Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Samadaria
  • G.K.Garg
Judges
  • K.S Rathore, J.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Samadaria
  • G.K.Garg
Judges
  • K.S Rathore, J.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (K.S. Rathore, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was serving as Branch Manager in the respondent bank. A charge-sheet dated 3.3.1988 was issued and an enquiry under Regulation 6 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Disciplinary and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 was initiated. The petitioner filed a detailed statement of defence. The Disciplinary Authority appointed Shri K.L. Sharma as Enquiry Officer by order dated 12.1.1989. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 28.4.1994, and a show-cause notice together with the enquiry report was issued to the petitioner on 10.5.1994. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 15.6.1994.

By letter dated 12.9.1994 the Disciplinary Authority conveyed a note of disagreement on Charges Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and invited submissions within seven days. The petitioner replied to that letter. By order dated 11.11.1994 the Disciplinary Authority found several charges proved and imposed penalties (described below), to run concurrently. The petitioner appealed under Regulation 17 to the General Manager; the Appellate Authority confirmed most punishments and amended the penalty for Charge No. 4 (as described in the opinion). The petitioner then filed this writ petition under Articles 226/227 seeking quashing of the charge-sheet, the punishment order dated 11.11.1994 and the appellate order dated 3.2.1996.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the departmental proceedings were conducted in violation of Regulation 7(2) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (i.e., whether the Disciplinary Authority failed to record reasons for disagreement with the Enquiry Officer and failed to afford a fresh opportunity before recording its own findings).
  2. Whether the imposition of multiple penalties (seven penalties imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and largely maintained by the Appellate Authority) was permissible under Regulation 7(3) of the Regulations, or whether Regulation 7(3) permits only a single penalty.
  3. Whether the specific punishment of reducing the petitioner's basic pay "to the lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-I)" (as imposed in relation to Charges Nos. 1, 4 and 8) was ultra vires Regulation 4(e) because the Regulation, according to the petitioner, permits only reduction by one stage (or withholding of increments) and not reduction to the lowest stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The departmental proceedings were conducted in utter disregard of Regulation 7(2) (argument: the Disciplinary Authority did not comply with the requirement to record reasons and give an opportunity before recording its own findings), rendering the proceedings invalid.
  • The seven penalties imposed by the punishment order dated 11.11.1994 (and largely maintained on appeal) were contrary to Regulation 7(3) which, according to the petitioner, permits only one penalty; therefore multiple penalties are ultra vires Regulation 7(3).
  • The penalty of "reduction of basic pay to the lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-I)" imposed for Charges Nos. 1, 4 and 8 is not provided by law (it is not permitted by Regulation 4(e)), hence it is ultra vires; Regulation 4(e) permits reduction only to a lower stage (interpreted by petitioner as one stage down or withholding increments), not to the lowest stage.
  • The petitioner relied on two Supreme Court decisions explicitly: Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra (1998) for the interpretation of Regulation 7(2) and State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul (1999) (paras 18–19) concerning the permissible scope of punishment.

