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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Explanation 2 to Section 2(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • The Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
  • Section 23-A of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 2 of the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1939
  • Section 261 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • The Twelfth Report of the Law Commission of India
  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Act
  • Section 2(6-A)(c) of the Act
  • Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
  • Section 2(6-A), Section 2(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 2(6-A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Explanation 2 to Section 2(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • The Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
  • Section 23-A of the Indian Income Tax Act
  • Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 2 of the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1939
  • Section 261 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • The Twelfth Report of the Law Commission of India
  • Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Act
  • Section 2(6-A)(c) of the Act
  • Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
  • Section 2(6-A), Section 2(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
  • Section 2(6-A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, Managing Director of R.K.V. Motors and Timber (P) Ltd., maintained a personal account in the company’s books. As on 31 March 1958 the company owed him Rs 36,546.17, but from January 1959 he began to draw money from the company and, by 31 March 1959, owed the company Rs 25,107.22. The balance-sheet of 31 March 1958 reflected net profits of Rs 18,950.98.

The assessee was originally assessed for AY 1959-60 on a total income of Rs 43,407. The Income-tax Officer (ITO) later reopened the assessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after learning of the withdrawals, treating them as “dividend” under Section 2(6-A)(e) of the 1922 Act. The assessee contended that only Rs 1,050 represented “accumulated profits” once provisions of Rs 11,000 (tax) and Rs 6,900 (dividend) were adjusted.

The ITO rejected the contention and treated Rs 25,107 as deemed dividend by including current profits. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the ITO. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal allowed the assessee’s plea that “accumulated profits” exclude current profits but refused deduction of the two provisions.

On reference, the High Court of Kerala answered (1) that accumulated profits do not include current profits and (2) that Rs 18,950 constituted accumulated profits—both in favour of the assessee. The Revenue obtained a certificate under Section 261 of the 1961 Act, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for purposes of Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, “accumulated profits” include the company’s current profits of the accounting year in which the loan/advance was made.
  2. Whether provisions of Rs 11,000 for tax and Rs 6,900 for dividend should be deducted when computing “accumulated profits” as on 31 March 1958, and whether the Tribunal was competent to refer this question to the High Court in the absence of a reference application by the assessee.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue’s Arguments

