AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1994 INSC 101
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 12(3)(b) of the Act
  • Section 12(3)(a) of the Act
  • The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 11(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 12 of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1994 INSC 101
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 12(3)(b) of the Act
  • Section 12(3)(a) of the Act
  • The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 11(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
  • Section 12 of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit premises comprise three small flats on Ramamaruti Road, Thane, originally owned by Omji Mulji and leased to the appellant-tenant company in 1963 at a contractual rent of Rs 300 plus Rs 20 municipal tax and Rs 15 water charges. In 1968 the property was sold to Gavand, to whom the appellant continued paying rent, including subsequent increases reflecting higher municipal taxes. By 1975 the respondents had become owners, and the appellant was paying Rs 358.29 per month (inclusive of taxes).

On 27 July 1977 the respondents served a notice terminating the tenancy, alleging arrears of “permitted increases” (Rs 56.50 p.m. calculated on education cess, water charges, unemployment charges and tree cess) from February 1976, as well as unauthorised alterations and nuisance. The appellant filed an application under Section 11(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (“the Act”) for fixation of standard rent; an interim rent of Rs 358 was ordered, which the appellant deposited monthly—first with the landlord, then in court.

On 26 April 1979 the respondents instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 384 of 1979 for arrears of permitted increases, rent and possession. The trial court decreed eviction for arrears of rent (not for alterations/nuisance). The District Judge dismissed the tenant’s appeal, and the Bombay High Court dismissed Writ Petition No. 5035 of 1985, holding the tenant had defaulted in paying permitted increases. The tenant brought the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for eviction and arrears is maintainable when the notice of demand allegedly fails to specify the period and amount of permitted increases claimed.
  2. Whether permitted increases—though part of “rent”—are required to be paid monthly so that non-payment attracts Section 12(3)(b) of the Act.
  3. Whether continuous deposit of the interim standard rent (Rs 358) without the permitted increases fulfils the tenant’s statutory obligations and protects against eviction.
  4. Whether the landlord must plead and prove actual payment of the taxes/cesses constituting permitted increases before claiming them from the tenant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • A valid notice of demand is a condition precedent; the July 1977 notice did not specifically demand permitted increases or state the arrears period, so Section 12(3)(a) or (b) cannot apply (relying on Chimanlal v. Mishrilal).
  • Permitted increases (education cess, etc.) are payable yearly, not monthly; therefore Section 12(3)(a) is inapplicable (Raju Kakara Shetty v. R.P. Shirole).
  • The landlord must first pay and then demand permitted increases; absence of such pleading/evidence vitiates the suit.
  • The tenant had timely applied for standard rent, and consistently deposited the court-fixed interim rent, which equalled the contractual rent; hence there was no default.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The notice expressly detailed the components of permitted increases (Rs 358.29 rent plus Rs 56.50 increases) and demanded the “entire arrears of rent,” which necessarily included those increases.
  • The plaint clearly pleaded arrears of permitted increases from 1 February 1976 to the suit date; thus Chimanlal is distinguishable.
  • Although permitted increases may not be payable monthly in law, they were claimed for a defined period (Feb 1976–Apr 1979), so default existed.
  • Municipal demands evidencing the landlord’s payment of taxes were produced; the High Court correctly appreciated the facts and law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chimanlal v. Mishrilal, (1985) 1 SCC 14; (1985) 2 SCR 39 Valid notice of demand is a condition precedent to an eviction suit for arrears. Distinguished on facts; Court held the July 1977 notice adequately demanded the amounts, so the principle did not assist the tenant.
Raju Kakara Shetty v. R.P. Shirole, (1991) 1 SCC 570 Where part of rent (municipal taxes/cess) is yearly, rent is not payable monthly, so Section 12(3)(a) may not apply. Held inapplicable because the landlord claimed permitted increases for a defined period (Feb 1976–Apr 1979); default still attracted Section 12(3)(b).
Maheshwari Mills Ltd., (1962) 3 Guj LR 574 Payment of municipal taxes by tenant forms part of rent; if payable yearly, Section 12(3)(a) not attracted. Cited within quotation; not relied on because periodical default under Section 12(3)(b) was established.
Prakash Surya, (1978) 1 RCR 10 Similar principle regarding taxes forming part of rent and their periodicity. Mentioned in quotation; not determinative of the outcome.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a valid demand notice is essential but found the 27 July 1977 notice sufficiently specific: it itemised rent (Rs 358.29) and each component of permitted increases (education cess, water charges, unemployment and tree cess) totalling Rs 56.50 per month, and demanded all arrears in toto. Thus, the tenant’s reliance on Chimanlal failed.

