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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Dalip Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These special appeals arise from separate judgments in two writ petitions challenging instructions for the Pre-P.G. Medical Examination, 2004. The common challenge was to the eligibility clause in the 2004 Instructions that treated as "in-service" candidates persons who had rendered three years' rural service while working on ad hoc/temporary appointment or on consolidated pay, alongside candidates who were duly selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (R.P.S.C.) and appointed under the Rajasthan Medical and Health Service Rules, 1963 ("the Rules of 1963").

Relevant administrative timeline in the opinion: Instructions/Guidelines issued in February 2004; last date for submission of forms 10.02.2004; entrance examination held on 27.02.2004; result declared on 28.02.2004; counselling scheduled to commence from 27.03.2004.

Procedural history (as recorded in the opinion): - Dr. Deepak Goyal filed a writ on 13.02.2004; the Single Judge dismissed that petition by judgment dated 25.02.2004. - Other petitioners (including Dr. Mukesh Garg, Dr. Rajesh Jain and others) filed writ petitions on 05.03.2004 and 23.03.2004 after the result was declared; those petitions were heard and dismissed by the Single Judge on 16.06.2004. - These appeals against the two impugned judgments were heard together with consent of the parties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Instructions for the Pre-P.G. Medical Examination, 2004 lawfully included persons serving on ad hoc/temporary appointment or on consolidated pay (who had rendered three years' rural service) within the category of "in-service candidates of the Rajasthan State Medical Services," notwithstanding that such persons were not duly selected by the R.P.S.C. and were not members of the Rajasthan Medical and Health Service under the Rules of 1963?
  2. Whether, assuming any deficiency in the Instructions, relief can appropriately be granted at a late stage after the examination, result declaration and admissions process have commenced or been completed, in light of the Medical Council of India (MCI) timetable and related Supreme Court directions (including Madhu Singh and subsequent authorities)?
  3. Whether appellants who participated in the entrance examination knowing the eligibility criteria are estopped from challenging the Instructions after obtaining lower merit?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The reservation for "in-service candidates of the Rajasthan State Medical Services" was intended to apply only to candidates who were duly selected by the R.P.S.C. and who are members of the Rajasthan Medical and Health Service under the Rules of 1963.
  • The inclusion in the eligibility clause of ad hoc/temporary appointees or persons on consolidated pay (who were not R.P.S.C.-selected and not members under the Rules of 1963) was contrary to the reservation provision and ran counter to the spirit and intent of the Instructions; therefore the eligibility clause should be struck down to that extent.
  • Reliance was placed on Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava (Supreme Court) as supportive of setting aside admissions given to ineligible candidates, and the appellants asked the Court to remedy the alleged inclusion of ineligible ad hoc/temporary/ consolidated-pay candidates.

Respondent / State and Supporting Parties' Arguments

  • The State (through the Additional Advocate General) relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh emphasizing strict adherence to the timetable for medical admissions; MCI had issued circulars (19.11.2003 and 03.01.2004) fixing the last date for admission to P.G. courses and indicating no extensions would be entertained. Given the MCI timetable and that the 2005 admissions process had already begun (and 2004 admitted candidates had completed a year), it would be impracticable and contrary to Supreme Court directions to admit appellants at this late stage or to run separate classes/examinations.
  • Intervening successful candidates (ad hoc/temporary/consolidated pay) who were higher in merit asserted that the impugned challenges could affect their rights to admission; they sought and were permitted to address the Court.
  • The State and respondents argued there was no violation of any MCI regulation or standard: the inclusion merely extended the category to those ad hoc/temporary/consolidated pay candidates who had rendered three years' rural service, and these candidates competed in and obtained higher marks in the same entrance examination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh Requirement that the MCI, State Governments and Universities adhere to a time-table/schedule for invitations, examinations, results, admissions and completion of courses; insistence on strict observance of admission timelines. The court accepted Madhu Singh's emphasis on maintaining the timetable and held that at this late stage relief depriving successful candidates of their admissions would conflict with the MCI timetable and Supreme Court directions; this weighed against granting relief to appellants.
Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava Authority where the Supreme Court set aside admissions given to ineligible candidates and, acknowledging delay, directed the State to consult the MCI to overcome difficulties of overlapping batches. The appellants relied on Harish Verma, but the court distinguished it: Harish Verma concerned wholesale reduction of minimum eligibility and violation of MCI regulations, whereas the present case did not involve lowering of MCI standards. Thus the court held Harish Verma did not assist appellants in the present facts.
Mridul Dhar (Minor) v. Union of India Reiteration by the Supreme Court that observance of the time schedule for medical admissions is paramount and must be adhered to by all authorities. The court cited Mridul Dhar to reinforce the principle that the timetable must be observed and used this to support the conclusion that late-stage relief would be inappropriate.
Ramji Sharma v. State of Rajasthan Single Bench holding that petitioners who, knowing the criteria, participated in the selection process without protest are estopped by conduct from later challenging the process. The court relied on Ramji Sharma to hold that appellants who participated in the examination (and filed writs after participating/after the result) were estopped from assailing the Instructions; accordingly some appeals were dismissed on that ground.
Sunita Aggrawal v. State of Haryana Authority on estoppel where a petitioner who participates in selection without protest may be estopped from later challenge. Cited (through Ramji Sharma) as supporting the proposition that candidates who took a chance by participating and did not protest are estopped; the court applied this principle to dismiss certain appeals.
Union of India v. N. Chandrashekharan Authority cited on estoppel by conduct in the context of participation in selection processes. Relied upon (via Ramji Sharma) for the estoppel principle; used by the court to bar late challenges by appellants who had participated in the examination.
Madan Lal v. State of J & K Authority cited on estoppel by conduct in selection proceedings. Relied upon (via Ramji Sharma) as supporting precedent for estoppel; applied by the court to deny relief to appellants who participated without protest.
Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla Another precedent referenced for the principle that participation without protest can estop a challenge to a selection process. Included among the authorities (via Ramji Sharma) that the court relied on to conclude estoppel applied to appellants who had participated in the selection process knowing the criteria.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps (stated in the opinion):