Respondent's Arguments

  • There is no jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record in the punishment order; the Court exercising Article 226 jurisdiction should not act as a Court of appeal.
  • Regulation 7(2) was complied with: the Disciplinary Authority recorded its disagreement with the Enquiry Officer on Charges Nos. 1, 3 and 4, enclosed Annexure I giving reasons, and afforded the petitioner seven days to make submissions (which the petitioner avers he did).
  • Multiple penalties are permissible under Regulation 7(3); the word "any" in the provision can be construed to permit more than one penalty (interpreting "any" as "all" in the context). The respondents relied upon multiple authorities and dictionary meanings to support that construction.
  • Regulation 4(e) (reduction to a lower grade or to a lower stage in the time scale) can be interpreted to permit reduction to a lower stage that may include reaching the lowest stage (respondents argued "a lower stage" can mean anywhere in the time scale downward from the current stage).
  • Respondent relied upon authorities supporting non-interference in disciplinary matters and supporting the interpretation that multiple penalties are permissible (a list of cases was cited in support).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 Interpretation of Regulation 7(2): natural justice requires that when Disciplinary Authority disagrees with Enquiry Officer it must record tentative reasons and give the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before recording final findings. The Court applied the principle but distinguished the present facts: it found that the Disciplinary Authority had given reasons (Annexure I) and afforded a seven-day opportunity which the petitioner avers he used; therefore the ratio of this case did not render the proceedings invalid here.
State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul, (1999) 4 SCC 759 Cited by the petitioner in support of the contention that certain punishments not provided by law cannot be imposed (paras 18–19 referred to by petitioner). The Court noted the petitioner's reliance on this decision. The opinion records the reliance but does not indicate that this case determined the outcome; it was referenced in the petitioner's submissions.
(1991) 1 SCC 57 : AIR 1991 SC 207 Cited by the respondents to support the proposition that a High Court exercising Article 226 jurisdiction should not re-appraise facts or sit as an appellate authority. The Court acknowledged the respondents' reliance on authorities indicating limited interference under Article 226 and considered that principle in assessing whether there was any jurisdictional error.
AIR 1960 SC 665 Relied upon by respondents in support of non-interference under Article 226 (general precedent referenced). The Court recorded the citation as part of the respondents' submissions supporting non-interference; the opinion does not elaborate further on specific application beyond considering the line of authority.
AIR 1992 (1) WLC Raj. 500 Relied upon by respondents as part of authorities resisting interference in disciplinary matters. Cited by respondents; the opinion records the citation but does not extract a distinct rule beyond the general submission that the Court should not act as an appellate body under Article 226.
AIR 1963 SC 1723 Relied upon by respondents (listed among authorities for non-interference). Cited by respondents; the Court noted the citation in support of the respondents' contention but did not expound specific application beyond that context.
(1969) 1 SCC 502 : AIR 1969 SC 966 Relied upon by respondents in the context of jurisdictional limits of Article 226 (general precedent cited). The opinion records the citation as part of the respondents' authorities; no distinct, separate application beyond acknowledgment is stated in the opinion.
Punnose v. Manager, P & T Motor Service, Cochin, 1977 (2) SLR 399 Authority illustrating that imposition of more than one punishment (e.g., censure and recovery of money) was not illegal. The Court cited this case for the proposition that multiple punishments have been held permissible in earlier decisions, but noted that Regulation 7(3) was not discussed in that case and thus analyzed applicability to the present regulatory scheme.
Commissioner of Rural Development v. A.S. Jagannathan, (1999) 2 SCC 313 Cited for the proposition that multiple penalties are permissible under relevant disciplinary provisions. The Court relied on the principle affirmed in this decision as supporting the permissibility of multiple penalties and found the analogy applicable to the instant case.
AIR 1961 SC 838 Cited in the context of construing the word "any" (interpreted in some authorities as "all"). The Court relied on this decision (among others) to support the interpretation that "any" in the regulatory context can mean more than one (i.e., "all"), thereby permitting multiple penalties.
AIR 1965 Mysore 227 Cited concerning the meaning of "any" and the permissibility of multiple penalties in disciplinary contexts. The Court cited it as part of the authorities supporting the broader interpretive stance that "any" may be read as "all" and multiple penalties may be awarded under the regulations.
AIR 1955 Cal. 225 Cited on the meaning of "any" and the issue of multiple punishments. The Court included this as one of the precedents supporting the interpretation that "any" can denote "one or more" and thus supports the permissibility of multiple penalties.
Kulwant Singh, 1990 (6) SLR 73 Interpreted "a lower stage in time scale" to validate withholding of increments (withholding two increments was held valid) — authority on proper reading of Regulation 4(e). The Court treated this case as distinguishing factual scenarios: Kulwant Singh concerned withholding increments (a lower stage), whereas the present case involved fixation at the lowest stage. The Court relied on this distinction to hold that the present penalty (fixation at lowest stage) was not the same as the "lower stage" envisaged in Kulwant Singh.
1991 (1) WLC 103 Recorded as following Kulwant Singh's interpretation about a lower stage in the time scale. The Court noted that this Court had followed Kulwant Singh in prior reasoning; it was cited in the course of interpreting Regulation 4(e) and the meaning of "a lower stage."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing each principal contention raised by the petitioner against the disciplinary orders:

