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Disposition
Attorney(S)
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  • Article 226 of the Constitution
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Disposition
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  • Article 226 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, an employee of the respondent, was dismissed from service on 12 December 1969. After pursuing relief in the civil courts, the dispute was ultimately referred to the Labour Court to determine the justification for the dismissal. In its award dated 6 September 1979, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement but denied back wages. The appellant challenged this aspect before the Gujarat High Court through a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A Division Bench modified the award by granting back wages only for the period 26 October 1976 to 18 January 1980 (the date of actual reinstatement), refusing back wages for the earlier period on the ground that the appellant had chosen an incompetent civil forum. Special Leave to Appeal was granted by the Supreme Court, confined solely to the question of back wages for the period 12 December 1969 to 26 October 1976.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant is entitled to receive back wages for the entire period between 12 December 1969 (date of dismissal) and 26 October 1976, despite having initially sought relief for reinstatement in a civil court that lacked jurisdiction.
  2. If back wages are payable, whether—and from what date—the respondent may deduct the appellant’s admitted earnings of ₹150 per month from sums due, given that the appellant commenced legal practice after enrolling as an advocate on 20 January 1972.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court erred in denying back wages for the period prior to 26 October 1976 merely because the appellant pursued his claim in a wrong forum on legal advice; this should not penalise him.
  • Although he admitted earning ₹150 per month after becoming an advocate, the deduction should not start immediately upon enrollment, as it is unrealistic to assume earnings from the first day of practice; a reasonable grace period is needed.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The period for which back wages are claimed should be split: (i) 12 December 1969–20 January 1972, when the appellant was not yet an advocate, and (ii) 21 January 1972–26 October 1976, during which he earned ₹150 per month and therefore should not receive full back wages.
  • The appellant’s own admission of monthly earnings mandates a corresponding deduction from any back-wages award.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the appellant’s dismissal had already been declared invalid, resulting in a direction for reinstatement. Ordinarily, a worker restored to service is entitled to full back wages unless there are compelling reasons to deny them.

The Court held that the High Court’s sole ground for refusing part of the back wages—namely, that the appellant had approached an incompetent forum—was not a “relevant consideration.” Seeking relief under competent legal advice, even if ultimately misguided, should not subject the workman to a “double jeopardy” of lost wages and delayed reinstatement.

On the question of deducting earnings from legal practice, the Court accepted that some deduction is appropriate but agreed with the appellant that immediate post-enrollment earnings are unlikely. It therefore fixed the commencement of deduction at one year after enrollment. Consequently, the respondent may deduct ₹150 per month only for the period 20 January 1973 to 26 October 1976.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The appellant is entitled to full back wages, inclusive of salary, allowances, and consequential benefits, for the period 12 December 1969 to 26 October 1976. The respondent may deduct ₹150 per month earned by the appellant between 20 January 1973 and 26 October 1976. The computed amount must be paid within two months. No order as to costs.

The ruling reinforces the principle that an employee wrongfully dismissed and subsequently reinstated is presumptively entitled to full back wages, and that pursuing an initially improper legal forum does not, by itself, justify a reduction in that entitlement. No new legal precedent was expressly set, but the decision clarifies the irrelevance of procedural missteps by a workman in determining back-pay rights.

    S.M Saiyad v. Baroda Municipal Corporation Baroda .

    Order

    1. Special leave to appeal limited to the question relating to the non-payment of salary for the period the appellant was litigating in the Civil Court was granted.

    2. Appellant was dismissed from the service of the respondent on December 12, 1969. After some litigation in the civil courts ultimately a reference was made to the Labour Court whether there was justification for the dismissal of the appellant from the service of the respondent.

    3. The Labour Court by its award dated September 6, 1979 directed that the appellant be reinstated in service but declined to grant back wages. In the special civil application filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution in Gujarat High Court, a Division Bench of the High Court modified the award in respect of back wages by awarding back wages for the period October 26, 1976 till January 18, 1980 the date on which appellant was reinstated in service. The High Court declined to interfere with the award refusing back wages for the earlier period on the ground that the appellant was seeking relief if reinstatement in the civil court which had no jurisdiction to grant the same and for such lapse on the part of the appellant the respondent cannot be asked to shoulder the burden of back wages.

