Baikuntha Nath Param... v. Sashi Bhusan Pramani..., Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Case Number

(From Calcutta High Court),Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1967, decided on August 9, 1972

Disposition

dismissed

Judges

Justice K.S. Hegde
Justice A.N. Grover

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The litigation originated as a suit for partition among three brothers— the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 3 and 4 are the sons of Defendant 1, while Defendants 5 and 6 are the plaintiff’s sons. The plaintiff alleged that although the family became divided in status in 1351 B.S., no physical partition of property had occurred, and he sought a division by metes and bounds, asserting that properties standing in the names of Defendants 1 to 4 were joint-family assets.

Defendants 1–3 resisted, claiming an earlier partition by metes and bounds in Magh 1349 B.S. and contending that the questioned properties were their self-acquired assets. They counter-claimed that certain properties in the names of the plaintiff and his sons were acquired with joint-family funds.

The trial court held that only the status, not the property, was divided in 1349 B.S. and rejected the plaintiff’s managerial-agency claim against Defendant 1, yet treated all pre-1349 acquisitions as joint-family assets. On appeal, the Calcutta High Court disagreed on the timing of division of status, fixing it at 1351 B.S., and ruled that all acquisitions in the three brothers’ names before that date were joint-family property; assets in the names of the sons (Defendants 3–6) were deemed separate.

The first defendant obtained a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. Both original plaintiff and first defendant died during pendency; their legal representatives were substituted. The appeal ultimately survived only for Supplemental Appellant 2 (original Defendant 3). The respondents did not contest the appeal in the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the joint family became divided in status in Magh 1349 B.S. or only in 1351 B.S.
Consequently, whether acquisitions standing in the name of Defendant 1 after Magh 1349 B.S. are joint-family properties liable to partition.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments (as advanced in lower courts)

No partition by metes and bounds had taken place; only a disruption of status occurred in 1351 B.S.
Properties standing in the names of Defendants 1–4 were purchased with joint-family funds and should be brought into the partition pool.
Defendant 1, though younger, managed family assets, implying control of family income for acquisitions.

Defendants' Arguments (as advanced in lower courts and before Supreme Court)

A complete partition by metes and bounds occurred in Magh 1349 B.S.; therefore, the suit for a further partition was untenable.
Properties in the names of Defendants 1–4 are their self-acquisitions and exempt from partition.
Certain assets in the names of the plaintiff and his sons were acquired from joint-family income and, if any partition were ordered, those should also be included.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court treated the two issues as inter-related. It scrutinised the record and noted that Defendants 1 and 2’s evidence, wholly oral, asserted an actual partition by metes and bounds in 1349 B.S. Both the trial court and the High Court had disbelieved this evidence. The trial court nonetheless inferred a division of status in 1349 B.S., a conclusion the Supreme Court found “rather surprising.”

The High Court’s contrary finding—division of status only in 1351 B.S.—was grounded in extensive documentary material. Key documents included:

Ex. 14 series: correspondence among the three brothers up to 1351 B.S., revealing joint management of family assets and instructions from Defendant 1 to Defendant 2.
Ex. 14-K: a joint letter from Defendant 1 to Defendant 2 and the plaintiff’s son concerning family affairs.
Ex. X: a statement filed by the plaintiff in 1351 B.S. listing lands under his possession.
Exs. 2—2-C: Kobalas of 1350 B.S. evidencing joint purchase of property by all three brothers—an unlikely event if partition had already occurred.
Exs. 7 and 7-A: Union Board assessment lists for 1350-51 B.S., corroborating continued jointness.

Finding “no reason to differ,” the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that the family status remained joint until 1351 B.S.

On the second issue, the Court observed that the family possessed at least 138 standard bighas, providing a substantial nucleus for further acquisitions. Defendant 1 admitted leveraging family usufruct for purchases, yet neither family nor personal account books were produced. Reiterating the principle that where adequate joint-family nucleus exists, acquisitions in the names of managers are presumed joint, the Court held that all properties standing in the names of the three brothers prior to 1351 B.S. were joint-family assets. The High Court’s findings were deemed “unassailable.”

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decree that:

The joint family became divided in status only in 1351 B.S.;
All acquisitions standing in the names of the three brothers prior to that date are joint-family properties liable to partition;
Properties standing in the names of Defendants 3–6 are not joint-family assets.

Because the respondents did not contest the appeal, no order for costs was made. The decision primarily affects the parties by finalising the partition framework and does not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming the evidentiary presumption regarding joint-family nucleus and acquisitions.

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Baikuntha Nath Paramanik (Dead) By His Lrs And Heirs v. Sashi Bhusan Pramanik (Dead) By His Lrs And Others

K.S Hegde, J.— This is an appeal by certificate. The deceased 1st defendant was the appellant. He as well as the plaintiff died during the pendency of this appeal. Thereafter the Appellants 1 to 7 were impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased appellant. Respondents are the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff. The appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution as regards Appellants 1 and 3 to 7 as per order of this Court, dated September 11, 1970. At present the appeal has been pressed only by the supplemental Appellant 2 who was Defendant 3 in the suit. The respondents did not contest the appeal.

2. This appeal arises from a suit for partition. Plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 2 were brothers. Defendants 3 and 4 are the sons of Defendant 1. Defendants 5 and 6 are the sons of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was the eldest brother.

