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1995 INSC 140
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  • CPC (Code of Civil Procedure)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1995 INSC 140
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • CPC (Code of Civil Procedure)
  • the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 2 obtained a money decree against Respondent 1 in OS No. 148 of 1970. In execution of that decree, immovable property known as “Chandrika Nilayam” (S.S. No. 67 / present Door No. 21-6) situated at Gandhinagaram, Rajahmundry, was attached and auctioned on 26-3-1985. The appellant’s highest bid of ₹3,01,000 was accepted.
• 21-4-1986: The executing court dismissed Respondent 1’s petitions under Order 21 Rules 90 & 91 CPC challenging the sale.
• 8-4-1987: Sale confirmed and sale certificate issued; description replicated the auction proclamation boundaries.
• 22-4-1987: Appellant obtained physical possession of the entire property within those boundaries.
• Respondent 1 thereafter instituted OS No. 107 of 1987 seeking a declaration that the certificate conveyed only the “terraced building” and not an alleged separate upstairs structure and vacant land.
• Pending that suit, Respondent 1 filed EA No. 478 of 1990 under §47/§151 CPC claiming wrongful delivery of an “upstair building” and adjacent vacant site (“petition schedule property”).
• 5-11-1991: The Subordinate Judge dismissed EA 478, finding the whole property within the proclaimed boundaries had been sold and delivered.
• Respondent 1’s revision (CRP No. 3998/1991) was allowed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 29-3-1994; the matter was remanded with a direction to appoint a Commissioner to determine whether an additional upstair building and vacant site existed within the boundaries. A review petition was dismissed on 23-11-1994.
• The present Supreme Court appeals are by the auction-purchaser challenging the High Court’s interference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the language of the sale certificate and boundaries therein, the entire property within those boundaries stood conveyed to the appellant, or only the “terraced building” formed the subject-matter of the sale.
  2. Whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, could upset the Subordinate Judge’s factual finding regarding the extent of property sold and delivered.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The sale certificate, which reproduces the boundaries given in the sale proclamation, conclusively proves that the whole property within those boundaries was sold; the term “terraced house” cannot be used to carve out a separate parcel.
  • Certificates of sale are documents of title that must not be loosely construed; the Subordinate Judge correctly interpreted the instrument.
  • The issue of what was sold is a pure question of fact; the High Court exceeded its limited revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating that finding and ordering a Commissioner’s inspection.

Respondent 1’s Arguments

  • Only the ground-floor terraced structure was attached, sold and delivered; a distinct upstair building with about 300 sq. yds. of vacant site was never brought to sale.
  • Because ambiguity exists, the executing court ought to ascertain, through a local Commissioner, whether the disputed upstair building and site lie within the proclaimed property; if so, they should be re-delivered to Respondent 1.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramabhadra Naidu v. Kadiriyasami Naicker, (1921) LR 48 IA 155; AIR 1922 PC 252 Sale certificates are documents of title that must not be lightly regarded or loosely construed. Used to emphasise that the wording of the certificate should be given full effect and not narrowed by extraneous assertions.
Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer, (1962) 2 SCR 753; AIR 1963 SC 1879 A misdescription (e.g., wrong plot number) does not vitiate the sale where correct boundaries are provided. Supported the view that mention of “terraced house” could not override the clear boundary description in the certificate.
S.M. Jakati v. S.M. Borkar, 1959 SCR 1384; AIR 1959 SC 282 Determination of what property was sold in execution is a question of fact. Relied upon to hold that the Subordinate Judge’s factual finding was not open to challenge in revision under §115 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Supreme Court reiterated that a sale certificate is a formal document of title whose language must be given its full effect. The certificate in question expressly sets out the boundaries identical to those in the sale proclamation, and specifies the property as “Chandrika Nilayam, S.S. No. 67, present No. 21-6”.
2. The phrase “terraced house” has no precise legal or architectural meaning; it encompasses the main structure, the room on the first floor and other appurtenant parts within the stated boundaries. Hence, the certificate cannot be split to exclude the alleged upstair building or vacant site.
3. Following Ramabhadra Naidu and Sheodhyan Singh, boundaries control over ambiguous descriptive words; therefore the entire area bounded by the four sides was auctioned and conveyed.
4. Under S.M. Jakati, identifying what was sold is a factual determination. The Subordinate Judge examined the documents and found that the whole property within the boundaries had been sold and delivered; this constitutes a finding of fact.
5. The High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC permits interference only on jurisdictional errors or material irregularity. Re-evaluating evidence, ordering a Commissioner’s inspection, and effectively substituting its own factual conclusion exceeded that limited jurisdiction.
6. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court’s order was unsustainable and required reversal.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed; High Court’s orders dated 29-3-1994 and 23-11-1994 set aside; order of the Subordinate Judge dated 5-11-1991 restored.

