AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Article 16(4)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 16(1)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Article 16(4)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 16(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The pronouncement concerns a set of review petitions in which the applicants sought reconsideration of an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of India. The Court first condoned the delay in filing the review applications but ultimately found no substantive merit in them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India creates a fundamental right or imposes a constitutional duty to provide reservations, or whether it is merely an enabling provision.
  2. Whether selected passages from Indra Sawhney (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217) alter or overturn earlier judicial views that Article 16(4) is only enabling in nature.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab (1999) 7 SCC 209 Held that Article 16(4) is only an enabling provision and neither imposes a duty nor confers a fundamental right to reservation. Primary authority relied upon to reaffirm that Article 16(4) is enabling; used to dismiss the review petitions.
Indra Sawhney, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 Nine-Judge Bench decision recognising Article 16(4) as a “power” rather than a guaranteed right. Clarified that none of the nine judges—including the passage at p. 691 relied on by the review petitioners—departed from the view that Article 16(4) is enabling.
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649; 1963 Supp (1) SCR 439 Early Constitution Bench holding that Article 16(4) is an enabling provision. Cited as historical authority supporting the consistent judicial stance.
C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 507; (1968) 1 SCR 721 Reaffirmed the enabling character of Article 16(4). Used to show continuity of the principle since 1968.
P&T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 147 Described Article 16(4) as enabling. Further precedent proving that the principle was never doubted.
State Bank of India SC/ST Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. State Bank of India (1996) 4 SCC 119 Repeated the enabling-provision view of Article 16(4). Added to the line of consistent authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a brief but pointed analysis. It began by noting that in Ajit Singh II (1999) the Court had already clarified, relying on judgments dating back to 1963, that Article 16(4) is merely an enabling provision and does not confer a fundamental right to reservations. The petitioners sought to rely on observations by Jeevan Reddy, J. at page 691 in Indra Sawhney to argue otherwise. The Court rejected this approach, emphasising that:

  • Every member of the nine-judge bench in Indra Sawhney maintained that Article 16(4) confers only a “power” or discretion on the State.
  • Multiple Constitution Bench decisions—M.R. Balaji (1963) and C.A. Rajendran (1968)—as well as later cases reaffirm the same principle and were never overruled.
  • The isolated passage from Indra Sawhney cited by the review petitioners does not contradict the settled view.

Having found no demonstrable error in the original judgment, the Court concluded that the review petitions lacked merit.

Holding and Implications

REVIEW PETITIONS DISMISSED.

Direct Effect: The petitioners receive no relief, and the original judgment remains undisturbed.
Broader Implication: The order reiterates, without creating new precedent, that Article 16(4) is an enabling provision rather than a fundamental right, reinforcing a long-standing constitutional interpretation.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Ajit Singh And Others Iii v. State Of Punjab And Others

    Order

    1. Delay condoned.

    2. We are of the view that there are no merits in the review applications.

    3. In Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab (1999) 7 SCC 209 it was stated (at pp. 229-30) relying upon earlier judgments starting from 1963, that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision and did not impose any constitutional duty nor confer any fundamental right for reservation. The observations at p. 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J. in Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, (1992) 22 ATC 385 relied upon in the review applications do not deal with the above issue. It was the view of two Constitution Bench judgments of this Court, one of 1963 in M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore AIR 1963 SC 649, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 439 and another in 1968 in C.A Rajendran v. Union of India AIR 1968 SC 507, (1968) 1 SCR 721 and also two-three judgments of this Court in P&T Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees' Welfare Assn. (Regd.) v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 147, (1988) 8 ATC 154 and State Bank of India Scheduled Caste/Tribe Employees' Welfare Assn. v. State Bank of India (1996) 4 SCC 119 that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. The view was nowhere dissented in Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, (1992) 22 ATC 385 much less at p. 691 by Jeevan Reddy, J.

    4. It appears to us that all the nine Judges in Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, (1992) 22 ATC 385 were of the same view that Article 16(4) was not in the nature of a fundamental right and was only an enabling provision. In this connection, reference may be made with advantage to the view of Jeevan Reddy, J. (at pp. 667-735) referring to Subba Rao, J. that Article 16(4) was a provision conferring a “power” and referring to Article 16(1) alone as a guarantee and not to Article 16(4); to the view of Sawant, J. [at p. 517, para 43(4)], Pandian, J. (at p. 407, para 168), Thommen, J. (at p. 449, para 284), Sahai, J. (at p. 580) with whom Kuldip Singh, J. agreed, — all expressly stating that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision. Thus, the majority of the learned Judges expressly stated that Article 16(4) was an “enabling provision”. Merely because the reservation for backward classes was created as a reasonable classification and justified at p. 691, that does not detract from the view that Article 16(4) was only an enabling provision.

    5. For the aforesaid reasons, we find there is no merit in these review petitions which are dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ajit Singh And Others Iii v. State Of Punjab And Others
    (Dec 8, 1999)