  1. Analysis of Regulation 7(2):
    • The Court reproduced Regulation 7(2), which requires that where the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on any article of charge, it must record reasons for disagreement and record its own findings if the evidence suffices.
    • The Court examined the record (Exhibit 7 dated 12.9.1994) and observed that the Disciplinary Authority had explicitly recorded disagreement on Charges Nos. 1, 3 and 4, enclosed an Annexure I containing reasons for disagreement, and sent the letter to the petitioner inviting submissions within seven days.
    • The Court considered the Supreme Court decision in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra and its interpretation that natural justice requires recording tentative reasons and giving the delinquent an opportunity to respond before final findings. The Court held that principle applies, but found on the facts that the opportunity was in fact given here and the petitioner submitted a reply; therefore PNB v. Kunj Bihari Mishra did not render the proceedings invalid in this matter.
  2. Interpretation of Regulation 7(3) and the permissibility of multiple penalties:
    • The Court reproduced Regulation 7(3) which, in its text, uses the words "penalties" in the first portion and "penalty" in the concluding portion — a point relied upon by the petitioner to argue that only a single penalty could be imposed.
    • The Court examined earlier decisions and authorities cited by the respondents (including Punnose and Commissioner of Rural Development v. A.S. Jagannathan) and consulted dictionary meanings. The Court accepted the view that the word "any" in the regulatory context may be construed to permit more than one penalty ("any" can mean "all" or "one or more" depending on context).
    • The Court was not convinced by the petitioner's textual argument that Regulation 7(3) mandates a single penalty. On the contrary, relying on judicial decisions and dictionary meanings, the Court held that multiple penalties are permissible under the regulations and the authorities cited supported that construction.
  3. Interpretation of Regulation 4(e) — reduction in pay/time-scale:
    • The petitioner contended Regulation 4(e) permits only reduction by one stage (or withholding increments) and not reduction to the lowest stage; therefore fixation at the lowest stage was unauthorized.
    • The respondents contended "a lower stage" may mean any stage lower in the scale (including the lowest), and that the petitioner's present pay being from a higher scale made fixation at the lowest stage of the lower scale a permissible adjustment (by cutting off increments applicable to the higher scale).
    • The Court examined Kulwant Singh (1990) where withholding two increments was upheld as a "lower stage" and recognized that Kulwant Singh concerned withholding increments (a lower stage), not fixation at the lowest stage. The Court held that reduction to "a lower stage" should mean reduction to a lower stage from the stage at which the officer was working, not necessarily fixation to the lowest possible stage in the scale.
    • Consequently, the Court concluded that the disciplinary order fixing the petitioner at the lowest stage exceeded what Regulation 4(e) permits in the circumstances of this case; the appropriate corrective modification was to reduce the punishment to a reduction to a lower stage (instead of to the lowest stage).
  4. Outcome of application of the principles:
    • The Court found that Regulation 7(2) had been complied with on the facts (reasons recorded and opportunity given); thus no jurisdictional invalidity under that provision was established.
    • The Court accepted the respondents' construction of Regulation 7(3) and the supporting precedents that multiple penalties may be imposed; it rejected the petitioner's contention that only a single penalty could be imposed under that provision.
    • However, on the specific point of the nature of the reduction in pay under Regulation 4(e), the Court concluded that fixation at the lowest stage was not correct in the facts of this case and modified the punishment accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

PETITION PARTLY ALLOWED

The Court held that:

  • The Disciplinary Authority complied with Regulation 7(2) on the material before the Court (reasons for disagreement were recorded and the petitioner was given an opportunity to respond).
  • Multiple penalties are permissible under Regulation 7(3) as construed in light of the authorities and dictionary meanings; the challenge that only a single penalty could be imposed was not accepted.
  • However, the specific penalty fixing the petitioner at the lowest basic pay in the lower time-scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-I) was excessive in the circumstances and inconsistent with the proper construction of Regulation 4(e). That aspect of the penalty was modified: the petitioner is to be fixed at a lower stage (i.e., a reduction) rather than being fixed at the lowest stage of the time-scale.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The writ petition succeeds in part: the Court modified the punishment (reduction in pay) so that the petitioner is to be placed at a lower stage rather than at the lowest basic pay in the relevant time scale.
  • The remainder of the disciplinary and appellate findings (including the imposition of multiple penalties and other penalties upheld by the Appellate Authority) stand, as the Court did not find those aspects invalid on the record before it.
  • No costs were ordered ("no order as to costs").
  • The opinion does not state that it establishes any novel or binding new precedent beyond applying established interpretive principles; the decision modifies the penalty in the particular facts of this case.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided judicial opinion and does not add or infer facts outside that opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Shri Satya Narain Gupta v. Uco Bank And Ors.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    K.S Rathore, J.:— The petitioner preferred this writ petition seeking writ, order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari quashing and setting aside Charge-sheet dated 3.3.88, order of punishment dated 14.11.1994 and order dated 3.2.1996 of the Appellate Authority.