  • Current profits of the year in which the advance was made form part of “accumulated profits” under Section 2(6-A)(e).
  • The Law Commission’s Twelfth Report purportedly shows that the legislative intent was always to include current profits; Explanation 2 to Section 2(22) of the 1961 Act merely clarifies that intent.
  • The Tribunal should not have referred the second question because only the Commissioner filed a reference application; hence the High Court lacked jurisdiction to answer it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girdhardas & Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1957) 31 ITR 82 (Bom) “Accumulated profits” exclude current profits; limits dividend on liquidation. Relied upon to affirm that current profits cannot be treated as accumulated.
CIT v. M.V. Murugappan (1970) 2 SCC 145; 77 ITR 818 (SC) Current year’s profits are not part of accumulated profits. Cited as Supreme Court authority confirming the same distinction.
CIT v. A.M.M.V. Valliammai Achi (1966) 62 ITR 382 (Mad) Explained concept of accumulated vs. current profits. Used to reinforce exclusion of current profits.
Hooper & Harrison Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation Historical distinction between accumulated and current profits. Quoted for conceptual clarity.
Hollins v. Allen (1866) 14 WR 980 Early articulation of that distinction. Referenced through Australian case to illustrate long-standing principle.
Sproule v. Booch (1885) 29 Ch D 635 Same as above. Referenced with other English authorities.
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Blott (1921) 2 AC 171 Further support for the accumulated/current profits distinction. Cited indirectly through earlier judgments.
CIT (Central) v. P.K. Badiani (1970) 76 ITR 369 (Bom) Applied exclusion of current profits under Section 2(6-A)(e). Approved as consistent with settled interpretation.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras-II v. G. Shankaran (1978) 111 ITR 220 (Mad) Reaffirmed that “accumulated profits” in Section 2(6-A)(e) do not include current profits. Cited as recent and consistent authority.
T. Sundaram Chettiar v. CIT & T. Manickavasagam Chettiar v. CIT (1963) 49 ITR 287 (Mad) Possibly contrary view; ratio unclear. Distinguished; Court noted lack of clarity.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. S.K. Srinivasan (1970) 75 ITR 93 (Mad) Bar on non-applicant seeking reference questions. Discussed while analysing competence of Tribunal to refer second question.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. Ramdas Pharmacy (1970) 77 ITR 276 (Mad) Same procedural principle. Referred to illustrate one extreme view.
CIT v. Bantiah Bank Ltd., IT Ref. No. 20 of 1950 Permitted non-applicant to raise questions on another’s reference. Contrasted as opposite extreme.
Educational & Civil List Reserve Fund v. CIT (1964) 51 ITR 112 (Raj) Similar to Bantiah Bank on reference scope. Referenced in procedural analysis.
Dhirajben R. Amin v. CIT (1968) 70 ITR 194 (Guj) Permissive approach to non-applicant’s questions. Part of comparative discussion.
CIT v. Mrs. Arundhati Balkrishna (1968) 70 ITR 203 (Guj) affirmed in CWT v. Arundhati Balkrishna (1970) 1 SCC 561; 77 ITR 505 Permissive approach; Supreme Court affirmation (though point not argued). Noted but distinguished.
CIT v. Jiwaji Rao Sugar Co. Ltd. (1969) 71 ITR 319 (MP) & related cases Recognised two categories for reference competence. Formed part of court’s analytical framework.
CIT v. A.K. Das (1970) 77 ITR 31 Considered distinction between the two categories. Cited in support of court’s categorisation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Interpretation of “Accumulated Profits”: Drawing on a consistent line of authority, the Court held that “accumulated profits” in Section 2(6-A)(e) refer only to profits accumulated prior to the accounting year in which the loan or advance is made; current profits are excluded. The Court adopted the reasoning of Bombay, Madras and earlier Supreme Court decisions, and found the contrary Madras rulings of limited persuasive value.

The Court rejected the Revenue’s reliance on the Twelfth Law Commission Report and Explanation 2 to Section 2(22) of the 1961 Act, finding no basis to override settled judicial interpretation.

Competence of the Reference on the Second Question: Analysing Section 256(1) of the 1961 Act, the Court distinguished two categories of cases: (a) where both parties are partly aggrieved and must file separate reference applications, and (b) where the winning party may seek to support the Tribunal’s order on additional grounds already argued. It held that the present case fell in the first category because the assessee sought an independent and distinct relief. As the assessee had filed no reference application, the Tribunal lacked competence to refer the second question; consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to decide it.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The appeal is ALLOWED IN PART. The Supreme Court:

  • Affirms the High Court’s answer to Question 1 that current profits are not included in “accumulated profits”.
  • Sets aside the High Court’s opinion on Question 2, declaring the reference incompetent.
  • Makes no order as to costs.

Implications: The ruling consolidates the jurisprudence that “accumulated profits” under Section 2(6-A)(e) of the 1922 Act exclude current profits, reinforcing consistent precedent. Procedurally, the judgment clarifies the limits of the Tribunal’s power to refer additional questions when only one party has sought a reference, guiding future reference applications under Section 256.

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    Commissioner Of Income Tax, Kerala, Ernakulam v. V. Damodaran, Trivandrum .

    R.S Pathak, J.— This is an appeal by certificate under Section 261 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the judgment of the High Court of Kerala interpreting the words “accumulated profits” in Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.

    2. The assessee is the Managing Director of a private limited company called R.K.V Motors and Timber (P) Limited. The company maintains an account pertaining to him in its books. The accounts showed that as on March 31, 1958 a sum of Rs 36,546.17 was due to him by the company. In January, 1959 for the first time he became indebted to the company in the sum of Rs 3757.04 His drawings increased, and as on March 31, 1959 the total amount due by him stood at Rs 25,107.22. It is also relevant to state that the balance sheet of the company as on March 31, 1958 showed a net profit of Rs 18,950.98.

