Sri Kanyaka Paramesw... v. Commissioner, Hindu ..., Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Appeal No. 1340 of 1986, Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1986, Civil Appeal No. 8535 of 1994, Civil Appeal No. 2718 of 1997

Disposition

remanded

Attorney(S)

K. Parasaran and Ms K. Amareswari, Senior Advocate (K.B.S Rajan, M. Vijaya Bhaskar, A.V Rangam, Vijay Bhaskar, C.A Brijesh, V.G Pragasam, A.V Rangam, K. Ram Kumar, Ms Santinarayan, Y. Subba Rao and Sridhar, Advocates, with them) for the appearing parties.

Judges

Justice K. Venkataswami

Acts

The Act
Section 27 of the Act, Sub-section (4)(a)
Article 26 of the Constitution
Section 27 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966
Sections 26 and 27 of the Act
Section 26 of the Act
Section 27 of the 1966 Act
Section 29 of the 1987 Act
Article 26(d)

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant institution originally attacked the constitutionality of Section 27 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (“the Act”). In Kakinada Annadana Samajam v. Commissioner of H.R.E, this Court upheld Section 27 but advised that institutions claiming to be religious denominations should first establish that status before challenging the provision. Acting on that direction, the appellant filed O.S. No. 466 of 1972 before the Sub-Judge, Vijayawada, seeking declarations that the Act did not apply, that the respondents lacked power to appoint an Executive Officer, and a permanent injunction.

The trial court (27-11-1976) declared the appellant a religious denomination but refused the injunction. A single judge of the High Court in A.S. No. 64 of 1977 affirmed the denomination finding, set aside suspension of trustees and the appointment of a “fit person,” yet upheld the appointment of an Executive Officer, treating it as a measure for better management that did not displace the governing body.

The appellant’s further challenge in L.P.A. No. 16 of 1979 failed; the Division Bench again agreed the institution was a denomination but ruled that appointing an Executive Officer from the same Arya Vysya community would avoid prejudice. The present Civil Appeal No. 1340 of 1986 questions that conclusion. The respondents filed Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1986 against the direction to select an officer from the Arya Vysya community. Two other related appeals (C.A. Nos. 8535 of 1994 and 2718 of 1997) concern interim orders and remain tied to A.S. No. 3603 of 1985, which is still pending before the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the appointment of an Executive Officer to a denominational institution violates the autonomy guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution of India.
Whether Sections 26 and 27 of the 1966 Act, as applied, amount to a total divestiture of the denomination’s right to administer its affairs.
Whether the High Court erred by sustaining the appointment without first determining the necessity and proportionality of such appointment in the light of Article 26(d).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

Invoked the decisions in Shirur Mutt, Ratilal, and Tilkayat Govindlalji to emphasise that a religious denomination enjoys constitutionally protected autonomy; any interference must be regulatory, not destructive.
Contended that Section 27—and the impugned order authorising the Executive Officer to take over records, finances, and litigation—removes administration “altogether,” offending Article 26(d).
Relied on Pavani Sridhara Rao to argue that appointment of an Executive Officer requires demonstrable necessity based on relevant material; no such necessity was examined by the High Court.
Submitted that even if the point was not urged below, this Court has previously permitted new constitutional arguments in the interest of justice.

Respondents’ Arguments

Asserted that the appellant cannot raise new grounds (necessity of appointment) at the Supreme Court stage as they were not canvassed before the High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kakinada Annadana Samajam v. Commissioner of H.R.E (1970) 3 SCC 359; (1971) 2 SCR 878	Upheld validity of Section 27 of the Act but required denomination status to be determined first.	Used by the High Court to reject a fresh constitutional attack on Sections 26-27; referred to by Supreme Court as background.
Commr., H.R.E v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar (Shirur Mutt) AIR 1954 SC 282; 1954 SCR 1005	Article 26 grants religious denominations autonomy; State may only impose regulatory, not destructive, controls.	Cited by appellant; Supreme Court viewed it as a governing benchmark the High Court had to consider on remand.
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388; 1954 SCR 1055	Delineates scope of Article 26(d) and permissible State regulation.	Relied upon by appellant to stress limits on State interference.
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1638; (1964) 1 SCR 561	Further explains denominational rights under Article 26.	Cited in support of appellant’s claim of special protection.
Pavani Sridhara Rao v. Government of A.P. (1996) 8 SCC 298	Appointment of an Executive Officer requires objective necessity grounded in facts and public interest.	Used by appellant to justify raising the “necessity” point for the first time in Supreme Court and to illustrate excessive statutory power.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the Division Bench of the High Court never examined whether an Executive Officer was in fact needed, nor did it weigh the constitutional safeguards afforded to a denominational institution. Given that denominational institutions receive “special protection under Article 26,” the Court held that a threshold inquiry into the necessity, proportionality, and effect of the appointment is indispensable. The absence of such an inquiry rendered the appellate decision incomplete.

