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  • Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
  • Article 19(1) of the Constitution (sub-clauses (a) and (b))
  • Section 4 of the Ordinance, Section 5 of the Ordinance, Article 19(1), clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1), clauses (2) and (3) of Article 19
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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  • Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution
  • Article 19(1) of the Constitution (sub-clauses (a) and (b))
  • Section 4 of the Ordinance, Section 5 of the Ordinance, Article 19(1), clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1), clauses (2) and (3) of Article 19
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Shri Radhey Shyam Sharma, was appointed as a Telegraphist in 1949 by the Post Master General, Nagpur. By July 1960 he was working as an officiating Teleprinter Supervisor at Jaipur. On the midnight of 11 July 1960, employees of the Posts and Telegraphs Department began a nation-wide strike despite a Central Government order dated 8 July 1960 issued under the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (“the Ordinance”) prohibiting such action.

The petitioner, who had completed his duty at 8 p.m., remained in the dormitory and was arrested at about 11:30 p.m. while a demonstration connected with the impending strike was underway. He was suspended on 13 July 1960 on the ground of a pending criminal charge, which was withdrawn on 18 July 1960. On 21 July 1960 he was served with a disciplinary charge-sheet alleging gross misconduct for taking part in a demonstration in furtherance of the illegal strike.

An inquiry conducted by the Post Master General, Central Services, Nagpur, found the charge proved and imposed a penalty of reduction of pay by three stages in the time-scale for two years, without postponing future increments after restoration. The petitioner’s appeal to the Director General, Posts and Telegraphs, was dismissed after the Director General examined the record and found no need for additional evidence. The petitioner then invoked the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging both the penalty and the validity of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 19(1)(b) (right to assemble peaceably without arms).
  2. Whether the disciplinary punishment imposed on the petitioner infringes his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b).
  3. Whether there was any evidence to justify the disciplinary authority’s finding that the petitioner acted in furtherance of an illegal strike.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance are ultra vires the Constitution as they allegedly violate Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b).
  • The disciplinary penalty infringes his fundamental rights, relying on the Supreme Court decisions in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar and O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph.
  • There was no evidence to establish that he participated in, or acted in furtherance of, the illegal strike.

Union of India’s Arguments

  • The Ordinance is constitutional and does not impinge upon Articles 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b).
  • The precedents cited by the petitioner concern different statutory provisions (Rules 4-A and 4-B of the Central Civil Services Conduct Rules) and are irrelevant to the present charge founded exclusively on the Ordinance.
  • Sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the petitioner took part in the demonstration and thereby acted in furtherance of the illegal strike.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1962) Supp 2 SCR 369 Rule 4-A of Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules partially violative of Articles 19(1)(a) & 19(1)(b) insofar as it banned all demonstrations. Distinguished; the current charge is based on acting in furtherance of an illegal strike under the Ordinance, not on a blanket ban on demonstrations.
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812 Invalidated Rules 4-A & 4-B of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules concerning demonstrations and strikes. Held inapplicable because the present case rests on the Ordinance, not the impugned Conduct Rules.
All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, (1962) 3 SCR 269 Recognised that there is no fundamental right to strike. Relied upon to affirm that the Ordinance’s provisions against illegal strikes do not infringe Article 19 rights.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

1. Constitutionality of Sections 3, 4 and 5. The Court noted that Article 19(1) does not confer any fundamental right to strike. The impugned sections merely penalise participation in an illegal strike; they do not curb freedom of speech, expression, or peaceful assembly. Hence, they do not attract the restrictions envisioned under Articles 19(2) and 19(3).

2. Relevance of Prior Precedents. The decisions in Kameshwar Prasad and O.K. Ghosh dealt with different conduct rules prohibiting demonstrations; those cases did not examine the Ordinance. Therefore, they afforded no assistance to the petitioner.

3. Validity of the Disciplinary Charge. The charge alleged that the petitioner acted “in furtherance of” an illegal strike, an offence punishable under Section 5 of the Ordinance. This allegation did not implicate the freedoms protected by Article 19(1)(a) or (b).

4. Assessment of Evidence. The disciplinary authorities relied on undisputed facts: (i) the petitioner was secretary of the local union; (ii) he remained on the premises beyond duty hours until shortly before the strike; (iii) a demonstration took place at 11:30 p.m.; and (iv) he was arrested among the demonstrators. The Court held that these facts constituted adequate evidence to conclude that he acted in furtherance of the impending illegal strike.

Holding and Implications

Petition Dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960, confirmed the disciplinary finding of gross misconduct, and sustained the penalty imposed on the petitioner.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that (i) there is no fundamental right to strike; (ii) disciplinary action based on participation in an illegal strike does not violate Articles 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(b); and (iii) the Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 is constitutionally sound. The ruling directly affects only the parties involved and does not announce any new constitutional principle beyond existing jurisprudence.

