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Disposition
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  • Section 379 CrPC read with Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 379 CrPC read with Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, sole accused, was tried for offences under Sections 302, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code for the fatal stabbing of Pappachan and for causing grievous and simple hurt to Baby (PW 2) and Pappachan’s father (PW 1) on 26-10-1982 near the deceased’s tea shop. A family feud existed between the accused—elder brother of PW 1—and the victims’ family.

During the altercation, the accused stabbed the deceased; PW 2 struck the accused with a stick, after which the accused stabbed PW 2 and inflicted a minor injury on PW 1 before fleeing. All injured parties were taken to Palghat hospital, where PW 1 lodged the First Information Report. The accused was arrested and a knife (MO 1) was recovered at his instance.

The trial court accepted the prosecution’s eyewitness testimony but acquitted the accused, holding that he acted in the reasonable exercise of his right of private defence. The State’s appeal was allowed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, which convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC, finding no right of private defence. The present appeal to the Supreme Court is filed under Section 379 CrPC read with Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accused had a right of private defence in the circumstances of the incident.
  2. If such a right existed, whether the accused exceeded its limits, thereby attracting Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC.
  3. Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC recorded by the High Court was sustainable, or whether the offence falls under Section 304 Part I IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the accused sustained a lacerated head injury and abrasions, corroborated by medical evidence. The presence of three adversaries (the deceased, PW 1 and PW 2) armed with knives and a stick created, in the Court’s view, a reasonable apprehension of harm to the accused. The Court reiterated that an accused need not conclusively prove the right of private defence; a plausible version suffices when supported by surrounding circumstances, including injuries on the accused.

Assessing both prosecution and defence versions, the Court concluded that the accused did possess a right of private defence. However, by inflicting four incised wounds on the deceased—including a fatal injury to the liver—and a serious abdominal wound on PW 2, he surpassed the limits of that right. Consequently, Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC applied, converting what the High Court treated as murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC. The Court affirmed the trial court’s view on the existence of self-defence but corrected its application of the law regarding excess in its exercise.

Holding and Implications

The conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment are set aside; the appellant is instead convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. Convictions and sentences under the other sections are confirmed, with all sentences to run concurrently. The appeal is partly allowed.

The decision reduces the offence from murder to culpable homicide due to recognition of a partial right of private defence. The ruling’s impact is confined to the parties; no broader precedent was explicitly established.

    Scaria v. State Of Kerala

    1. This is an appeal under Section 379 CrPC read with Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The appellant, who is the sole accused in the case, was tried for offences punishable under Sections 302, 326 and 324 IPC for allegedly causing the death of one Pappachan and for causing grievous hurt to Baby, PW 2, and simple hurt to the father of the deceased, PW 1, on 26-10-1982 at about 2.30 p.m near the tea shop of the deceased. The accused also received injuries and the plea of self-defence had been put forward.

    2. The prosecution case is mainly on the evidence of the two injured witnesses, PWs 1 and 2 and PW 3, wife of the deceased. The trial court having examined the evidence of the injured witnesses as well as that of PW 3, concluded that it was the appellant who inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased and caused grievous hurt to PW 2 and simple hurt to PW 1. But, taking into consideration the plea set up by the accused, it took the view that the accused had a right of private defence and since he had a reasonable apprehension that the three persons were likely to cause his death or grievous hurt, in that view of the matter, acquitted the accused.

    3. The State preferred an appeal questioning the said order of acquittal and a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court reversed the same holding that the accused had no such right of private defence. Hence, this appeal.

    4. The accused is no other than the elder brother of PW 1, and the deceased was the son of PW 1 and PW 2 was the son of the deceased. It is stated that there was some family feud between the deceased and his family members on one hand, and the accused on the other. On the day of occurrence, PW 1 got down from a jeep in front of the house of the deceased and by then a quarrel was going on between the accused and the deceased. He saw the quarrel between the accused and the deceased. He then saw the accused whipping out a knife and stabbing the deceased. At that juncture, PW 2, son of the deceased, came out of the house with a stick and dealt a blow on the head of the accused. Thereafter, the accused stabbed PW 2 also on his stomach. When PW 1 tried to pacify, it is alleged that the accused also inflicted an injury on him and ran away.

    5. All the three injured were taken to the hospital at Palghat whereat PW 1 gave a report, Ext. P-1, to the police. The case was registered and the accused was arrested and at his instance, MO 1, the weapon was recovered.