The Court accepted that similar constitutional issues had been entertained for the first time in Pavani Sridhara Rao, thereby rejecting the respondents’ procedural objection. Rather than adjudicate the merits itself, the Court deemed it “appropriate to remand” the matter so the High Court can:

Proceed on the admitted finding that the appellant is a denominational institution; and
Re-evaluate the legality of the Executive Officer’s appointment specifically in the light of Article 26 and the precedents cited.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order insofar as it upheld the appointment of an Executive Officer and REMITTED the matter to the Andhra Pradesh High Court for fresh consideration.

Allied appeals (C.A. Nos. 1341 of 1986, 8535 of 1994 and 2718 of 1997) were disposed of without substantive relief; status quo regarding any existing Executive Officer/fit person is to be maintained pending A.S. No. 3603 of 1985.

Implications: The judgment does not create new precedent but reinforces that courts must rigorously scrutinise State interference with denominational administration. Future appointments of Executive Officers to religious denominations must withstand a necessity and proportionality test vis-à-vis Article 26 protections.

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Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Anna Satram Committee And Others v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Deptt. And Others

Civil Appeal No. 1340 of 1986

1. Though elaborate arguments were addressed by counsel on both sides challenging and defending the appointment of an executive officer to the appellant institution, we are of the view that it is not necessary at this stage to deal with the merits or demerits of the contentions in the view we propose to take in this appeal.

2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows:

The appellant initially challenged the constitutionality of Section 27 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

3. This Court in Kakinada Annadana Samajam v. Commr. of H.R.E (1970) 3 SCC 359, (1971) 2 SCR 878 while upholding the validity of Section 27 of the Act, directed that the issue whether the appellant institution and similarly established institutions are religious denominations within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution should be agitated in a proper forum before challenging the vires of Section 27 of the Act. Thereafter, the appellant filed OS No. 466 of 1972 before the Sub-Judge, Vijayawada, for a declaration that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the appellant institution; that the respondents had no jurisdiction to appoint an executive officer to the appellant institution and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the administration of the institution. The trial court by its judgment dated 27-11-1976 held that the appellant institution is a religious denomination. However, the challenge to the appointment of an executive officer and the injunction prayed for were refused. Aggrieved by that refusal of injunction, the appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court in AS No. 64 of 1977.

4. A learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by a judgment dated 21-8-1978 held that the power of the functionaries under the Act to suspend a trustee and appoint a fit person under Section 26 or to appoint an executive officer under Section 27 should be read down to mean that the power so exercised should not amount to total extinction or destruction altogether of the right of the religious denomination to administer the property and vest in any other authority. The learned Single Judge, however, held

“by the appointment of the executive officer, there is no interference with the constitution of the Governing Body. But the executive officer is appointed for better management of the institution. Sub-section (4)(a) of Section 27 of the Act clearly provides that the executive officer appointed shall be under the administrative control of the trustee of the institution or endowment and shall be responsible for carrying out all lawful directions issued by such trustee from time to time. Thus, the executive officer merely works under the direction of the Governing Body and is under the control of the Governing Body. I do not, therefore, think that the administration of the property of the religious denomination is entirely taken away and vested in another person by the appointment of the executive officer. Thus, the suspension of the trustees by the Endowment was set aside, the appointment of fit person to the appellant institution was also set aside. The other claim in the suit, i.e, that the provisions of the Act are inapplicable to the institution and the Endowment has no jurisdiction to appoint an executive officer was dismissed”.

5. Still aggrieved, the appellant preferred LPA No. 16 of 1979. Before the Division Bench, the appointment of executive officer was challenged inter alia on the ground that Sections 26 and 27 of the Act are violative of the provisions of the Constitution and, therefore, the appointment of executive officer under Section 27 of the Act is liable to be set aside. The High Court rejected such a contention in view of the decision of this Court in Kakinada Annadana Samajam (1970) 3 SCC 359, (1971) 2 SCR 878. The Division Bench, while agreeing with the learned Single Judge that the appellant institution is a religious denomination, was of the view that the appointment of executive officer was for the better management of the institution and if an executive officer from the same community (Arya Vysya) is appointed as an executive officer there cannot be any prejudice to the appellant. Accordingly, the Division Bench directed the respondents to appoint an executive officer from the Arya Vysya community.

6. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench sustaining the appointment of the executive officer, preferred this appeal. The respondents have also preferred Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1986 challenging that portion of the judgment directing them to appoint an executive officer from the Arya Vysya community.

7. A careful perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench shows that it had not addressed itself rightly because no such argument was placed before it, whether the appointment of an executive officer for the appellant institution was warranted and the reason given in the impugned appointment order, namely, “for the better management”, was a relevant consideration especially when the institution was declared a religious denomination.

