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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1993 INSC 353
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147, 148, 149, 506, 341 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1993 INSC 353
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147, 148, 149, 506, 341 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

An Additional Sessions Judge (the petitioner) had initially rejected on merits the bail applications of five accused charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 506, 341 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Despite the rejection, he first granted the accused temporary bail and ultimately released them on permanent bail. The complainant, supported by the State, sought cancellation of that bail in the High Court. On 13 July 1991, the High Court cancelled the bail for all five accused and, in doing so, made severe observations insinuating that the petitioner had been “won over” and had acted under “corrupt influence.” The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court seeking expunction of those remarks.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the harsh and imputative remarks made by the High Court against the Additional Sessions Judge, suggesting corrupt motive, should be expunged from the High Court’s order dated 13 July 1991.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the High Court was “fully justified” in cancelling the bail because, on the record, there was no basis for granting bail to the accused. However, the Court stressed that:

  • Judicial fallibility is recognised in the legal system; errors by lower courts are corrected through the appellate process without necessarily imputing improper motives.
  • Lower judicial officers often work under intense pressure; their mistakes should not automatically be attributed to corruption or bias.
  • Publicly castigating subordinate judges with allegations of “corrupt influence” undermines confidence in the judiciary and damages judicial discipline.
  • When a higher court suspects misconduct, the appropriate course is to record such concerns confidentially for use in service records or disciplinary proceedings, rather than making sweeping public allegations.
  • Self-restraint and measured language are essential attributes of judicial conduct; intemperate remarks risk “destroying the judiciary from within.”

Balancing these considerations, the Court concluded that, while the bail orders were rightly set aside, the personal accusations against the petitioner exceeded permissible judicial comment and had to be removed from the record.

Holding and Implications

Petition Allowed; Remarks Expunged.

The Supreme Court directed that the offending portions of the High Court’s judgment of 13 July 1991 be deleted. The immediate effect is to clear the petitioner’s judicial record of allegations of corruption. No new substantive legal precedent on bail was set; rather, the decision reinforces the principle that higher courts must exercise restraint and avoid attributing motives to subordinate judges without due process.

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    K.P Tiwari v. State Of M.P .

    Order

    1. This is a petition by a judicial officer who at the relevant time was an Additional Sessions Judge, for expunging remarks which were made against him by the High Court while reversing the orders of bail passed by him in Miscellaneous Criminal Case Nos. 816 and 466 of 1991.

    2. The undisputed facts are that the accused in those cases are charged with the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 506, 341 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. A charge-sheet was being processed in respect of the offences in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate at the relevant time. The five accused in the meanwhile, applied for bail. Their application was considered on merits and rejected by the petitioner. However, in spite of the rejection of the application on merits, the petitioner first granted the accused temporary bail for one reason or the other and all of them were subsequently granted permanent bail. Against the order granting permanent bail, the complainant preferred an application to the High Court and prayed for cancellation of the bail. The State did not file a separate application but supported the complainant's application and also pressed for the cancellation of the bail. The High Court discussed the case of each of the five accused who were granted bail and pointed out that on facts there was no justification for granting bail to any of them and by its order of July 13, 1991 cancelled the bail of all the accused. However, while passing the order, the High Court made the following observations:

    “The fact that the final grant was made without hearing the State Government and without verifying the fact, points to the interestedness of Shri K.P Tiwari, learned First Additional Sessions Judge in the non-applicants. Indeed this interestedness is apparent in all the five cases. The impression that one gets is that Shri K.P Tiwari, First A.S.J has been won over by the non-applicants and therefore was open to write any judgment, or order, releasing non-applicants on bail. It is therefore a case where the non-applicant (sic) not only have shown disregard to law and the judicial process but are also reasonably suspected of exercising corrupt influence over Shri K.P Tiwari, the First A.S.J This Court has necessarily to recall such orders.
    Indeed, it (court) will be failing in its duty if it accepts corrupting influence of the non-applicants (sic) and permits illegal orders to remain effective.”

    3. There is no doubt that the High Court was fully justified in cancelling the bail granted by the petitioner. In fact, on the facts and circumstances on record, we are not at all satisfied that there was any case in favour of the accused for releasing them on bail.

    4. We are, however, impelled to remind the learned Judge of the High Court that however anguished he might have been over the unmerited bail granted to the accused, he should not have allowed himself the latitude of ignoring judicial precaution and propriety even momentarily. The higher courts every day come across orders of the lower courts which are not justified either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside. That is one of the functions of the superior courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the judges and hence provides for appeals and revisions. A judge tries to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing so, sometimes, he is likely to err. It is well said that a judge who has not committed an error is yet to be born. And that applies to judges at all levels from the lowest to the highest. Sometimes, the difference in views of the higher and the lower courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and perception. On such occasions, the lower courts are not necessarily wrong and the higher courts always right. It has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks — more correctly up to their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patiently. Every error, however gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders creating a suspicion of judicial conduct which is not wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Even in such cases, the proper course for the higher court to adopt is to make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his work and to use it on proper occasions. The judges in the higher courts have also a duty to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. The respect for the judiciary is not enhanced when judges at the lower level are criticised intemperately and castigated publicly. No greater damage can be done to the administration of justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary than when the judges of the higher courts publicly express lack of faith in the subordinate judges for one reason or the other. It must be remembered that the officers against whom such strictures are publicly passed, stand condemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and of the members of the public. No better device can be found to destroy the judiciary from within. The judges must, therefore, exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is certainly not one of them. That is the surest way to take the judiciary downhill.

    5. We, therefore, accept the petition and expunge the abovequoted remarks from the judgment of the learned Judge of the High Court delivered on July 13, 1991 in Misc. Criminal Case Nos. 816 and 466 of 1991. The petition is allowed accordingly.

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    Comments

    K.P Tiwari v. State Of M.P .
    (Oct 29, 1993)