Addressing the argument that permitted increases are not payable monthly, the Court noted that the landlord claimed these increases for a continuous period (1 February 1976 to 27 April 1979). Consequently, the default attracted Section 12(3)(b) despite the annual character of certain cesses; Raju Kakara Shetty was therefore inapposite.

The Court recorded that standard rent was ultimately fixed at Rs 358 and permitted increases at Rs 56 per month (14 September 1983). The appellant paid only the former. Section 12(3)(b) obliges the tenant to deposit “permitted increases” during the pendency of any standard-rent application and the eviction suit. Continuous payment of Rs 358 alone could not relieve that statutory obligation.

Evidence adduced by the landlord—including municipal notices—demonstrated payment of the underlying taxes, refuting the tenant’s contention that the landlord had not borne the charges. Accordingly, the concurrent findings of the trial court, first appellate court and High Court were upheld.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the eviction decree and directed the tenant to deliver vacant possession within six months, conditional on filing the usual undertaking within four weeks.

Implications: The decision reiterates that a composite demand for rent and permitted increases suffices where the components are specified, and that tenants must deposit both standard rent and permitted increases to claim protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. No new legal principle was promulgated; the ruling applies existing doctrine to the facts.

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    Chase Bright Steel Limited v. Shantaram Shankar Sawant And Another

    S. Mohan, J.— The short facts leading to this civil appeal are as under.

    2. The original owner of suit property situate at Ramamaruti Road, Thane (Maharashtra) was one Omji Mulji. He leased out three small flats having two rooms and a kitchen in favour of the appellant company in 1963. The rent was fixed at Rs 300 plus Rs 20 municipal taxes and Rs 15 water charges.

    3. In 1968, Omji Mulji sold away the property to one Gavand. Thereafter, the appellant tendered the rent including the taxes to the said Gavand from 1968. In the same year of 1968, the municipal taxes were increased. The appellant paid a lump sum of Rs 338.58 as rent. Due to further increase in the taxes, the appellant tendered Rs 358.29 including taxes to the owner.

    4. In the year 1975, the respondents came to purchase the suit property. Since then, the appellant had been paying regularly rent and taxes at the rate of Rs 358.29 p.m

    5. The Advocate for the respondents issued a notice dated July 27, 1977 to the appellant terminating their tenancy and called upon the appellant to hand over vacant possession since the appellant was in arrears of permitted increases amounting to Rs 5650 from February 1976. The notice also stated two of the grounds for eviction, in that the appellant had altered the premises and causing nuisance to the neighbours.

    6. On receipt of the above notice, the appellant filed an application under Section 11(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for fixation of standard rent. On August 30, 1977, an interim order fixing the rent at Rs 358 was passed. It was directed to be deposited in the court on or before 10th of every month. For the months of August and September, the appellant paid the interim rent to the respondents. The same had been accepted. However, since October 1977 the appellant was depositing the interim rent in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane.

    7. On April 26, 1979, the respondents filed Civil Suit No. 384 of 1979 in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Thane for arrears of permitted increases, rent and for possession. The ground urged was that the appellant was in arrears of permitted increases amounting to Rs 56.50 per month since October 1976. This was on the basis of calculation at 7% as education cess on the rent of Rs 358.29, Rs 30 water charges, 1/4% as unemployment charges and 1/4% as tree cess. Further grounds for eviction namely unauthorised alteration and creating nuisance were also urged. In September 1981 the application for fixation of standard rent was dismissed in default for non-appearance. This dismissal came to be noted by the Advocate only in the year 1985. However, the appellant had been depositing the interim standard rent all along.