    3. The assessee was originally assessed for the Assessment Year 1959-60 (the relevant previous year being the year ended March 31, 1959) on a total income of Rs 43,407. Thereafter, the Income Tax Officer came to know that the assessee had been withdrawing moneys from the company, and in the belief that those amounts were liable to be treated as “dividend” under Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, he reopened the assessment by virtue of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In the assessment proceedings which followed, the assessee claimed that the accumulated profits of the company amounted to Rs 1050 only, and that amount alone could be considered as “dividend” under Section 2(6-A)(e). The figure was worked out on the basis that a sum of Rs 11,000 as a provision for tax and of Rs 6900 as a provision for dividend had to be adjusted against the balance of Rsl 8.950 in the Profit and Loss Account. The Income Tax Officer rejected the contention of the assessee and determined a sum of Rs 25,107 as dividend under Section 2(6-A)(e). He arrived at this figure by including the current profits of the company for the account year ending March 31, 1959. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed an appeal filed by the assessee. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in second appeal, upheld the claim of the assessee that the words “accumulated profits” in Section 2(6-A)(e) could not be construed as including current profits, but it rejected the contention that the two sums of Rs 11,000 and Rs 6900 had to be taken into account in determining the figure of the accumulated profits at Rs 18,950.

    4. The Revenue applied for a reference to the High Court of Kerala, and at its instance the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Tribunal was legally correct in holding that the accumulated profit will not include current profits for the purpose of Section 2(6-A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922?”

    5. The assessee also requested the inclusion of a question, and therefore the second question referred to the High Court was:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that Rs 18,950 constituted accumulated profits for the purpose of Section 2(6-A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922?”
    The High Court, by its judgment dated January 18, 1972 has answered the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative, both questions being answered in favour of the assessee. And now, the present appeal by the Revenue.

    6. We have heard Shri B.B Ahuja, for the Revenue. No one appears for the assessee.

    7. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 did not originally contain any definition of “dividend”, and the meaning of that word was confined to the connotation it held under the law relating to companies. By Section 2 of the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1939, the Indian Legislature inserted sub-section (6-A) in Section 2 of the Act and set forth an inclusive definition. Certain clauses of the sub-section were amended thereafter, and in their ultimate form Section 2(6-A)(c) and Section 2(6-A)(e) read as follows:

    “(6-A) ‘Dividend’ includes—
    (c) Any distribution made to the shareholders by a company on its liquidation, to the extent to which the distribution is attributable to the accumulated profits of the company immediately before its liquidation, whether capitalised or not.
    (e) Any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested within the meaning of Section 23-A of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) by way of advance or loan to a shareholder or any payment by any such company on behalf or for the individual benefit of a shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits.”

    8. The question is whether the profits earned by the company during the year in which the loans were advanced to the assessee, that is to say the current profits, can be regarded as included within the accumulated profits of the company. It will be noticed that the expression “accumulated profits” occurs in Section 2(6-A)(c) of the Act. Construing that clause in Girdhardas & Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1957) 31 ITR 82 the Bombay High Court said: “The limitation imposed by the legislature is that the profits must in the first place be accumulated in contradistinction to the profits being current . . .”. The Madras High Court in CIT v. M.V Murugappan and CIT v. A.M.M.V Valliammai Achi (1966) 62 ITR 382 (Mad HC) took the same view. It analysed the concept of “accumulated profits” and in that connection particularly referred to the observations of Isaacs and Rich, JJ. in Hooper & Harrison Limited (In Liquidation) v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation who relied on Hollins v. Allen (1866) 14 WR 980 and Sproule v. Booch (1885) 29 Ch D 635 and Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Blott (1921) 2 AC 171 where the distinction between current profits and accumulated profits was graphically brought out. The decision of the Madras High Court was affirmed in appeal by this Court in CIT v. M.V Murugappan (1970) 2 SCC 145, (1970) 77 ITR 818 and it was observed that “the profits of the year in the course of which the company was ordered to be wound up not being accumulated profits were not part of the dividend”. Thereafter, the Bombay High Court in CIT (Central) v. P.K Badiani (1970) 76 ITR 369 (Bom HC) while interpreting Section 2(6-A)(e) of the Act, applied the same construction and held that the expression “accumulated profits” in that clause must mean profits which had accumulated prior to the accounting year of which the income, profits and gains were being assessed, while current profits would mean the profits of the accounting year. In a recent case, CIT v. G. Shankaran (1978) 111 ITR 220 the Madras High Court has reaffirmed that the expression “accumulated profits” on Section 2(6-A)(e) cannot take in current profits.

