Mohini Badhwar v. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran .

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent–landlord let certain premises to the appellant–tenant on 1 April 1971. The appellant simultaneously owned another residential property, House No. D-196, Defence Colony, New Delhi, which was at that time occupied by her own tenant. On 20 November 1973 that tenant vacated and handed over vacant possession of the Defence Colony house to the appellant. Four days later, on 24 November 1973, the appellant executed a written agreement to sell that house to Smt. Leela Wati.

Invoking Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958—which permits eviction when a tenant “acquires vacant possession of a residence” after the commencement of the Act—the respondent filed an eviction petition. The Assistant Rent Controller and, on appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal both found that the statutory ground for eviction was satisfied. The Delhi High Court affirmed those findings, relying on its earlier decision in Hem Chand Baid v. Smt. Prem Wati Parekh (AIR 1980 Del 1). The present appeal was then brought by the tenant to the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the appellant’s acquisition of vacant possession of her own house on 20 November 1973 constituted “alternative accommodation” under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, even though she sold that house four days later.
2. Whether the existence of an alleged prior oral agreement to sell the house negated the appellant’s possession so as to defeat the landlord’s eviction claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Before the Defence Colony house was vacated, the appellant had already entered into an oral agreement to sell it to Smt. Leela Wati; the written agreement dated 24 November 1973 merely formalised this earlier commitment.
• Because of that pre-existing contractual obligation, the appellant never had an unfettered right to occupy the house, and therefore it could not be treated as “alternative accommodation” for the purposes of Section 14(1)(h).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first observed that both the Assistant Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal had made concurrent factual findings that:

• The appellant became the undisputed owner in possession of House D-196 on 20 November 1973.
• The alleged oral agreement of sale preceding that date was not proved.

Because the appellant had physical and legal control of the Defence Colony house on 20 November 1973, the Court held that “it was available to her for her occupation,” thereby satisfying the statutory language of Section 14(1)(h). The subsequent sale on 24 November 1973, and the fact that the house was no longer in her occupation when the eviction petition was filed, were deemed immaterial; the statute requires only that the tenant “acquires” such possession at any time after commencement of the Act.

Rejecting the appellant’s contention that a prior oral agreement deprived her of meaningful possession, the Court relied on the Tribunal’s adverse finding on that alleged agreement. Consequently, the statutory ground for eviction stood established.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. No order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The eviction order against the appellant stands confirmed, obliging her to surrender the rented premises to the respondent.

Broader Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that even transient vacant possession of an owned residence can trigger Section 14(1)(h) liability, provided the tenant had control over that accommodation. The Court did not announce any new legal doctrine but affirmed the consistent interpretation applied by the Delhi High Court.