  1. Identification of the central factual/legal dispute: whether ad hoc/temporary/consolidated-pay employees who rendered three years' rural service could be treated as eligible "in-service" candidates alongside R.P.S.C.-selected appointees under the Rules of 1963.
  2. Consideration of the MCI-Supreme Court jurisprudence on the importance of adhering to admission timetables (Madhu Singh and Mridul Dhar) and the existence of MCI circulars (19.11.2003 and 03.01.2004) fixing the last date for P.G. admissions and directing against extensions. The court accepted that MCI and Supreme Court directions emphasise maintaining the timetable for medical admissions and that non-compliance causes practical difficulties.
  3. Examination of the appellants' reliance on Harish Verma: the court analysed Harish Verma's facts and found it concerned a different vice — the lowering of minimum academic eligibility by the State in contravention of MCI Regulations. In contrast, the present case did not involve lowering or relaxation of MCI standards; instead, it involved the inclusion of additional categories of candidates within an eligibility clause. Therefore Harish Verma was distinguished and found not to assist the appellants.
  4. Assessment of merit and competitiveness: the court noted that the ad hoc/temporary/consolidated-pay candidates had competed in the same combined entrance examination, obtained higher marks than appellants, and thus stood higher in merit; there was no indication that any MCI-prescribed standards were relaxed for them.
  5. Application of estoppel doctrine: for those appellants who participated in the examination and later filed writ petitions after results were declared, the court applied the principle (as articulated in Ramji Sharma and supporting Supreme Court authorities) that a petitioner who, knowing the criteria, participates in the selection process without protest is estopped by conduct from later challenging the selection process.
  6. Practical/institutional considerations and final assessment of relief: taking into account the MCI timetable, the fact that admissions and academic cycles were underway (including that the 2004 admitted batch had progressed and the 2005 notification had been issued), the court concluded that at such a late stage it was not appropriate or practicable to grant the relief sought by appellants (e.g., by admitting them or running separate classes/examinations). These pragmatic constraints, coupled with the legal distinctions and estoppel, led the court to find the appeals devoid of merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final disposition was that the appeals are dismissed. The opinion states the appeals "stand dismissed without any order as to costs."

DISPOSITION: All three appeals were dismissed without any order as to costs.

Legal and Practical Implications (as stated in the opinion)

  • Direct effect on the parties: The successful candidates (including those who were ad hoc/temporary/consolidated-pay appointees and who obtained higher marks) retain their admissions; appellants are not granted retroactive relief to displace those admissions.
  • Timing and administrative feasibility governed outcome: The court emphasised adherence to the MCI timetable and held that, in view of the stage of admissions and the forthcoming academic/examination schedule, it was not practicable to admit appellants or to direct separate classes/examinations. This practical constraint formed an important basis for denying relief.
  • No extension of MCI standards or departure from precedent was made: the court distinguished cases relied upon by appellants (notably Harish Verma) and did not find a violation of MCI norms meriting setting aside admissions; the decision does not purport to create a new legal precedent altering MCI timelines or selection norms beyond the application in these appeals.
  • Estoppel doctrine applied: The decision reiterates that candidates who participate in a selection process knowing the criteria and fail to protest may be estopped from later challenging those criteria after results are known.

