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  • Sections 376/511 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Article 136, Article 142
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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  • Sections 376/511 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Article 136, Article 142
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 25-12-1987 Ravinderjit Kaur was tied to a eucalyptus tree, assaulted with the blunt side of a datar and ultimately killed after she resisted an attempted rape by the respondent, Nirmal Singh. The incident was witnessed by PW-5 Balbir Singh, who immediately informed the victim’s father. Despite what the Supreme Court later described as “clinching and conclusive evidence,” the trial court acquitted the accused. The State did not appeal. The victim’s grandfather, Dharma, invoked the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction; the High Court dismissed the revision with a one-word order, “Dismissed.” Dharma then approached the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, leading to the present decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Supreme Court, when approached under Article 136, is constrained by the limitation in Section 401(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code that bars a High Court from converting an acquittal into a conviction in revision.
  2. Whether the evidence on record—eyewitness testimony, extra-judicial confession, recovery of the weapon, injury on the accused, and his abscondence—establishes the respondent’s guilt under Sections 376/511 (attempt to rape) and 302 (murder) of the Indian Penal Code.
  3. What sentence is appropriate upon conviction: capital punishment or life imprisonment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Complainant)

  • Eyewitness PW-5 Balbir Singh clearly saw the respondent assault the victim with the blunt side of a datar.
  • Sarpanch PW-4 Kashmir Singh received an extra-judicial confession from the respondent, corroborated by the respondent’s injury and motive.
  • The blood-stained datar was recovered on information and at the instance of the respondent, connecting him to the crime.
  • Abscondence of the accused after the incident further supports guilt.
  • The trial court misread medical evidence and ignored crucial circumstances; the High Court failed to exercise its revisional jurisdiction.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Under Section 401(3) CrPC a finding of acquittal cannot be converted into conviction in revision; therefore, even if the Supreme Court finds the acquittal wrong, it can only order a retrial.
  • Medical evidence indicated the injuries could have been caused by the handle, not the blunt side of the blade, casting doubt on PW-5’s testimony.
  • Conduct of PW-5 was unnatural; he should have alerted villagers instead of searching for the victim’s father in another town.
  • The datar could have been discovered by a normal police search; recovery at the accused’s instance is not reliable.
  • Abscondence was not proved because the police searched only on the first day.
  • The case is not the “rarest of the rare”; given the respondent’s age (about 19 in 1987) and the previous acquittal, capital punishment is unwarranted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 Recognises increasing sexual violence against women and society’s inadequate concern for their honour. Court cited to underscore the seriousness with which offences involving sexual violence must be viewed.
E.K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, (1995) 2 SCC 99 Article 136 powers of the Supreme Court are not limited by statutory constraints such as those in the CrPC. Relied upon to reject the respondent’s argument that Section 401(3) CrPC restricted the Supreme Court from converting an acquittal into conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Jurisdictional question: The Court first addressed whether Section 401(3) CrPC bars it from converting an acquittal to a conviction. Relying on its plenary powers under Article 136 and, if necessary, Article 142, and on the precedent of E.K. Chandrasenan, the Court held that no such limitation applies to the Supreme Court.

Assessment of evidence:

  • Eyewitness testimony: PW-5’s account of seeing the respondent strike the victim with the blunt side of a datar at close range was found natural and credible. The Court rejected the trial court’s doubts based on the medical officer’s speculation about whether the handle or blade caused the injuries, holding that an autopsy surgeon’s expertise extends to the nature, not the exact mode, of infliction.
  • Extra-judicial confession: PW-4, the village Sarpanch, testified that the respondent admitted attempting to rape and then killing the victim, and sought the Sarpanch’s help because police pressure was mounting. The Court considered this confession believable in the village context.
  • Recovery of weapon: On the respondent’s information, police recovered a blood-stained datar hidden under fuel wood in his cattle shed, a circumstance the trial court virtually ignored. The Supreme Court treated the recovery as a strong incriminating link.
  • Physical injury on accused: Medical examination revealed a sub-conjunctival haemorrhage on the respondent’s right eye, consistent with the victim’s fist blow described in the confession.
  • Abscondence: Evidence showed the respondent was unavailable when police first searched and later told the Sarpanch that police were pressuring his family, establishing abscondence as an incriminating circumstance.