8. Shri K. Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that in view of the judgments of this Court in Commr., H.R.E v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282, 1954 SCR 1005, Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388, 1954 SCR 1055 and Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1638, (1964) 1 SCR 561 the religious denomination enjoys a special status under Article 26 of the Constitution and, therefore, before sustaining an order appointing an executive officer, the Court ought to have considered whether there was sufficient reason for such appointment. It is the contention of Shri Parasaran that in view of Article 26(d) a religious denomination enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion and no authority has jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in this regard. Matters like scale of expenditure in connection with such religious observance would be matters of administration of property. While the right to administer property in accordance with law vests in the denomination, it may be controlled by secular authorities in accordance with law. This is to ensure that the institution and its endowment are preserved and not destroyed in the guise of autonomy in matters of religion. It is not for the purpose of enabling the taking over of the administration from the denomination by any secular authority.

9. The law must leave the right of administration to the denomination itself subject to such restrictions and regulations as may be provided by law. But such law if it takes away the right of administration from the hands of the religious denominations altogether and vests it in any other authority, would violate Article 26(d).

10. The substance of the interference has to be looked at, to decide whether the rights have been altogether taken away. The restrictions have to be reasonable and should be merely regulatory and the purpose of such restrictions or regulations has to be to ensure (a) that there is no maladministration of the institution as right to administration does not carry with it a right to maladministration, or (b) regulatory provisions can be such as to ensure that mismanagement or maladministration is guarded against. So long as the institution and its properties are properly administered to ensure that they are not destroyed there will be no occasion for appointment of an executive officer.

11. In support of the above submissions, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court referred to above. He also submitted that the provisions of the A.P Act, i.e, Section 27 of the 1966 Act and Section 29 of the 1987 Act are very drastic. To authorise the executive officer to arrange for proper collection of income, for incurring all expenditure, or permitting him to sue and be sued in the name of the institution and empowering him to lodge all moneys received by him in a scheduled bank and exclusively entitling him to sign all orders or cheques against such moneys, etc. and the nature of the order passed in the present case of appointment of executive officer directing him to take over complete charge of the records, etc. and directing the denomination “to hand over charge of the records, accounts, etc. to the executive officer appointed” read with the powers under the Act referred to above are nothing but taking away the right of administration altogether. It would be a travesty to describe an appointment of an executive officer with such powers as a regulatory measure.

12. In support of this submission, he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Pavani Sridhara Rao v. Govt. of A.P (1996) 8 SCC 298 in which an order of appointment of executive officer to a religious institution (not a case of religious denomination which stands on a higher footing) was set aside. He also placed reliance on this judgment to contend that though the point now argued was not advanced before the High Court, in that case this Court allowed the point to be raised for the first time. In that judgment, this Court observed that the power had to be exercised on the relevant data and on necessary facts and material. It could not be exercised just offhand without there being any necessity of appointing an executive officer for the temple in the public interest.

13. The learned Senior Counsel, Ms K. Amareshwari, appearing for the respondents, however, submitted that such an argument was not advanced before the High Court and, therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise that contention now. We have already noticed that this Court has permitted under similar circumstances to raise a point which was not argued before the High Court in the interest of justice.

14. It cannot be denied that among the religious institutions denominational institutions stand on a different footing and enjoy special protection under Article 26 of the Constitution. Therefore, while considering the challenge to the appointment of an executive officer, it is essential to bear in mind the protection given under Article 26 of the Constitution, which the High Court failed to do. In the circumstances, we are of the view that instead of ourselves going into that, we consider it appropriate to remand the matter to the Division Bench to hear and dispose of the case on that aspect. While accepting the finding, which has not been challenged by the respondents that the appellant institution is a denominational one, the High Court will decide the legality of the appointment of the executive officer particularly in the light of Article 26 of the Constitution and the decisions of this Court referred to earlier.

15. Since we remand the matter to the High Court to decide the legality of the appointment of executive officer, no further order need be passed in Civil Appeal No. 1341 of 1986.

16. Accordingly, we remit the matter to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for hearing on the legality of the appointment of executive officer to the appellant denominational institution.

Civil Appeals Nos. 8535 of 1994 and 2718 of 1997

Civil Appeal No. 2718 of 1997

17. This appeal is preferred against an order of the Division Bench in LPA No. 1 of 1986. That LPA was filed against an interim order in CMP No. 21126 of 1985 in AS No. 3603 of 1985. We are informed that AS No. 3603 of 1985 on the file of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is still pending. The question whether the appellant institution is a religious denomination or not itself is a question yet to be decided in the appeal and, therefore, we do not propose to interfere with the order under appeal of the Division Bench. Likewise, no order in CA No. 8535 of 1994 need be passed in view of the pendency of AS No. 3603 of 1985 and the High Court was right in holding so. However, we make it clear that if the executive officer/fit person, if any, appointed for the appellant institution has taken charge and is functioning as such, he will continue to be in office subject to the result of AS No. 3603 of 1985. In case the executive officer/fit person has not taken charge for any reason, he shall not take charge notwithstanding the dismissal of CA No. 2718 of 1997. In other words, the status quo as on date shall be maintained pending disposal of AS No. 3603 of 1985.

18. The appeals are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.

Sri Kanyaka Paramesw... v. Commissioner, Hindu ...