Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 18 of the Act
  • Section 23(1-A) of the Act
  • Section 34 of the Act
  • Section 54 of the Act
  • The Amendment Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 28 of the Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 18 of the Act
  • Section 23(1-A) of the Act
  • Section 34 of the Act
  • Section 54 of the Act
  • The Amendment Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • Section 28 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Uttar Pradesh published a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 29-9-1976, followed by a declaration under Section 6 on 30-9-1976. Invoking its power under Section 17(4), the Government dispensed with the Section 5-A enquiry on the ground of urgency. Notice was served on 15-11-1976 and possession was taken on 16-12-1976.

The landowners (appellants) filed writ petitions in 1977 before the Allahabad High Court challenging (i) the Government’s resort to the urgency clause and (ii) the consequent denial of the Section 5-A enquiry. The Division Bench dismissed the petitions on 30-8-1979. Constructions on the acquired land have since been completed.

The appellants then filed the present appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the litigation, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 22-3-1983.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State was justified in invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A.
  2. Whether, owing to the delay between possession (December 1976) and the award (March 1983), the appellants are entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the compensation amount, over and above the statutory interest under Sections 34 and 28 of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The urgency powers under Section 17(4) were wrongly exercised; there was no real urgency justifying the denial of a Section 5-A enquiry.
  • Because the award was made only on 22-3-1983—more than six years after the acquisition—interest at 12% per annum should be awarded to compensate the delay.
  • Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44, particularly paragraph 16, where such interest was granted in similar circumstances of delayed award.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The delay in making the award was a consequence of the appellants’ own litigation; proceedings in both the High Court and the Supreme Court had restrained further steps.
  • Sections 34 and 28 of the Act comprehensively govern the State’s liability for interest. Under the unamended Act, interest is 6% per annum until deposit; higher rates arise only upon enhancement by a court.
  • The Land Acquisition Officer deposited the total compensation (including statutory interest) on 15-11-1976, and therefore no additional liability survives.
  • Awarding extra-statutory interest would reward litigants for delay and would run counter to the compensatory mechanism introduced by Section 23(1-A).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 The Supreme Court granted 12% interest where the Land Acquisition Officer failed to make awards for several years even after writ petitions had been dismissed. Distinguished. The Court noted that in the present case the delay stemmed from ongoing litigation initiated by the appellants, not from administrative inaction.
Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285 Referenced in Ram Chand as the earlier decision after which no awards were passed, illustrating administrative delay. Mentioned indirectly; served only as background in the discussion of Ram Chand. It had no direct bearing on the present appeal’s outcome.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Urgency under Section 17(4): The Supreme Court observed that constructions on the acquired land had already been completed. Given this irreversible factual development, the Court held that it was unnecessary to revisit the validity of the urgency declaration at this late stage.

2. Claim for 12% Interest:

  • The Court examined Sections 34 and 28 of the Act, noting that statutory interest (6% under the unamended Act and escalated rates after the 1984 amendment) is payable from the date of possession until deposit of compensation.
  • Liability for further interest arises only when compensation is enhanced by a Reference Court or an appellate court (Section 28).
  • The award was delayed primarily because the appellants’ writ petitions (filed in 1977) resulted in stays, and a subsequent “status quo” order was obtained in the Supreme Court. Hence the administrative machinery could not proceed earlier.
  • Unlike in Ram Chand, where the delay was entirely administrative, the present delay was litigation-induced; therefore the rationale for awarding 12% interest did not apply.
  • Section 23(1-A)—introduced to offset delay in making awards—already provides a statutory mechanism for compensation, preventing a person responsible for delay from obtaining an unwarranted premium.
  • The respondents had deposited the compensation (with statutory interest) promptly after passing the award, further negating any claim for additional interest.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. No order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The appellants are confined to the compensation and interest already calculated under the statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act; no additional 12% interest is payable. Broader Implication: The decision underscores that extra-statutory interest will not be awarded when delays in the acquisition process are attributable to the claimants’ own litigation and where statutory mechanisms (Sections 34, 28, and 23(1-A)) sufficiently address compensation for delay.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Kishan Das And Others v. State Of U.P And Others

    Order

    1. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment dated 30-8-1979 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in CMW No. 35 of 1977. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was published in the Gazette on 29-9-1976. Declaration under Section 6 was made on 30-9-1976. While issuing the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the Government exercised the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Consequently, notice under Section 4(1) of the Act was served on 15-11-1976 and possession of the land was taken on 16-12-1976.

    2. The appellant had challenged the exercise of the power of the Government under Section 17(4) contending that there is no such urgency as is warranted to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A and the exercise of power under Section 17(4), therefore, was illegal. The High Court had not accepted the contention holding that there was urgency to dispense with the enquiry and the court could not substitute the satisfaction of urgency recorded by the Government when it exercised power under Section 17(4) of the Act. It is now an admitted fact that in the land under acquisition constructions have been made and completed. Under these circumstances, the need to go into the question of urgency and exercise of power under Section 17(4) at this belated stage does not arise.

    3. Shri B.B Sanyal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, contended that the award was made on 22-3-1983 though the acquisition was made in September 1976. Therefore, the appellants should be compensated by payment of interest @ 12 per cent per annum. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 and in particular on paragraph 16 of the judgment. It is seen that in Ram Chand case (1994) 1 SCC 44 even after the dismissal of the writ petitions by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285, no action was taken by the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award. Thus, till 1980-81 no award was made in respect of any of the acquisitions. Under these circumstances, this Court had directed the Government to pay interest @ 12 per cent on the amount awarded to compensate the loss caused to the appellants therein. In this case, it is seen that though the notification was issued in September 1976, the writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court immediately thereafter in 1977 and obviously further proceedings were stayed. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Officer delayed the award. After the dismissal of the writ petitions, the appellants came to this Court and obtained status quo. Obviously, the Land Acquisition Officer was not in a position to pass the award immediately. Thereafter, it would appear that he passed the award on 22-3-1983. Section 34 of the Act obligates the State to pay interest from the date of taking possession under the unamended Act @ 6 per cent and after the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 at different rates mentioned therein. The liability of the State to pay interest ceases with the deposit made as per Section 34 of the Act. Further liability would arise only when the court on reference under Section 18 enhances the compensation under Section 28 of the Act. Similarly, in an appeal under Section 54 of the Act if the appellate court further increases the compensation, then again similar obligation under Section 28 arises.

    4. In the light of the operation of the respective provisions of Sections 34 and 28 of the Act, it would be difficult to direct payment of interest. In fact, Section 23(1-A) is a set-off for loss in cases of delayed awards to compensate the person entitled to receive compensation; otherwise a person who is responsible for the delay in disposal of the acquisition proceedings will be paid premium for dilatory tactics. It is stated by the learned counsel for the respondents that the amount of interest was also calculated and total amount was deposited in the account of the appellants by the Land Acquisition Officer after passing the award, i.e, on 15-11-1976 in a sum of Rs 20,48,615. Under these circumstances, the liability to pay interest would arise when possession of the acquired land was taken and the amount was not deposited. In view of the fact that compensation was deposited as soon as the award was passed, we do not think that it is a case for us to interfere at this stage.

    5. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kishan Das And Others v. State Of U.P And Others
    (Sep 12, 1995)