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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1991 INSC 286
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864
  • (the Act and the Rules)
  • It is settled law that the word ‘shall’ be construed in the light of the purpose that the Act or rule seeks to serve.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1991 INSC 286
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 36 of the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864
  • (the Act and the Rules)
  • It is settled law that the word ‘shall’ be construed in the light of the purpose that the Act or rule seeks to serve.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant’s 13.07-acre coffee estate in Semmanthaputhur village was auctioned under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (“the Act”) to recover an alleged misappropriation amount of Rs 12,163.50 (a charge of which the appellant was later acquitted). On 30 March 1979 the Tahsildar conducted the auction, where Respondent 1 purchased the property for Rs 12,225, depositing 15 % (Rs 2,000) of the price.

Section 36 of the Act requires publication of the date and place of sale and mandates that the purchaser deposit the remaining 85 % of the consideration within 30 days. Nonetheless, the sale was confirmed on 23 October 1981, and Respondent 1 paid the balance only on 4 November 1981—about 19 months after the auction.

The appellant’s objections were overruled by the Revenue Divisional Officer the same day the sale was confirmed. On appeal, the Additional District Collector, Salem, set aside the sale (13 October 1982). Respondent 1 then filed W.P. No. 246 of 1984. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court quashed the Collector’s order (21 August 1990); a Division Bench dismissed the appellant’s writ appeal (4 April 1991). The present appeal to the Supreme Court followed, after special leave was granted.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether failure to publish the place of sale in the Gazette notice, as required by Section 36 of the Act, renders the auction sale invalid.
  2. Whether confirmation of the sale is illegal when the purchaser deposits the balance 85 % of the sale consideration well beyond the 30-day period mandated by Section 36.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • Publication in the Gazette omitted the place of sale; Section 36 makes such publication mandatory, so the sale is void.
  • The purchaser failed to deposit the remaining 85 % within 30 days; confirmation of sale after a 19-month delay violates Section 36 and is therefore illegal.

Respondent 1’s Arguments

  • Form 7 (not Form 7-A) governs the notice; it requires no mention of place, hence the publication was sufficient.
  • The delayed deposit resulted from prolonged correspondence; once authorities accepted the payment, they acquiesced, curing any defect.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that the word “shall” in Section 36 is unequivocally mandatory, guided by the statutory purpose of ensuring open, competitive, and fair auctions.

  • Publication Requirements: Proper notice serves as an invitation to potential bidders. Omitting the place of sale thwarts transparency, discourages participation, and risks underselling the debtor’s property. The Court emphasized that procedural forms (Forms 7 or 7-A) cannot override the statute; any form must conform to Section 36. Therefore, failure to publish the place rendered the sale invalid, not merely irregular.
  • Deposit of Balance Consideration: Section 36 also mandates payment of the remaining 85 % within 30 days, with forfeiture of the earnest money as the statutory consequence for non-compliance. Unless restrained by a court order—which was not the case—the purchaser must meet this deadline. A 19-month delay cannot be condoned; confirming the sale before receipt of full consideration violated the Act.
  • Administrative and Judicial Oversight: The Additional District Collector correctly annulled the sale. The High Court, both at the single-judge and Division Bench levels, erred in treating the statutory requirements as directory and in relying on the form rather than the governing statute.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; writ petition dismissed; order of the Additional District Collector, Salem, restoring cancellation of the auction sale, is reinstated. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Immediate consequence: the 1979 auction sale of the appellant’s coffee estate stands annulled, and any title purportedly acquired by Respondent 1 is void. Broader implications are confined to reaffirming the mandatory nature of Section 36’s requirements under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act; the judgment clarifies that statutory notice and payment timelines cannot be circumvented by administrative practice or acquiescence.

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    Lakshmanasami Gounder v. C.I.T, Selvamani And Others

    K. Ramaswamy, J.— Special leave is granted.

    2. This appeal is against the judgment dated April 4, 1991 of the Madras High Court. A sum of Rs 12,163.50 was alleged to have been misappropriated by the appellant (now he was acquitted of the charge of misappropriation) and for the recovery thereof his 13.07 acres of coffee estate situated in Semmanthaputhur village was brought to sale under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (for short ‘the Act’). On March 30, 1979 the sale by auction was held by the Tahsildar. Respondent 1 purchased for a sum of Rs 12,225 and deposited a sum of Rs 2000 being 15 per cent of the sale price. Under Section 36 of the Act, respondent 1 should have deposited the balance consideration within 30 days from the date of the auction. On October 23, 1981 the sale was confirmed and the balance amount was deposited on November 4, 1981. The appellant filed an application but by proceeding dated October 23, 1981, the Revenue Divisional Officer overruled the objections and dismissed the application. On appeal the Additional District Collector, Salem set aside the sale on October 13, 1982. Respondent 1 filed Writ Petition No. 246 of 1984 in the High Court. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated August 21, 1990 quashed the order of the Additional District Collector. On writ appeal, the Division Bench dismissed it. Thus this appeal.