    2. The petitioner at the relevant point of time was working as Branch manager in the respondent bank. A charge sheet dated 3.3.88 was issued and an enquiry was initiated against the petitioner under Regulation 6 of the UCO Bank Officer Employee's (Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations 1976). A memorandum of charge sheet was also served upon the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his detailed statement of defence. The disciplinary authority vide its order dated 12.1.89 appointed Shri K.L Sharma as Enquiry Officer to conduct the departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer conducted the departmental enquiry and submitted his findings on 28.4.94 After receipt of the enquiry report from the Enquiry Officer disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice to the petitioner along with the report of the enquiry vide letter dated 10.5.1994

    3. The petitioner submitted his representation on 15.6.1994 to the disciplinary authority in reply to the show cause noticed dated 10.5.94

    4. After about four months the petitioner received a letter dated 12.9.94 by which the petitioner was conveyed note of disagreement on Charges No. 1, 3 and 4 requiring him to make his submissions within 7 days of receipt of the said letter, if he so wished.

    5. The petitioner submitted his reply to the letter dated 12.9.94

    6. The disciplinary authority by its order dated 11.11.1994 imposed 8 penalities upon the petitioner which are as follows:

    Charge No. 1:—Proved—Reduction of basic pay of Shri Gupta to the lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-I) applicable to him.

    Charge No. 2:—Proved-Censure

    Charge No. 3:—Proved-Censure

    Charge No. 4: —Proved-recovery of Rs. 75000/- from pay and allowances or terminal benefits of Shri Gupta or such other amount as may be due to him.

    Charge No. 5:—Proved-withholding of promotion for a period of five years from the date of this order.

    Charge No. 7:—Proved-Censure

    Charge No. 8:—Proved—Reduction of Basic pay of Shri Gupta to the lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-I applicable to him.

    7. The above penalities are to run concurrently.

    8. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order dated 11.11.94 under Regulation 17, to the general Manager of the Bank at Calcutta. The appellate authority also found charges proved against the petitioner. The appellate authority while considering the appeal has taken a lenient view as regards recovery of Rs. 75,000/- from the petitioner imposed as penalty by the Disciplinary Authority against Charge No. 4 held as proved. Considering the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority in respect of other charges. In exercise of the powers conferred under Regulation 17 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 confirmed the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority in respect of Charges No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 held as proved and amend the Order of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of Charge No. 4 held as proved and penalty of reduction of basic pay of the petitioner to the lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-I) applicable to him.

    9. The petitioner by way of this petition assailed the legality and propriety of the departmental proceedings which culminated in passing the order of seven penalities against the petitioner vide punishment order dated 11.11.1994 on the ground that (1) Departmental Proceedings have been conducted in utter disregard of Regulation 7(2) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 making the proceedings invalid & non-est in eye of law.

    (2) Seven Penalties inflicted by punishment order date 11.11.1994 and by and large maintained by Appellate Authority are ultra vires the provision of Regulation 7(3) of UCO Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1976 and are therefore illegal and invalid in eye of law.

    (3) Punishment of “Reduction of Basic Pay of Shri Gupta to lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade Scale-1) in relation to Charge No. 1, 4 and 8 imposed by punishment order dated 11.11.1994 order & appellate order dt. 3.2.1996 is not even provided by law, therefore, could not have been imposed on the principle that punishment not provided by law cannot be imposed upon delinquest. Thus, aforesaid punishment of reduction of basic pay to the lowest basic pay in scale-1 is ultra vires to Regulation 4(e) of UCO Bank Officers Employees' (Discipline and Appeal Rule, 1976).