    4. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is entitled to claim back wages for the period December 12, 1969 the day on which he was dismissed from service till October 26, 1976 from which date onward the appellant has been awarded back wages by the modification of the award by the High Court. The appellant seeks back wages for the period December 12, 1969 to October 26, 1976. This period according to the respondent has to be divided in two parts: (1) from December 12, 1969 to January 20, 1972 when the appellant was enrolled as an advocate, and (2) for the period January 21, 1976 to October 26, 1976 from which date he has already been awarded back wages. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the appellant himself has admitted that since his being enrolled as an advocate he was earning Rs 150 per month which aspect must be Bome in mind while considering the submission of the appellant for the award of back wages.

    5. The High Court declined to grant back wages for the period the appellant was seeking relief of reinstatement in civil court. It may be recalled that the appellant has been reinstated in service meaning thereby that the dismissal of the appellant from the service of the respondent was found to be invalid and a declaration followed that the appellant continued to be in service. It is in the context of these facts that we have to examine the submission that the High Court was not justified in refusing the back wages on the only ground that the appellant sought relief from a forum which had no jurisdiction to grant the same. When the appellant was dismissed from service he was not a qualified lawyer. He must have sought assistance and advice from a qualified legal practitioner and then approached the civil court for relief of reinstatement. The appellant must have gone in search of justice to a forum to which he must have been advised to approach but ultimately because of complexities of the justice system it transpired that he cannot get relief from that forum. He cannot be faulted for this outcome of technicalities of jurisdiction. Now if on this account the appellant is declined back wages he suffers double jeopardy through no fault of his, in that not only all wages are directed (sic) but also delay occurred in getting reinstatement. Is this denial justified when the appellant could not be blamed for approaching a forum under competent legal advice. This would amount to imposing a penalty which with respect to the High Court the appellant did not deserve. On this lean ground we find it difficult to depart from the normal rule that on dismissal order being found to be invalid and the direction for reinstatement having been given the workman would be entitled to full back wages, unless the same can be denied on some relevant grounds. We are of the opinion that the denial of back wages for a portion of period for the reason that he was prosecuting remedy in a wrong forum would not be a relevant consideration for refusal of back wages. As a corollary to this finding the appellant would be entitled to back wages for the whole of the period December 12, 1969 to October 26, 1976 and straightway we would have awarded the same but further enquiry becomes necessary on account of one more aspect brought to our notice.

    6. Appellant enrolled himself as an advocate after taking requisite educational qualification on January 20, 1972. It was pointed out to us that the appellant admitted that he was earning Rs 150 p.m since he started his legal practice. It was therefore, urged that no back wages for the period January 20, 1972 to October 26, 1976 should be awarded. We are not impressed. Undoubtedly the respondent will be entitled to deduct the amount which the appellant was admittedly earning from the back wages payable to him. The question is from what date deduction at the rate of Rs 150 p.m should be permitted.

    7. Appellant contended and in our opinion rightly that deduction at the rate of Rs 150 p.m should not commence from the very day he was enrolled as an advocate because it is common knowledge that no one earns from the first day and therefore a reasonable period must be set apart from finding a footing in the profession. The contention deserves consideration. The appellant himself has been rather loose in his statement. It would be reasonable to hold that he must have at least started earning at the rate of Rs 150 p.m as stated by him after the lapse of one year from the date he was enrolled as an advocate.

    8. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court refusing the back wages for the period December 12, 1969 to October 26, 1976 and direct that the appellant shall be entitled to back wages including salary and allowances and other benefits to which he would be entitled as if he had continued the service. While making the payment of back wages as per his order the respondent is entitled to deduct the amount of Rs 150 p.m from January 20, 1973 to October 26, 1976 from the amount which becomes payable to the appellant. The respondent must compute the amount payable as herein directed and pay what becomes payable, to the appellant within a period of two months from today.

    9. The appeal is allowed to the extent herein indicated. As the appellant has appeared in person, there will be no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    S.M Saiyad v. Baroda Municipal Corporation Baroda .
    (Aug 7, 1984)