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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1990 INSC 11
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the Act
  • Sections 437 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
  • Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • the relevant provisions of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1990 INSC 11
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the Act
  • Sections 437 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
  • Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • the relevant provisions of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, a prominent member of the Shiv Sena Party and Chief of its Thane District Unit, was arrested on April 21, 1989 in Crime No. 1348/89 for the murder of Corporator Shridhar Khopkar. The killing allegedly followed public threats issued by the respondent after the party’s defeat in the March 20, 1989 Mayoral election, where he declared that “traitors” responsible for cross-voting would not be spared. He was booked under Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

While investigation was still underway, the Designated Court at Pune, by order dated May 18, 1989, released the respondent on bail. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Designated Court correctly applied Section 20(8) of TADA and the general principles governing bail in serious offences when it granted bail to the respondent.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with a discretionary bail order when the lower court relied on irrelevant considerations such as the accused’s political status.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the Designated Court’s approach “misconceived” and its order “unsustainable” for several reasons:

  • Statutory misapplication: Section 20(8) of TADA requires the court to refuse bail unless it is satisfied—by recorded reasons—that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not involved in disruptive activities. The Designated Court failed to address this threshold.
  • Irrelevant considerations: The lower court relied chiefly on the respondent's status as a “respectable person” and leader of a “big political organisation,” assuming such a person would not commit the offence and requiring no conditions on bail. The Supreme Court held that status or influence is irrelevant to bail in grave crimes.
  • Failure to examine investigative material: Although empowered to peruse the case diary, the Designated Court refused to look at witness statements taken during investigation because they had not been formally read in open court. This omission prevented proper assessment of whether reasonable grounds existed to believe the respondent guilty.
  • Weight of incriminating utterances: The respondent’s repeated public threats, published in “Navakal,” “Lokprabha,” and “Urdu Times,” demonstrated incitement to violence. These assertions heightened the seriousness of the allegations and should have been evaluated before granting bail.
  • Appellate interference justified: While the Supreme Court generally defers to lower-court discretion on bail, it will intervene where that discretion is exercised on irrelevant considerations and without regard to the nature of the accusation or material on record.

Holding and Implications

Bail order set aside; appeal allowed; bail cancelled.

The respondent’s release on bail is revoked, though he retains the right to seek bail afresh before the Designated Court at a later stage. The judgment underscores that courts must strictly apply Section 20(8) of TADA and weigh the seriousness of allegations over the social or political stature of the accused. No new legal precedent was established, but the decision reinforces existing principles governing bail in terrorism-related cases.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    State Of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe .

    M. Fathima Beevi, J.— By the impugned order dated May 18, 1989 the Designated Court, Pune, directed the respondent to be released on bail. The respondent was accused of having committed offence under Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) besides the offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 120-B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    2. The respondent was the member of the Shiv Sena Party and the Chief of the Thane District Unit. In consequence of the defeat of the party in Mayoral election held on March 20, 1989 the party felt that there was cross-voting and there were traitors among them. There had been a declaration by the respondent that such traitors would not be spared. The respondent was arrested in connection with the murder of one of the Corporators Shridhar Khopkar on April 21, 1989 on registering Crime No. 1348/89.

    3. In releasing the respondent on bail while investigation was pending, the Designated Court appears to have been influenced by the fact that respondent was the leader of Political Party. The court assumed that as a leader, he would not be involved in such crimes and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is not guilty of any offence under the Act.

    4. Having heard both the sides, we feel that the whole approach by the learned Judge was misconceived and the order is unsustainable. We have been taken through the entire proceedings. We find that the learned Judge has not noticed the relevant provisions of the Act which restrict the powers of the court in granting bail. The learned Judge had also refused to consider the materials placed before it for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has committed the offence. In the course of the investigation witnesses have been questioned and their statements have been reduced to writing. The learned Judge refused to consider the statements recorded in the course of the investigation for the simple reason that such statements had not been read out in open court though the court was empowered to peruse the case diary for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the stage of investigation and the nature of the evidence that had been collected.

    5. Sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the Act clearly provides that unless the court is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent is not involved in disruptive activities, bail shall ordinarily be refused. Even under the provisions of Sections 437 and 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the powers of the Sessions Judge are not unfettered. The salient principles in granting bail in grave crimes have not been taken note of.

    6. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower court in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the accusation and relevancy of materials on record, this Court would not hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice.

    7. There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the court. Where the offence is of serious nature the court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of such considerations as the nature and seriousness of offence, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such similar other considerations.

    8. In the present case the learned Judge observed that it is a case of respectable person of a big political organisation, his freedom cannot be curtailed if he is entitled to bail. His liberty cannot be curbed if enlarged on bail and, therefore, no kind of condition is required to be imposed. The court also observed that being a leader of the big political organisation one cannot expect that the respondent will commit any offence if enlarged on bail and he cannot be called to be a criminal. The learned Judge was obsessed by the fact that the respondent was associated with a political party and was oblivious of the nature of the allegations made against him and the relevant materials indicating that the respondent had been making utterances inciting violence. The respondent gave repeated statements to the press saying that the traitors' life will be made difficult and probably they will be killed. This was published in Marathi Daily ‘Navakal’ on March 22, 1989. He repeated his threat and this appeared in an interview given to the reporter of the weekly magazine ‘Lokprabha’ in its issue of April 9, 1989. In an interview in daily ‘Urdu Times’ dated April 16, 1989 the respondent asserted that he knew the names of the traitors but would not disclose the same. He also asserted that the punishment for traitors is death and they would be killed and this decision has not been taken by him in anger.

    9. In the backdrop of such assertions, it was necessary for the court to consider the further materials collected by the investigating agency by recording statements of witnesses. The court below misdirected itself in refusing to look into such statements and concluding that it is a case for granting bail taking into account only the position held by the respondent in the party. The court clearly erred in disposing of the application for bail.

    10. In view of what has been stated above, we set aside the order of the Designated Court and allow the appeal and cancel the bail granted to the respondent, without prejudice to his right to move the Designated Court at any subsequent stage.

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    Comments

    State Of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe .
    (Jan 16, 1990)