    8. In defence to the Regular Civil Suit No. 384 of 1979, it was urged that the payment of standard rent had been made without fail throughout and, therefore, he was not in arrears. The other grounds namely, unauthorised construction and causing nuisance were also denied. The trial court decreed the suit for eviction on account of arrears of rent but not permitted increases.

    9. Aggrieved by the said order, appellant filed Civil Appeal No. 452 of 1983 before the District Judge, Thane. The said appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, the appellant preferred Writ Petition No. 5035 of 1985 before the High Court. That was dismissed on February 19, 1987 on the ground that the tenant was not in arrears of rent but had defaulted in payment of permitted increases. Thus, the present civil appeal.

    10. Mr Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant raised the following points for our consideration.

    (i) A valid notice of demand is a condition precedent for the maintainability of suit for arrears of rent or permitted increase. In the absence of requisite demand, there can be no question of non-compliance. In such a case, the consequences mentioned under Section 12(3) sub-section (3)(a) or (b) will not be attracted. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on Chimanlal v. Mishrilal (1985) 1 SCC 14, (1985) 2 SCR 39.
    (ii) In the present case, the notice of demand dated July 27, 1977 does not mention the period of alleged arrears or the permitted increase. The demand is only for the payment of entire arrears of rent and not permitted increases.
    (iii) Permitted increase, though part of rent, is not payable monthly. It is well settled that education cess being payable on a year to year basis, the rent ceases to be payable every month within Section 12(3)(a) of the Act as laid down in Raju Kakara Shetty v. R.P Shirole (1991) 1 SCC 570.
    (iv) The landlord can have no cause of action to recover permitted increase until he had paid the permitted increases. Therefore, he must plead and prove payment of permitted increase. There is no such pleading in this case. In spite of this point having been urged before the lower appellate court as well as the High Court it has not been dealt with. The High Court has gone wrong in misreading the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. It has read into it obligations and conditions which are not statutorily prescribed. It should have taken note of the following facts:
    (a) That the application for standard rent was made in time;
    (b) That the interim rent as fixed by the court has been paid regularly throughout the pendency of the suit and the appeal;
    (c) That the interim rent fixed was the same as the contractual rent.

    11. Mr A.M Khanwilkar, learned counsel for the respondents in answering these submissions would urge that it is not correct to state that there is no valid demand. The notice specifically states as to what exactly the tenant was liable to pay namely; the rent at Rs 358.29, 7% education cess, Rs 30 for water charges, 1/4% as unemployment charges, 1/4% as tree cess. All these total up to Rs 56.50 per month as permitted increases. When the notice called upon the tenant to pay the entire arrears of rent, all these which are part of rent were required to be paid. As a matter of fact, the plaint clearly discloses as to what exactly was the demand. Therefore, on facts the ruling of Chimanlal case (1985) 1 SCC 14, (1985) 2 SCR 39 has no application.

    12. There is no demur to the proposition that the permitted increases, though part of rent, are not payable monthly. But, in this case, the plaint clearly states that the permitted increases were from February 1, 1976 till the date of filing of suit in 1979. Hence this proposition does not in any way affect either the claim or the recovery thereof.

    13. The landlord never disputed that the tenant had not paid the municipal taxes. As a matter of fact, the municipal demands had been produced in evidence. The High Court had appropriately appreciated the matter and it warrants no interference.

    14. As a proposition of law, it cannot be disputed that there must be a valid demand for maintainability of suit for arrears of rent or permitted increases. It has been so laid down in Chimanlal case (1985) 1 SCC 14, (1985) 2 SCR 39 (at SCR pp. 43-44).

    15. In this case, the notice dated July 27, 1977 is as follows:

    “You have been leased out the entire second floor. You are in occupation of the entire second floor. The month of tenancy is according to British Calendar Month. You have accommodated your three officers in the three blocks on the second floor. The net rent in respect of the said second floor is Rs 358.29 Over and above the said rent you require to pay to my client 7% as education cess, Rs 30 for water charges and 1/4% as unemployment charges and 1/4% as the tree cess. Thus you are supposed to pay to my client Rs 56.50 per month as permitted increases. You are at present in arrears of rent from February 1976. My client has demanded the same but you have neglected and failed to pay the same. You are thus a defaulter. You are not ready and willing to pay the rent as and when it becomes due.
    You are also called upon to pay the entire arrears of rent on receipt hereof. Failing compliance of which, my clients will be compelled to go to the court of law for getting their grievances redressed entirely at your risk as to the costs and consequences which please note.”

