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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Central Excises and Salt Act. 1944
  • The Act or the Rules or the notifications
  • Section 35-P of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Central Excises and Salt Act. 1944
  • The Act or the Rules or the notifications
  • Section 35-P of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-company filed a classification list under Rule 173-B of the Central Excise Rules seeking permission to clear a product described as “PPRF yarn” without further duty, on the ground that duty had already been paid on its constituent yarns. The department rejected this list and directed classification under Tariff Item 68, after which the appellant began clearing the goods on payment of duty under protest from 27 April 1976.

In October 1978 the appellant sought a refund of Rs 84,651.77 for duty paid between April and September 1978. A show-cause notice was issued, and the appellant replied that no new manufacture occurred because PPRF yarn merely combined two duty-paid plies of polyester spun yarn with one duty-paid ply of rayon filament yarn. The Assistant Collector rejected the refund on 3 July 1979. Subsequent departmental appeals culminated in a decision by the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT) holding that PPRF yarn fell under Tariff Item 68 and that no refund was due. The present statutory appeal before the Supreme Court challenges that CEGAT decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the process of doubling two plies of polyester spun yarn with one ply of rayon filament yarn results in a “manufacture” that brings a new and distinct commodity—PPRF yarn—into existence for the purposes of excise duty.
  2. Consequently, whether PPRF yarn is classifiable under Tariff Item 68 attracting fresh duty, or whether duty already paid on its constituent yarns exhausts the levy.
  3. Whether the appellant is entitled to a refund of duty collected on PPRF yarn between April and September 1978.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • PPRF yarn is only a physical doubling of duty-paid polyester spun yarn (Tariff Item 18-E) and duty-paid rayon filament yarn (Tariff Item 18-II); no “manufacture” occurs because no new product with a distinct name, character or use emerges.
  • Since excise is a duty on manufacture and not on sale, and no manufacturing process has taken place, the further levy under Tariff Item 68 is illegal.
  • Accordingly, the duty collected under protest between April and September 1978 should be refunded.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not provide a detailed account of the respondent’s arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 791 Test for “manufacture”: emergence of a new commodity with distinct name, character or use Cited as foundational authority to determine whether PPRF yarn constitutes a manufactured product
Union of India v. HUF Business known as Ramlal Mansukhrai, (1970) 2 SCC 472 Continuation of the principle laid down in Delhi Cloth & General Mills on manufacture Reinforced the threshold for treating a process as manufacture
Allenburry Engineers (P) Ltd. v. Ramakrishna Dalmia, (1973) 1 SCC 7 Clarified “manufacture” as transformation yielding a new article Used to support the Tribunal’s conclusion that PPRF yarn is distinct
Deputy Commissioner (Law) v. Pio Food Packers, 1980 Supp SCC 174 Transformation test: new commodity commercially known as separate article Applied to examine whether PPRF yarn is commercially distinct
Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 653 Emphasised commercial identity in determining manufacture Relied on to favour classification under Item 68
Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 314 Compilation of earlier rulings on manufacture and tariff classification Supreme Court referenced the case as a compendium of relevant principles
Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. v. Union of India, 1980 ELT 735 (Del) Tribunal’s own earlier view supporting similar classification questions Cited as corroborative authority affirming the Tribunal’s reasoning
Piramal Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1982 ELT 145 (Bom) Held in different facts that intertwining cotton and nylon yarn did not create a new product Distinguished by the Court as fact-specific and not applicable
CST v. Sarin Textile Mills, (1975) 4 SCC 308 Defines “yarn” as spun strand primarily meant for weaving/knitting/rope-making Used to emphasise the commercial understanding of “yarn”
King v. Planters, 1951 CLR (Ex) 122 (Canada) Preference for trade meaning over dictionary meaning in fiscal statutes Cited to justify reliance on market perception of PPRF yarn

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated that excise duty is attracted when a manufacturing process results in a new commodity possessing a distinct name, character, or use. Drawing on the line of authorities beginning with Delhi Cloth & General Mills, the Court held that:

  1. The Tribunal had recorded evidence showing that PPRF yarn is commercially known and traded as a product separate from both polyester spun yarn and rayon filament yarn.
  2. Trade understanding is paramount in tariff interpretation; dictionary definitions are secondary. The product meets the trade criteria for “yarn” and is recognised as a new marketable commodity.
  3. Earlier cases suggesting that mere intertwining of fibres is insufficient (Piramal Spg.) were fact-specific and distinguishable.
  4. No relevant legal principle or material fact was ignored by the Tribunal; its classification finding is therefore not susceptible to interference on appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; the CEGAT decision classifying PPRF yarn under Tariff Item 68 and denying the refund is affirmed.

Immediate implication: the appellant remains liable for duty on PPRF yarn and receives no refund. The judgment reinforces the existing jurisprudence that market recognition of a product as distinct is pivotal in determining “manufacture”, but it does not announce a new legal principle beyond established precedent.

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    Aditya Mills Ltd v. Union Of India .

    Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.— This is a statutory appeal against the decision of the Customs Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (for short “CEGAT”). The appellant Company had filed a classification list under Rule 173-B of the Central Excise Rules stating that they intended to clear PPRF yarn, on which duty had already been paid.

