AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1988 INSC 85
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 8 or a reference under Section 20 of the Act
  • Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) and Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it mentions 'the Act' which is likely to be the Arbitration Act, 1940
  • Section 20 of the Act, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1988 INSC 85
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 8 or a reference under Section 20 of the Act
  • Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) and Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it mentions 'the Act' which is likely to be the Arbitration Act, 1940
  • Section 20 of the Act, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Delhi Development Authority (DDA) accepted the appellant-contractor’s tender on 5 October 1976 for construction of 240 Janta Houses at an estimated cost of Rs 24,49,262. The work, originally scheduled for completion by 14 July 1977, was extended and ultimately finished on 2 April 1980, after which the houses were allotted.

Between February 1983 and December 1985 the appellant sent several letters—beginning on 28 February 1983—requesting finalisation of the bills and release of a security deposit of Rs 1 lakh. On 4 September 1985 the appellant, through counsel, formally demanded payment and asked that the dispute be referred to arbitration under the contract’s arbitration clause. Receiving no response, the appellant filed an application in January 1986 under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking a court direction to file the arbitration agreement and refer the dispute to arbitration.

A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed the Section 20 application as time-barred; a Division Bench affirmed that dismissal. The present appeal to the Supreme Court challenges those rulings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filed in January 1986, was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  2. For the purpose of computing limitation, when does a “difference” or “dispute” arise under Section 20—on completion of the work or on assertion and denial of the monetary claim?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K.K. Amsom and Besom, (1976) 4 SCC 634; AIR 1977 SC 282 Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to any petition or application filed in a civil court. Used to establish that the three-year limitation period under Article 137 governs an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court emphasised that two pre-conditions must exist for a Section 20 reference: (i) the presence of an arbitration agreement (undisputed here), and (ii) the emergence of a “difference” or “dispute” governed by that agreement.

It distinguished between the mere accrual of a right to payment upon completion of work and the existence of a dispute. A dispute materialises only when a claim is asserted and is either denied or repudiated by the other side; mere inaction to pay does not suffice.

Because the final bills had not been prepared and the appellant first asserted its claim on 28 February 1983—followed by the respondent’s silence/refusal—the Court identified that date as the moment the dispute arose. Calculated from 28 February 1983, the January 1986 Section 20 application was filed within the three-year limitation period prescribed by Article 137.

The High Court therefore erred in treating 2 April 1980 (completion of work) as the starting point for limitation. By misidentifying the accrual of cause of action, it wrongly dismissed the application as time-barred.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgments set aside. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to make an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and issue consequential directions. Costs of the appeal will be costs in the arbitration proceedings.

Implications: The ruling clarifies that, for limitation purposes under Article 137, a dispute under Section 20 arises when a claim is asserted and denied, not merely when contractual performance is completed. While reaffirming existing precedent, the decision ensures that contractors are not time-barred before a genuine dispute crystallises, but it does not establish a new legal doctrine beyond that clarification.

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    Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority .

    Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.— Special leave granted.

    2. The Delhi Development Authority vide its letter dated 5-10-1976 accepted the tender of the appellant for construction of 240 Janta Houses at the estimated cost of Rs 24,49,262. The work was to commence on 15-10-1976 and was required to be completed by 14-7-1977. By a subsequent extension of time the work was finally completed on 2-4-1980 and the houses so constructed have been allotted to several people. Between February 1983 to December 1985 the appellant sent several letters to the respondent requesting them to finalise the bills. It appears, however, that the first of such letters was written on 28-2-1983. Thereafter the appellant wrote several letters and finally on 4-9-1985 to the respondent to finalise the bills and ultimately served the notice through his counsel requesting it to release the security of Rs 1 lakh and refer the dispute to arbitration. The respondent failed to do so. In January 1986 the appellant filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) seeking a direction from the court that the respondent be directed to file the arbitration agreement in the court and the dispute be referred to the arbitration The learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi dismissed the application as barred by time. There was an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi. The Division Bench upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge. Hence this appeal to this Court.

    3. The question is, whether the High Court was right in upholding that the application under Section 20 of the Act was barred by limitation. In view of the decision of this Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K.K Amsom and Besom, Kerala (1976) 4 SCC 634, AIR 1977 SC 282, (1977) 1 SCR 996, it is now well settled that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to any petition or application filed in a civil court. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act provides as follows:

    “20. Application to file in court arbitration agreement—
    (1) Where any persons have entered into an arbitration agreement before the institution of any suit with respect to the subject-matter of the agreement or any part of it, and where a difference has arisen to which the agreement applies, they or any of them, instead of proceeding under Chapter II, may apply to a court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates, that the agreement be filed in court.”

    4. Therefore, in order to be entitled to order of reference under Section 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly, difference must arise to which this agreement applied. In this case, there is no dispute that there was an arbitration agreement. There has been an assertion of claim by the appellant and silence as well as refusal in respect of the same by respondent. Therefore, a dispute has arisen regarding non-payment of the alleged dues of the appellant. The question is for the present case when did such dispute arise. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the work was completed in 1980 and therefore, the appellant became entitled to the payment from that date and the cause of action under Article 137 arose from that date. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under Section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or dispute must arise. It is true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on 28-2-1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, 28-2-1983. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 or a reference under Section 20 of the Act. See Law of Arbitration by R.S Bachawat, first edition, page 354. There should be dispute and there can only be a dispute when a claim is asserted by one party and denied by the other on whatever grounds. Mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion of denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. Whether in a particular case a dispute has arisen or not has to be found out from the facts and circumstances of the case.

    5. The application under Section 20 of the Act was filed in court in January 1986, that is to say, within the period of three years therefore the application was within time. The High Court was in error in dismissing the application on the ground of limitation. The judgment and order of the High Court are, therefore, set aside. The High Court is directed to make an order under Section 20 of the Act and give consequential directions in respect of the same. This costs of this appeal would be costs in the arbitration proceeding. The appeal is thus allowed and disposed of as aforesaid.

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    Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority .
    (Mar 24, 1988)