    10. Learned counsel for the petitioner drawn my attention towards Regulation 7(2) of Regulations of 1976, which is reproduced as under:

    “The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.”

    11. In support of his submission he also referred the case of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 : [1998 (5) SLR 715 (SC)] and relevant para 19 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the Regulation 7(2) of the Regulation 1976. He also referred the regulations 7(3) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees' Regulation, 1976. As per Regulation 7(3) the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer employee it shall, notwithstanding any thing contained in regulation 8 make an order imposing such penalty.

    12. By referring the clause 7(3) learned counsel for the petitioner demonstrated before me that words which are used in 7(3) penalties and penalty, any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer employee whereas in the concluding part of the Regulation 7(3) anything contained in regulation 8 make an order imposing such penalty and submits that under this regulation composite penalties cannot be passed and only penalty can be imposed as evident by bare perusal of clause 7(3).

    13. Mr. Sunil Samdaria further submits that punishment of Reduction to lowest basic pay in the time scale (Junior Management Grade-I) in relation to charge No. 1, 4 and 8 imposed by punishment order dated 11.11.1994 and appellate order dated 3.2.1996 is not even provided by law, therefore, could not have been imposed on the principle that punishment not provided by law cannot be imposed upon delinquent as it is ultra vires to Regulation 4(e) of the Regulation 1976.

    14. So far as the reduction to a lower grade or part or to a lower stage in a time scale is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Sunil Samdaria submits that imposition of such punishment is not even provided by law. Provided in only reduction of lowering down one stage in a time scale. The action, which has been taken by the disciplinary authority is also contrary to the Regulation 4(e) of the Regulation 1976.

    15. He also referred pleading part of the respondents in the averment made in ground 24(1). As the respondent has only expressed that the contents of ground 1 are not admitted in the manner stated meaning thereby contents of ground 24(1) stand unrebutted by the respondents.

    16. He also referred the stages of lowering the pay scale of Rs. 4390 to 4260. Various stages of pay in time Scale-I & II are reproduced here-in-below:—

    Scales-I—2100-120/16-4020_

    Scale II—3060/120/10-4360-130/10-4390+2 stagnation increment of Rs. 130/- each.

    17. Even in case of reduction of pay scale, the petitioner at the maximum could have been relegated to the stage of Rs. 4260/- whereas the disciplinary authority has lowered down the whole time scale.

    18. The punishment in relation to charge No. “I, 2 & 8 could not have been imposed as not provided by law. In support of his contention petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. T.J Paul reported in (1999) 4 SCC 759 : [1999 (2) SLR 641 (SC)] more particularly para 18 and 19. He also placed reliance on the judgment reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 (Punjab National Bank v. Kunjbihari Misra):

    Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner have been controverted by learned counsel appearing for the respondents Mr. Garg. At the outset learned counsel for the respondents submits that there is no error of jurisdiction in the punishment order and there is no error apparent on the fact of record. He submits that while exercising the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal. In support of his contentions he placed reliance on the following judgment:

    (1) (1991) 1 SCC 57 : AIR 1991 SC 207

    (2) AIR 1960 SC 665

    (3) AIR 1992 (1) WLC Raj. 500

    (4) AIR 1963 SC 1723

    (5) (1969) 1 SCC 502 : AIR 1969 SC 966

    19. He also referred Regulation 7(2) to show that this regulation has not been violated by the respondents. The Disciplinary Authority conveyed its note of disagreement to the petitioner differing with the opinion of the enquiry officer holding the charge No. 1, 3 and 4 as proved on the basis of observations and reasoning given in enclosure 1 to the note and the Disciplinary Authority gave full opportunity of making submission to the petitioner by way of grant of 7 days time.

    20. With relation to the regulation multiple penalties are concerned, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the multiple penalties can be imposed upon the delinquent officer and the imposition of penalties upon the petitioner is within the scope of regulation 4 as well as 7(3). The word ‘Any of the penalties’ as mentioned in the regulation cannot be construed as meaning one alone by word ‘any’ should be interpreted as ‘all’. He further submits that Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court construed the meaning of ‘any’ as ‘all’.