Combining these strands, the Court concluded that the trial court and the High Court had “casually” overlooked overwhelming evidence and that the prosecution had proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt.

Sentencing: Although the offences were grave, the Court accepted defence submissions that the matter did not fall within the “rarest of the rare” category warranting capital punishment, especially given the respondent’s youth at the time of crime and the lapse of time since 1987. A life sentence was deemed appropriate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court convicted the respondent under Sections 376/511 (attempt to rape) and 302 (murder) IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The respondent is to be arrested and further steps taken in accordance with law.

Implications: The judgment reaffirms the Supreme Court’s unrestricted power under Article 136 to correct miscarriages of justice, including converting an acquittal into a conviction where warranted. It underscores judicial vigilance in cases of sexual violence and murder, criticises prosecutorial and judicial laxity in lower courts, and illustrates that delay or prior acquittal does not shield a deserving accused from conviction. No new legal doctrine was created, but the decision reinforces existing principles about the Court’s wide appellate jurisdiction and the evidentiary value of extra-judicial confessions and recoveries.

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    Dharma v. Nirmal Singh Alias Bittu And Another

    B.L Hansaria, J.— Sex violence is on the increase, and in a big way. It is an irony, as recently pointed out by this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384, JT (1996) 1 SC 298 that while celebrating woman's rights in all spheres, we show little concern for her honour, which is a sad reflection. It has to be remembered that a rapist not only violates the victim's personal integrity but degrades the very soul of the helpless female.

    2. Present case is much more serious, because here, after Ravinderjit had resisted rape, she was done to death. There can be no doubt that such an offence has to be viewed very seriously and a person accused of such an offence does not deserve to be acquitted lightly. But this is precisely what has happened inasmuch as the trial court, despite there being clinching and conclusive evidence to find the accused guilty, acquitted him. What is more, the State did not think it fit to file an appeal. We wonder why? It was left to the complainant to knock the door of the High Court by invoking its revisional jurisdiction. And see what the High Court has done. It passes one-word order only saying ‘Dismissed’. We are afraid, the High Court was far from justified in doing so inasmuch as from what is being stated later it would appear that a foolproof case exists against the accused. The complainant was, however, not to be disheartened at losing at the hands of two courts, as he moved this Court by filing the present appeal. May we say by allowing the appeal, for reasons to be given, we have felt a little relieved that the failure of justice has after all been taken care of and the damage done to womanhood and the society is being repaired, albeit belatedly.

    3. We are satisfied about the guilt of respondent Nirmal Singh, the sole accused in this case, because there is on record the testimony of PW 5, Balbir Singh, who had seen Nirmal Singh assaulting helpless and hapless Ravinder with the blunt side of the datar (which is a heavy instrument made of iron whose one side is sharp and the other blunt) on her head. Then there is evidence of Sarpanch PW 4, Kashmir Singh, about the extra-judicial confession of the accused. This is not all. A datar was recovered pursuant to the information given by the accused which was found concealed in the cattle shed under the heap of fuel wood. The datar had bloodstains on it. The fact of abscondence was also pressed into service by the prosecution. Then the accused had an injury on the outer angle of the right eye, which also shows his involvement inasmuch as when he made the extra-judicial confession, he had stated to the Sarpanch that when he was trying to commit rape on Ravinder, she had given a fist blow on the right eye. It fails our comprehension as to how despite the aforesaid believable evidence being on record, the accused could be acquitted?