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    Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Post Master General, Central Circle, Nagpur And Others

    Wanchoo, J.— This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner was appointed as a Telegraphist by the Post Master General Nagpur in 1949. In July 1960, he was serving as an officiating Teleprinter Supervisor at Jaipur. The employees of the Posts and Telegraphs Department (hereinafter referred to as “the Department”) went on strike from the midnight of July 11, 1960 throughout India and there was a similar strike at Jaipur. The petitioner was on duty on that day from 12 noon to 8 p.m He says that after his duty was over, he did not go home but went to the dormitory where he fell asleep as he was tired. At about 11-30 p.m he woke up on hearing some noise and discovered that it was very late and then he wanted to go home. But as he came out, he was arrested by the police on the ground that he was also one of the demonstrators, who were demonstrating outside in connection with the strike. The arrest was made under the Essential Services Maintenance, Ordinance 1 of 1960, (hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance”). On July 13, the petitioner was suspended on the ground that a criminal charge was pending against him in a criminal court. However, the criminal charge was withdrawn on July 18, 1960. On July 21, 1960, a charge-sheet was served on the petitioner in the following terms:

    “That Shri Radhey Shyam Sharma I. C/S Telegraphist, CTO Jaipur committed gross misconduct in that on the midnight of the 11th July 1960, he took part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike of the P and T Employees in violation of the orders dated 8-7-1960 issued by the Government of India under the “Essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 (1 of 1960) prohibiting strike in any postal, telegraph or telephone Service.”
    An inquiry was made in the matter by the Post Master General, Central Services, Nagpur to whom it was transferred as the petitioner had been appointed by that officer. The enquiry officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge framed against him and thereupon a notice was issued to him to show cause why the penalty of reduction in the time scale by three stages for a period of two years affecting the future increments be not imposed upon him. Thereafter the Post Master General after taking into account the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice ordered that the pay of the petitioner should be reduced in the time scale by three stages for a period of two years and on restoration the period of reduction was not to operate to postpone his future increments. Thereupon the petitioner filed an appeal to the Director General, Posts and Telegraphs. The Director General directed further evidence to be taken on certain lines before deciding the appeal. However, no further evidence was given on behalf of the Department and the matter was re-submitted to the Director General as it was. Finally, the Director General considered the whole matter on the merits and rejected the appeal.

    2. The present petition is a sequel to the order of the Director General, and the petitioner contends that the punishment imposed upon him is violative of his fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) and should be quashed. Reliance is placed on his behalf on two cases of this Court in Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962) Supp 2 SCR 369 and O.K Ghosh v. E.X Joseph AIR (1963) SC 812. Further it is contended that Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance are ultra vires, as they contravene sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1). Lastly, it is urged that in any case there was no evidence on which it could be found that the charge against the petitioner had been proved.

    3. The petition has been opposed on behalf of the Union of India and it is urged that the Ordinance is perfectly constitutional and does not violate any fundamental rights. It is further urged that the two cases relied upon by the petitioner are of no assistance to him, as they were concerned with Rule 4-A and Rule 4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. Lastly it is urged that there was evidence on which the authorities concerned could find the charge proved against the petitioner.

    4. The first question that arises is whether Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance are violative of any fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The Ordinance as its name shows was passed in order that essential services may be maintained. Its necessity had arisen because of a threat of strike inter alia by the employees of the Department. Among “Essential Service” as defined in Section 2(1) is included the postal, telegraph or telephone service. Section 3 of the Ordinance provides that “if the Central Government is satisfied that in the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by general or special order, prohibit strikes in any essential service specified in the Order”. Further upon the issue of such an order no person employed in any essential service to which the order relates shall go or remain on strike; and any strike declared or commenced, whether before or after the issue of the order, by persons employed in any such service, shall be illegal. Section 4 provides that any person who commences a strike which is illegal under the Ordinance or goes or remains on or otherwise takes part in, any such strike shall be punished with imprisonment. Section 5 provides that any person who instigates, or incites other persons to take part in, or otherwise acts in furtherance of, a strike which is illegal under the Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment.

    5. The constitutionality of these sections is attacked on the ground that they violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1). Under clause (1)(a) all citizens have the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression and under clause (1)(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms. Reasonable restrictions on these fundamental rights can be placed under the conditions provided in clauses (2) and (3) of Article 19. We are of opinion that there is no force in the contentiton that these provisions of the Ordinance violate the fundamental rights enshrined in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1). A perusal of Article 19(1) shows that there is no fundamental right to strike, and all that the Ordinance provides is with respect to any illegal strike as provided in the Ordinance. This aspect has been elaborately discussed in the Bank Employees' case (1962) 3 SCR 269 and it has been held that there is no fundamental right to strike (see All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1962) 3 SCR 269). There is no provision in the Ordinance which in any way restricts freedom of speech and expression, nor is there any provision therein which restricts any one from assembling peaceably and without arms. The Ordinance thus has nothing to do with restricting the fundamental rights enshrined in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1), and there is therefore no necessity of even considering whether the provisions of the Ordinance can be justified under clauses (2) and (3) of Article 19. It is not disputed that Parliament had the competence to make a law in the terms of the Ordinance and therefore the President had also the power to promulgate such an Ordinance. The competence of the legislature therefore being not in dispute we fail to see how the Ordinance can violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-cls (a) and (b) of Article 19(1) for there is no provision in it which in any way restricts those fundamental rights.

