not on their own, the decision was vitiated. Having so set aside the orders of termination, the learned Single Judge left it open to the DRDAs concerned to take a decision afresh after properly applying the mind to the financial and administrative aspects of the case. In the event of the services of the employees of the DRDAs being terminated after following the directions of the High Court, the State Government was advised to consider the absorption of the petitioners in various other departments if the State Government by practice was doing so. The Division Bench has differed with the learned Single Judges and therefore set aside their decisions.

    8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that these appeals are wholly devoid of any merit and hence are liable to be dismissed. It is not disputed that the employment was given to the petitioners under various schemes framed by the State of Rajasthan and entrusted to the DRDA Societies for implementation. The Societies did not have any funds of their own. The funding was hundred per cent by the State of Rajasthan. One Rajender Jain Committee was constituted in the year 1992 to review several decisions taken regarding various schemes of SS and IRD which recommended that out of the then 1339 posts in the DRDAs under various schemes, 338 posts needed to be abolished and 112 new posts deserved to be provided under various schemes. The 338 abolished posts included 19 posts of UDCs, 43 posts of LDCs, and 24 posts of Class IV. The newly-created 112 posts did not include any posts of UDCs, LDCs and Class IV.

    9. Several appointment letters filed on behalf of the petitioners themselves go to show that the appointments were made by District Rural Development Agencies. There is no material brought on record to hold that the Societies were merely a veil but the real employer was the State of Rajasthan. The appointment letters clearly go to show that the petitioners were appointed as temporary LDCs/Class IV employees for a period of six months or the date of expiry of the posts, whichever was earlier. The footnotes inserted in the letters of appointment stated that the appointment was purely temporary and the services of the Agency were not transferable in any other department of the Government though the period of appointment would be extended after putting in satisfactory service during the period of initial appointment, i.e, six months. Such appointments were extended from time to time but on similar terms and conditions. Inasmuch as the need for the work was partially over and the Government was finding it difficult to provide funds for administrative expenses which it found to be non-productive and unnecessary, an Expert Committee was appointed to review the situation. Decision for abolition of posts was taken consistently with the findings and recommendations of such Committee.

    10. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn. (1992) 4 SCC 99, AIR 1992 SC 789 clinches the issue. It was a case of temporary employment provided to the petitioners therein under the Jawahar Rozgar Yojna. It was held that the right to livelihood was found not feasible to be incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution and therefore the employment was also not guaranteed under the constitutional scheme. Employment schemes were brought into being consistently with the limited resources available at the disposal of the State. It was further held:

    “To get an employment under such scheme and to claim on the basis of the said employment, a right to regularisation, is to frustrate the scheme itself. No court can be a party to such exercise. It is wrong to approach the problems of those employed under such schemes with a view to providing them with full employment and guaranteeing equal pay for equal work. These concepts, in the context of such schemes are both unwarranted and misplaced. They will do more harm than good by depriving the many of the little income that they may get to keep them from starvation. They would benefit a few at the cost of the many starving poor for whom the schemes are meant. That would also force the State to wind up the existing schemes and forbid them from introducing the new ones, for want of resources. This is not to say that the problems of the unemployed deserve no consideration or sympathy. This is only to emphasise that even among the unemployed a distinction exists between those who live below and above the poverty line, those in need of partial and those in need of full employment, the educated and uneducated, the rural and urban unemployed etc.”

    11. In Sandeep Kumar v. State of U.P 1993 Supp (1) SCC 525, AIR 1992 SC 713 there were employees working on a project of slum clearance. The project was for a particular purpose and there was no permanent need for work. The employment having been brought to an end and the terminations having been subjected to challenge, it was held that a direction as to regularisation of services of such employees could not be given. In State of H.P v. Ashwani Kumar (1996) 1 SCC 773, (1996) 32 ATC 820, JT (1996) 1 SC 214 a project had to be closed down for non-availability of funds. It was held that a direction to regularise the displaced employees of the project could not be given because such direction would amount to creating posts and continuing them in spite of non-availability of work. So is the view taken in State of U.P v. U.P Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh (1996) 7 SCC 34, AIR 1996 SC 708.

