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  • Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, (20 of 1958)
  • Section provides, to the extent material, that when any person under 21 years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment, but not with imprisonment for life, the court shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act.
  • Section 379 of the Penal Code
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, (20 of 1958)
  • Section provides, to the extent material, that when any person under 21 years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment, but not with imprisonment for life, the court shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act.
  • Section 379 of the Penal Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was prosecuted before the Presidency Magistrate, 36th Court, Bombay, for stealing a gold necklace on March 7, 1973. The Magistrate convicted her under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, imposing 18 months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹500, with six months’ additional imprisonment in default. The Bombay High Court summarily dismissed her appeal. She then approached the Supreme Court by special leave, the leave being confined to the question of sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of the appellant being under 21 years of age at the time of conviction, she should be granted the benefit of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, rather than undergo the custodial sentence imposed by the trial court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant was less than 21 years old on the date of conviction and therefore fell squarely within Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
  • Section 6 mandates that a court shall not sentence a person under 21 to imprisonment unless, after obtaining and considering a Probation Officer’s report, it is satisfied that release on probation is undesirable.
  • The trial Magistrate did not call for such a report, thereby failing to comply with the statutory requirement.

No detailed arguments of the prosecution/respondent are recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the Magistrate had indeed omitted to seek a Probation Officer’s report, as required by Section 6(2) of the Probation of Offenders Act. To cure that defect, the Court itself had obtained the report while granting leave. After examining the report, the Court concluded that:

  • The appellant had a history of prior misconduct: she was arrested in 1971 in suspicious circumstances and, although released on a bond, faced another theft charge on March 5, 1973 (in which she was acquitted on benefit of doubt).
  • The appellant admitted to the Probation Officer that she had committed similar thefts two or three times which went undetected.
  • Given the nature of the current offence, her prior conduct, and her own admissions, it was not desirable to extend the leniency contemplated by Sections 3 or 4 of the Act.

Additionally, the Supreme Court agreed with the reasons recorded by the Magistrate in paragraph 21 of his judgment for denying probation, finding nothing to warrant interference with the custodial sentence.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was dismissed and the sentence of 18 months’ rigorous imprisonment and ₹500 fine (with six months’ imprisonment in default) was affirmed.

Implications: The decision leaves the appellant subject to the original custodial sentence. The Court applied, but declined to extend, the Probation of Offenders Act on the specific facts, setting no new precedent beyond reaffirming that probation is discretionary even for offenders under 21 when circumstances render it undesirable.

    Kamroonissa v. State Of Maharashtra .

    Y.V Chandrachud, J.— The appellant was tried by the learned Presidency Magistrate, 36th Court, Bombay on the charge that on March 7, 1973 she had committed theft of a gold necklace. Accepting the evidence led by the prosecution in support of the charge, the learned Magistrate convicted the appellant under Section 379 of the Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and to pay a fine of Rs 500; in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months. The appellant carried an appeal against that judgment but the High Court of Bombay dismissed the appeal summarily by a brief order. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court, the leave being restricted to the question of sentence.

    2. While granting leave, this Court had called for the report of the Probation Officer. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argues that since the appellant was less than 21 years of age on the date of conviction, she ought to have been given the benefit of Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, (20 of 1958). That section provides, to the extent material, that when any person under 21 years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment, but not with imprisonment for life, the court shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that it would not be desirable to deal with him under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides that, for the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to proceed under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act, the court shall call for a report from the Probation Officer and consider it. It appears from the judgment of the learned Magistrate that though his attention was drawn to the Probation of Offenders Act he did not consider the applicability of Section 6, which could only be done after calling for the report of a Probation Officer.

    3. But we have before us the report of the Probation Officer from which we are satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the appellant, it would not be desirable to deal with her under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act. The report shows that the appellant was arrested in 1971 while moving in a local train in suspicious circumstances but she was released on a bond of good behaviour in the sum of Rs 100. Thereafter, she was tried under Section 379 of the Penal Code in connection with an incident, dated March 5, 1973, but she was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted. The appellant herself stated before the Probation Officer that she had committed similar thefts on two or three other occasions but those thefts went undetected. Though at the relevant time the appellant was under 21 years of age this, in our opinion, is not a proper case for applying the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act.

    4. The learned Magistrate, has, in para 21 of his judgment, given various reasons why the appellant should not be released on probation. We agree with those reasons, confirm the order of sentence and dismiss the appeal.

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    Comments

    Kamroonissa v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Oct 4, 1974)