G.B Pattanaik, J.— The appellant and two others were tried by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad for the offences under Sections 307 and 302 IPC and Sections 3 and 5 of the Indian Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Accused Mohammed Sardar died during the pendency of the trial and therefore, the criminal proceeding stood abated as against him. The appellant was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge under Section 302 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs 5000, in default to suffer RI for two years. He was also sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of 10 years and also to pay a fine of Rs 5000, in default to suffer RI for two years for the offence under Section 307 IPC and under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, he was sentenced to undergo RI for ten years and also to pay a fine of Rs 5000, in default to suffer RI for three years and under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, was sentenced to RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs 5000, in default to suffer RI for two years. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The other accused Mohd. Burhanuddin was convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 1000, in default to suffer RI for one year and for the offence under Sections 307/34, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of five years and also to pay a fine of Rs 2000, in default to suffer RI for one year and for the offence under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 34 IPC, he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 10 years and also to pay a fine of Rs 2000, in default to suffer RI for two years and for the offence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 34 IPC, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of five years and also to pay a fine of Rs 1000, in default to suffer RI for one year. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh came to hold that the prosecution had failed to establish the charges under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and accordingly set aside the conviction and sentences thereunder, but affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and Section 307 IPC as well as the sentences passed thereunder and also the conviction and sentences against the accused Mohd. Burhanuddin under Sections 302/34 and Sections 307/34. The appellant preferred the appeal in this Court which was registered as Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 1994 and the co-accused preferred the appeal which was registered as Criminal Appeal No. 375 of 1993. Criminal Appeal No. 375 of 1993 stood abated as the appellant therein died during the pendency of this appeal and hence we are concerned with the present appellant alone.
2. The prosecution case in a nutshell is that on 6-7-1990 at about 10.15 a.m, the three accused persons came on a scooter which was being driven by accused Burhanuddin and the present appellant hurled five bombs, causing injury to PW 1 as well as deceased Gopal Sharma and deceased Kishan Rao Kandekar and on account of such injuries received by them, Gopal Sharma died in the hospital on 10-7-1990 at 9 a.m while Kishan Rao Kandekar died on the same day at 6.50 a.m in Osmania General Hospital. The prosecution alleged that there existed civil disputes between the brother of the present appellant and PW 1 and others in respect of a land in Piagah Colony and on account of the said dispute, one Sabir Bin Salam had been murdered on 2-3-1990 and the police had registered Crime No. 48 of 1990 on that score against PWs 1, 2, 6 and 8. After PW 1 was released on bail in the aforesaid case on 4-5-1990 and was running his wine shop at Muslimgunj Bridge in partnership with one Ranjit Singh and was also doing real estate business at a place opposite to the wine shop, on the relevant date the accused persons came on a scooter and after getting down from the scooter Accused 1 (the present appellant) who was the pillion-rider, took out from a box some bombs and hurled them at the office of PW 1 which exploded and there was a lot of smoke and it is in that explosion that not only PW 1 himself was injured but the two persons as already stated died and the accused persons went away with the scooter. The two deceased persons were brought to Osmania General Hospital in an unconscious condition and PW 1 himself was admitted to the hospital. SI of Police PW 25 came to know of the incident from some passer-by and then he came to the Hospital where he recorded the statement of PW 1 Exhibit P-2. PW 26, another Sub-Inspector of Police also had received a prior intimation Exhibit P-2 and had registered the crime case and treated the same to be FIR and took up investigation. On completion of investigation, the police submitted the charge-sheet and on being committed, the accused persons stood their trial. The prosecution examined as many as 28 witnesses and exhibited a large number of documents. The defence plea was one of denial. The learned Sessions Judge and the High Court relied upon the evidence of the three eyewitnesses PWs 1, 6 and 7 and convicted the appellant of the charge under Sections 302 and 307 as already stated on the basis of the aforesaid evidence. It may be noted that the appellant was not in the picture and his name also did not find place in the FIR and it is only after the statement of PW 6 was recorded on 30-7-1990, the appellant was brought into the arena of accused persons.
3. Mr U.R Lalit, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the prosecution version as unfolded in the FIR was to the effect that one Sayeed, who was the pillion-rider, got down from the scooter, took out a bomb and threw it towards PW 1 and then four other bombs were thrown by him. This earliest version is now being changed in the course of evidence during trial and Sayeed is being replaced by the appellant and it is being stated that the appellant threw the bomb. According to Mr Lalit, this story as unfolded through the prosecution witnesses in court cannot be sustained in view of the positive statement of Raghunandan, PW 1 that it was one Sayeed who got down from the scooter, took the bomb and threw it. According to Mr Lalit, the eyewitnesses admittedly being inimical towards the accused persons, their evidence needs a stricter scrutiny before being accepted by the Court and on such a scrutiny being made, no court can rely upon their testimony in view of several material omissions from their earliest version recorded under Section 161 CrPC and several contradictions having been brought out by way of confrontation and, therefore, the Sessions Judge and the High Court committed error in relying upon the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses. It is to be noticed that though in Exhibit P-2, Raghunandan had categorically stated that Sayeed was sitting as a pillion-rider and then threw the bombs but no charge-sheet was filed against Sayeed and instead charge-sheet was filed against the present appellant and two others who in the meantime had died.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh on the other hand contended that two courts having believed the evidence of the three eyewitnesses, it would not be proper for this Court to re-examine the same and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant cannot be interfered with.