Note: The summary above is strictly confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No fact or legal proposition beyond what is expressly stated in the opinion has been added.

    Deepak Goyal (Dr.) v. University Of Rajasthan & Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Dalip Singh, J.:— These special appeals through filed against separate judgments in (i) S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 1676/2004 Dr. Mukesh Garg v. State of Rajasthan decided on 16.06.2004 and (ii) S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 881/2004 Dr. Deepak Goyal (Dr.) v. University Of Rajasthan & Others decided on 25.02.2004 raise a common question, inasmuch as, a challenge has been made to the provisions contained in the Instructions issued for the Pre-P.G Medical Examination, 2004 in so far as in the category of “in-service Doctors” who have rendered ⅔ years rural service the State Government has permitted by way of said Instructions in the eligibility clause in Annexure-1 in the writ petition of Dr. Deepak Goyal. The candidates who have worked in the rural areas continuously for three years in the service of State in the category of ad hoc/temporary appointees or on consolidated pay to be eligible as “in-service” category along with such candidates who are duly selected by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the R.P.S.C”) and holding the appointments under Rajasthan Medical and Health Service Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1963”) in pursuance of their selection by the R.P.S.C

    2. In nutshell, the case of the appellants is that they are inservice candidates who have been duly selected by the R.P.S.C and are members of Rajasthan Medical and Health Service under the Rules of 1963, whereas, the candidates who are working on ad hoc/temporary basis or on consolidated pay are not such candidates who are duly selected by the R.P.S.C and are not members of Rajasthan Medical and Health Service under the Rules of 1963. Irrespective of the fact that such candidates have rendered three years of service in rural area and they are ad hoc/temporary appointees or appointees on contract basis or on consolidated pay they could not be made eligible for the seats reserved under the clause (b) for “in-service candidates of the Rajasthan State Medical Services.”

    3. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants petitioners is that while the State has made a reservation for in-service candidates of the Rajasthan State Medical Services, the clause providing for reservation does not postulate the inclusion of ad hoc/temporary appointees or persons appointed on consolidated pay who are not members of the Rajasthan State Medical Services and who have not been duly selected by the R.P.S.C under the Rules of 1963, as such, in the subsequent portion of the Instructions under the eligibility clause, the inclusion of such candidates run counter to the very spirit of the former provisions in the Instructions which provides for reservation and creates the category of in-service candidates and hence, the eligibility clause referring such ad hoc/temporary appointees or persons on consolidated pay to be eligible is liable to be struck down being contrary to the main provision.

    4. It would be relevant to notice some of the relevant facts before adverting to the main case itself. These cases relate to the Pre-P.G Medical Examination, 2004 for which the Instructions or guidelines to the candidates (Annexure-1) were issued in February, 2004. The last date for the submission of forms was 10.02.2004 The Entrance Examination was conducted on 27.02.2004 and the result of the examination was declared on 28.02.2004 As per the merit list, the candidates were required to appear for counselling commencing from 27.03.2004 The appellant, Dr. Deepak Goyal (in D.B Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 310/2004) filed the writ with the aforesaid challenge on 13.02.2004 The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 25.02.2004 The other appellants Dr. Mukesh Garg and six Others (in D.B Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 417/2004) filed their writ petition (S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 1676/2004) on 05.03.2004 and the appellants Dr. Rajesh Jain and Dr. Rakesh Bhatnagar (in D.B Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 429/2004) filed their writ petition (S.B Civil Writ Petition No. 1805/2004) on 23.03.2004 after declaration of the result on 28.02.2004 These writ petitions were heard together by the learned Single Judge who by the impugned judgment dated 16.06.2004 dismissed the same. Since all the writ petitions raise a common question, these appeal arising from the aforesaid two judgment dated 25.02.2004 and 16.06.2004 have been heard together with the consent of the parties.

    5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants, learned Additional Advocate General for the State, learned counsel for the University and learned counsel for the intervenors who are the candidates who have been successful on account of their being higher in merit than the appellants-petitioners and who have been granted admission to the Post Graduate courses but they belong to the category of ad hoc/temporary/appointees on the consolidated pay and who have not been selected by the R.P.S.C in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of 1963. Since, these candidates apprehended that the judgment given by the court on the writ petitions filed by the petitioners or in their appeals could affect their rights and continuance in the course, they approached to this court by means of applications and were permitted to address the court on the point at issue.

