Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard on merits.
3. The respondent's service was terminated by an order dated April 21, 1986 after an inquiry into the charges levelled against him. The respondent challenged that order by a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. By the impugned judgment the High Court has set aside the order terminating the respondent's service and directed his reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. This judgment has been challenged by special leave.
4. The High Court has allowed the respondent's writ petition for two reasons. The first reason given by the High Court is that the failure to furnish the respondent with a copy of the enquiry report vitiated the ultimate order of termination. This view was taken on the basis of the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991) 1 SCC 588, even though according to that decision itself it did not apply to cases where the order of penalty was made prior to the date of that decision. The other reason given by the High Court is that the Managing Director who was the disciplinary authority had relied on the comments invited by him and offered by another Accounts Officer even though the report of the Enquiry Officer was in favour of the respondent, exonerating him of all the charges. The High Court took the view that reliance on the adverse comments made by the Accounts Officer had vitiated the decision of the Managing Director inasmuch as it was influenced by some extraneous material.
5. The first reason given by the High Court based on the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (1991) 1 SCC 588 obviously results from a misreading of that decision. This position has been reiterated recently in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (1994) 4 SCC 727, (1993) 25 ATC 704, JT (1993) 6 SC 1. The High Court's judgment cannot, therefore, be sustained on that ground.
6. The other reason given by the High Court for quashing the order of termination of service passed by the Managing Director does appear to be correct even though the direction given thereafter cannot be sustained. The High Court rightly took the view that the decision of the Managing Director was vitiated on account of the fact that it was influenced by some extraneous material in the form of adverse comments of another Accounts Officer. Having correctly taken that view, the direction appropriate in the circumstances was to require the disciplinary authority to decide the matter afresh only on the basis of the relevant material excluding from consideration the extraneous material in the form of adverse comments of the other Accounts Officer. In our opinion, this is the appropriate direction to give in the present case.
7. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and so also the order dated April 21, 1986 passed by the Managing Director of the appellant-Corporation by which the services of the respondent were terminated. The Managing Director of the Corporation should now decide the matter afresh with advertence to the above observations taking into account the decision of this Court in B. Karunakar (1994) 4 SCC 727, (1993) 25 ATC 704, JT (1993) 6 SC 1. In the circumstances of the case, we also direct that the Managing Director of the Corporation should decide the matter as early as possible and preferably by January 31, 1994.
8. No costs.