Mohd. Aslam v. Union Of India And Others, Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Neutral Citations

1996 INSC 424

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Writ Petition (C) No. 135 of 1996, decided on March 22, 1996

Disposition

dismissed

Attorney(S)

Dr Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate (M.M Kashyap, Advocate, with him) for the Petitioner;
O.P Sharma, Senior Advocate, for the Respondents.
Danial Latifi, Senior Advocate (Avikar Ray, Akhtar Hussain and Ms Nanita Sharma, Advocates, with him) for the Intervener(s).

Judges

Justice K. Venkataswami
Justice N.P. Singh
Justice J.S. Verma

Acts

Section 123, Representation of the People Act, 1951
Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
Article 32 of the Constitution of India

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution seeking “reconsideration” of the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil, (1996) 1 SCC 169. The petition alleged that the earlier decision was erroneous and conflicted with the constitutional principle of secularism. No other prior proceedings were described; the matter came directly before the Supreme Court on the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Article 32 of the Constitution permits the Supreme Court to reopen or reconsider the correctness of one of its own final judgments on merits.
Whether the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil misinterpreted sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, thereby undermining the principle of secularism.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

The decision in Manohar Joshi is “incorrect” and should be reconsidered.
The judgment allegedly enables misuse of religion in electoral campaigns and is inconsistent with the secularism doctrine discussed in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India.
Apprehensions were expressed that the ruling weakens the statutory prohibition in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil, (1996) 1 SCC 169	Previous authoritative construction of Section 123(3) & (3-A) RPA; basis of challenged judgment.	The Court affirmed that the legal conclusions in this case were based on binding Constitution Bench precedents and required no reconsideration.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 3 SCC 114	Article 32 cannot be used to attack or review the merits of a Supreme Court judgment.	Cited as conclusive authority for dismissing the writ petition at the threshold.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602	Explained in Khoday regarding limits on judicial review of Supreme Court decisions.	Reinforced the principle that extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to revisit final judgments.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1	Landmark on secularism, but not on Section 123 RPA.	Court clarified that Bommai is “inapposite” for interpreting Section 123(3) & (3-A) and therefore offers no basis for reconsideration.
Jamaat-E-Islami Hind v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 428	Standard of proof required for corrupt practice allegations.	Referenced (paras 62-67 of Manohar Joshi) to show that the alleged statement was never legally proved.
Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte, (1996) 1 SCC 130	Subsequent application of Manohar Joshi.	Cited to demonstrate that Manohar Joshi does not facilitate religious appeals in elections.
Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik v. Saroj Sandesh Naik (Bhosale), (1996) 1 SCC 384	Another application of Manohar Joshi.	Used to underscore the continued validity and correct application of the challenged decision.
Mohan v. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, (1996) 7 SCC 679	Further instance applying Manohar Joshi.	Supported the view that the precedent does not permit misuse of religion in elections.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Step 1 – Bar under Article 32: Relying principally on Khoday Distilleries, the Court held that Article 32 is not a vehicle to challenge the merits of, or seek reconsideration of, a Supreme Court judgment. This jurisdictional bar alone was “sufficient to dismiss the writ petition.”

Step 2 – Clarification of Misapprehensions: Notwithstanding the dispositive jurisdictional bar, the bench addressed the petitioner’s “apprehensions.” It observed that:

S.R. Bommai dealt with federal power and secularism but did not interpret Section 123(3) or (3-A) of the RPA; therefore, reliance on Bommai was misplaced.
The contentious observation in Manohar Joshi about “hope of Maharashtra becoming a Hindu State” was hypothetical and expressly disapproved by the Court; moreover, it was never proved by legal evidence.
The ratio decidendi of Manohar Joshi rested on Constitution Bench precedents, not on the disputed factual assumption.

Step 3 – Legislative Domain: The Court remarked that any perceived “deficiency” in Section 123’s statutory prohibition must be corrected by Parliament, not by judicial insertion of words into a penal provision.