    6. The deceased died and the post-mortem was conducted, and four incised injuries were found on the dead body. One of the injuries extended into the left lobe of the liver and the other injuries were on other parts, namely, on the left of the neck and on dorsum of the left hand and on the back of the chest. It is only the injury to the liver which was serious. The doctor, however, opined that the death was due to the injury to the liver as well as cumulative effect of the other injuries.

    7. PW 2 was also examined by the doctor who found an incised injury on his stomach. On PW 1 a simple incised injury was found on the left arm.

    8. The doctor, who examined the accused, found one lacerated injury, 4 cm × 0.5 cm wound deep on the right side of the head and also two abrasions on the forehead and on the palm. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was laid.

    9. When examined under Section 313 CrPC, the accused pleaded that he was not guilty and put forward a version stating that on the date of the incident he had gone to the house of one Jose in connection with the purchase of a cow and while he was passing through the road in front of the tea shop of the deceased, he saw the deceased, PWs 1 and 2 standing in front of the shop armed with knives and a stick. The deceased abused him and caught hold of him and PWs 1 and 2 beat him. Apprehending that he would be killed by them, the accused stated that he tried to wield the knife from him and then there was a scuffle between him and the three persons and, thereafter, he ran away. In his version the accused suggested that he did not intentionally inflict injuries on the three persons, and it was during the scuffle that the three persons happened to receive those injuries.

    10. The trial court accepted the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 as well as that of PW 3 that the deceased and PWs 1 and 2 received the injuries at the hands of the accused but observed that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the occurrence and the belated plea that PW 2 happened to inflict an injury on the accused cannot amount to a proper explanation of the injury found on the accused, and that the accused has taken a specific plea which leads to an inference that he must have acted while exercising his right of private defence and, therefore, the accused was entitled to acquittal.

    11. The High Court while upsetting that finding held that the accused had no right of private defence and he was armed with a knife and deliberately inflicted injuries on these persons. It may be mentioned that PW 1 who gave the report did not say anything about the accused having received any injury. No doubt, at a later stage, the prosecution has made an effort to explain away the injuries on the accused but when a specific plea has been put forward by the accused and the presence of injuries on him is corroborated by medical evidence, the court has to see whether the plea set up by him is plausible.

    12. It is needless to say that the accused need not affirmatively establish that he had a right of private defence and he exercised the same in that manner. The general exception which deals with the right of private defence lays emphasis on the reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused while exercising the right of private defence. However, for the purpose of this case, we need not go into the various aspects that have to be kept in mind in giving benefit of the general exception to the accused. Suffice it to say that where an injury is found on the accused and if the accused comes forward with a specific plea, the same has to be considered in the facts and the surrounding circumstances obtaining in the case. Every kind of explanation put forward particularly at the belated stage by the prosecution will not be sufficient and cannot be held to be an appropriate explanation to reject the version put forward by the accused particularly when it does not appear to be false but, on the other hand, appears to be plausible.

    13. The injury was inflicted on the forehead of the accused which is on a vital part. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the accused had no reasonable apprehension that some hurt, at least, would be caused to him. Further, as pleaded by him, there were three persons who were about to attack. The presence of the three persons at the scene of occurrence is not in dispute. In such a case, naturally, a reasonable apprehension would have been there in the mind of the accused. It is in this background we have to consider the plea set up by the accused and examine whether the accused was justified in exercise of right of private defence. At least, a reasonable doubt arises in this case when we consider the prosecution version as well as the version put forward by the accused in the light of the facts and surrounding circumstances and the situation in which the occurrence had taken place.

    14. As already mentioned, they are all closely related to each other. Though the trial court has not satisfactorily dealt with the aspect of right of self-defence but we, having given our earnest consideration, are of the view that the plea set up by the accused cannot simply be brushed aside. Under these circumstances, it is quite reasonable to hold that the accused had the right of self-defence. However, having regard to the fact that he inflicted four injuries on the deceased and also a serious injury on PW 2, he certainly exceeded the same. Therefore, Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC is attracted and not the general exception, as held by the trial court.

    15. Accordingly, in the result, we set aside the conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment awarded thereunder and convict him under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentence him to undergo 7 years’ RI. The other sentences and convictions are, however, confirmed. The sentences are directed to run concurrently.

    16. The appeal is, thus, partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Scaria v. State Of Kerala
    (Mar 9, 1995)