    9. The position appears to be well settled. Except for T. Sundaram Chettiar v. CIT and T. Manickavasagam Chettiar v. CIT (1963) 49 ITR 287 (Mad HC) in which the ratio is far from clear, a long line of judicial decisions has taken the view that the words “accumulated profits” in Section 2(6-A) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 cannot be construed to include current profits. We are in agreement with that view, being persuaded in that behalf by the reasoning which has prevailed in the aforementioned cases. The distinction between “accumulated profits” and “current profits” has long held the field, and as the learned Judges of the High Court of Australia observed in Hooper and Harrison Ltd. (In Liquidation), it has been well known in judicial decision and in the mercantile world for well over a century. Moreover, this Court in M.V Murugappan (1970) 2 SCC 145, (1970) 77 ITR 818 has also taken the view that current profits cannot be included in accumulated profits. It appears to be now the established law of the land. An attractive submission was raised on behalf of the Revenue that in the Twelfth Report of the Law Commission of India, the authors of the Report consider that the intention of the legislature was to include current profits in the expression “accumulated profits” in Section 2(6-A) and that the present definition of “accumulated profits” by Explanation 2 to Section 2(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 only clarified what the true intent was all along. In the view which has found favour with us, we are not persuaded by that submission.

    10. Accordingly, we hold that the High Court was right in answering the first question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    11. The second question is whether the provision for payment of tax and dividend can be taken into account when computing the accumulated profits as on March 31, 1958. The Revenue contends that this question should not have been referred by the Appellate Tribunal to the High Court at the instance of the assessee because no reference application was made by the assessee. The only reference application, it is pointed out, before the Appellate Tribunal was the reference application filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax. We are of opinion that the Revenue is right. The objection was taken by the Revenue before the Appellate Tribunal when the statement of case was being prepared, but the Appellate Tribunal overruled the objection, relying on Girdhardas & Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1957) 31 ITR 82 (Bom HC) It does not appear that the Revenue contended before the High Court that the reference made to it by the Appellate Tribunal was incompetent insofar as the second question was concerned. Since, however, the objection pertains to the competence of the reference to the extent that it covers the second question and, therefore, relates to the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider and decide that question, we are of opinion that the Revenue is entitled to raise that question before us.

    12. Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 entitles the assessee or the Commissioner, as the case may be, to apply to the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of the order made by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 254. A period of limitation for making such application is prescribed. If the application is rejected by the Appellate Tribunal the applicant is entitled to apply to the High Court, again within a prescribed period of limitation, and the High Court may, if it is not satisfied of the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, require the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer it. It is clear that the statute expressly contemplates an application in that behalf by a party desiring a reference to the High Court. The application has to be filed within a prescribed period of limitation. If the application is rejected by the Appellate Tribunal, it is the applicant thus refused who is entitled to apply to the High Court. If the Appellate Tribunal allows the application made to it, Section 256(1) requires it to draw up the statement of the case and refer it to the High Court. The statement of the case is drawn up on the basis of the application made by the applicant, who in that application must specify the questions of law which, he claims, arise out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal made under Section 254. The form of reference, application prescribed by Rule 48 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 specifically requires the applicant to state the questions of law which he desires to be referred to the High Court. He may, in appropriate cases, be permitted by the Appellate Tribunal, to raise further questions of law at the hearing of the reference application. But in every case, it is only the party applying for a reference who is entitled to specify the questions of law which should be referred. Nowhere in the statute do we find a right in the non-applicant (a phrase used here for convenience) to ask for a reference of questions of law on the application made by the applicant.

