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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 23 of Mysore Act 1 of 1971
  • Section 23, Mysore Act 1 of 1971
  • Section 60 clause (b) of the Mysore Act 1 of 1971
  • Section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1965
  • Section 18 of this amending Ordinance, Section 60(b), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Mysore Act 1 of 1971, Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970
  • Section 60 of the Principal Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 23 of Mysore Act 1 of 1971
  • Section 23, Mysore Act 1 of 1971
  • Section 60 clause (b) of the Mysore Act 1 of 1971
  • Section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1965
  • Section 18 of this amending Ordinance, Section 60(b), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Mysore Act 1 of 1971, Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970
  • Section 60 of the Principal Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 1 October 1970 the police filed a charge-sheet against the respondent in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Badami, alleging an offence punishable under Section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1965. Relying on the then-prevailing text of Section 60(b) (as amended by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970, which had deleted the words “or police”), the Magistrate held that he could take cognizance of such an offence only on a complaint by an Excise Officer. He therefore returned the charge-sheet and ordered the respondent’s release.

The State challenged that order successively before the Sessions Court, Bijapur, and the High Court, both of which summarily dismissed the revisions. The State then obtained special leave and appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the subsequent retrospective amendment introduced by Mysore Act 1 of 1971 restoring the words “or police” to Section 60(b), a Magistrate could validly take cognizance of an offence under Section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act on the basis of a police charge-sheet filed on 1 October 1970.
  2. Whether the legal fiction created by the retrospective amendment required courts to treat the deleted words “or police” as if they had always formed part of Section 60(b) during the relevant period.

Arguments of the Parties

State’s Arguments

  • Even under the text of Section 60(b) as amended by Ordinance 4 of 1970 (which omitted “or police”), Section 60(B) rendered the offence cognizable, thereby empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance on a police report.
  • In any event, Mysore Act 1 of 1971 retrospectively reinstated the words “or police”, deeming the earlier deletion to have never occurred; hence the Magistrate’s refusal lacked legal foundation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.K. Venkatachalam, I.T.O. v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 875; 1959 SCR 703 Courts must give full and logical effect to a statutory legal fiction. The Supreme Court invoked this principle to treat the reinstated words “or police” as if they had always existed in Section 60(b), thereby validating the police charge-sheet.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court traced the legislative history of Section 60(b):

  1. Originally the clause allowed cognizance on the complaint or report of an Excise or Police Officer.
  2. Ordinance 4 of 1970 deleted “or police”, seemingly limiting cognizance to Excise-initiated complaints.
  3. Subsequently, Mysore Act 1 of 1971, deemed effective from 7 August 1970, provided that the earlier deletion “shall be deemed never to have been made”.

Relying on Section 23 of the 1971 Act and the principle articulated in Bombay Dyeing, the Court held that the retrospective fiction obliterated the Ordinance amendment ab initio. Consequently, at the time the Magistrate dealt with the case (3 October 1970) the statutory text legally included the words “or police”. Hence:

  • The charge-sheet filed by the police was valid.
  • The Magistrate’s refusal to take cognizance, and the affirming orders of the Sessions Judge and High Court, were based on a non-existent legal position.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; orders of the Judicial Magistrate, Sessions Judge, and High Court set aside.

Immediate consequence: the charge-sheet filed by the police stands valid, and the Magistrate is competent to proceed with the case against the respondent. Broader implication: the judgment reinforces the settled doctrine that retrospective legislative fictions must be applied fully, but it does not create a new legal precedent beyond affirming that principle.

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    State Of Mysore v. Fakkrusab Babusab Karanandi .

