AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 964
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Act
  • Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 964
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)
  • Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Act
  • Section 5-A of the Act
  • Section 4 of the Act
  • Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants challenged a notification dated 23-2-1989 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, acquiring about 80 acres of their land for allotment to the second respondent, N.T.I. House Building Co-operative Society. They participated in the Section 5-A enquiry but, before a declaration under Section 6 could be issued, filed Writ Petitions Nos. 5316-35 of 1989 in the Karnataka High Court. A learned Single Judge rejected five objections raised by the appellants on 30-3-1989. The Division Bench, by order dated 17-7-1989, dismissed the ensuing writ appeals in limine. These civil appeals were filed in the Supreme Court by special leave against that Division Bench order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned acquisition was vitiated by mala fides because portions of the appellants’ lands had been taken earlier for other public purposes.
  2. Whether availability of alternative lands and alleged unfitness of the acquired land rendered the acquisition invalid.
  3. Whether publication of the Section 4(1) notification in a newspaper on 1-2-1989, prior to its Gazette publication on 23-2-1989, and alleged non-publication of its substance in the locality, violated the mandatory procedure under Section 4(1).
  4. Whether, owing to lapse of more than one year and absence of any blanket stay, the notification stood lapsed under Explanation I to the proviso to Section 6(1).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The successive acquisitions of their lands (in 1973, 1988 and the present notification) show mala fides.
  • Alternative lands were available and the notified land was not suitable for house construction.
  • The statutory procedure was breached because: (i) newspaper publication preceded Gazette publication, and (ii) the substance of the notification was not published in the locality.
  • The limitation of one year for issuing a Section 6 declaration had expired since only dispossession had been stayed, causing the notification to lapse.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, (1985) 3 SCC 1; (1985) 3 SCR 995 Publication of a Section 4(1) notification in the Gazette is a mandatory prerequisite to a valid acquisition. The Court accepted the mandatory nature of Gazette publication but distinguished the precedent, holding that in the present case Gazette publication had in fact occurred on 23-2-1989; the earlier newspaper publication was treated as a curable irregularity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. On mala fides, the Court noted that providing house sites to members of a registered co-operative society squarely falls within the enlarged definition of “public purpose” in Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act (as amended in 1984). Earlier acquisitions for other purposes could not taint the present one.

2. Suitability of land and existence of alternatives were factual matters already examined and rejected by the learned Single Judge; no error was shown.

3. Concerning procedural compliance, the Court acknowledged that the notification appeared in a newspaper on 1-2-1989 before its Gazette publication. Treating this sequence as an “irregularity” rather than an illegality, the Court reasoned that the statutory object—notice to landowners—was nonetheless achieved. Gazette publication on 23-2-1989 satisfied the mandatory requirement, and the locality publication on 20-3-1989 completed the process. The precedent in Raja Ram Jaiswal did not render the acquisition void because Gazette publication was lacking in that case, unlike here.

4. Regarding lapse under Section 6(1), the Court held that the period during which the writ petitions and subsequent appeals were pending must be excluded. Consequently, the one-year limit had not expired, and the notification remained valid.

Holding and Implications

The appeals were dismissed. The Supreme Court directed the State Government to consider the Section 5-A report and, if it still found the public purpose subsisting, to issue and publish the Section 6 declaration within four months of receiving the Court’s order. The decision maintains the validity of the acquisition proceedings and imposes a timeline on the State, but it sets no new legal precedent beyond reiterating that premature newspaper publication is only an irregularity when Gazette publication has duly occurred.

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    Venkataswamappa v. Special Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) .

    Order

    1. These appeals by special leave arise from the order of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court made on 17-7-1989 in Writ Appeals Nos. 877-896 of 1989 dismissing the appeals in limine and confirming the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 30-3-1989 made in Writ Petitions Nos. 5316-35 of 1989.

    2. The appellants have challenged the validity of the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, “the Act”), acquiring 80 acres of land in favour of the second respondent-N.T.I House Building Cooperative Society. Notification under Section 4(1) was published on 23-2-1989. Enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted. The appellant participated in the enquiry. Before the declaration could be taken up, the appellants filed the writ petition in March 1989 challenging the validity of the notification. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellants had taken five grounds of objections as enumerated in para 2 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. He dealt with each of the points separately and negatived the same. The Division Bench summarily dismissed the appeal. Thus, these appeals by special leave.