    21. In support of his contention he referred the following judgments:

    (1) AIR 1961 SC 838

    (2) 1977 (2) SLR 399

    (3) AIR 1965 Mysore 227

    (4) AIR 1955 Cal. 225

    22. Mr. Garg further referred Mitra's legal dictionary, Prem's judicial dictionary, Black's law dictionary, Oxford dictionary. At page 58 of Mitra's legal dictionary it is mentioned that ‘any’ means ‘all’. At page 162 of Prem's judicial dictionary the word ‘any’ in the context can mean ‘all’. In Black's law dictionary meaning of ‘any’ some, an indefinite number. At page 44 of Oxford dictionary ‘any’ means one or more.

    23. The Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in the various cases held that multiple penalties are permissible. The cases upon which the respondents placed reliance are (1999) 2 SCC 313, 1977 (2) SLR 399.

    24. As per regulation 4(e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale can be awarded. Learned counsel for the respondents controverted the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and he submits that “a lower stage in time scale” provided only “one” stage down in time scale is not correct interpretation, the correct interpretation of the same is “any where in the time scale”. A lower stage may be the lowest being a lower stage. The meaning of “a” should be interpreted as ‘more than one’ also reading the entire context of the regulation.

    25. This controversy has been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kulwant Singh reported in 1990 (6) SLR 73, “a lower stage in time scale” held withholding of 2 increments valid impliedly adopting same interpretation. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been followed by this Court in the case reported in 1991 (1) WLC 103.

    26. As per dictionary meaning of prefix ‘a’ means ‘any or every’.

    27. Mr. Garg further submits that petitioner was drawing a basic pay of Rs. 4390/- at the time of imposition of penalty though he was in Junior Management Grade Scale-I. The Scale I starts from Rs. 2100 and ends at Rs. 4020. Since the petitioner was drawing Scale II and basic pay salary of the petitioner was Rs. 4390/-, therefore the order of punishment bringing him to the lowest of Scale 1 was given cutting off the increments of the Scale II which he was drawing at that time.

    28. Prior to this present petition, the petitioner preferred writ petition before this Court and vide order dated 1.12.1994 the same was dismissed. As the petitioner has alternative remedy available to him under the relevant rules, the Court observed that it is not a fit case for interference by this Court by exercising the jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed in limine with liberty to file appeal within prescribed period before the appellate authority.

    29. Heard rival submissions of the respective parties and gone through the relevant regulations of the bank and the material available on the record.

    30. First of all I like to refer relevant provisions of the Conduct and Discipline & Appeal Regulations, 1976 of Officer Employees, which are referred by the respective parties.

    31. Regulation 7(2) is herewith reproduced as under:

    “The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.”

    32. By bare perusal of the Regulation 7(2) the Disciplinary Authority if disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, have to record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.

    33. As per Ex. 7 dated September 12, 1994 the appellant authority has expressed disagreement with the opinion of the enquiry officer in respect of the allegation No. 1, 3 and 4. It was given out that on the basis of the records of the enquiry, the appellate authority deffer with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer and held the aforesaid charges as proved on the basis of observations and reasoning given in Annexure-I, which was enclosed along with the said letter dated September 12, 1994. In Annex. 1 the disciplinary authority has given reasons of disagreement regarding allegation Nos. 1, 3 and 4. After giving reasons the Disciplinary Authority have observed that they do not agree with the view of the enquiry officer in this regard and held the allegation as proved against the petitioner.

    34. I have also gone through the judgment of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 and the relevant part 19 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tenatative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The Supreme Court has also held that the authority has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty but after giving an opportunity to officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.

    35. As in the instant case the disciplinary authority vide its letter dated 12.9.1994 informed the petitioner regarding disagreement to the allegation Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and along with this letter Annex. 1 was also enclosed by the disciplinary authority and same was sent. Prior to imposing penalty on the allegation Nos. 1, 3 and 4 the opportunity as evident by the letter dated 12.9.94 has been given to the petitioner and the petitioner was asked to make a submission within a period of 7 days from the receipt of the letter dated 12.9.94 It is not disputed that the petitioner has submitted reply to this letter. The ratio decided in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Bihari Mishra (Supra) is not applicable in the instant case as the opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to represent his case before recording its finding. The petitioner is wrongly interpreting the reasons of disagreement as the finding recorded against the petitioner, which is in my considered view is not correct.