5. It is true that ordinarily this Court does not examine the evidence and reappreciate the same when two courts of fact have already relied upon, but if there appear some glaring features in the evidence, which can be seen by a mere perusal, then the Court will be failing in its duty if it does not examine the same to test their reliability on which evidence the accused persons are being convicted of a charge of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle if we examine the evidence of PW 1, whose statement had been recorded on the date of the occurrence, it appears that it would be highly unsafe to rely on his evidence. At the outset it may be stated that while in his statement recorded on 6-7-1990 he had unequivocally stated that on the scooter he could recognise Sayeed and his two brothers and it was Sayeed who was having a box in his hand and after getting down from the scooter took out a bomb and threw it and thereafter four other bombs were thrown, but in his evidence in court, the version is totally changed and he stated that only two persons were on the scooter namely the appellant and Accused 3 and it was Appellant 1 who was the pillion-rider and it is he who brought out a bomb from a box and threw it. When he was confronted with his earlier version made before the police he gave the explanation that his signature was taken on a document without the contents being known to him and, therefore, his so-called earlier version is not his statement. In his examination-in-chief, while he stated that he knew both the accused persons who were present in court but in cross-examination he stated that the accused persons were totally strangers and, therefore, he participated in the identification test that was conducted. When he was confronted with the contradictions made in his earlier statement to the police, he flatly denied to have made such statement to the police as contained in Exhibit P-2. This being the evidence of the witness in court, we have no hesitation to hold that he is a thoroughly unreliable witness and, therefore, his testimony cannot be utilised by the prosecution for bringing home the charge against the appellant. Coming to the next witness PW 6 who is stated to be a friend of PW 1, it appears that he was examined by the police on 30-7-1990, though the occurrence is of 6-7-1990. There is no explanation for such delayed examination of this witness under Section 161 CrPC. In such delayed examination by the police, the witness had categorically stated that three persons were going on the scooter, whereas in court he stated that the appellant and Accused 3 were going on the scooter. In his statement under Section 161 CrPC he had stated that it was Sardar who got down from the scooter and took out the bombs and threw them into the office of Raghunandan, whereas in court he stated that it was the appellant who threw the bombs after getting down from the scooter. A definite suggestion was given that Inspector Narasing Rao introduced himself after a month of the incident to counter the earlier murder case and to put pressure on Accused 1 to compromise the case which of course the witness denied but in view of the material contradictions as pointed out earlier even with regard to the person who threw the bomb, we do not think it safe to rely on the evidence of this witness for establishing the charge against the appellant that it was the appellant who threw the bombs on the shop of PW 1. PW 7 is yet another witness who in his evidence has stated that he was working in the wine shop of PW 1 and when on the day of the occurrence he heard some sound, he found that one person was sitting on a scooter and the other person was hurling 3 or 4 times some object towards the office of PW 1 and those were objects of explosion and he pointed out towards the appellant to be the person who hurled the bombs and he is supposed to have identified them in a test identification parade. But in his earliest statement to the police recorded under Section 161 CrPC he had positively asserted that he knows all the brothers and if he really knew all the brothers then the fact that he could not name any and the so-called test identification parade is of no consequence. Further in his earlier statement with which he was duly confronted, though he had stated that there were three accused persons who sped away but in court he changed the version and restricted it to Accused 1 and Accused 3. The so-called identification also is of a peculiar nature and the witness in his evidence stated that the police asked him whether he could identify the persons who were on the scooter to which he replied in the affirmative and then the two accused persons were shown for the purpose of identification and he identified them. We fail to understand as to how the so-called identification done in the aforesaid manner will assist the prosecution in any way and this cannot be held to be a test identification parade. In the aforesaid premises, we feel it unsafe to rely upon the statement of the aforesaid eyewitness PW 7. Learned counsel appearing for the State in the course of his submission has urged that even PW 3 can be held to be an eyewitness to the occurrence and it is he who identified the two accused persons in court when he was examined on 8-4-1992. He did not state in the evidence that he knew the persons and the prosecution had not taken any steps to hold the test identification parade for getting the accused persons identified by this witness. The so-called identification of the accused persons by this witness after two years in the course of trial is of no consequence and on such identification it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to bring home the charge against the accused. This witness also in his Section 161 statement, unequivocally stated that the three persons came on a scooter and one got down and took out a box and picked up a bomb and threw it on the office of PW 1 which exploded loudly and it further stated that of the three persons who ran away one among whom was Sayeed but in court he gave a totally different picture and on being confronted with his earlier version made a clean denial. In this state of unsatisfactory prosecution evidence it is difficult for us to sustain the conviction of the appellant of a serious charge of murder and we have no hesitation to hold that the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court committed serious error by relying upon such untrustworthy witnesses. In our considered opinion the prosecution has totally failed to establish the charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and acquit him of the charges levelled against him. This criminal appeal is allowed. The bail bonds stand discharged.