    3. It is strenuously contended for the appellants that since some of the lands of the appellants were acquired, one on 2-3-1973 for defence purposes and second on 28-7-1988 for the HMI House Building Cooperative Society, the acquisition of the lands under this notification is mala fide and, therefore, is not valid in law. We find no force in the contention. Providing house sites for construction of houses for the members of the second respondent, Co-operative Society registered under State Cooperative Societies' Act, is a public purpose is not in question and cannot be questioned in view of the enlarged definition of “public purpose” under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984. Therefore, so long as providing house sites to the members of the Cooperative Society is a “public purpose”, the contention that on earlier occasion also some of the lands belonging to the appellants were acquired for such or some other public purpose, cannot be held to be mala fide.

    4. It is next contended that alternative lands are available and the lands in question are not fit for construction. That question was gone into by the learned Single Judge and was negatived. It is a question of fact in each case. The serious contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that while the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 23-2-1989 the newspaper publication thereof had come to be made prior thereto, i.e, on 1-2-1989 and, therefore, the mandatory requirement under sub-section (1) of Section 4 has not been complied with. It is further contended that the substance of the notification was not published in the locality. These two contentions were not raised before the learned Single Judge; even otherwise, we find that there is no force in these contentions. It is stated in the counter-affidavit and also in the record of the Section 5-A enquiry produced by the appellant which would clearly indicate that after the notification was published, it was published in one of the newspapers on 1-2-1989 and substance thereof was published in the locality on 20-3-1989. The second publication in the newspaper could not be made for the reason that it was already published prior to the publication of the notification in the Gazette. The question is whether the procedure adopted in publishing the notification in the local newspaper before it was actually published in the Gazette is in violation of the requirement under Section 4(1)?

    5. It is true that normally publication in the newspapers would be preceded by a publication in the Gazette notification. It would appear that in this case while sending the notification, which was approved by the Government for publication in the Gazette, simultaneously direction was issued to have it published in the Gazette. Therefore, it would appear that before publication in the Gazette was made, it was published in one of the newspapers. This is only an irregularity in the procedural steps required to be taken under the Act. It does not vitiate the validity of the notification published in the Gazette on 23-2-1989.

    6. In support of the contention that it is mandatory that the procedure prescribed under Section 4(1) should be strictly complied with, the learned counsel has placed strong reliance on the ratio of this Court in The Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal (1985) 3 SCC 1, (1985) 3 SCR 995. There is no dispute on the proposition that publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette is a mandatory requirement. In fact, in that case, that was not done. The contention raised in Jaiswal case (1985) 3 SCC 1, (1985) 3 SCR 995 was that it is only an intention and not mandatory. This Court has rightly rejected that contention. As noted earlier, since the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) was made on 23-2-1989, the intention of the Government to acquire the land for public purpose had been set in motion and it was directed to take the procedural steps in that behalf as mandated under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. What transpires, therefore, is that the notification was made in one of the newspapers published earlier to the actual publication in the Gazette. As stated earlier, it was only an irregularity in the procedural steps to be taken under the Act. It is to be seen that the object of the publication of Section 4(1) is to put a notice to the owners that the land is proposed to be acquired for a public purpose and that they are prevented to deal with the lands in any manner detrimental to the public purpose. Obviously, therefore, the publication in the newspaper would put the owners on notice of the proposed acquisition even prior to the actual publication. Admittedly, in one of the newspapers notification was unauthorisedly published before the publication in the Gazette, namely on 1-2-1989. The substance was also published, as indicated in the proceedings of the Land Acquisition Officer conducted under Section 5-A, on 20-3-1989; the last of the dates was taken for the purpose of notification under Section 4(1). In that view we hold that there was no infraction of the compliance of the requirement under Section 4(1) of the Act.

    7. It is then contended that since the limitation period of one year from the date of the publication under Section 4(1) had elapsed and the stay granted by the High Court or this Court was only of dispossession of the appellants from the lands, the notification under Section 4(1) now stands lapsed by Explanation 1 to proviso to Section 6(1). We find no force in the contention. It is seen that the writ petitions came to be filed in March 1989 in the same month in which the substance of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) was made and the proceedings were pending before the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench and in this Court. Under these circumstances, the entire time taken from the date of the filing of the writ petitions till the date of the receipt of the order of this Court stands excluded and the limitation of one year would start thereafter only. Accordingly, we hold that the notification under Section 4(1) has not lapsed. It is now on record that the appellants have already filed their objections; enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted and report obviously must have been furnished to the Government for taking further steps in the matter. It would, therefore, be necessary for the Government to consider the objections and have the declaration under Section 6 published, if the Government is of the opinion that the public purpose still subsists.

    8. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with the above observations. The State Government is directed to publish the declaration, if the objections are overruled, within four months from the date of the receipt of this order. No costs.

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    Venkataswamappa v. Special Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) .
    (Aug 28, 1996)