    36. Regulation 7(3) is herewith reproduced as under:

    “If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charges, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in regulation 4 should be imposed on the officer employee it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in regulation 8 make an order imposing such penalty.”

    37. Upon perusal of Regulation 7(3) it reveals that in the first part of the regulation 7(3) the word ‘penalties’ has been mentioned whereas in the concluding part word ‘penalty’ has been mentioned meaning thereby out of the penalties the disciplinary have to choose among the penalties and award only penalty and as demonstrated by the petitioner that the word ‘penalty’ restricted to impose one penalty and not multiple penalties. As per the order of the disciplinary authority dated 11.11.1994 seven penalties were imposed upon the petitioner. The charges are already reproduced hereinabove.

    38. I have perused the judgments referred by the respondents on this point reported in 1977 (2) SLR 399 (Punnose v. Manager, P & T Motor Service, Cochin) and (1999) 2 SCC 313 (Commissioner of Rural Development v. A.S Jagannathan). In the case of Punnose v. Manager, P & T Motor Service, Cochin the Hon'ble Court has held that double jeopardy Punishment-Imposition of two punishments i.e one of censure and another for recovery of money for causing demage to vehicle of department Not illegal. But in this case regulation 7(3) has not been discussed and other paramaterial provisions has also not been considered. The same view has been taken in the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Rural Development v. A.S Jagannathan.

    39. In view of this fact, I am also not convinced with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner that as per Regulation 7(3) the multiple penalties cannot be passed. The word ‘any’ should be interpreted as ‘all’ as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court and I fully convinced with the view of Hon'ble Supreme Court and the various High Courts in the following cases:—

    AIR 1961 SC 838, 1977 (2) SLR 399, AIR 1965 Mysore 227 and AIR 1955 Cal. 225.

    40. In these cases, the word ‘any’ is interpreted as ‘all’ or more than one. I have also gone through the Mitra's legal dictionary, Prem's judicial dictionary, Black's law dictionary and Oxford dictionary where the meaning of word ‘any’ has been considered as ‘all’. The word ‘any’ in the context can mean ‘all’ and ‘any’ one or more.

    41. In the cases reported in (1999) 2 SCC 313 and 1977 (2) SLR 399 the Supreme Court has held as discussed hereinabove that multiple penalties are permissible under the regulations. The analogy drawn by Hon'ble Supreme Court is applicable to the instant case.

    42. Perused the regulation 4(e) which stipulates reduction. The petitioner has interpreted the provision of regulation 4(e) and contended that regulation do not permit reduction to more than one stage in the time scale. Had the intention of the Regulations Making Authority been to reduce the pay to more than one stage, it would not have prefixed ‘a’ to lower stage. ‘A’ is an article which connects ‘One’ and not ‘many’. Certainly, it does not connote/postulate ‘many’. So also the ‘lower’ does not tend to main the ‘lowest’. It; is an accepted principle of law of interpretation that when a provision is susceptiable to two interpretations, one favourable to the employee should be adopted.

    43. After considering the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, as per the interpretation of Mr. Garg a lower stage in time scale provides only one stage down in time scale is not correct. Meaning of ‘a’ cannot be construed as meaning one alone but word ‘a’ should be interpreted as more than one. In the dictionary meaning of ‘a’ means any or every.

    44. I have also carefully gone through the case of Kulwant Singh reported in 1990 (6) SLR 73 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that a lower stage in time scale held withholding of 2 increments valid but herein the instant case the petitioner was fixed to lowest stage not a lower stage in time scale and the reduction in scale not on immediately lower stage but the petitioner stage was reduced to more than one stage in the time scale.

    45. In my considered opinion as per the provisions of regulation 4(e) reduction to a lower grade means reduction to the lower stage from the stage the petitioner at relevant point of time was working not on the lowest grade. The judgment referred by the respondents is not applicable to the instant case as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant Singh held withholding of 2 increments valid. This is a lower stage in time scale not a lowest. In view of this fact the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority and upheld by the appellate authority to fix the petitioner in lowest stage is herewith modified to lower stage instead of lowest stage.

    46. Consequently, the writ petition is herewith partly allowed with no order as to costs.

    47. Petition partly allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Shri Satya Narain Gupta v. Uco Bank And Ors.
    (Nov 11, 2003)