    12. In the cases at hand, on special leave petitions being filed, by interim orders passed by this Court the employment of the petitioners was protected and they were continued in service. In its concern for the employees, the Court directed the State of Rajasthan to examine the possibility of absorption of the petitioners if necessary by shifting them to other DRDAs and to indicate a scheme/roster for absorption/appointment. The Court also at one stage adjourned the hearing in these matters to enable the respondent-State to frame a scheme, if any, so as to absorb the petitioners. An additional affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-State on 6-10-1998 setting out the relevant facts and circumstances and explaining why the posts earlier held by the petitioners were abolished and how and why presently, there were no posts available against which the petitioners could be accommodated or absorbed. However, at the end, the respondent-State has made a statement (vide para 9 of the affidavit dated 6-10-1998) which reads as under:

    “In view of the facts mentioned above and after evaluating the fact that the number of persons working are already in excess to the posts existing in the DRDAs in the above-mentioned categories, it is submitted that there is no scope of adjusting/absorbing the persons for the present, however, in case if additional posts are created in future due to some new schemes/programmes, the petitioners and similarly situated persons can be given preference according to their seniority subject to eligibility after giving relaxation of age.”

    13. In our opinion, when the posts temporarily created for fulfilling the needs of a particular project or scheme limited in its duration come to an end on account of the need for the project itself having come to an end either because the project was fulfilled or had to be abandoned wholly or partially for want of funds, the employer cannot by a writ of mandamus be directed to continue employing such employees as have been dislodged because such a direction would amount to requisition for creation of posts though not required by the employer and funding such posts though the employer did not have the funds available for the purpose. The decision taken by the respondent-State to abolish the posts was a bona fide decision taken after due application of the mind by appointing an Expert Committee which went deep into all relevant considerations and made recommendations in the interest of rationalisation. The decision is based on administrative and financial considerations. There is nothing wrong in the Societies having acted on the policy decision of the State Government. Really speaking, there was hardly anything left to be done by the DRDA Societies at their own end. Inasmuch as the Societies did not have any funds of their own, independent of those made available by the State Government, how could the Societies have continued with the posts and the incumbents thereon though they were left with no means to pay salaries attaching with the posts?

    14. An attempt was made by the petitioners to bring in some new material on record to raise a plea that a few years after the abolition of the posts, the respondents have opened new avenues of employment whereagainst the petitioners could be accommodated. The respondents have disputed such stand taken on behalf of the petitioners. We find it difficult to entertain such plea taken at this stage and sustain the same when no reliable material has been placed before us to uphold such plea of the petitioners. In fact, a similar attempt was made before the Division Bench also by the petitioners moving an application for review of the judgment of the Division Bench but the review petition was dismissed by the Division Bench forming an opinion that a new plea was not open for consideration in review jurisdiction of the court and if at all there was any substance in such plea of the petitioners, then it provided a new cause of action enabling the petitioners to file a fresh petition. In our opinion, the Division Bench was right in taking the view which it did. From the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and the figures placed before us in the form of a tabular statement, we are satisfied that the State has already made efforts at accommodating dislodged employees of one DRDA in other DRDAs as far as possible. There are no transferees/deputationists from the Government occupying posts meant for LDCs or Class IV in the DRDAs and therefore the petitioners' plea that they may be accommodated by repatriating such governmental employees has no merit and no foundation.

    15. We do not find any reason to interfere with the well-considered judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. In our opinion, these appeals are liable to be dismissed and are dismissed accordingly subject to the observation that the petitioners must feel satisfied with the stand taken by the State Government in the affidavit dated 6-10-1998 filed on its behalf, the relevant extract wherefrom has been reproduced in para 12 above. Subject to this observation, CAs Nos. 5476-83 and 5484-94 of 1998 are dismissed.

    16. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 540 of 1998 was filed by Rafiq Ahmed and others who were working as Biogas Mistry Grade II under the DRDAs and their employment was also terminated consequent upon a decision taken to abolish the posts of Biogas Mistries Grade II. This writ petition was simply retained for hearing with the appeals dealt with hereinabove. As we have found that the petitioners in the civil appeals are not entitled to any relief, for the same reasons the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 540 of 1998 also are held not entitled to any relief. The petition is dismissed subject to the observation that in the event of any additional posts being created in future due to some new schemes/programmes being introduced, the petitioners herein may be given preference according to their seniority subject to eligibility after giving relaxation of age in view of the service so far rendered by each one of them in the DRDAs.

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    Rajendra And Others v. State Of Rajasthan And Others
    (Feb 5, 1999)