    13. In this connection, two categories of cases can be envisaged. One consists of cases where the order of the Tribunal under Section 254 has decided the appeal partly against one party and partly against the other. This may be so whether the appeal consists of a single subject-matter or there are more than one independent claims in the appeal. In the former, one party may be aggrieved by the grant of relief, even though partial, while the other may be aggrieved by the refusal to grant total relief. In the latter, relief may be granted if refused with reference to individual Items in dispute, and accordingly one party or the other will be aggrieved. In either case, the party who is aggrieved and who desires a reference to the High Court must file a reference application for that purpose. It is not open to him to make a reference application filed by the other party the basis of his claim that a question of law sought by him should be referred. The second category consists of cases where the order made by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 254 operates entirely in favour of one party, although in the course of making the order the Appellate Tribunal may have negatived some points of law raised by that party. Not being a party aggrieved by the result of the appeal, it is not open to that party to file a reference application. But on a reference application being filed by the aggrieved party it is open to the non-applicant, in the event of the Appellate Tribunal agreeing to refer the case to the High Court to ask for a reference of those questions of law also which arise on its submissions negatived in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal. It is, as it were, recognising a right in the winning party to support the order of the Appellate Tribunal also on grounds raised before the Appellate Tribunal but negatived by it.

    14. There are, therefore, those two categories, one in which a non-applicant can ask for the reference of questions of law suggested by it and the other in which it cannot. To the extent to which the courts have omitted to consider the distinction between these two categories, they have erred. There are cases where it has been held that there is an absolute bar against a non-applicant seeking a reference of questions of law on a reference application made by the other party. They include: CIT v. S.K Srinivasan (1970) 75 ITR 93 (Mad HC) and CIT v. Ramdas Pharmacy (1970) 77 ITR 276 (Mad HC). Cases taking the opposite extreme view are: CIT v. Bantiah Bank Ltd. IT Ref No 20 of 1950, followed in Girdhardas & Co. Ltd. (1957) 31 ITR 82 (Bom HC) and Educational & Civil List Reserve Fond 1 through H.H Maharana Bhagwat Singhji of Udaipur v. CIT (1964) 51 ITR 112 (Raj HC). Dhirajben R. Amin Smt v. CIT (1968) 70 ITR 194 (Guj HC) and CIT v. Mrs Arundhati Balkrishna (1968) 70 ITR 203 (Guj HC). The judgment in the last case was affirmed by this Court in CWT v. Arundhati Balkarishna (1970) 1 SCC 561, (1970) 77 ITR 505 but the point raised before us does not appear to have been taken there. The observations in Bantiah Bank Limited (1964) 51 ITR 112 (Raj HC) seem to show that the High Court was alive to the possibility of a winning party being deprived of the right to raise questions of law which could properly arise as further questions because they would be intimately involved in a decision on the questions referred at the instance of the applicant, but it failed to classify such a case separately from the case where a non applicant seeks to raise independent and unassociated questions of law. Cases in which a distinction was noticed between the two categories but no opinion was expressed on the right of a winning party to raise questions of law without applying for a reference are CIT v. Jiwaji Rao Sugar Co. Ltd. (1969) 71 ITR 319 (MP HC) followed in CIT v. Dr Fida Hussain G. Abbasi (1969) 71 ITR 314 (MP HC) and CIT v. K. Rathnam Nadar (1969) 71 ITR 433 (Mad HC). Some attention has been given to the distinction between the two categories in CIT v. A.K Das (1970) 77 ITR 31.

    15. In the present case, the question whether the provision of Rs 11,000 for tax and Rs 6900 for dividend can be taken into account when determining the accumulated profits as on March 31, 1958 is not related to the question whether accumulated profits can take in current profits. The two questions involve the grant of separate and distinct reliefs and the decision on one question does not affect the decision on the other.

    16. Accordingly, we hold that the Appellate Tribunal was not competent to refer the second question, and the reference to that extent must be considered void. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to examine the second question on its merits. The judgment of the High Court must be set aside so far as it incorporates its opinion on the second question.

    17. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the judgment of the High Court on the second question is set aside while the appeal is dismissed in respect of the judgment on the first question. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Commissioner Of Income Tax, Kerala, Ernakulam v. V. Damodaran, Trivandrum .
    (Oct 15, 1979)