3. The case put forward on behalf of the plaintiff was that the family was divided in status in 1351 B.S but no actual partition by metes and bounds had taken place. Hence he prayed for a partition of the family properties detailed in the plaint-schedule by metes and bounds. He further claimed that the properties standing in the names of Defendants 1 to 4 were acquired out of joint family funds and as such were liable to be partitioned.

4. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 contested the suit on various grounds. They pleaded that there was actual partition in the family in Magh 1349 B.S and as such there was no question of again partitioning the family properties. They further contended that the properties standing in the names of Defendants 1 to 4 were their individual properties and not liable to be partitioned. In their turn they claimed that certain properties standing in the name of the plaintiff and his sons were acquired from out of the joint family funds and as such in the event of a partition those properties are also liable to be partitioned.

5. According to the plaintiff, Defendant 1, though younger to him was managing the family properties as he was the most intelligent member in the family. This allegation was denied by Defendant 1.

6. The trial court did not uphold the contention of the plaintiff that there was a disruption of status of the family only in the year 1351 B.S It opined that the division of status took place in 1349 B.S At the same time it did not uphold the contention of Defendants 1 and 2 that there was a division of the family properties by metes and bounds in 1349 B.S It held that in that year there was only a division of status of the family but the family properties remained to be divided by metes and bounds. It did not accept the plaintiff's case that the 1st defendant was the manager of the family. But at the same time it came to the conclusion that all acquisitions made in the names of various members of the family till the division of status took place in 1349 B.S were joint family properties and were liable to be partitioned.

7. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the plaintiff appealed to the High Court of Calcutta. The defendants filed cross-objections. The High Court partly allowed the appeal as well as the cross-objections. It came to the conclusion that the family properties were neither actually divided nor was there any division of status of the family in 1349 B.S It accepted the contention of the plaintiff that the division of status took place only in the year 1351 B.S It further opined that the 1st defendant had an important hand in the management of the family properties. But it opined that all the three brothers participated in the management of the family properties. It came to the conclusion that all acquisitions made in the names of all the three brothers before the division of status took place in 1351 B.S were family properties and consequently were liable to be partitioned. But it held that the properties standing in the names of Defendants 3, 4, 5 and 6 are not family acquisitions.

8. In this appeal only two contentions were advanced before us viz. (1) that the High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the family was not divided in status in Magh 1349 B.S and (2) it erred in holding that acquisitions made in the name of Defendant 1 after Magh 1349 B.S were family acquisitions.

9. The abovementioned two contentions are inter-related. The most important question for decision is whether the family was divided in status in Magh 1349 B.S or in 1351 B.S In support of the contention that the family became divided in status in Magh 1349 B.S the contesting respondents adduced only oral evidence. That evidence had not commended itself to the High Court. It may be noted that the case for Defendants 1 and 2 was that there was a division by metes and bounds in Magh 1349 B.S and not that there was merely a division of status at that time. All the witnesses examined on behalf of Defendants 1 and 2 speak to the division by metes and bounds and not about any division of status. This evidence has been disbelieved both by the trial court as well as by the High Court. It is rather surprising that the trial court even after rejecting the testimony of these witnesses as regards the division by metes and bounds should have relied on that testimony for finding that the family became divided in status in Magh 1349 B.S The High Court very rightly was unable to place any reliance on the testimony of those witnesses. In support of its conclusion that the family was divided in status only in 1351 B.S the High Court relied on several documentary evidences. Ex. 14 series are letters that passed between the three brothers. They cover a period ending with 1351 B.S From these letters, it is clear that the 1st defendant was instructing the second defendant as to the management of the family properties. These letters indicate that till 1351 B.S, the family was a joint family. Ex. 14-K is a letter written by Defendant 1 jointly to Defendant 2 and Bejoy son of plaintiff containing instruction and advice on family matters. Then there is Ex. X, a statement filed by the plaintiff in the office of the A.R.C.P in 1351 B S. showing the lands in his possession. Exs. 2—2-C are Kobalas of 1350 B.S Under the documents the three brothers purchased certain properties jointly. This could not have happened if the family properties had been divided by metes and bounds by that time. Some evidence as to when division of status took place is also afforded by Exs. 7 and 7-A, the Union Board assessment lists of 1350 and 1351 B.S Hence we see no reason to differ from the conclusion reached by the High Court on the question of the division of status of the family.

10. We next come to the question of acquisitions standing in the names of the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 2. Admittedly the family of the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 2 owned extensive properties. There is no dispute that that family owned as much as 138 standard Bighas. The 1st defendant admitted in his written statement that with the aid of the usufruct of the lands belonging to his family several acquisitions had been made. Even on the basis of the admitted evidence the nucleus afforded by the family income was sufficient to acquire all the properties that stood in the names of the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 2. The High Court came to the conclusion that all the three brothers were participating in the management of the family properties. In reaching that conclusion it relied on Ex. 14 series as well as other evidence. The family account-books have not been produced. The 1st defendant who says that he had his own income has also not cared to produce his own account-books. Under these circumstances the finding of the High Court that the acquisitions standing in the names of the three brothers made prior to 1351 B.S are family acquisitions is unassailable. When a joint family is found to be in possession of nucleus sufficient to make the impugned acquisitions then a presumption arises that the acquisitions standing in the names of the persons who were in the management of the family properties are family acquisitions.

11. For the reasons mentioned above, we see no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. As the respondents did not contest the appeal, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

Baikuntha Nath Param... v. Sashi Bhusan Pramani...