Step 4 – Conclusion: Having found the petition based on a “misreading” of the earlier judgment and barred in limine, the Court dismissed the writ.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED: The writ petition under Article 32 seeking reconsideration of Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil was dismissed.

Implications: The ruling reaffirms that Article 32 cannot be used to review or overturn final Supreme Court judgments. It also clarifies that the alleged conflict between Manohar Joshi and secularism doctrine is unfounded. No new precedent was set; rather, the Court reinforced existing jurisprudence on the limits of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction and left any statutory reforms to the legislature.

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Mohd. Aslam v. Union Of India And Others

Order

1. The prayer in this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is for reconsideration of the judgment in Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil (1996) 1 SCC 169. The petitioner's contention, in substance, is that the judgment is incorrect.

2. It is sufficient to say that Article 32 of the Constitution is not available to assail the correctness of a decision on merits or to claim its reconsideration. This has been clearly reiterated in the recent decision in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India (1996) 3 SCC 114, (1995) 6 Scale 742, wherein the decision in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602, 1988 Supp (1) SCR 1, has been explained. This alone is sufficient to dismiss the writ petition.

3. However, in view of certain apprehensions expressed by the petitioner, we deem it proper to make some further observations now, which we had considered unnecessary to incorporate in the judgment in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169. We may observe that the decision of this Court in S.R Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1, did not relate to the construction of, and determination of the scope of sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and, therefore, nothing in the decision in S.R Bommai (1994) 3 SCC 1 is of assistance for construing the meaning and scope of sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. Reference to the decision in S.R Bommai (1994) 3 SCC 1 is, therefore, inapposite in this context.

4. We may also add that the challenge in the writ petition to the correctness of the decision in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169 is based on a misreading of that decision. In the judgment, the decision on the question of law is based on earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court by which we are bound; and the observation therein which is challenged as incorrect in this writ petition, is not the basis of the decision but an opinion expressed on an assumption if the making of the alleged statement of the hope of Maharashtra becoming a Hindu State, in the speech is held to be proved, without recording a finding that it was so proved. This allegation was based on a police report and Manohar Joshi did not admit the making of such a statement in his speech. Moreover, strong disapproval was expressed of such a statement, if actually made. This is clear particularly from paras 62 to 67 of the decision in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169. Specific reference has been made for this purpose in paras 64 to 67 (SCC) to the decision in Jamaat-E-Islami Hind v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 428, to indicate the standard of proof required for proving a corrupt practice which had not been satisfied in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169 in view of the absence of legal evidence to prove the corrupt practice alleged in the case.

5. A careful and dispassionate reading of the decision would show that the apprehensions and misgivings expressed in the writ petition, are imaginary and baseless. There is no occasion to read in the judgment in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169, something which is not said or to say that it conflicts with the concept of secularism in S.R Bommai (1994) 3 SCC 1 where this question relating to the meaning of sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act neither arose, nor was decided. The application of the decision in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169 in cases like Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo (Dr) v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte (1996) 1 SCC 130, Suryakant Venkatrao Mahadik v. Saroj Sandesh Naik (Bhosale) (1996) 1 SCC 384 and Mohan v. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat (1996) 7 SCC 679, (1996) 1 Scale SP 3, is another pointer to indicate that there is nothing in the judgment in Manohar Joshi (1996) 1 SCC 169 to give rise to any such apprehension that it can enable misuse of religion for making an appeal for votes in an election.

6. We may add that the deficiency, if any, in the statutory prohibition enacting the corrupt practice in Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, has to be cured by legislation and that deficiency cannot be cured by reading into a penal provision something which is not enacted therein. The proposal was made at one time to perform the legislative exercise of enacting a provision to prevent any possible misuse of religion during elections, but it was, unfortunately, abandoned. We do hope that at least now there would remain no misapprehension in the mind of anyone.

7. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.

Mohd. Aslam v. Union Of India And Others

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mohd. Aslam v. Union Of India And Others

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