    6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection relies on two cases of this Court to which reference has already been made. Kameshwar Prasad case (1962) Supp 2 SCR 369 related to Rule 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, which provided that no government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service. this Court held in that case that Rule 4-A insofar as it prohibited any form of demonstration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing a breach of public tranquility was violative of Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. this Court also held that insofar as that rule prohibited a strike it was good, since there was no fundamental right to resort to strike. In O.K Ghosh case AIR (1963) SC 812 this Court was concerned with Rule 4-A and Rule 4-B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, and following the decision in Kameshwar Prasad's case (1962) Supp 2 SCR 369, Rule 4-A was struck down in part so far as it related to demonstrations and Rule 4-B was also held to be invalid. That case did not deal with the Ordinance at all and the charge in that case did not seem to have been in the same terms as the charge in the present case. No argument appears to have been urged either in the High Court or before this Court about the validity of the Ordinance or about the validity of the impugned order in relation to the Ordinance or the illegal character of the strike. In the circumstances that case is also of no assistance to the petitioner and there was nothing decided there which would in any way affect the validity of the provisions of the Ordinance. We are therefore of opinion that the Ordinance is valid.

    7. We have already set out the charge framed against the petitioner. It will be seen that the charge is based entirely on the Ordinance and has no connection with Rules 4-A and 4-B which were considered in the O.K Ghosh case AIR (1963) SC 812. The petitioner is charged with gross misconduct on the ground that on the midnight of July 11, 1960, he took part in a demonstration in furtherance of the strike of the employees of the Department in violation of the order of July 8, 1960. It is not disputed that on July 8, 1960, the Central Government had issued an order under Section 3 of the Ordinance prohibiting any strike in the Department. The strike therefore that started on the midnight of July 11, 1960 was an illegal strike in view of Section 3(4)(b) of the Ordinance. Section 5 of the Ordinance provides inter alia that any person who acts in furtherance of a strike which is illegal is punishable thereunder. The charge against the petitioner was that he had acted in furtherance of the strike which was to commence on the midnight of July 11, 1960 and was therefore guilty of gross misconduct. It is this charge of gross misconduct which has been found to be proved against the petitioner and which has led to the punishment inflicted on him. This charge as already indicated has nothing to do with Rule 4-A and Rule 4-B and therefore the two cases on which the petitioner relies have no relevance in connection with this charge. The punishment given to the petitioner cannot therefore be set aside on the ground that the charge was in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 19(1), which deal with freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. The charge does not deal with these two matters at all. On the other hand it deals with acting in furtherance of the illegal strike which started on the midnight of July 11, 1960, and the petitioner was charged with gross misconduct inasmuch as he acted in furtherance of the illegal strike on July 11, 1960 after the strike had been prohibited by the Central Government by order dated July 8, 1962. Whether the “acting” in furtherance of the strike took the form of speeches or demonstrations would make no difference. In either case it can be said that there is a violation of Article 19(1)(a).

    8. The only question that remains for consideration therefore is whether the petitioner's contention that there was no evidence at all on which the authorities concerned could find the petitioner guilty of the charge is correct. So far as that is concerned, the authorities had the following undisputed facts before them:

    (1) The petitioner was the Secretary of the local union of the employees of the Department;
    (2) On that day the petitioner's duty finished at 8 p.m and he should have normally gone home; but he stayed on in the dormitory till 11-30 p.m which was just half an hour before the strike was to commence;
    (3) The demonstration was held in connection with the strike by the employees of the Department at 11.30 p.m just half an hour before the strike was to commence;
    (4) The petitioner took part in that demonstration and was actually arrested amongst the demonstrators.
    If on these undisputed facts the authorities came to the conclusion that the petitioner acted in furtherance of the strike which was to commence half an hour later and was thus guilty of gross misconduct it cannot in our opinion be said that there was no evidence on which the authorities concerned could find the charge framed against the petitioner proved. The contention therefore that there was no evidence on which the authorities concerned could find the charge proved must fail.

    9. We therefore dismiss the petition. In the circumstances, of this case we pass no order as to costs.

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    Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Post Master General, Central Circle, Nagpur And Others
    (Mar 23, 1964)