    4. Before we record our reading of the evidence produced in the case, let a legal submission advanced by Shri Lalit, appearing for the respondent-accused, be dealt with. His submission is that as the complainant had approached the High Court in revision and as under the revisional power available to the High Court under Section 401 CrPC, the High Court could not have altered the finding of acquittal into one of conviction, because of what has been stated in sub-section (3) thereof, if we were to be satisfied that the acquittal was wrongful, it would not be within our competence to convict the respondent; at best the case could be sent back for retrial. We are not impressed with this submission inasmuch as the approach to this Court being under Article 136 of the Constitution. We do not read the limitation imposed by Section 401(3) of the Code qua the power available to us under the aforesaid provision. May it be pointed out that a similar submission had been advanced by Shri Lalit himself in the case of E.K Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala (1995) 2 SCC 99, JT (1995) 1 SC 496, then contending that this Court is incompetent to issue rule of enhancement as had been done in those cases. It was held in the aforesaid decision that the power available to this Court under Article 136 is not circumscribed by any limitation. In any case, power under Article 142 is available to pass such order as may be deemed appropriate to do complete justice. We, therefore, reject this contention of Shri Lalit and proceed to examine the materials to find out whether case of conviction does exist, as the contention of the appellant.

    5. We have dealt with the aforesaid legal submission at the threshold because if we were agreed to Shri Lalit, we would not have analysed the evidence ourselves but would have sent the case for retrial by passing a short order indicating broadly as to why, according to us, the acquittal was not justified. As the legal contention is not acceptable to us, we propose to enter into the merits ourselves and see whether the case really was one of acquittal or of conviction.

    6. Let us first note the evidence of the sole eyewitness, PW 5, Balbir Singh and why he has been disbelieved by the trial court. His deposition is that on the date of occurrence, which was 25-12-1987, he had come to his village as it was a holiday. At about 6.15 a.m he went to the field of Malkiat Singh which adjoins his field. After exchanging greetings they separated to go to their respective destinations. At about 7.00 a.m he went to his field and saw a girl tied to a eucalyptus tree and the accused was present there who was known to him before. He found him giving datar blows on the head of the girl, by using the blunt side of the weapon. The girl was also known to him from before — she was Ravinderjit Kaur. He could not hear the alarm of the girl, even if raised, as a loudspeaker fixed to a gurdwara was in action. On seeing the witness, the accused ran away. Reaching near the victim, the witness saw that she had been tied to the tree with the help of a cloth. Injuries could be noticed on the head and her salwar was open. He wanted to bring this immediately to the notice of Shital Singh, father of the victim, and in search of him he went up to Mahilpur on a cycle. Not finding him there, he took a bus for Nangal and brought the matter to his notice. This was around 11.00 a.m, whereafter both of them came back to the village.

    7. The aforesaid clearly shows that Balbir Singh had seen the assault on the person of the girl. The trial court, however, disbelieved him because of the evidence given by PW 2, Dr Mahajan, who had done the autopsy. On this being done the following injuries were noticed on the person of Ravinder:

    (1) A lacerated wound 4 ½ cms × 1 ½ cms × bone deep on the head extending to both sides 12 cms from frontal hairline. On dissection, there was a depressed fracture of the skull underneath the wound and corresponding area of the meninges was also having a tear of 1 cm × 1/4th cm.
    (2) An oblique lacerated wound 6 cms × 1 ½ cms bone deep on right side back of head, 2 cms back to Injury 1. On dissection, underneath bone, meninges and brain were healthy.
    (3) A lacerated wound 1 cm × ½ cm × bone deep on the left side chin 2 ½ cms from the midline, on dissection, underneath bone was healthy.
    (4) A lacerated wound ½ cm × bone deep on midline of chin. On dissection, the underneath bone was normal.
    (5) A reddish contusion 3 ½ cms × 2 ½ cms on front of the left shoulder joint.
    (6) A reddish contusion 5 cms × 2 ½ cms on front of left mid-clavicular region. On dissection of Injuries 5 and 6, underneath bones were healthy and normal.
    (7) Dissection of the ligature mark. The sub-cutaneous tissue was having ecchymosis and underneath plasma was ruptured and blood was present in the adjoining area. There was laceration on both carotids. On further dissection, there was found dislocation of the second cervical vertebrae.

    8. On this witness being asked by the court whether “Injuries 1 and 2 were likely to have been caused by the blunt side of the blade of datar (Exhibit P-1) or by its handle?”, the answer was “by the handle of datar and not by the blunt side of the blade”. By referring to this piece of evidence, the trial court stated that it was difficult to expect that the assailant would hold the weapon from the blade and cause injury from the handle. The court further opined that the rapist must have decided resolutely to finish off the girl, in which case he would have rather used the weapon more effectively. This led the court to observe the possibility of a blunt weapon other than Exhibit P-1 with bigger girth or width, having been used, in the circumstances of the case.

