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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 166(3)
  • Sections 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the text, but included for completeness)
  • Section 120-B, Section 420, Section 468/471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 166(3)
  • Sections 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the text, but included for completeness)
  • Section 120-B, Section 420, Section 468/471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns allegations of arbitrary and motivated allotment of 52 government-owned shops/stalls by Smt. Shiela Kaul, then Minister for Urban Development. Acting on information suggesting corruption (popularly called the “Housing Scam”), the Supreme Court of India, by order dated 14-02-1996, directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to inquire. The CBI submitted four interim reports indicating that the Minister had allotted six shops to her own relatives, employees, and family friends, and many stalls to relatives or friends of her personal staff, bypassing other eligible applicants and ignoring the 1994 Government policy that required a tender process.

On 19-07-1996 the Court recorded that an FIR under the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act had been registered against the Minister and others. It also ordered notices to the 52 allottees. After receiving their objections, the Court heard the allottees on 27-09-1996. The present opinion resolves how to rectify the illegality and determine the liability of the former Minister.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the discretionary allotments made by the Minister, contrary to the 1994 tender policy, were arbitrary and illegal.
  2. What remedial steps are necessary to cancel the tainted allotments and institute a lawful process for future allotment.
  3. Whether the former Minister can be held personally liable in tort for “misfeasance in public office” and subjected to exemplary damages for abuse of power causing loss to the State exchequer.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 530 State largesse must be distributed fairly; arbitrary distribution violates law. Used to reinforce that arbitrary allotment of shops/stalls is impermissible and actionable.
Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, (1994) 1 SCC 243 Recognised “misfeasance in public office” as actionable tort; public servants liable in damages. Cited to ground personal liability of the Minister for misuse of power.
Pon Carelli v. Duplejis, (1959) 16 DLR (2d) 689 (Supreme Court of Canada) Damages can be awarded personally against high officials for abuse of authority. Relied on to show international acceptance of personal liability for public officials.
Farrington v. Thomson, 1959 VR 280 (Supreme Court of Victoria) Public officers liable for ordering acts they know to be beyond their powers. Supports the proposition that knowing abuse of office entails tort liability.
Henly v. Lyme Corporation, (1858) 5 Bing 91 Early articulation that abuse of public office causing injury is actionable. Quoted (via Smith J.) to underline long-standing common-law basis for misfeasance claims.
Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, (1985) 3 All ER 585 Permits damages claims against Ministers for misfeasance. Cited (with Lord Diplock’s comment in Dunlop) to show well-established nature of the tort.
Dunlop v. Woollahra Municipal Council, 1982 AC 158 Affirmed availability of damages for misfeasance in public office. Used to bolster the legal foundation for awarding damages.
Deshpriya v. Municipal Council, Nuwara Eliya, (1996) 1 CHRD 115 (Sri Lanka) Exemplary damages for political discrimination and abuse of power. Cited to demonstrate comparative jurisprudence supporting exemplary awards.
Tynes v. Barr, Supreme Court of Bahamas (28-03-1994) Exemplary damages for arbitrary, oppressive action by State officials. Referenced to justify the possibility of exemplary damages against the Minister.
Samulls v. Attorney General, Supreme Court of Jamaica (11-11-1994) Exemplary damages for assault, battery, malicious prosecution by State actors. Further comparative support for exemplary awards in public-power abuse cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first recounted the CBI’s prima facie findings that the Minister allotted shops to relatives, staff, and acquaintances, ignoring numerous other applicants and bypassing the mandatory tender system under the 1994 policy. Such conduct was labelled “wholly arbitrary” and a misuse of public power.

To frame an appropriate remedy, the Court reviewed domestic and foreign jurisprudence recognising the tort of misfeasance in public office. It cited authoritative academic commentary (Wade, Bailey et al.) and a line of Indian and common-law decisions demonstrating that public officials who knowingly abuse their authority can be held personally liable in damages, often exemplary in nature. Although no private individual claimed injury here, the Court held that injury to the State exchequer and to the public law principle of good governance sufficed to invoke the doctrine.

On loss, the Court reasoned that failure to invite tenders deprived the State of higher revenue, establishing a quantifiable detriment. Consequently, corrective measures had to address both (a) invalid allotments and (b) accountability of the wrongdoer.