    6. Learned Additional Advocate General also apprised the court during the course of hearing that for the year 2005, the Notification inviting applications from desirous candidates seeking admission to the Post Graduate Courses in M.D/M.S has already been issued and the selected and successful candidates who were admitted in the course in the year 2004 have put in one years' study, therefore, it is the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that at this late juncture, neither it would be appropriate to permit the appellants to be admitted to be courses of study and take examination along with regular batches nor it would be possible for the medical colleges to run separate classes for these candidates if they are admitted now to persue their study and nor it would not be possible for the University to conduct a separate set of examination for such candidates. Learned Additional Advocate General has at the outset submitted that on account of the judgment of their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court given in the case of Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh (1), which requires the Medical council of India, respective State Government and the concerned Universities which are the three bodies who are concerned with the norms for admission, maintenance of the acedamic standard, eligibility for admission, curricula, examination, conferment of degrees and recognition of such degrees adhere to a time table/time schedule from time of inviting of applications to the holding of enterence examination, declaration of its result, consequent admission and completion of courses and in view of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Medical Council of India has also written a letter on 19.11.2003 wherein the Medical Council of India has specified the last date for admission to the Post Graduate Courses from Acedamic Year 2004 onwards as 31st of May. This was again reiterated in the letter of Medical Council of India dated 03.01.2004 addressed to all Chief Secretaries of the State and the Universities having medical faculties that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court no request for extension of last date for admissions shall be entertained. On the basis of the aforesaid, it was contended by the learned Additional Advocate General that in the present scenario when the examinations for the year 2005 have already been announced, it would not be in consonance with the directions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court contained in Madhu Singh's case (supra), to give any direction regarding the admission of appellants in case the writ petitions and appeals were to be allowed.

    7. In reply to the aforesaid, learned counsel appearing for the appellants-petitioners drew our attention to the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava (2), decided on 16.09.2003 where while allowing the appeal their Lordships while setting aside the admissions given to ineligible candidates took into consideration that some delay in commencement of post-graduation studies would result into the overlapping of batches and directed that State Government should take necessary steps in consultation with the Medical Council of India to overcome the aforesaid difficulty.

    8. We have considered the aforesaid submissions made at the Bar by the learned Additional Advocate General and the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-petitioners. It is no doubt true that their Lordships of Supreme Court have laid great stress while deciding Madhu Singh's case on the maintenance of time schedule in the matters of medical education. This has again been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Mridul Dhar (Minor) v. Union of India (3), wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court taking note of the fact that in spite of previous directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to the time schedule to the maintained for completion of admission process, the same had not been adhere by the various authorities, their Lordships have held that observance of time schedule is paramount and once again their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment have laid down the time schedule which is required to be adhere to by all the authorities.

    9. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants petitioners that in Madhu Singh's case, their Lordships were concerned with the admission to the MBBS/BDS courses and the present one is the case of admission to the Post Graduate Courses and, as such, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners that directions in the said judgment do not apply on the case at hand. So far as this submission is concerned, the authorities viz., Medical Council of India having taken note of the said directions have taken steps by issuing the circulars of 19.11.2003 and 03.01.2004 of which a reference has been made above requiring all the State Government and the Universities to comply with the directions in terms of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Madhu Singh's case even in respect of the Post Graduate Courses and have fixed the last date of admission. The legislature has enjoined upon the medical Council of India by the Medical Council of India Act to perform certain function and issue necessary Instructions and guidelines to the respective bodies in the matters relating to the admissions to various courses and, therefore, it would not be correct to undermine the necessity for adhering to the requirement of maintaining the time schedule in this regard. So far as the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Verma is concerned, the aforesaid case relates to the wholesale reduction of the minimum eligibility for the admission which was contrary to the provisions contained under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Regulations framed thereunder. It was held by their Lordships that lowering of the standards of minimum marks was beyond the scope of the State Government and the State Government could not take a decision in this behalf contrary to the guidelines laid down in the Regulations by the Medical Council of India. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as a consequence of the said judgment, the counselling was required to the done afresh and admissions were to follow thereafter. Even then their Lordships directed that State Government would be required to overcome in difficulties that it may face in consultation with the Medical Council of India.