    9. According to us, the trial court was swept too much by the aforesaid answer of the autopsy surgeon. Injuries 1 and 2 being lacerated, the same could have been caused by the blunt side of datar. It may be pointed out that what has to be accepted when an autopsy surgeon deposes in the court is his findings relating to the nature of injuries, and not as to how these were caused. Shri Lalit does not deny this legal position but, according to him, the blunt side of datar would not have been used as the accused must have attempted to cause death, in which case, he would have used the sharp side. The learned counsel goes a step further and submits that Balbir Singh deposed about the use of blunt side of the weapon having known that the injuries were lacerated in nature.

    10. The last part of the submission has absolutely no merit inasmuch as even though the post-mortem was done on 25-12-1987 itself, it is common knowledge that the post-mortem reports do not become available for long even to the police. This being the position, the submission that when Balbir Singh stated during investigation about the use of the blunt side of datar during his examination on 25-12-1987 itself, he had done so because of the post-mortem finding, is meritless. The question as to why the blunt side of datar was used, is answered by the type of weapon the datar was, which, as would appear from Exhibit PO-1 had a blade 9 ½″ in length and handle 5 ½″ long. This shows that even the blunt side of datar had lethality. This apart, as the assault was on the head, striking by the blunt side would have achieved the object inasmuch as a purely blunt weapon like lathi is very often used for assault on head, so much so as to cause death of the victim.

    11. Because of the above, we totally disagree with the trial court's assessment of the evidence of Balbir Singh. To shake his credibility, Shri Lalit, however, urges that having seen Ravinderjit in the condition deposed by the witness, he should not have gone in search of her father up to Nangal, but should have gone to the village Abadi nearby and brought to the notice of the villagers as to what had happened to Ravinderjit. Instead of doing this, if Balbir Singh thought it proper to first inform the father of Ravinderjit, we do not think what the witness had done was unnatural; indeed, it was a natural conduct to first speak to the father having found that Ravinderjit had not only been assaulted but was perhaps raped. The fact that the father (Shital Singh) was not examined as an eyewitness cannot take away the weight of Balbir Singh's evidence, though it would have been better for the prosecution to produce Shital Singh also as a witness. But then, this lapse has been met to a great extent by examining the grandfather of Ravinderjit, who is PW 6, Dharma, and who is the person who had approached the High Court and is the appellant herein. From his evidence it has come out that his son Shital Singh had left for Nangal at about 6.15 a.m So, the evidence of Balbir Singh that he had met Shital Singh at Nangal has received corroboration from the deposition of Dharma.

    12. Yet another criticism of Balbir Singh is based on what was stated in this remand application — Exhibit DA. As the original document is in Gurmukhi (whose translation was not found in record), this was translated for us in the Court by a counsel knowing Gurmukhi. A perusal of the same shows that it mentioned about registration of a case against the accused on 25-12-1987 at about 6.30 a.m, on the information given by Dharma who had gone to the field in search of Ravinderjit as he had not come back. The informant had stated that “one young man, name not known” had murdered Ravinderjit. Materials on record show that the name of the accused had not come to be known to Dharma before Shital Singh had come back to the village around 11 a.m So the statement by Dharma made around 6.30 a.m that an unnamed young man had caused the murder, cannot affect the veracity of Balbir Singh.