The two-step solution formulated was: (1) cancel all 52 allotments, require the Government to review and, if necessary, revise the 1994 policy to ensure fairness, then re-allot the shops through a lawful tender process within two months of policy formulation; and (2) issue notice to Smt. Shiela Kaul to show cause within three weeks why exemplary damages should not be imposed on her personally for each illegal allotment.

Holding and Implications

ORDER: The Court cancelled the existing 52 shop/stall allotments, directed the Government to finalise a fair policy within two months and complete fresh allotments within a further two months, allowed current allottees to remain in possession for up to three months if ultimately rejected, and issued a show-cause notice to Smt. Shiela Kaul regarding personal liability for damages.

Implications: The decision immediately voids tainted allotments, mandates a transparent tender system, and signals that Ministers can face personal financial liability for arbitrary exercise of discretion. While no new legal doctrine was created, the ruling reinforces the applicability of the tort of misfeasance in public office in India and underscores the Court’s willingness to award exemplary damages for abuse of governmental power.

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    Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union Of India And Others

    B.L Hansaria, J.— Edmund Burke stated as early as 1777: “Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot long exist.” In 1778, he observed: “An arbitrary system indeed must always be a corrupt one. There never was a man who thought he had no law but his own will, who did not soon find that he had no end but his own profit.”

    2. According to Francis Beaumount (1584-1616) corruption is a tree, whose branches are of an unmeasurable length, they spread everywhere, and the dew that drops from thence, hath infected some chairs and stools of authority.

    3. In the Encyclopaedia of Democracy by Seymour Martin Lipset, Vol. 1, p. 310, in the Chapter ‘Corruption’, it is stated that corruption is an abuse of public resources for private gain. It is known that bribes open the way for access to the State for those who are willing to pay and can afford to pay. The situation leaves non-corrupt citizen with the belief that one counts only if one has the right personal contact with those who hold power and also allow persons with money power to get things done to their advantage through backdoor.

    4. In the present case, as we are concerned with alleged motivated, arbitrary and high-handed actions of a Minister, it would be worthwhile to point out what role has been assigned in a parliamentary democracy to a Minister. The head of the State (President or Governor in our country, as the case may be) calls upon the leader of the political party that commands majority to form Government and appoints him as Prime/Chief Minister; and on latter's advice appoints other Ministers. Business of the Government gets allocated and is run as per business rules framed, which in our Constitution has been dealt by Article 166(3). The executive power of the Government is distributed department-wise and one Minister is made the head of that department. That Minister becomes responsible for the actions, acts and policies of his department. He becomes principally accountable and answerable to the people. His powers and duties are regulated by the law of the land. The legal and moral responsibility or liability for the acts or omissions rest solely on the Minister.

    5. Having noted the philosophy, sociology and etymology of corruption, as well as the essence of a parliamentary democracy, let it broadly be seen what had happened in the present case. For this purpose it would be enough to note some of the prima facie conclusions arrived at by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) who was required by this Court to inquire into the matter (which has come to be known as Housing Scam) by Order dated 14-2-1996.

    6. The CBI has since inquired into the matter in some detail and has by now submitted 4 interim reports. According to the CBI, orders of allotment in respect of the shops/stalls in question were passed by Smt Shiela Kaul, the then Minister of Urban Development, and “all the 6 shops have been allotted by her to her own relatives/employees/domestic servants of her family members and family friends. She has allotted 2 shops to her 2 grandsons, one shop to the maidservant of her son, Shri Vikram Kaul who is residing in Dubai, one shop to handloom manager of the firm owned by her son-in-law and another shop to a close friend. One shop has been allotted to the nephew of the Minister of State, Shri P.K Thungon. While making allotments in respect of stalls, she has allotted most of stalls to the relatives/friends of her personal staff and officials of Dte. of Estates”. The CBI has also reported that Smt Shiela Kaul had made ten different categories of persons as the basis for deciding allotments, but even this categorisation was not adhered to while making allotments. The further findings are: (1) “Many other organisations/persons who had also applied for allotment of shops/stalls from time to time were not considered for allotment and no reasons, whatsoever, were assigned for non-allotment of shops/stalls to them”; and (2) “At the time of discretionary allotments made by Smt Shiela Kaul in 1992 and 1994 persons who were relations of her personal staff were considered and allotted shops”.