Direct effect: the appellant retains title and possession over the entire property within the proclaimed boundaries, including the disputed portion; the appellant is awarded costs. Broader implication: the judgment reaffirms (i) the conclusive nature of sale certificates as documents of title, (ii) primacy of boundary descriptions over ambiguous nomenclature, and (iii) the limited scope of High Court revisional power under Section 115 CPC in matters involving findings of fact. No new legal precedent is set, but existing principles are reinforced.

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    P. Udayani Devi v. V.V Rajeshwara Prasad Rao And Another

    S.C Agrawal, J.— Leave granted.

    2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

    3. These appeals are by the auction-purchaser of a property sold to him in execution proceedings. A money decree was passed against Respondent 1 in OS No. 148 of 1970 filed by Respondent 2. In execution of the said decree the property of Respondent 1 was sold by auction on 26-3-1985 to the appellant whose bid of Rs 3,01,000 was the highest. In the sale certificate dated 8-4-1987 the property that was sold was thus described in the Schedule:

    “East Godavari District, Rajahmundry Taluk, Gandhinagaram, Block No. II, Rajahmundry belonging to the judgment-debtors and named as ‘Chandrika Nilayam’ in SS No. 67 and present No. 21-6 terraced house, situated within the following boundaries—

    East : House of M.V Reddy South : Main Road West : Park North : House of Mullapudi Satyanarayana”

    4. The same description was given in the sale proclamation. Before issuance of the sale certificate Respondent 1 had filed petitions, EAs Nos. 387 of 1985 and 506 of 1985 under Order 21, Rules 90 and 91 CPC, for setting aside the sale which was held on 26-3-1985. One of the grounds that was urged for setting aside the sale in the said petitions was that Respondent 1 had only 1/4th share in the property and further that the property was worth Rs 5 lakhs and the bid was too low. Along with the said petitions Respondent 1 also filed a schedule which gave the description of the property in the same terms as mentioned in the sale proclamation and sale certificate. The said petitions were dismissed by the executing court by order dated 21-4-1986 and the sale was confirmed on 8-4-1987 and the sale certificate was granted to the appellant. In pursuance of the sale certificate the appellant obtained possession of the entire property within the boundaries as mentioned in the sale certificate on 22-4-1987. After the delivery of the possession Respondent 1 filed a suit, OS No. 107 of 1987, in the court of Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry for a declaration that the sale certificate dated 8-4-1987 issued in favour of the appellant does not pass title to the property bearing Door No. 14/7 and relates only to the terraced building and for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of Respondent 1 in respect of the other building. During the pendency of the said suit Respondent 1 filed a petition, EA No. 478 of 1990, in the execution proceedings under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC wherein he prayed for a declaration that the sale certificate does not pass title to the appellant in respect of the property mentioned in the schedule to the said application, hereinafter referred to as “the petition schedule property”, on the ground that even though there was no attachment and sale of the said property and even though the appellant did not purchase the same and even though the sale certificate does not contain it, the appellant had taken the delivery of possession of the said property in the execution proceedings. The boundaries of the petition schedule property are thus described by Respondent 1 in the said petition—

    East : House belonging to M.V Reddy West : Terraced building now taken delivery by the first respondent (appellant herein) South : Main Road North : House belonging to Mullapudi Satyanarayana

    5. The said petition was contested by the appellant as well as by the decree-holder (Respondent 2) who asserted that the petition schedule property was also brought to sale after attachment and was in fact sold by the court and it is also covered by the sale certificate. The Subordinate Judge, by order dated 5-11-1991, dismissed the said petition of Respondent 1. It was held that the petition schedule property is located within the boundaries mentioned in the schedule to the execution petition as well as in the schedule attached to the sale certificate. The Subordinate Judge rejected the contention that there were two buildings, the terraced building and the upstair building, and held that there is only one structure on the terrace which looks like a staircase room and there is absolutely no upstair building at all and that the major portion of the building is a terraced one and that in spite of the location of a small room on the terrace the building remains a terraced building only. According to the Subordinate Judge the sale proclamation and sale certificate clearly go to show that the property purchased by the appellant extends up to the park on the west and up to the house of M.V Reddy on the east and that the petition schedule property is a part and parcel of the property within the said boundaries and, therefore, the petition schedule property was also purchased by the appellant under the sale certificate and the appellant was entitled to the entire property including the petition schedule property under the sale certificate and is entitled to take the delivery of the entire property including the petition schedule property. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Subordinate Judge, Respondent 1 filed a revision petition, CRP No. 3998 of 1991, in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The said revision petition was allowed by the High Court by judgment dated 29-3-1994. The High Court was of the view that when Respondent 1 raised the contention that within the boundaries there is other upstair building with vacant site of 300 and odd sq. yds. and that the property that was sold pursuant to the auction and delivered was only the terraced building, the lower court ought to have appointed a Commissioner in order to find whether in fact there is any upstair building in the said site and that if there is also upstair building and vacant site within the boundaries the appellant is not entitled to take delivery of the upstair building as the only property that was brought to sale was the terraced building within the boundaries mentioned therein and further that the sale certificate does not refer to the upstair building and the vacant site. The High Court, therefore, remitted the matter to the executing court with the direction to appoint a Commissioner to make local inspection of the petition schedule property and if, within the boundaries mentioned in the sale certificate, there is an upstair building which is not included in the sale certificate and the vacant site adjacent to it he may direct re-delivery of that property and if there is no upstair building and the vacant site within the boundaries mentioned in the sale certificate, the Subordinate Judge may dispose of the execution application in accordance with law. The appellant filed a review petition for review of the said order of the High Court but the same was dismissed by order dated 23-11-1994. These appeals are filed against the said orders of the High Court dated 29-3-1994 and 23-11-1994.