    13. The aforesaid would show that there was really nothing to disbelieve Balbir Singh. The prosecution, however, has not sought to rely on Balbir Singh alone to demand conviction of the respondent inasmuch as there is on record the evidence of Sarpanch, PW 4 Kashmir Singh, to speak about the extra-judicial confession of the accused. From his evidence it has transpired that the accused had an eye on Ravinderjit from before and it was on 30-12-1987 that the accused came to him to seek some assistance because he being a Sarpanch had a say with the police who was putting pressure upon his family members because of his having caused the offence in question. The accused, therefore, desired that the Sarpanch should meet the police which was so done. But before that when the accused had met the witness he had stated that he had committed the offence in question and on the girl offering resistance she was taken to a nearby field in which trees were planted. The accused also had stated to the Sarpanch that Ravinder Kaur had given fist blow on the right side of his eye while offering resistance. The further admission was that on the girl stating that she would disclose what he had attempted to do with her, a cloth was tied around her neck and she was dragged up to the tree, tied to it and injuries were inflicted with datar from the blunt side.

    14. The trial court disbelieved the Sarpanch stating that the same did not inspire confidence because of the reason that the offence having been committed in absolute secrecy, the perpetrator would have been too hesitant to make a confession; more so, when practically all the residents of the village were strongly condemning the rapist/killer of a young girl of the same village. According to us, the trial court absolutely missed the point that the Sarpanch was approached by the accused to seek protection inasmuch as police was putting pressure on the members of his family. A Sarpanch being a man of authority it was nothing unnatural in the accused approaching him and apprising him as to what he had done.

    15. The above is not all. There is evidence of the Investigating Officer, PW 7, that a datar had been recovered consequent upon the information given by the accused that he had kept the same concealed in his cattle shed under the heap of fuel wood. After giving this information, the accused really led the police to the place from where recovery was made and a bloodstained datar was found. This recovery does connect the accused with the crime.

    16. Shri Lalit submitted that as the room of the house of the accused was lying unlocked, police itself could have recovered the datar if thorough search would have been made. But as the instrument was lying hidden in the cattle shed under the heap of fuel wood, the weapon could not have been found on search but for the information given and leading the police to the place of concealment.

    17. It is baffling to us as to how such an important piece of circumstance was totally missed by the trial court. This shows the casual approach not only of the trial court but also of the public prosecutor. The casualness does not stop here inasmuch as the State did not feel it necessary to file an appeal against the acquittal, leaving it to the old grandfather of the victim to knock the door of the High Court first and lastly of this Court.

    18. The involvement of the accused is fortified by the fact that on his examination by PW 1 reddishness/sub-conjunctival haemorrhage was found on the outer angle of the right eye, which must have been the result of the fist blow on his right eye given by Ravinderjit, about which the Sarpanch had deposed, as already noted.

    19. We have also on record the fact of abscondence of the accused. Shri Lalit would not like us to believe this inasmuch as there is no evidence that the police had searched for the accused at his house all the days after the occurrence till his surrender. The learned counsel put the matter thus because the evidence of PW 8, SI Avtar Singh, who had taken up investigation from PW 7, is that after recording the statements of witnesses, he had searched for the accused on 25-12-1987 itself but he was not available. Shri Lalit contended that as this witness had not stated that search was made on subsequent days also, the circumstance of absconding has not been established. But then from the evidence of PW 6 we find that the police had been visiting the village in connection with this case. It may be that on such visits being made, whereabouts of the accused were tried to be ascertained. The fact that the accused was keeping away from the police has transpired from the evidence of the Sarpanch also according to whom the accused met him on 30-12-1987 saying that the police was putting pressure on his family members. All these evidences taken together do establish the fact of abscondence.

    20. We are thus fully satisfied that the respondent had first attempted to commit rape on Ravinderjit and thereafter killed her. He is, therefore, convicted under Sections 376/511 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    21. This requires us to consider the question of sentence. As to this, the submission of Shri Lalit is that the present is not the “rarest of the rare” case. Further, in view of the fact that the occurrence had taken place in 1987 and the accused was then aged around 19, he may not be visited with capital punishment; more so, as he had been acquitted by the trial court, which order was not interfered with by the High Court. We accept the submission and hold that sentence of imprisonment for life would be the appropriate punishment.

    22. In the result, the appeal is allowed by convicting the respondent under Sections 376/511 and 302 of the Penal Code, for which offences we award a composite sentence of imprisonment for life. He would be got arrested and follow-up steps would be taken as required by law.

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    Dharma v. Nirmal Singh Alias Bittu And Another
    (Feb 5, 1996)