AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1988 INSC 292
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The United Provinces Act
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Punjab Act (definition of ‘offence’)
  • Section 5, Punjab Borstal Act, 1926
  • Section 2(4) of the Punjab Borstal Act
  • Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act
  • The Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925 (5 of 1926)
  • United Provinces Borstal Act, Section 7 of 1938
  • Section 302, Penal Code
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1988 INSC 292
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The United Provinces Act
  • Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Punjab Act (definition of ‘offence’)
  • Section 5, Punjab Borstal Act, 1926
  • Section 2(4) of the Punjab Borstal Act
  • Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act
  • The Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925 (5 of 1926)
  • United Provinces Borstal Act, Section 7 of 1938
  • Section 302, Penal Code
  • Article 32 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

A batch of writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed by prisoners who had been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Each petitioner sought premature release by invoking Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act, 1926, which limits the period of detention for adolescents sent to a Borstal Institution. The State of Haryana opposed these claims. The Supreme Court, through Justice Ranganath Misra, delivered a common judgment disposing of all the petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act, 1926, applies to convicts sentenced under Section 302 IPC, an offence “punishable with death”.
  2. What is the correct interpretation of the word “punishable” in the context of the Act’s definition of “offence”.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners’ Arguments

  • Relied on the two-Judge Bench decision in Hava Singh v. State of Haryana (1987) 4 SCC 207, which ordered release after seven years’ detention under Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act.
  • Invoked State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vallabhapuram Ravi (1984) 4 SCC 410, where similar relief was granted under the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act for a Section 302 conviction.
  • Submitted that, consistent with modern penological thinking, the statute should benefit adolescent offenders even if convicted of murder.

State of Haryana’s Arguments

The judgment records that the State opposed the petitions, but it does not set out the State’s arguments in detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subbhash Chand v. State of Haryana (1988) 1 SCC 717 (Three-Judge Bench) Held that the Punjab Borstal Act does not apply to offences “punishable with death”, including murder under Section 302 IPC. Treated as binding authority; formed the decisive basis for dismissing the present petitions.
Hava Singh v. State of Haryana (1987) 4 SCC 207 Granted release under Section 5 after seven years’ detention for a Section 302 convict. Distinguished and declared incorrect because it had not considered the statutory definition of “offence”.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vallabhapuram Ravi (1984) 4 SCC 410 Applied the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act to a Section 302 conviction. Cited but not followed; different statutory context and overridden by the larger-Bench ruling in Subbhash Chand.
Kunwar Bahadur v. State of U.P. 1980 Supp SCC 339 Interpreted the U.P. Borstal Act to limit a life-sentence convict’s detention to five years. Found not material because the U.P. Act lacks the definition of “offence” found in the Punjab Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting that it is bound by the three-Judge Bench decision in Subbhash Chand. The key statutory question turned on the definition of “offence” in Section 2(4) of the Punjab Borstal Act, which expressly excludes offences “punishable with death”. To resolve semantic doubts, the Court consulted multiple legal dictionaries and determined that “punishable” means “liable to be punished”, not “must be punished”. Therefore, murder under Section 302 IPC, which carries a possible sentence of death, squarely falls within the exclusion.

Because the earlier two-Judge Bench decisions (Hava Singh and Vallabhapuram Ravi) did not consider this statutory exclusion, their conclusions were deemed incorrect insofar as they applied to the Punjab legislation. The Court consequently reaffirmed that adolescents convicted of Section 302 IPC are ineligible for the seven-year maximum detention benefit under Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act.

The petitioners’ plea for legislative amendment to harmonise Borstal laws nationwide was acknowledged but left to the discretion of the State legislature.

Holding and Implications

All writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.

Immediate Effect: The petitioners remain subject to their life sentences and cannot claim the seven-year maximum detention under the Punjab Borstal Act. Broader Implication: The judgment reinforces the binding authority of Subbhash Chand and confirms that the Punjab Borstal Act excludes offenders convicted of crimes carrying a possible death sentence; however, it sets no new precedent beyond affirming existing law.

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    Sube Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

    Ranganath Misra, J.— These are a batch of writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution raising the common claim of entitlement to the benefit of Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act, 1926.

    2. In each of these writ petitions, the petitioner has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code and has been sentenced to life imprisonment. The State of Haryana has challenged the claim of the petitioner in each of these writ petitions.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of this Court in Hava Singh v. State of Haryana (1987) 4 SCC 207 in support of the claim advanced in the writ petitions. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in that case referred to Section 5 of the Act and held:

    “On a conspectus of the aforesaid decision as well as on a consideration of the facts and circumstances the only conclusion follows that the petitioner who has already undergone actual imprisonment for seven years is entitled to be released from detention and from imprisonment. Para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual is not applicable in this case as the petitioner who was an adolescent convict below twenty-one years of age was sent to the Borstal Institute at Hissar for detention in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act, 1926. He being convicted by the Sessions Judge the maximum period of detention as prescribed by the Act is seven years. We have already said hereinbefore that such an inmate of the Borstal Institute cannot be transferred to jail on the ground that he has attained the age of twenty-one years as the said Act does not provide for the same. The only provision for transfer to jail is in the case of incorrigible inmate or inmates convicted of major Borstal Institution offence.”