    16. No doubt, the word ‘supposed’ in paragraph 3 has been incorrectly used. But that does not in any way affect the validity of the notice. Besides, merely because it is stated ‘arrears of rent’, it does not mean that there is no demand for permitted increases since those permitted increases are part of rent. The plaint in no mistakable terms says as follows:

    “The month of the tenancy of the defendant was according to British Calendar Month. The net rent in respect of the said second floor was Rs 358.29 over and above the said rent the defendant was required to pay to these defendant 7% as education cess, Rs 30 for water charges, 1/4% as unemployment charges and 1/4% as tree cess. These plaintiffs submit that thus the defendant was required to pay the permitted increases per month amounting to Rs 56.90 The defendant was in arrears of permitted increases since February 1976. These plaintiffs demanded the same time and again but the defendant has failed to pay the same. The defendant is, thereby a defaulter.”

    17. Therefore, this contention of Mr Soli J. Sorabjee cannot be accepted. Factually, the ruling stated as Chimanlal case (1985) 1 SCC 14, (1985) 2 SCR 39 is distinguishable. In R.K Shetty case (1991) 1 SCC 570 it is stated at p. 581 as under : (SCC para 13)

    “In Maheshwari Mills Ltd. (1962) 3 Guj LR 574 under the terms of the tenancy the tenant was obliged to pay the municipal taxes and property taxes in respect of the demised premises. The court took the view that such payment was by way of rent and since the municipal taxes and property taxes were payable on year to year basis, a part of the rent was admittedly not payable by the month and, therefore, Section 12(3)(a) was not attracted. In Prakash Surya (1978) 1 RCR 10 the tenant had agreed to pay the municipal tax and education cess. The amount payable towards these taxes constituted rent and since the same was payable at the end of the year the court held that the rent had ceased to be payable by the month and hence Section 12(3)(a) had no application.”

    18. As rightly urged by Mr Khanwilkar, learned counsel for the respondent the permitted increase may not be payable monthly; but in the instant case, the period, for which the permitted increases are claimed, is between February 1, 1976 till April 27, 1979. This is evident from paragraph 6 of the plaint as under:

    “The cause of action for the purpose of filing of this suit first arose on or about March 1, 1976, for arrears of permitted increases and for possession on September 1, 1977 and is being continued respectively from time to time till the filing of this suit.”

    Therefore, R.K Shetty case (1991) 1 SCC 570 cannot be pressed into service.

    19. At no point of time, the tenant disputed the payment of municipal taxes by the landlord. In fact, the evidence is to the following effect:

    “Permitted increase was amounting to Rs 56.50 since February 1976. I have produced the xerox copy of the notices issued by Municipality at Ex. 13. We demanded the permitted increase to the defendant. But they failed to pay the same.”

    20. On September 14, 1983, the standard rent was fixed at Rs 358 per month and the permitted increases were fixed at Rs 56 per month. The appellant continued to pay Rs 358 per month being the standard rent. He did not pay the permitted increases. The fact that he was depositing throughout Rs 358 and even during the stage of writ petition, can hardly relieve him from such an obligation. Under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act, there is an obligation to deposit the permitted increases not only during the pendency of the standard rent application which in this case has come to be dismissed for default but even during the pendency of suit for eviction. As rightly held by the High Court, if this were not to be so, the tenant could claim protection on its showing that he had within a period of one month from the date of service of notice of demand under Section 12(2) filed an application for standard rent and that he had obeyed that order; in this case the interim standard rent.

    21. Accordingly, we hold that there are no merits in this civil appeal which stands dismissed. The tenant shall hand over vacant possession of the said premises within six months on condition that he files the usual undertaking within four weeks from the date of this order.

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    Chase Bright Steel Limited v. Shantaram Shankar Sawant And Another
    (Mar 2, 1994)