    7. In the order dated 19-7-1996 this Court noted that a regular case under Sections 120-B, 420, 468/471 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, has been registered against Smt Shiela Kaul and her Additional Private Secretary Rajan S. Lala and others. The order of that date has also noted about various other steps taken, which include issuance of show cause why allotments of shops/stalls should not be cancelled. It was desired that the notices be served within a week and the Estate Officer, after considering their replies, if any, place a report before the Court within four weeks.

    8. Such a report was filed under the affidavit of Shri Harcharan Jeet Singh, Director of Estates, which was taken up for consideration on 6-9-1996. The affidavit of the Director has stated that from 1994 onwards 52 shops/stalls had been sanctioned by the then Minister of Urban Development (Smt Shiela Kaul) out of which 7 shops were allotted by Smt Kaul before she had approved the policy of 1994 and the remaining 45 shops were allotted after the policy of 1994. In the affidavit the gist of the objections filed by the various allottees was enclosed. This Court thought it appropriate to give an opportunity of hearing to all these persons before any action was taken. A direction was, therefore, given to the Director to issue individual notices to the 52 persons (wrongly mentioned as 42 in the order) to be personally present in the Court or be represented through their counsel on 27th September. These allottees so appeared either in person or through counsel and they were heard. The sum and substance of the representations of the allottees was that they had been given an allotment either because of their being unemployed youths, freedom fighters, handicapped, members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, widow or poverty-stricken.

    9. Question is whether they were selected in accordance with law, which aspect has its importance because apparently a large number of other persons could as well fall within the categories in question and had applied also. From the report of the CBI it is clear that the allottees had been selected, not by following the tender system, as required by the policy of 1994, but because of their relationship with the Minister or her personal staff, or being employees or friends of such persons. If that be so, the allotments were wholly arbitrary and speak of misuse of power. The all important question is what is required to be done to undo the wrong and how the wrongdoer is to be dealt with within the parameters known to law.

    10. It would be apposite in this context to refer to the recent decision of this Court in Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 530, in which one of us (Kuldip Singh, J.) reiterated the need to act fairly and justly in the matter of grant of largesses, pointing out that any arbitrary distribution of national wealth would violate the law of the land. Mention was made of the judgment in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243, stating that the same approved “misfeasance in public office” as a part of the law of the tort. It was pointed out that public servants become liable in damages for malicious, deliberate or injurious wrongdoing.

    11. A reference to Wade's Administrative Law shows that a breach of statutory duty does give rise in public law to liability, which has come to be known as “misfeasance in public office”, and which includes malicious abuse of power. This aspect has been dealt at pp. 789 et al of the 7th Edn. It has been stated that public authorities or officers may be liable in damages for malicious, deliberate or injurious wrongdoing. The Supreme Court of Canada in Pon Carelli v. Duplejis (1959) 16 DLR (2d) 689 awarded damages against the Prime Minister of Quebec personally for directing the cancellation of a restaurant-owner's liquor licence. The Supreme Court of Victoria in Farrington v. Thomson 1959 VR 280, awarded damages against a licensing inspector and a police officer who had ordered the plaintiff to close his hotel and cease supplying liquor, though they knew they did not possess such a power. Smith, J. referred in that case to the statement of Best, C.J made in Henly v. Lyme Corpn. (1858) 5 Bing 91, Bing at 107 reading as below:

    “Now I take it to be perfectly clear, that if a public officer abuses his office, either by an act of omission or commission, and the consequence of that, is an injury to an individual, an action may be maintained against such public officer. The instances of this are so numerous that it would be a waste of time to refer to them.”

    12. The learned author has then opined that the cases establish that the tort of misfeasance in public offices goes at least to the length of imposing liability on the public officer who does an act which to his knowledge amounts to an abuse of his office.

    13. We may also note what has been stated in this regard in Cases and Materials on Administrative Law by S.H Bailey and others at pp. 826 et al of the 2nd Edn. The authors have noted the decision rendered in Bourgoin SA v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1985) 3 All ER 585, (1985) 3 WLR 1027, 1986 QB 716, on the subject of misfeasance. In that case damages were claimed against a Minister, which was held permissible. Lord Diplock's observation in Dunlop v. Woollahra Municipal Council 1982 AC 158, (1981) 1 All ER 1202, (1981) 2 WLR 693, that this was “well established” position was noted.