    4. Reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on another two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vallabhapuram Ravi (1984) 4 SCC 410. That was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925 (5 of 1926) and the question for consideration was the same as here with reference to the provision of Section 8 of that Act. The two-Judge Bench held that the provisions of the Borstal Schools Act applied to the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

    5. Both these cases were referred to in Subbhash Chand v. State of Haryana (1988) 1 SCC 717 by a three-Judge Bench. It referred to Hava Singh case (1987) 4 SCC 207 at length. The three-Judge Bench in its judgment referred to the definition of “offence” under Section 2(4) of the Punjab Borstal Act which defined “offence” to mean—

    an offence punishable with transportation or rigorous imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code other than—
    (a) an offence punishable with death;
    The court found that Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code provides:
    Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine…
    and proceeded to say again:
    One of the punishments for the offence of murder is death and, therefore, the offence of murder would be covered within Section 2(4)(i)(a) of the Punjab Act and to such a conviction the Punjab Borstal Act would have no application. Support for such a view is available from several decisions of different High Courts.
    The court ultimately held:
    In Hava Singh case (1987) 4 SCC 207 the definition was not placed for consideration before the court and, therefore, the conclusion which has been reached is not correct. The Punjab Borstal Act does not have application to an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
    This being a decision of a larger Bench we are bound by it.

    6. In the Webster's Third New International Dictionary the following meaning has been given to the word “punishable”:

    “Deserving of, or liable to, punishment: capable of being punished by law or right.”

    7. Aiyar's The Law Lexicon (Reprint Edition 1987) gives the meaning of “punishable” thus:

    “The word ‘punishable’ as used in statutes which declare that certain offences are punishable in a certain way, means liable to be punished in the way designated.”

    8. In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, the meaning of the word “punishable” has been given as “liable to punishment”. In Words and Phrases — Permanent Edition, the following meaning has been given:

    “The word ‘punishable’ in a statute stating that a crime is punishable by a designated penalty or term of years in the State prison limits the penalty or term of years to the amount or term of years stated in the statute.”

    9. The word “punishable” is ordinarily defined as deserving of or capable or liable to punishment, punishable within statute providing that defendant may have ten (sic) peremptory challenges if offences charged is “punishable” with death or by life imprisonment; means deserving of or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or right, may be punished, or liable to be punished, and not must be punished.

    10. Corpus Juris Secundum gives the meaning as:

    “Deserving of, or liable to, punishment; capable of being punished by law or right; said of persons or offences. The meaning of the term is not ‘must be punished’, but ‘may be punished’, or ‘liable to be punished’.”
    In the absence of a definition of “punishable” we have referred to these for gathering the exact meaning of the word. In the sense given to the word, as above, there can be no doubt that the offence of murder is punishable with death even though the punishment awarded is not death but imprisonment for life.

    11. An earlier decision of this Court in Kunwar Bahadur v. State of U.P 1980 Supp SCC 339, where a two-Judge Bench dealt with the provisions of the United Provinces Borstal Act 7 of 1938 was also relied upon. The judgment is a short one. Detailed reference to the provisions of the United Provinces Act has not been made but Section 7 of the Act was referred to and it was observed:

    “Under this section where a prisoner is sentenced for transportation i.e life imprisonment and is below the age of 21 years he should be sent to Borstal School where he cannot be detained for more than five years. The law thus contemplates that for such an offender the sentence of five years will be equivalent even to a higher sentence of life imprisonment.”
    Obviously in the United Provinces Act, there is no definition of “offence” as available in the Punjab Act. Therefore, the decision in Kunwar Bahadur case 1980 Supp SCC 339 is not really material for our purpose.

    12. “Punishable” carries a meaning “liable to be punished” as indicated by the three-Judge Bench. Since the offence under Section 302 is punishable with death, the provisions of the Punjab Borstal Act would not cover an offence under Section 302 of IPC and the benefit would not therefore, be available to an accused convicted of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC.

    13. During the hearing of the matters learned counsel for the petitioners had maintained that the provisions of the Punjab Act should be suitably amended to bring about uniformity in the law on the subject. This is a matter for the State and the legislature and it is for them to consider whether the provision should be suitably amended keeping the modern concept of punishment and treatment of adolescents in view.

    14. Each of the writ petitions is dismissed. There would be no order for costs.

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    Comments

    Sube Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others
    (Sep 21, 1988)