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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion, delivered by M. Hidayatullah, C.J., concerns the procedural handling of two connected civil appeals, Civil Appeal No. 2634 of 1969 and Civil Appeal No. 63 of 1970. These appeals arose out of two writ petitions that had been filed in the High Court of Delhi and were disposed of by a common judgment of a learned Single Judge on December 5, 1969.

The appeals reached the Supreme Court on the basis of a certificate of fitness for appeal that was granted suo motu by the same Single Judge under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India. The Single Judge recorded that, at an earlier stage of the writ proceedings, a request had been made to him to refer the petitions for decision to a Bench, on the ground that important questions were involved. At that time, he declined to refer the matter to a larger Bench because he considered that there was already a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Raj 81, and he felt that this precedent made such a reference unnecessary.

However, in the order granting the certificate, the Single Judge later stated that at the time of the final hearing of the writ petitions he found that several questions arose which were not covered by the Rajasthan decision. He appears to have felt that, as the points he had to decide had not been considered by the Supreme Court in any prior decision and as he had decided the case while sitting singly, he should grant a certificate suo motu for an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s present order addresses the propriety of that course, cancels the certificate granted under Article 132(1), and leaves the parties free to pursue an appeal in the High Court, if they so choose.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a learned Single Judge of a High Court, when confronted with important questions of law in writ petitions, ought to refer the matter to a Bench rather than deciding it singly.
  2. Whether it is proper for a Single Judge, after deciding a case singly and without reference to a Bench, to grant a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 132(1) of the Constitution in a manner that bypasses the parties’ right to file an intra-court appeal against the Single Judge’s decision within the High Court.
  3. Whether the practice of deciding such cases sitting singly and then granting an Article 132(1) certificate to the Supreme Court, although technically correct, is a practice that should be endorsed or discouraged in the Indian judicial system.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Raj 81 The content of the legal rule or principle from this decision is not described in the provided opinion. It is referred to as a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court that the Single Judge initially believed covered the important questions arising in the writ petitions. The Supreme Court notes that the Single Judge relied on this Division Bench decision to justify not referring the writ petitions to a larger Bench. However, at the stage of granting the certificate, the Single Judge himself acknowledged that several questions before him were not covered by this Rajasthan decision. The Supreme Court does not base its own reasoning on this precedent; it is mentioned only to explain the procedural history and the Single Judge’s approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court, speaking through Hidayatullah, C.J., focuses on the propriety of the procedure adopted by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court rather than on the merits of the underlying writ petitions.

First, the Court observes that the Single Judge himself recognized that the writ petitions raised important questions of law. Initially, when a request was made to refer the matters to a Bench, the Single Judge declined, relying on an existing Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. Union of India, which he believed obviated the need for reference to a larger Bench.

Later, however, the Single Judge realized that several questions arising at the hearing were not covered by the Rajasthan decision. In spite of this, he decided the case sitting singly and then granted a certificate suo motu under Article 132(1) of the Constitution for an appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court states, with respect, that the learned Judge was in error in not making a reference to a Bench when he found that important questions of law arose before him. The Supreme Court indicates that the proper course, once the existence of such important and uncovered questions of law was appreciated, was to refer the matter to a Bench of the High Court for authoritative determination.

Even assuming that no reference to a Bench was made, the Supreme Court emphasizes that the Single Judge should have left open to the parties their ordinary remedy of appeal within the High Court. Specifically, he should have allowed the parties to take an appeal in the High Court itself under the provisions providing for appeals against the decisions of a Single Judge. By choosing instead to grant a certificate directly under Article 132(1), the Single Judge effectively short-circuited that intra-court appellate right.

The Court acknowledges that granting such a certificate is “technically correct” in the sense that Article 132(1) of the Constitution does empower a High Court to certify that a case involves a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution, thereby enabling an appeal to the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court characterizes the practice adopted here—deciding the case singly and then sending it directly to the Supreme Court via such a certificate— as an “improper practice.”

The central rationale for this conclusion is the protection of the litigant’s right to an appeal within the High Court. The Supreme Court stresses that it is the right of a party to file an appeal against the decision of a Single Judge in the High Court itself, and this right “should not be shortcircuited” by resorting to the mechanism of direct certification to the Supreme Court. Allowing such a procedure to become normal practice would, in the Court’s view, create “a bad precedent in India,” implying broader systemic concerns about bypassing established appellate structures within the High Courts.

On this reasoning, the Court explicitly declines to endorse the practice followed in the present case. Instead, it exercises its authority to cancel the certificate granted under Article 132(1). By doing so, it restores the ordinary appellate hierarchy, enabling the parties to pursue an intra-court appeal in the High Court if they so desire.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court holds that the practice of a Single Judge deciding a case involving important questions of law and then granting a certificate under Article 132(1) for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, without reference to a Bench or allowing the usual intra-court appeal, is improper. The Court therefore cancels the certificate granted by the learned Single Judge under Article 132(1) of the Constitution.

As a consequence of this holding, the Supreme Court leaves the parties free to file an appeal in the High Court, if they so desire. There is no order as to costs.

Implications: The immediate implication is procedural: the appeals cannot proceed before the Supreme Court on the basis of the cancelled certificate, and the parties must instead avail themselves of the appellate remedy within the High Court. More broadly, the Supreme Court explicitly refuses to endorse the practice of bypassing intra-court appeals by Single Judges granting certificates directly under Article 132(1) after deciding cases involving important questions of law. The Court characterizes such a practice as likely to create “a bad precedent in India,” thereby signaling to High Courts that they should:

  • Refer important questions of law to a Bench when appropriate; and
  • Respect and preserve the parties’ right to an appeal against Single Judge decisions within the High Court before recourse is made to the Supreme Court through constitutional certification.

The opinion is confined to disapproving this particular procedural practice and does not set out any new substantive rule on the underlying merits of the original writ petitions.

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    R.D Agarwala And Another v. Union Of India And Another

    M. Hidayatullah, C.J— This order will govern the disposal of Civil Appeals Nos. 2634 of 1969 and 63 of 1970. These two appeals arise out of two writ petitions filed in the High Court of Delhi which were disposed of by a common judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge on December 5, 1969. The appeals have been brought on certificate granted suo motu by the learned Single Judge under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India. While granting the certificate, the learned Single Judge observed that at an earlier stage in the case, request was made to him to refer these two petitions for decision to a Bench, because important questions were involved in them. At that time, the learned Judge felt that since there was a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Jaipur Udyog Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1969 Raj 81 there was no need to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The learned Judge goes on to say in the order granting certificate that at the time of the hearing, he found that several questions arose before him which were not covered by the Rajasthan decision. He probably felt that as the points which he had to decide were not considered by this Court in any earlier decision and as he had decided the case sitting singly, he should grant certificate suo motu for appeal to this Court.

    2. In our opinion, and we say it respectfully, the learned Judge was in error in not making a reference to a Bench when he found that important questions of law were arising before him. Even if he did not make any reference, he should have allowed the parties to take an appeal in the High Court itself under the provisions pertaining to appeals against decisions of a Single Judge. The practice of deciding the case sitting singly and giving a certificate under Article 132(1) for appeal to this Court, although technically correct, is an improper practice. It is the right of the party to file an appeal in the High Court itself against the decision of the Single Judge and that right should not be shortcircuited by passing on the case to the Supreme Court for decision. We think we should not endorse this practice which would create a bad precedent in India. We accordingly cancel the certificate and leave the parties free to file an appeal in the High Court, if they so desire. There will be no order as to costs.

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    R.D Agarwala And Another v. Union Of India And Another
    (Feb 23, 1970)