    6. Shri R.F Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, was in error in interfering with the order passed by the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application filed by Respondent 1 under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC. The submission of Shri Nariman was that the boundaries of the property which was sold in the auction-sale are clearly indicated in the sale certificate and they are the same boundaries as are mentioned in the sale proclamation and that in view of the said description in the sale certificate the entire property lying within those boundaries was the subject-matter of sale in favour of the appellant. The submission of Shri Nariman was that the sale certificate issued in favour of the appellant is conclusive and that the Subordinate Judge had correctly construed it and that there was no infirmity in the order passed by the Subordinate Judge which could justify interference by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

    7. We find considerable substance in this contention. The position in law is well settled that “certificates of sale are documents of title which ought not to be lightly regarded or loosely construed”. (See : Ramabhadra Naidu v. Kadiriyasami Naicker (1921) LR 48 IA 155, AIR 1922 PC 252. In Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichara Kuer (1962) 2 SCR 753, AIR 1963 SC 1879 in the sale certificate the boundaries as well as the plot number were mentioned but there was a mistake in mentioning the plot number. It was held: (SCR p. 759)

    “The matter may have been different if no boundaries had been given in the final decree for sale as well as in the sale certificate and only the plot number was mentioned. But where we have both the boundaries and the plot number and the circumstances are as in this case, the mistake in the plot number must be treated as mere misdescription which does not affect the identity of the property sold.”

    8. In the instant case, we find that in the sale certificate the boundaries of the property that was sold have been clearly indicated. In addition, the sale certificate also gives the description of the property as “Chandrika Nilayam” bearing the number “S.S No. 67 and present No. 21-6”. The mention of the words “terraced house” in the description cannot be construed to mean that only a part of the property falling within the boundaries was sold and a part of the said property was left out. The expression “terraced house” is not an expression of precise connotation as pointed out by the Subordinate Judge. The main building having the terrace and a room on the first floor can properly be described as the terraced house and other structures and land within the boundaries are part of the said property. There is no dispute that the possession of the entire property, including the house having a room on the first floor, was delivered to the appellant after the sale certificate had been issued in his favour. What Respondent 1 wants is to divide the property mentioned in the sale certificate in two portions having the following boundaries:

    (I) East : House of M.V Reddy West : Terraced building mentioned in the sale certificate South : Main Road North : House of Mullapudi Satyanarayana (II) East : Building having a room on the first floor and open land West : Park South : Main Road North : House of Mullapudi Satyanarayana

    9. According to Respondent 1 only property (II) was sold in the auction-sale and is covered by the sale certificate. The plain terms of the sale certificate do not lend support to this contention. According to the sale certificate the entire property falling within the boundaries was the subject-matter of the sale. In view of the said description in the sale certificate it is not possible to split up the property into two portions and confine the sale certificate to a part of the property and thereby alter the boundaries of the property that has been sold.

    10. Moreover, it is settled law that the question as to what was sold in execution of the decree is a question of fact. (See : S.M Jakati v. S.M Borkar 1959 SCR 1384, AIR 1959 SC 282.) In the present case, the Subordinate Judge, after an examination of the sale certificate and other documents, has recorded a finding that the entire property falling within the boundaries mentioned in the sale certificate has been sold. That was a finding of fact. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, was not justified in reopening the finding of fact recorded by the Subordinate Judge. The judgment of the High Court cannot, therefore, be upheld and must be set aside.

    11. The appeals are accordingly allowed, the judgment of the High Court dated 29-3-1994 as well as the order dated 23-11-1994 are set aside and the order dated 5-11-1991 passed by the Subordinate Judge is restored. The appellant will be entitled to his costs.

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    P. Udayani Devi v. V.V Rajeshwara Prasad Rao And Another
    (Feb 24, 1995)