    2. According to the appellant, the PPRF yarn consists of two varieties of yarn on which duty has already been paid, namely, two plies of Polyester Spun yarn — PP and one ply of Rayon Filament yarn — RF, which are doubled together and the resultant yarn is referred to as PPRF yarn. The aforesaid classification list filed by the appellant was rejected and it was directed to file a fresh classification list showing PPRF yarn under tariff Item 68 of the Central Excise Rules. The case of the appellant is that since it was not permitted to clear PPRF yarn without further payment of duty under tariff Item 68 of the said Rules, on or from 27-4-1976 they started making clearance on payment of duty on PPRF yarn under protest.

    3. Thereafter, in October 1978 the appellant filed refund claim for the period from April to September 1978 for a sum of Rs 84,651.77 collected by the revenue as duty on PPRF yarn under tariff Item 68. The appellant Company, thereafter, received a show-cause notice requiring it to show- cause as to why the refund claim should not be rejected. The appellant Company filed its reply stating therein that the duty had already been paid on Polyester Spun Yarn, which was manufactured by it in its factory (under tariff Item 18-E of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act. 1944, hereinafter called “the Act”) and further that the appellant was purchasing Rayon Filament yarn, on which duty had already been paid (under tariff Item 18-II) and that the appellant was only doubling two plies of duty paid Polyester Spun yarn with one ply of Rayon Filament yarn and no process of manufacture was carried out and further no new product came into being.

    4. On or about 3-7-1979 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise rejected the refund claim of the appellant despite the fact that a representation was pending before the Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Jaipur, against the action of the Inspector, Central Excise, in rejecting the classification list dated 10-4-1978 and demanding duty of excise on the PPRF yarn, on which duty has already been paid. In February 1980, the appeal filed before the Revisional Authority against the order of the Appellate Collector was transferred to the CEGAT under Section 35-P of the Act.

    5. By the judgment in appeal, the Tribunal held that the goods in question, namely, PPRF yarn was taxable under tariff Item 68 and there was no question of any refund being due to the appellant.

    6. Hence, the short question involved in this appeal, is: whether the goods in question, namely, a special type of yarn marked as a finished product known as “PPRF yarn”, should be treated as such and taxed on that basis. Excise duty is a duty on the manufacture of goods and not on sale. Manufacture is complete as soon as by the application of one or more process, the raw material undergoes some change. If a new substance is brought into existence or if a new or different article having a distinct name, character or use results from particular process or processes, such process or activity would amount to manufacture. The moment there is transformation into a new commodity commercially known as a separate and distinct commodity having its own character and use, “manufacture” takes place. See the observations of this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills AIR 1963 SC 791, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 586, Union of India v. HUF Business known as Ramlal Mansukhrai, Rewari (1970) 2 SCC 472, (1971) 1 SCR 936, Allenburry Engineers P. Ltd. v. Ramakrishna Dalmia (1973) 1 SCC 7, (1973) 2 SCR 257, Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Law) Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers 1980 Supp SCC 174, (1980) 3 SCR 1271, Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 653 and the cases referred to in the decision of this Court in Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 3 SCC 314, 1985 Supp (1) SCR 292.

    7. In our opinion, the Tribunal was justified in the view it took. The Tribunal's view is corroborated by its own view as expressed in its decision in Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. v. Union of India 1980 ELT 735 (Del HC). Our attention was, however, drawn to the observations of the Bombay High Court in the case of Piramal Spg. & Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1982 ELT 145 (Bom HC) where the facts were slightly different but the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that merely by intertwining strings of cotton yarn and nylon yarn, no new product comes into being. Whether by a certain process a new product comes into being or not, is a question of fact. There is no particular definition of “yarn” in the Act or the Rules or the notifications. According to the Oxford Dictionary “yarn” means any spun thread specially of kinds prepared by weaving, knitting or rope-making. According to the Webster's New World Dictionary, it is defined as any fibre, as wool, silk, flax, cotton, nylon etc. spun into strands for weaving, knitting or making thread.

    8. This Court in CST v. Sarin Textile Mills (1975) 4 SCC 308, (1975) 35 STC 634 held that the fibre in order to answer the description of yarn must have two characteristics, firstly, it should be a spun strand and secondly such strand should be primarily meant for use in weaving, knitting or rope-making. The question is not whether it is a mixture of two yarns where as a process of mixing a separate and distinct goods known in the market as such, comes into being. For ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry reference to a dictionary is apt to be a somewhat delusive guide, as it gives all the different shades of meaning. The correct guide is the context and the trade meaning. The trade meaning is always to be given preference. See in this connection the observations in the famous Canadian case of King v. Planters 1951 CLR (Ex) 122.

    9. The Tribunal has found that indisputably a new yarn has come into being which is known in the market on the evidence adduced before the Tribunal, and that PPRF is treated differently from Polyester Spun yarn and Rayon Filament yarn. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that this is a separate and distinct item. If having borne the correct legal principles in mind and in the light of the facts and without ignoring any relevant or material fact, the Tribunal comes to a conclusion on a question of classification of an item for tariff purpose, in our opinion, that finding cannot and should not be interfered with in appeal before this Court. In that view of the matter the appeal cannot be entertained and is, therefore, dismissed.

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    Comments

    Aditya Mills Ltd v. Union Of India .
    (Aug 29, 1988)