    P.N Bhagwati, J.— This appeal by special leave raises a short but interesting question of law. The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and briefly stated as follows:

    2. On October 1, 1970 the police filed a charge-sheet against the respondent in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Badami, charging him with having committed an offence punishable under Section 34 of the Mysore Excise Act, 1965. The learned Judicial Magistrate by an order dated October 3, 1970 refused to take cognizance of the offence in this charge-sheet, since it was filed by the Police and not by an Excise official. The view taken by the learned Magistrate was that under Section 60 clause (b) as amended by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970 which represented the law as it then stood, it was not competent to him to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 34, except on the complaint or report of an Excise Officer and since the charge-sheet in the present case was filed by the police and not by an Excise Officer, he was precluded from taking cognizance of the offence. The learned Judicial Magistrate on this view directed that the charge-sheet be returned to the police and ordered release of the respondent. The State thereupon preferred a Revision Application to the Sessions Court, Bijapur. The learned Sessions Judge agreed with the view taken by the Judicial Magistrate and holding that the Judicial Magistrate was right in refusing to take cognizance of the offence on the charge-sheet filed by the police, rejected the Revision Application summarily. This led to the filing of a Revision Application by the State before the High Court. The High Court too summarily rejected the Revision Application and hence the State preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.

    3. Now in order to appreciate the contention that has been raised on behalf of the State in support of the appeal, it is necessary to notice the various changes which Section 60 of the Principal Act went through from time to time during the relevant period. Section 60 clause (b) as it originally stood provided that no Magistrate shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under any section of the Act other than Section 35 or 38 or 46 or 48 “except on his own knowledge or suspicion or on the complaint or report of an Excise or Police Officer”. But before the charge-sheet in the present case came to be filed by the police, an amendment was made in Section 60 clause (b) by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970 which came into force on August 7, 1970. Section 18 of this amending Ordinance omitted the words “or police” in clause (b) of Section 60. The result was that cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 34 could not be taken by a Magistrate “except on his own knowledge or suspicion or on the complaint or report of an Excise Officer”. Section 60(b) was also added at the same time and by this new section inter alia offence under Section 34 was made cognizable and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 with respect to cognizable offences were made applicable to such offence. It was on the basis of the amended clause (b) Section 60 that the learned Judicial Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge Held that cognizance of the offence under Section 34 charged against the respondent could not be taken, since the charge-sheet was filed by the police and not by an Excise Officer. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State contended before us that even on the language of the amended clause (b) of Section 60 without the words “or police”, it was competent to the Judicial Magistrate by reason of the enactment of Section 60(B) to take cognizance of the offence, but it is necessary for us to examine this contention since we find that before the Revision Application came to be heard by the High Court, a further amendment was made in clause (b) of Section 60 by Mysore Act 1 of 1971 and that restored the position which obtained prior to the amendment made by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970. Mysore Act 1 of 1971 was deemed to have come into force on August 7, 1970 and Section 23 of this Act provided inter alia that the amendment to Section 60 made by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1971 shall be deemed never to have been made and the provisions of Section 60 as they stood prior to the said amendment shall be deemed to continue to be in force. The result of the enactment of this provision by More Act 1 of 1971 was that the amendment made in Section 60 clause (b) by deleting the words “or police” by Mysore Ordinance 4 of 1970, was obliterated and wiped out with retrospective effect so that in the eye of the law it was never made at all. It is now settled law that when a legal fiction is enacted by the legislature, the Court should not allow its imagination to boggle but must carry the legal fiction to its logical extent and give full effect to it. We must, therefore, proceed on the basis that the words “or police” were always there in clause (b) of Section 60, even at the time when the learned Judicial Magistrate made his order dated October 3, 1970 refusing to take cognizance of the offence and returning the charge-sheet to the police. If these words were in clause (b) of Section 60 at that time, then obviously the learned Magistrate was in error in refusing to take cognizance of the complaint on the ground that the charge-sheet was not filed by an Excise Officer but by the police. That is the clear effect of the legal fiction enacted in Section 23 of Mysore Act 1 of 1971 and that this would be so is amply supported by the decision of this Court in M.K Venkatachalam, I.T.O. v. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1958 SC 875, 1959 SCR 703 The High Court as well as the Court of Sessions, were therefore, clearly in error in affirming the order made by the learned Judicial Magistrate and it must be Held that the charge-sheet was validly filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate by the police and the Judicial Magistrate was entitled to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of such charge-sheet.

    4. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the orders made by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sessions Judge and the High Court*

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    State Of Mysore v. Fakkrusab Babusab Karanandi .
    (Dec 17, 1976)