    3. The formidable objection raised by the appellant is that it is mandatory under Section 36 that the date and place of sale shall be published in the gazette and that the publication did not mention the place of sale. Therefore, the sale is invalid in law. It is also his further plea that it is equally mandatory that the balance sale consideration of 85 per cent should be deposited within 30 days from the date of sale which was done only on November 4, 1981 long after one year and eight months of the date of sale. The sale and confirmation thereof are, therefore, illegal. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench held that Form 7-A of the forms prescribed under the Act read with relevant provisions of the Board Standing Order No. 41 does not prescribe the place of sale and that, therefore, the omission to specify the place of sale does not render the sale invalid nor an irregularity. Shri Selvamani, respondent 1-in-person (himself a practising advocate) contended that it is Form 7 and not Form 7-A that would be applicable to the facts of the case. Form 7 contains the place of sale and that it was complied with. Therefore, the sale is not illegal. It is also contended that the deposit was made after protracted correspondence and that, therefore, the non-deposit within 30 days from the date of sale is not illegal. At any rate, having accepted the amount, the authority acquiesced to the deposit. Therefore, the confirmation of the sale is not illegal. We find no substance in either of the contentions. The contention that Form 7 and not Form 7-A would be applicable to the facts, is not the case set up or argued either before the authorities or the courts below. For the first time he cannot raise that plea in this Court. That apart specifically the High Court (learned Single Judge and the Division Bench) held that it is Form 7-A that is applicable and that it does not prescribe publication of place of sale and therefore, the omission thereof does not render the sale invalid. The High Court wholly misconceived of Section 36. A reading of Section 36 manifests that the word ‘shall’ is mandatory in the context.

    4. The publication is an invitation to the intending bidders to prepare and participate at the bid. Unless there is a due publication of the date and place of sale, the intending purchasers cannot be expected to run after the Sale Officer to find out the date and place of sale and to participate thereat. The Sale Officer has a statutory duty and a responsibility to have the date and place of sale mentioned in the notice and given due publication in terms of the Act and the Rules. Public auction is one of the modes of sale intending to get highest competitive price for the property. Public auction also ensures fairness in actions of the public authorities or the sale officers who should act fairly, objectively and kindly. Their action should be legitimate. Their dealing should be free from suspicion. Nothing should be suggestive of bias, favouritism, nepotism or beset with suspicious features of underbidding detrimental to the legitimate interest of the debtor. The fair and objective public auction would relieve the public authorities or sale officers from above features and accountability. Any infraction in this regard would render the sale invalid.

    5. It is settled law that the word ‘shall’ be construed in the light of the purpose that the Act or rule seeks to serve.. It is not an invariable rule that even though the word ‘shall’ is ordinarily mandatory but in the context or if the intention is otherwise, it may be construed to be directory. The construction ultimately depends upon the provisions itself, keeping in view the intendment of the enactment or of the context in which the word ‘shall’ has been used and the mischief it seeks to avoid. Where the consequence of failure to comply with any requirement of a provision is provided by the statute itself, the consequence has to be determined with reference to the nature of the provision, the purpose of enactment and the effect of non-compliance thereof. In its absence the consequence has to be determined with reference to the effect of the non-compliance of the provision of the legislature. Mere use of the word ‘shall’ need not be given that connotation in each and every case that the provision would be invariably interpreted to be mandatory or directory. But given due consideration to the object, design, purpose and scope of the legislation, the word shall be construed and interpreted in that design and given due emphasis. Section 36 obligates the Sale Officer (Tahsildar) that he shall publish the date and place of sale. The object thereby is an invitation to the public at large that the notified property would be brought to sale at that specified time and place and that they are invited to participate, if they so desire. To reiterate for emphasis and continuity that the object of the sale is to secure the maximum price and to avoid arbitrariness in the procedure adopted before sale and to prevent underhand dealings in effecting sale and purchase of the debtor's property. As a responsibility as Sale Officer and a duty towards the debtor, the Sale Officer should conduct the sale strictly in conformity with the prescribed procedure under the statute and the rules as the case may be. Such due and wide publicity would relieve the debtor from the maximum liability he owes and payable to the creditor. This responsibility is not only salutary to vouchsafe bona fides in the conduct of the Sale Officer but also to ensure fairness in the procedure adopted in bringing the property of the debtor to sale. Considered from this perspective the non-compliance of Section 36 i.e, omission to mention the place of sale would visit with deprivation of the property to the debtor for an inadequate sale consideration due to absence of competing bidders. Thus, we hold that specification of the date and place of sale shall be mandatory. The Forms either 7 or 7-A are only procedural and they should be in conformity with Section 36. The form cannot prevail over the statute. The omission of specification of the place of sale in the form renders the sale not merely irregular but also invalid.

    6. Equally the second objection is insurmountable. It is mandatory that “the balance of the sale amount shall be remitted within 30 days from the date of auction” and if not the earnest money deposited is liable to forfeiture. Confirmation of the sale should precede the deposit of the sale amount. Section 36 mandates remittance of the balance of 85 per cent of the sale consideration within 30 days from the date of auction. It is obligatory on the purchaser to deposit the amount within that period unless he is prevented by an order of the court or tribunal from so making deposit. The non-compliance renders the 15 per cent deposit liable to forfeiture. Therefore, the confirmation of the sale without compliance is illegal. We hold that the sale is vitiated by manifest error of law and rightly set aside by the Additional District Collector, Salem (appellate authority). The High Court, both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench committed manifest error of law in interfering with the order of the appellate authority. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed and the order of the Additional District Collector, Salem restored, but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.

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    Lakshmanasami Gounder v. C.I.T, Selvamani And Others
    (Nov 1, 1991)