    10. In the instant case, however, it is not a case of outright flagrant violation of the norms or Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India by State Government, even if assuming that the persons holding the ad hoc/temporary appointment or appointment on consolidated pay were not duly selected by the Public Service Commission, in spite of the fact that they have rendered three years rural service are not eligible. It cannot be denied even assuming that such candidates who are not duly selected by the Public Service Commission do not strictly speaking come within the scope of in-service candidates but the fact remains that they have secured higher marks than the appellants-petitioners and stood higher in merit as so as to entitle themselves to be admitted to the Post Graduate course whereas conversely in the case of Harish Verma, candidates who did not qualify as per the standards laid down by the Medical Council of India in their case the State Government lowered the acedamic qualifications holding that it had the power to prescribe lower percentage of makes for in-service candidates contrary to the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India. In the instant case, there is no such violation of any Rule or Regulation or Instruction issued by the Medical Council of India. All that has been done is to include within the category of in-service candidates persons who are serving in the State on ad hoc/temporary appointment and on consolidated pay within the eligibility clause of the Instructions. All other standards and norms which had been laid down by the Medical Council of India stands fulfilled and had not been relaxed in any manner. On the contrary, these candidates have competed with the appellants-petitioners who through have been selected by the R.P.S.C and are members of the Rajasthan State Medical Services as per the Rules of 1963. They have appeared at the same combined competitive entrance examination but the appellants-petitioners stood lower in merit to those ad hoc/temporary employees or persons appointed on consolidated pay. In that view of the matter, in our view the judgment in Harish Verma's case does not help the appellants-petitioners as it does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    11. There is yet another impediment in so far as the appeals which arise out of the writ petitions which were filed after the examination was conducted and the result was declared on 27.02.2004 and 28.02.2004 respectively. As these appellant petitioners knowing fully well the criteria for selection took a chance by participating in the said examination and on being unsuccessful or having secured lesser marks they are estopped by their conduct from assailing the Instructions. A Single Bench of this Court (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Shiv Kumar Sharma) while sitting singly in the case of Ramji Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (4), has held in para 18 of the judgment as under:—

    “18. That takes me to the other arguments advanced in regard to maintainability of the writ petitions. Undisputedly the petitioners knowing fully well criteria for selection, themselves took a chance and participated in the selection process without any protest. The issue of estoppel was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court extensively in Sunita Aggrawal v. State of Haryana, (2000) 2 SCC 615, Union of India v. N. Chandrashekharan ((1998) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1998 SC 795), Madan Lal v. State of J & K, (1995) 3 SCC 486) and Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla (1986 Supp SCC 285 : AIR 1986 SC 1043) and it was held that the petitioner having appeared before the selection committee without any protest and having taken a chance is estopped by conduct from challenging the selection process. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that very process of Entrance Examination has not been assailed but the challenge is made only to the limited extent of inviting the candidates who have secured less than 50% marks therefore principle of estoppel is not applicable in the instant cases. I do not agree with this submission looking to the prayers made in the writ petitions. The writ petitions No. 2375/2001, 2363/2001 and 3172/2001 involve a challenge to the decision of holding candidates qualified on the basis of 33% minimum pass marks for qualifying Entrance Examination whereas in writ petition No. 2555/2001 condition providing for conversion of seats reserved in favour of in-service candidates is under challenge. Knowing fully well the criteria for selection, the petitioner took a chance and participated in selection process without any protest therefore they are estopped by their conduct from assailing the instructions for the Entrance Examination and the Ordinance 278-E and 278-G.”

    12. A look at the aforesaid judgment would show that while relying upon the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sunita Aggrawal v. State of Haryana (5), Union of India v. N. Chandrashekharan (6), Madan Lal v. State of J & K (7) and Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla (8), it was held that candidates who appeared before the selection committee and participated in the selection committee and participated in the selection process having taken a chance are estopped therein by challenging the selection process.

    13. In the view of the matter, the appellants of appeal in D.B Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 417/2004. Dr. Mukesh Garg v. State of Rajasthan and D.B Civil Special Appeal No. 429/2004, Dr. Rajesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan are liable to be dismissed on the aforesaid ground as their writ petitions were filed after participating in selection process being fully conscious about the Instructions relating to the Entrance Examination for the post Graduate courses in medicine and Post Gradate Medical Course.

    14. Since, we are of the view that at this late stage, no relief can be granted to the appellants-petitioners, in view of the fact that last date for admission having already passed and the Notification in respect of the Entrance Examination for the year 2005 having already been issued by the State Government for the Acedamic Session 2005–06 and the Examinations for Acedamic Session 2004–05 being about to be held by the University and particularly in view of the requirement of adhering to the time schedule and laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Singh (supra), and subsequently in the case of Mridul Dhar (supra), these three appeals are devoid of merits.

    15. For these reasons, the appeals stand dismissed without any order as to costs.

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    Deepak Goyal (Dr.) v. University Of Rajasthan & Others
    (Feb 28, 2005)