    14. From the aforesaid it is clear that the above has been accepted as a part of the law of tort practically all over the world. What is more, in some countries exemplary damages have been awarded for misuse of public power. Reference may be made to Deshpriya v. Municipal Council, Nuwara Eliya (1996) 1 CHRD 115, which is a decision of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka dated 10-3-1995, noted at pp. 115 to 117 of 1996 (1) Commonwealth Human Rights Law Digest (CHRD). Therein, aggravated award was ordered where political discrimination was the motive for restricting freedom of expression. The Supreme Court of Bahamas in the case of Tynes v. Barr, by a decision rendered on 28-3-1994, ordered for exemplary damages for arbitrary, oppressive or unconstitutional action by State officials. A summary of this decision is reported at pp. 117 to 120 of the aforesaid Law Digest. The need for awarding exemplary damages was felt by Sauyer, J. because of the arrogant, abusive and outrageous disregard shown by the police for the law. The learned Judge awarded $ 40,505 as special damages; $ 75,000 for assault, battery and false imprisonment; $ 1,00,000 for malicious prosecution and $ 40,000 for breach of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court of Jamaica in Samulls v. Attorney General (noted at pp. 120 to 122 of the aforesaid Digest) in which Reckford, J. by his decision dated 11-11-1994, awarded exemplary damages for assault, battery and malicious prosecution. The award was quantified at $ 1,00,000.

    15. The world of jurisprudence has thus accepted misfeasance in public office as a species of tortious liability and, to prevent misuse, different courts across the sea have been awarding exemplary damages.

    16. We are conscious that the aforesaid cases dealt with injury to a third party (following misuse of power) who had sought damages for the loss caused, whereas in the present case there is no injury as such to any third person. Even so, the aforesaid cases have been referred for two purposes. Firstly and primarily to bring home the position in law that misuse of power by a public official is actionable in tort. Secondly, to state that in such cases damages awarded are exemplary. The fact that there is no injury to a third person in the present case is not enough to make the aforesaid principles non-applicable inasmuch as there was injury to the high principle in public law that a public functionary has to use its power for bona fide purpose only and in a transparent manner. Insofar as the aspect of loss is concerned, it deserves to be pointed out that there was loss in present case also; and this was to the State Exchequer resultant upon giving of allotments without calling tender as required by the policy. Needless to say that if tender would have been called, higher revenue would have been earned by the State on giving the allotments. For these reasons, we are of the view that the mere fact that in the present case there is no injury to a third person and he has not come forward to claim damages, has no sequitur insofar as the tortious liability following misfeasance of public office is concerned.

    17. Now, to take care of the illegality, we have to take two steps. First, cancel the allotments. To decide as to who should get the shops/stalls, the Government would first consider whether its policy of 1994 and categorisation made by it needs alteration in any way. While undertaking this work, the Government would make such provisions in the policy which are just and fair. After the policy has been framed, the shops/stalls would be allotted as per the policy and by following a procedure having the sanction of law. In case it would be that any of the present allottees would not be the person so selected, he/she shall be asked to vacate the shop/stall by giving three months' time. We would require the Government to formulate the policy within two months and thereafter to complete the exercise of allotment within two months. Till then, the present allottees would be allowed to continue.

    18. Secondly, Smt Shiela Kaul, who was prima facie personally responsible for the illegal allotments, has to be asked to show cause as to why damage should not be awarded against her for her alleged misuse of power. So, a notice be issued to her to show cause why she should not be asked to pay such sum as damages, for each of the illegal allotments made by her, as this Court would deem just and proper. The cause would be shown within three weeks of the receipt of this order.

    19. The issue relating to the matter of illegal allotments of the aforesaid 52 shops/stalls, stands disposed of accordingly. It may be put up for further orders on 1-11-1996.

    20. Let a copy of this order be served on Smt Shiela Kaul urgently to enable her to act as ordered in the judgment. Steps in this regard shall be taken by the Registry within three days.

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    Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union Of India And Others
    (Oct 11, 1996)